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Synopsis 
Management and managed: a study of the development of shop floor 
industrial relations at Chrysler Corporation~s Dodge Main, 
Detroit factory from 1930 to 1980 
The thesis argues that industrial relations outcomes in 
different car manufacturing companies differed primarily because 
of managerial traditions, rather than because of differences in 
technological or market positions. These traditions were shaped 
and altered according to tap management's political origins, the 
Particular firm's corporate structure, its business strategy and 
market position. Managerial control is seen as a dual mechanism: 
a power relationship between capital and labour in whi~h the 
balance of farces remained largely unchanged throughout the 
Period investigated; and as shop floor authority aver the labour 
process. The extent of the managerial 'frontier of control' aver 
the pace and pattern of work throughout the fifty years studied 
at Dodge Main varied according to the capacity of collective 
Worker organization to struggle to place restraints upon that 
authority. 
COllective action was largely shaped by workers' views of what 
Constituted their "legitimate rights". These views reflected the 
interplay 'of a complex of farces: outside political developments, 
gOvernment policy, managerial idealogy, the development of the 
Particular company's industrial relations' strategy and the 
Workers' awn recent experience of workplace struggle and of 
CYclical economic movements. 
The study examines changes in the management structure and 
bUSiness and industrial relations strategy of the Chrysler 
Corporati,on of America, focusing particularly an developments at 
Chrysler's biggest factory, Dodge Main, with comparisons taken 
from General Motors and Ford which operated in the same market 
USing similar technology. 
The main empirical findings are that mass unionism was achieved 
~~ a period of heightened struggle 2!tg~ managerial practice had 
egitimised" important aspects of shop floor union organisation; 
and that subsequently Chrysler experienced widespread sectional 
bargaining and the emergence of custom and practice agreements 
that imposed significant restraints on management's "right to 
manage" between 1939 and 1957. These restraints on managerial 
a~thority were only consistently challenged and then eventually 
~lmited or removed when major changes in the market situation 
lmposed changes in business strategy and changes in management 
structure first between 1956 and 1959 and then in 1978 to 1982. 
Managerial responses to product and labour market changes were 
thus found to be a major element determining the particular 
COnfiguration of a firm's industrial relations system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
SOleone lanages and sOleone is lanaged, . and this is an eternal opposition of 
interest, which lay be lade bearable but can never be elilinated in a cOlplex, 
industrial society. 
The labour relations record of Chrysler, America"s third largest 
auto manufacturer and tenth largest corporation, throws doubt on 
acce~ted versions of American labour history. This book traces 
that record from 1928, when the three-year-old Chrysler 
Corporation acquired Dodge Brothers, to 1980, when Dodge Main was 
closed. It also tackles a far broader issue. The American auto 
industry was crucial 
throughout the world. 
in shaping modern industrial history 
It transformed and dominate~ American 
industry, whose leading companies, once consolidated in a massive 
domestic market, expanded to dominate other national economies 
after World War Two. It also combined two distinct traditions of 
industrial organization: mass production and high quality 
consumer durable production. This combination became in many ways 
a paradigm for the development of world industry this century. 
The exceptional ism (or lack of it) of Chrysler has, then, an 
importance for managerial control and the development of the 
labour process which extends beyond the United States. 
The book is in six parts. Part One introduces the questions 
that prompted the writing of it - questions that were a response 
to sweeping generalizations about the development of the labour 
process and managerial control systems ov~r the last fifty years. 
How can the continuing presence of both worker resistance and 
Worker accommodation be explained? 
Chrysler for the study? (Chapter 2) 
(Chapter 1 ) Why choose 
The three historical parts have separate introductions which 
seek to situate the relationships of management and managed at 
Chrysler in a wider historical, industrial and political context 
and to consider the key arguments relevant to each period. Part 
Two traces the union response to management strategy during the 
rooting of trade unionism at Dodge Main in the 1930s and suggests 
how the two interacted to produce Chrysler's particular form of 
shop floor unioni s m. (Chapters 3-7) Part Three con~iders the 
movement of the frontier of managerial control at Dodge Main as 
management attempted to re-establish autonomy during World War 
Two and in the late 1950s. (Chapters 8-11) Part Four considers 
the last twenty years when Chrysler strengthened its control 
system to take into account the new challenge of the black 
movement, and its workers voted to accept pace-setting contract 
concessi on!:; . (Ch.:.~pter·s 12-17) 
Part Five summarizes this historical micro-study and places 
it in the context of the debates on American exceptional ism. The 
conclusion is that Chrysler"s relatively high levels of open 
Conflict were the product not of a super-militant labour force but 
of management failure under conditions of considerable market 
Elsewhere in the US managements were able to suppress 
open conflict more effectively, but Chrysler management performed 
. 
in many similar ways to the ineffective management of the UK car 
industr'y. (Chapter 18) 
PMT O~ 
QUESTIONS 
1 
CHAPTER 1 
MANAGEMENT, MANAGED AND CONTROL 
Chapter 1 discusses the central concepts used in the book and 
critically examines certain aspects of the American literature on 
the development of the labour process over the last fifty years. 
I. Concepts 
Three distinct aspects of industrial relations dominate this 
history. The first is how management develops strategies to exert 
control over the labour process. The second is workers' 
consciousness and how it changes and legitimizes particular 
patterns of managerial control. And the third theme is about the 
significance of workers' collective organizations for workplace 
behaviour. 
Other writers have tried to capture the complexity of the 
relationship between managers and managed by counterposing 
1 
"manager" i al contr"ol" to "WOI'" ker~ .. :' • •• stronq uni 1 atel~a~ control." ~ 
and by invokinq "the wClr·kplace rule of l"""'J" as a self-evident 
2 
determinant of workers' actions. But to understand the process 
of simultaneous consent and resistance in the workplace~ the 
change in balance between both, and their different deqrees of 
i nteH1si ty over" time ~ demands mor-e sl=.ms .. i ti v~? anal yti cal 
categories. New or amended concepts will be employed to encompass 
the totality of workplace experience. They are briefly introduced 
hen? 
Managerial power and authority 
Management is a highly complex organizational and political 
Many who recognize that to discuss 'the working class' 
means examining the history, strength, politics and strategizing 
capacity of working cl.ass organization, frequently do not do same 
for management. Child ' s pioneering study of British management 
s ugges ted management could be analysed from three different 
perspectives: as ian "el-:ite s ociial groLlping", as an "economic 
I"esource per-forming c:.~ series of technical functions", and as a 
"sys tem of authclr i ty throu<;Jh \.'Jhi ch pol icy is transl.-ated into the 
of tasks". Each perspective reveals a process 
---------------------------
1. Allan Flanders, ~!~!q~~~~i !~q y~t~n~t i~~ !~~qty !nq ~~i~t! ~i lnQY!itt!t ~~l!itq~~ (london: 
Faber & Faber, 19751, 167. 
2 . Divi d Brody, ~qr.l~r.~ til lllc!\!!ir.t!! Q~~r.l£!t ~~!!'i! qll i~~ fQt~ ~!.lliYr.'i ~ttyqq!!. (Ne.. York: 
Oxford University Press, 1981), 206. 
'\ 
rather than a fixed and permanent entity, and analysis of these 
processes is crucial for a study of the shop floor interaction of 
management and managed. For workers' independent activity is more 
assertive in those spaces left for it by what Williamson has 
4 
decl" ibed in cos t analy~5is as "managerial discr"etion". And t,he 
Conve rse i s al s o true: managerial authority is most assertive 
Where working class res istance is weakest. Managerial discretion~ 
the leeway allowed individual managers in policy-execution, 
5 
operates at all levels, from executives to foremen. Thurley and 
Wood point out that this 'strategic choice " "implies t.hat 
managements' objectives are not fixed but open, so that managers 
ar e not a "neutral' group rationally deciding on organizational 
s 'i:.J'"ategy purely in terms 
6 
o 'f given and non-comp£.~t i ng 
ClI'"g a ni z ation ial objectives". The history of t.he managerial group 
and how structural or market constraints encourage the exercise 
o f discretion and at what levels of management they operate most 
---------------------------
4. The developlent of "Ianagerial discretion' within an organization when the expansion 04 a 
centralized unitary-fori COlpany to a levil of cOlpltxity beyond the physical capacity of an 
individual chief executive, has been identified by Chandler and Willialson in terls of a loss, of 
financial control; A. Chandler, ~![!!!gy !D~ ~![y~!y[! (New York: Doubleday, 19b6), 282-3; 0 E 
Willialson, ~!r!!!§ !Dg H!!r!rfh!!~l Bn!!Y§i~ !ng Bn!!!rY~! b!g!~!!!ign (NeN York: Free PreiS, 
1975), 135. The argulent here is that 'adlinistrative inefficiences' and '.anagerial control loss· 
also occur in the area of labour relations adlinistration. 
~. Millial BrONn in his study of custOI and practice in the British engineering industry 
distinguishes between "errors of cOI.ission" usually deliberately lade by sinior lanagelent and 
"errors of olission" generally lade when foreaen turn a blind eye; ei~£~~Q~~ , ~!~q!i~i~q (London: 
Heinemann, 1973), 98-9. 
6. Keith Thurley and Stephen Wood, tQ~y~t~i!t R~l!ttQ~~ !q~ ~!~!q~!~~t §t~!t!qy (London: Calbridge 
University Press, 1983), 3. 
4 
force~ully are therefore all important in the study. 
' Managerial control' is a concept that embraces both the 
' power ' over workers generated by the labour-capital relationship 
and the consequent 'authority' management exercises on the 
8 
7 
job. 
There is no Chinese wall dividing the two~ but it is argued here 
that this distinction between managerial power and authority is 
helpful while the Weberian definition of power and . authority 
obscures the relations hip between the division of and access to 
wealth in wider society and the pattern of managerial control. 
The assumption that management is a dynamic phenomenon 
prompts the question: which aspects of management change? Fox 
introduces a useful distinction between two kind of relations 
management has with its employees: 
Harket relations have to do with the terll and conditions on which labour is hired - they arf 
therefore econotic in character. Hanagerial relations arise out of what lanagelent seeks to do 
with its labour having hired it • . They have to do with the exercise of authority and can for 
this reason be terled political in character.9 
In the market~ ownership provides management with absolute 
power, backed up by the state and the force of law~ to determine 
---------------------------
(3. Richard "Ylan and Robert" Fryer, "Trade Unions: Sociology and Political EconolY·, I[!q! 
Yn!Qn! ~ng!! ~~P!!~!!!!, eds. TOl Clarke and Laurie Cle.ents (London: Fontana, 1977), 152. 
9 . Alan Fox, "Industrial Sociology and Industrial Relations· (londons ""SO, Royal CO.lission on 
Trade Unions and E.ployers Associations, Research Paper 3, 19661, 6. 
wa<;}e rates, the hours of work~ number s of workers and to 
construct the working environment. The precise terms are often 
disput ed - for example, by work+?rs asking, for- wage rises~ or 
opposing a plant closure. But concessions of wage rises or a stay 
of execution of a plant closure do not challenge ownership rights 
or diminish managerial power. Increases in labour costs can hamper 
the return on capital and lead to financial loss or even 
bankruptcy, but historically the s hare of labour in total costs 
has moved little. And when labour costs have risen they have first 
stimulated management to push for greater worker output, and 
tht?n, if they remained at a level that threatened managerial 
capital resources, have demonstrated capital's powQr to close 
10 
plants and relocate geographically or into other investment s . As 
Wright has argued, "the fundamental class antagonism between 
Worker-s and capitalists" arises out o-f: their Y-elationships in 
three distinct processes that mirror Child's approach to 
management = "cc:~pi tal i s:.t s contl~ol the accumul ati on proces~s, deci de 
how the physical means of production are to be used, and control 
1 1 
the authclr'i ty structur+? \.'Ji thi n the 1. abour process". vJorkers are 
totally excluded from the first, economic ownership, have a 
mc:~rgi nal influence over what plant and equipment is used, 
---------------------------
le). Jeanne Prial Gordon, Paul Jarley and louis A Ferlan studied the US literature on plant 
Closures in the 1960s and 1970s, and found: "the decision to shut down a plant or to relocate i5 a 
unilateral one ••• Kanagelent laintains that capital lobility is e5sential ••• Kanagelent hal the right 
to take its own decision and publi~ize it at its ONn discretion"; f!~n! ~!g~!ng! ~n~ g~gng!if 
Pi!!Qf~!iQn IKalalazoo: W E Uphjohn Institute for ElpIoYlent Research, 1981), 37. 
1 1. Erik Olin "right, n!~h ~~t~t~ !Ilc! t~! ~t!t! (london: NlB, 1978), 73. 
6 
and 
poS'!sess ttle potenti al to m:erci se any real rest.rai nt onl y over-
the third process~ the authority structure. It is import.ant to 
retain this understanding of managerial power as a process or 
as a resource available to the top managers - rather than as a 
fixed historical given. The power resources of capital vary 
enormously in size~ us e and degree of mobility and accessibility, 
as do the political traditions of particular managements. 
Once worker s are tlired, they are subject to the influence of 
'managerial relations'. Managerial authority determines how work 
is organized and executed in the workplace. In contr .:\st t.o 
managerial power, it is classically flexible. It is the 
prevai ling politics and disciplinary process that management 
operates to secure adherence to the effort bargain - what is 
promised by workers in return for their wages. Its fie}: i b iii t Y 
lies in the fact that what workers 'promise" they do not 
necessarily deliver and so employment contracts vary both in form 
12 
.:\nd in content. At its core the concept of managerial authority 
is about. what Goodrich described as, "Hc)w the worker is treated -
what sort of authority he is under, how much freedom he is 
all c)wed". 
---------------------------
12. John Child, ·Hanilgerialstrilti!gies, labour process ilnd neN teChnology·, Work Organization 
Research Centre Occasional Paper (Birlinghal: Aston University, 19831, (Iileographedl. 
1:3. Carter l Goodich, I~! t[q~ti![ qi ~q~ttql, (london: Pluto, 1975, first ed. 1920), 27. 
Goldthorpe also draws a distinction between manag e rial power 
cmd aLithori ty~ but, following Weber, he defi nes authority a s 
flowing from ownership: 
••• authority is understood, in the lanner of "ax Neber, as referring to the 'legitilate 
exercise of cOlland' ••• 
Kanagerial authority ••• over workers ste.s, on the one hand, frol the lanager's statu! as the 
agent of the eaployer and, on the other, frol the contract of elploYlent in which workers have 
been engaged. In this sense, then, lanagerial authority lust be seen as still at the present 
tile largely intact: it has not been ceded, and indeed has not had to face any lajor 
challenge ••• Kanage.ent, in other words, still retains its right to plan and conduct the 
affairs of the enterprise in the interests of the elployer and, to this end, to issue orders 
to elployees.14 
Manageria l QQ~gC, Goldthorpe defines as "management~s use o f 
v a rious r esources at its disposal in order to achieve a work 
cii sci pI i ne". And it is thi S "POWSI'"" that he see s as havi ng b een 
"weakene d" by "the improved market situation of industric:'\l 
Workers •.. their n~re effective organization at shopfloor leve l, 
the:i r self-confidence and heightened vJants and 
1 co ,J 
en:pec:tiations" • 
Why is it important to invert Goldthorpe's d efi nit i on$ and 
to r-eserve "power" fo r ' the manager-i al pl'"ocesses directly 
Conse quent on the ownership of capital, and "authority" fOI'" the 
way workers experience management day-to-day? In Weber power is 
defined as the abi li ty of a social a c tor to impose hi~ will on 
"'powe r ' is the probability that one actor within a 
--------------------------
14 . John Goldthorpe, "Industrial Relations in Great Britain: a Critique of Reforiisi-, qa £it, 
eds Clarke and Clelents, 192-3. 
8 
social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own 
16 
I.'Ji 11 despi te r'esi st.O'Ince. " Power is viewed as manifest at the 
point of confrontation betwee8 individual s oci al acton; (or 
collectives of s ocial actors). Authority, however, is legitimated 
power - a power that is accepted, respected, legitimated by the 
wider social order. For Weber the wider social order of modern 
industrial society rest s on legal -rationality, not on tradition 
or charisma as in earlier societies: 
Our aodern 'associations', above all the political ones, are of the type of 'legal' authority. 
That is, the legitilacy of the pONerholder to give cOllands rests upon rules that are 
rationally established by enactaent, by agreement, or by ilposition. The legiti.ation for 
etablishing these rules rests, in turn, upon a rationally enacted or interpreted 
'constitution'. Orders are given in the nale of the ilpersonal nor •••• 17 
The Weber ian approach thus rests on two questionable assumptions. 
Fir st, that power is a relationship between !D~!Y!~Y~! actors or 
Collectives of individuals. In the following analysis of 
industrial relations in the American auto industry it is found, 
by c ontr-ast, that while it is individuals who access the power 
resources of capital, their behaviour can only be explained by 
r' ef(~rence to the wider business community of owners 
18 
controllers of capital. F'o,,"Jer" i s not, therefore, at roclt, 
and 
a 
Confrontation of a bureaucratic collective of individual managers 
---------------------------
16. Cited in Lewis A Coser, "The Notion of Power: Theoretical Developlents', ~~~t~t~qt~!t IUt~r~, 
eds. Lewis A Coser and Bernard Rosenberg (New York: Kaclillan, 19761, 151. 
17. Hax Weber, "Types of Authority", Q~ ~tt, eds. Coser and Rosenberg, 131. 
18. Howell John Harris argues that without assuling a lonolothic and all-wise viewpoint, the use 
of the generic "business cOllunity" is a helpful analytic tool for studying Alerican lanagelent in 
tlhge 1930s and 1940s; l~~ [!g~! !Q !~n!g~l In9Y!![!!! B!!!!!Qn! fQ!!f!!! gf B!~[!f!n ~Y!in!!! in !h! 
-- ~g! (Kadison: University of Wisconsin, 19921, 4. 
9 
with collectives of individual workers, 
19 
but of capital and labour 
resources. Second, Weberians assume that authority is a higher 
form of power based on societal consent. But this begs the 
20 
questions: who consented? how? and when? And it projects the 
determining role of ideology as more important than the material 
relationship of capital to the worker with labour power to sell. 
This study finds it was the greater power resources of American 
management that allowed it more unrestrained authority on the 
21 
shop floor than British management. So by using the terms 
in this way, managerial power, as a generally inflexible feature 
of capitalist employment relations, and managerial authority, as 
an e s sentially subjective feature, the distinction between two 
forms of managerial control is confirmed and enriched. With 
managerial power viewed as deriving ultimately from capital, th e 
s haping role of wider forces of production can be kept in mind; 
and with s hopfloor managerial authority derived from managerial 
POwer resources, the subordination of labour to capital is 
---------------------------
19. As HYlan and Fryer argue: "the critical locus ol any analysis ol pOMer lust be the 
differential distribution of control over and access to resources and sanctions, both laterial and 
ideological"; ~ ~tt, 153. 
2 (1. Alan Aldridge, ~~!!tL 4~t~~ttt~ !Qq R!~tti£ti~! Et!£ti£!lt 4 ~~£t~lqqi£!l ~l!!~ qQ lQq~~ttt!l 
~~l!tt~Q~ (Oxford: Blackwell, 1976), 114-6. 
21. Stephen Hill notes that even in Britain the weakness ol the Weberian approach appeared: "It 
becale clear to several observers in the lid-1970s that the apparently agreed fraleNorts of rules 
which used to guide conflict resolution and the apparent consensus on the basic details of the 
Organization of industry were based largely on worker acquiescence in the face of superior 
lanagerial power, rather than on any institutionalization and legitlization of norls and custolary 
procedures·; ~Q!2g!1!lQn ~D~ ~Qn![Q! ~! ~Q[! (London: Heinelann, 1981), 149. 
10 
22 
retained. 
The distinction drawn here between managerial power and 
authority is most apparent when they are under challenge. The 
control held directly as a consequence of the purchase of labour 
power by capital can only be loosened by widespread social and 
Political action; managerial authority, on the other hand~ can 
be considerably weakened by restraints on its free exercise as a 
result of collective pressure by workers who do not see 
themselves ( as posing a revolutionary challenge. Managerial 
authority faces societal, operational or collectively-imposed 
Worker restraints. Habit, mis-management, conscious self-
restraint and changes in managerial ideology can all check the 
maXimiSing of profit. So can state legislation or other forms of 
Political pressure~ workers' collective pressure and the 
interaction of all these. Profit-maximising economic man may 
exist in the classical textbooks, but in real life the central 
profit motive experiences major interference. 
---------------------------
22. EdMard Greer .akes a parallel critique of both pluralist and corporatist 'poMer elite' theories 
in his study of political pOMer in Gary, Indiana: "Funda.entally, piuraiisl fails as a description 
of co •• unity political power in Gary because it has no concept to incorporate the reality of 
.onopoly econolic pOMer"; while he argues against the corporate liberal historians that "allost 
without exception the .ajor de.ocratic and social gains of the .ass of the people over the course of 
Our national history were won against intransigent capitalist resistance"; 'ig §!!!!1 !!!f~ f9!i!!f~ 
!ng ~9rp9r!!! f9~!r in §!rY~ !n~!!n! (New York: "onthly Review, 1979), 15-19. 
1 1 
Struggled-for restraints 
This wide range of restraints presents a further complexity 
in attempting to locate a clear "frontier of control' between 
manager i. al authority and workers' self-organization. 
, ,,) .. ;t" 
......... ' 
Some 
restraints over managerial authority owe little to positive 
Worker resistance, and a great deal to managemen~~ and c:~s 
GOodrich fOllne!: "There is a significant psychological dif ·ference 
between 'admission' and 'invasion'~ between control pr~sented to 
24 
and control s:.ei z ed by a tr- ade uni on. " 8i nce management' s 
influence applies also to the character of shop floor union 
Organization, the difficulties in deducing the extent of 
management's unilateral shop floor authc)r it Y are clearly 
25 
considerable. The approach taken here is to focus on the 
eVidence of shop floor conflict and to try and establish its 
direction and trend. 
The concept o~: :' struggl ed-for' restraints is used to 
describe those issues in management-labour relations which involve 
£Qnt~§t§ between managerial authority and worker resistance. The 
achievement of a struggled-for concession, and its maintenance 
---------------------------
I ""} ..... 
L~\. Goodrich accepted ·discipline and lanagelent ••• are convenient terll for the frontier of 
control·, but insisted ·that frontier lust lust be looked for as a shifting line in a great lass of 
regulations·; ~ £tt, 62. 
25. Willial Brown, Robert Ebsworth and "ichael Terry, ·Factors shaping Shop Steward Organization 
in Britain·, ~r!!!§b ~gYrn~! gf Jngy§!r!!! B~!~!!Qn§, XVI, no. 2 (1978), 148. 
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through continual ideological and industrial mobilization of 
Workers against their employer, has different implications for 
labour relations than a restraint accepted voluntarily or 
introduced by management to improve the . plant"s operational 
efficiency or in response to legislation. The scope and level of 
fol~al collective bargaining clearly influence the opportunities 
available fo~ workers to codify these restraints. Over the last 
for ·ty 
. years the proportion of struggled-for restraints over 
managerial authority has reduced in comparison with "operational" 
(such as fast, efficient elevators) or 'societal" (such as non-
discriminatory hiring) restraints. This development was much less 
the result of conscious managerial control strategies than of a 
continuing labour-management conflict in which the accumulation of 
Serious organizational and political defeats eventually eroded 
labour"s ability to sustain its positive pressure. 
The shift in the §QY~£@ of restraints on management should 
not be interpreted as m&aning that operational and societal 
restraints no longer impede managerial authority. Indeed, the 
possibility of ideological and industrial mobilization by workers 
in defense of these discretionary restraints is a key factor in 
constraining management from acting directly in its own short-
13 
term profit-ma ximi si ng interest. A rest raint rema in s a limitation 
2 6 
for man agement regardless o f its origins. The argument here is 
that t h e distinction of source is important since it allows an 
assessment of the strength and strategizing capacity of shop 
floor unioni s m as an independent factor influencing ma nager' i al 
The body of restraints on managerial autonomy exercised by 
Workers or through operational or societal pressures is often 
descri bed as "job control s ". The a pproac h adopted here~ however~ 
suggests such terminology is generally inappropriate. I-ls F'r i c:e 
"the i ndi scr' i mi nate LIse of the term "craft control " " 
whi c h "r"ightly ccmnotE'!s a series of s pecial conditions and 
(::i n : l.lIn!st a nces" ~ s hould be avoided when it refers to the much 
mOI~f;! t:omm<:ln case of .::'\ "tus~~ l e between wor kers" i:'\nd empl oyc~rs :' 
27 
disc :lpline". But it is i mpor't a nt to go still fUl"' ther with this 
line of argument. If 'control' is to retain its sense as a word 
that helps the reader locate those who hold power and authority~ 
---------------------------
:26 . Richard Herding, ~~~ ~~utt~l aU4 Yrri~rr ~tt~£t~t~ (Rotterdal: UniverSity Press: 19721, Part 1, 
sets out to de.onstrate how the ' real interests· of workers are obscured by the 'collective-
bargaining ideologies' (page Ibl that pretend to be advancing the "hulanization· of the workplace 
but instead are proloting 'hierachization' and 'rationalization' (page 21). But he nonetheless 
OVerstates his point by virtually denying that 'job control devices· operate to any significant 
extent to restrain arbitrary .anagelent. 
~~7 • Richard Price, ~!~t~r~L ~~t~Q~ ~~4 !~~t ~~r~ £~~tr~t t~ ~~tt~t~q !~~ t~! rt~~ ~f t!~q~rL 
t~~Q:l~l! (Calbridge: University Press, 1980), 9. 
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it should not b e confused with the broader term ·restraint'. 
For portrayed be low is an account of the e bb and flow o f 
control - a t certain times nearly completely 
unrestrained~ at others r est rained by c hanging combinations of 
forces. To i s olat e a particular restraint and elevate its 
s ignificance within the process of continuing struggle as 
'control ' is to idealize that moment in cont r ast to the others; 
and is to deprive the obser ver of the language and the 
understanding accurately to describe hi s torical periods in which 
the social relations of production are actually being challenged. 
The phrase 'j ob controls' is loade d with the assumptions of 
29 
either pre-mass production 'craft control' or of post-mass 
30 
produc tion ' workers' control'. Although both these ideologies 
could be found in Chr~sler plants during these years, neither 
dominat e d workers' collective consciousness. Instead, workers' 
actions were determined by the movement o f a hybrid ideology 
described here as ' workplace legitimacy'. 
---------------------------
28 . Herding approaches this proble. by another route. He begins by accepting that ·'job control' 
Nill refer to all devices of labour union influence on the existence of, the access to, and, the 
perforaance of operations at particular workplaces in industry· (t~t~, page 21 - and then goe5 on to 
Show that luch of "hat passes for ~9[~![!~ 'job control' is ideologically covering up for leasures 
!~at advance .anage.ent interests !qlt~~t workers' interests (page 16, Part II. Those ele.ents of 
Job control' which he vieNS as continuing to function in the workers' interests he defines as 
' offensive 'job controls' (page 441. 
29 . Price defines 'craft control' as ' control that Nas overlain by support syste.s of tradition 
or genuine skill'; 9R fA!, 11. 
3(1. Hy.an defines ·workers ' control ••• in {qtt~{tt~~ ter.s: the deter.ination by the whole labour 
force of the nature, .ethods and indeed purpose of production'; 9R fA!, lBO. 
15 
Workplace legitimacy and the Rule of Law 
Workplace legitimacy is determined by perceived limits of 
legitimate action; these limits are~ in turn, established by the 
interaction of three key elements: (1) tradition, (2) recent 
experiences of workplac e struggle and (3) workers~ politics 
31 
(ideology and organi z ation). As Armstrong, Goodman and Hyman 
put it: "Within the overall balance of power, the pattern of 
Workplace rules is not so much created by the ideological raw 
3 2 
materials as fashioned from them." The concept has a n 
important implication for changing level s of labour combativity. 
For if workers' responses to management actions and to movement s 
in the labour market depend crucially on their understanding of 
what i s ' legitimate', then the ability of the employers' "'Joy-I d 
Vi e w to shape worker s ' views of legitimacy becomes a major factor 
determining worker combativity. 
Workplace legitima cy is not the exclusive product of the 
-------------------------
:: .\1. Hy.an describes this workplace legiti.acy as: "a shifting set ol traditions and 
understandings which are never identical in any two work situations... governing workers' relations 
with one another and Nith lanage.ent'; q~ £tt, 25. . 
(london: 
..... ...,. 
'-''':' .. . 
P J Arlstrong, J F B Goodlan and J D Hy.an, 
Croo. Hel., 1981), 56. 
) 
BrONn, 2£ £tt, 168. 
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employers" world view. It is moulded by a short-term 
commonsense pragmati s m, on which management does have a direct 
35 
effect, and by a more deeply acquired a wareness of rights. This 
awareness h as two sources. First, in the dominant 19th and 20th 
century political philosophy of political democracy. The deni al 
o f full democracy within the workplace relations of the e arly 
19305 and its denial for black work e r s in the 19605 provided a 
36 
strong source for the legitimization of industrial action. 
Second, it arises in the capital - labour relationship itself. 
Within capitalist employment relations workers are held to be 
"free"; but they must sell their labour to live and surrender 
37 
their " freedom" in order to find a buyer for their labour. They 
have the · theoretical " freedom " to move around and to tell the 
foremen where to get off, while they are simultaneously forced by 
---------------------------
34. Arlstrong, Goodlan and HYlan, ~~ £tt, 39-49. 
~~ ~,~. David Hontgolery's critical review of the 'new history' of the last 20 years points out three 
key areas of elphasis that reinforce this point: [1] study of the 'Ioral codes by which workers have 
sought to regulate their bearing toward each other and toward their bosses on the job" £2] Itress 
on the source and lilits of workers' paMer in ·the values and beliefs that ilpel thel to action; [3) 
exa.ination of workers' sub-cultures, both at Mark and in the neighbourhoodl "To Study the People: 
the American Working Class', ~!~g[ ~!~!g[y, 21, no. 4 (Fall 1980), 502. 
36 . H Gintis argues against the view that workers experienced 'false consciousness', suggesting 
instead that class struggle in the 20th century ·took the discourse of liberaiisl - the discourse of 
natural rights"; 'Colaunication and Politics: Marxisl and the 'Problel' of Liberal Delocracy', 
~g~!!!i~! B!Yi!~ (1980), 190. 
37 . Price, t~t4, 7, writes: 'When workers sell their labour power, they ilplicitly recognize a 
certain degree of subordination to the orders and landates of the elployers ••• But it il precisely 
frol this subordination that lany of the problels of industry derive. For elployers' authority is 
never total nor is it ever unalbiguously accepted by Markers. There is a constant and unrelitting 
resistance and challenge to elployers' authority that assuees lany different shapes and forls." 
17 
the exercise of sanctions to attend one workplace punctually and 
regularly and to obey that foreman. The uneasy balance between 
these two ultimately contradictory elements, the rights that rest 
on an absolute "freedom", and the immediate requirements of 
subordination in the workplace, gives rise to the framework of 
~legitimate action'. This concept is neither total subordination 
total . -h-eedom. Instead it is a changing and often 
contradictory pattern of workers~ rights against managerial 
authority that are respected and defended ~itbin the overall 
acceptance of management power, what Baldamus has described as 
the "strange t.o~orld of intricately mi>:ed, highly organized, and 
38 
Yet morally compulsive en:pectations". 
The concept of workplace legitimacy borrows from BrodY"5 
more prec ise "t.oJorkplace r-ule of law" i.~nd Slichter :'s concept of 
"industr ial jurisprudence" but is a more useful way of 
descr ibing the s tructural situation of the post-war American 
labour movement. For while the mushrooming of "contractual 
(including f ederal legislation) was obviously a key 
elf?ment influencing worker I~esist .. mc:e, the notion of the "rule of 
I aw" does not e>:pl ai n why so often t.omrkers bel i eved they were 
justified in taking "illegal" action outside the contract a nd 
---------------------------
~, (~. Brody, QR £tt, 202; SUlner H Slichter, YutQU eQtl£t!! !U~ !U~y~ttt!! ~!U!q!!!~t IWishington 
DC: Brookings Institute, 1941), 1. 
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often outside the law. This approach also puts into context 
GOuldne r' s finding that "workers u s ually defined the strike in 
ethical terms, holding it to be morally justified". He suggested 
that, 
workers defined their lajor role obligation as working or production. Their obedience 
obligations to superiors were residual Dr auxiliary; at best these were thought of as 
legitilate delands only insofar as they were necessary to do a particular job.40 
The broader notion of workplace legitimacy, which has management 
and labour constantly and conflictually remaking workplace rules 
and then penalizing the other side for transgressing them ~ 
41 
provides a two-sided view of the labour process. 
Workplace legitimacy is seen here as highly malleable, 
reflecting the mediating influence of tradition and workers' 
current political experience (in society and in the workplace), 
42 
and the traditions and political experiences of management. 
Workers may therefore believe their own actions are legitimate 
even though they defy the "law; or they may collectively defend 
Positions (such as concessions) that appear antagonistic to their 
Collective interests. And they can act for short periods of time 
--------------------------
40. Alvin II 6ouldner, ~!14£!t ~tt:.!1@ (Yellow Springs, Ohio: Antioch, 195-il, 59, lB. 
41. Arlstrong, Goodaan and MYlan, Q2 £tt, 15. 
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in either wa y without necessarily altering their awareness of 
43 
their basic rights or of their basic subordination. Moreover 
managers may also act in ways that defy the law in the belief 
that all laws that interfere with managerial authority are 
44 
illegitimate. The limit s of workplace legitimacy result from a 
two- way exchange betwee n the way workers try to maximise their 
rights and fr~edoms and the current managerial control strategy. 
As Littler argues: 
Actual shop floor behaviour and relationships lust be seen... not as consequences of the 
unilateral ilposition by lanagelent on a passive workforce of specifications and 
prescriptions, but a two-way exchange in which an ,accollodation concerning the laning and 
relevance of such prescriptions is achieved in exchange for sOle level of cOllitlent to the 
existing distribution of authority, and to working objectives.45 
Workplace legitimacy customarily reflect s ambivalent 
consciousness: resistance and s ubordination share the same 
moment. Which a s pect appears to dominate is strongly influenced 
by workers' awareness of their collective strength. This i s a 
fUnction of history~ economics~ politics and organization. 
Union organization 
The third group of issues concerns the role of shop floor 
wider union organi zation and politics in shaping 
------------------------
43. The 1944-1945 wartile wildcat strikes followed by the lajority yote in support of the 'No 
Strike Pledge' is an obvious exalple of the cOlpatibility of illegal resistance with acceptance of 
subordination (see Part Three below). 
4 1~ . Thus Henry Ford openly defied the Wagner Act in the 19305; 6H and Chrysler did so covertly 
(see Part Two below). . 
4~ . Craig R Littler, lu~ q~Y~lQ~!~qt Q! tu~ ~!~QY[ ~[Q£!~~ iq ~~it!ti~t ~Q£i~ti!! (London: 
Heinelann, 1982), 42. 
-
20 
consciousness and views of workplace legitimacy. It is alr"gued 
that workplace organization is first constructed and then 
46 
maintained by a layer of key individuals. The relative autonomy 
of the shop floor organization from domination by the 
int.rnational union and by management is the key to understanding 
its sensitivity to rank and file concerns , and demands. But the 
organizational tradition in the different plants, the -political 
composition and strength of the international union leadership, 
and the intervention of management interact to influence that 
autclnomy. The concept of organizational independence used in the 
stUdy must, be seen as a changing set of ideological 
Positions and actions rather than as a fixed constitution. It is 
an important concept because it suggests that labour's capacity to 
develop distinct strategies to represent workers' interests is 
not simply an ideological question: there is a symmetry between 
active shop floor participation in union organization and that 
organization " s representation of workers' distinctive interests. 
An historical process is at work: management legitimated 
Shop s teward organization in an endeavour to defeat unionism. The 
--------------------------
46. "any studies of particular plants have delonstrated this; see, Peter Friedlander, I~! 
£~!rg!nf! 9! ~ YB~ ~9f~!~ j2~k=!J~Jl B ~!ygy in ~!~~§ !ng ~Y!!Yr! (Pittsburg: University of 
Pittsburg Press, 1975); John 6 Kruchko, !h! Dlr!b 9! ! YD19D ~9£!!! Ib! Hl~!9rY 9! Y~~ ~9£!! ~1~~ ~9r~99g~ 9n!9~ !J~~=j2~Q (New York: Cornell UniverSity School of Industrial and Labour Relations, 
1972). In the British auto industry: Huw Beynon, ~qt~t~q iqt Eqt4 (Makefield: EP Publiihing, 1975); 
Henry Friedlan and Sander "eredeen, I~! qy~!~t~~ qi !~4~~ttt!l ~q~tlt£tt ~!~~q~~ itq~ Eqt4 (London: 
Croot Hell, 1980); Eric Batstone, Ian Boraston and Stephen Frenkel, who posit the developlent of a 
crUCial quasi-elite group along a vehicle plant's shop stewards; ~h92 §!!!~rg§ in ~f!i9nl In! 
9!g~ni~~!i9n 9! ~9r~2!~f! ~gn!!if! ~ng Bff9~!9g~!i9n (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977) 
21 
SUccess of the sit-down movement contributed to the strengthening 
of compromising tendencies among the international union 
leaderships. For many years the history of post-war American 
47 
labour has been dominated by the myth of a 'labour truce·, but 
the relative strength of the centralized business unions compared 
to the rank and file membership is only part of the picture. 
American labour was obliged to exercise its collective potential 
Within and against very powerful managerial control systems, 
backed by massive power resources in a political and economic 
atmosphere that gave management great confidence after the 
outbreak of World War II. In much of industry managerial 
discretion in the post-war boom allowed workers the opportunity 
to organize and win certain concessions and establish a new 
"workplace legitimacy'. as kuhn has argued, the shop 
stewards and committeemen were utilized by foremen "to win back 
some control of their shops (in matters of discipline, placement, 
48 
classi-fication , rates, transfers i.~nd promotions)". But the 
limits of ·workplace legitimacy· were also constantly struggled 
-first in a climate of economic expansion and in the late 
19505 and late 19705 in periods of shar~ening economic pressure. 
--------------------
47 . See David Gordon, Richard EdNards and "ichael Reich, ~~q!~~t~4 ~qt~L ~tyt4~4 ~qt~tt~t t~~ 
h!!!g!if~! !!~Djf9r!~!i9n 91 !~~9Y! !D !h~ YD!!~g §!~!!j (Calbridge: University Press, 1982), 216-9; 
and for Chrysler's Dodge "ain cOlplex itself, Dan Georgakas and "arvin Surkin, »,!r9i!1 ! ~g !in~ 
gY!ng~ ~ J!ygy in Yr~~n !~Y9!Y!i9n (HeN York: St Kartin's, 1975), 24, Nhere they write: ·on Kay 2, 
1968, 4,000 Markers shut daMn Dodge "ain in the first wildcat strike to hit the plant in fourteen 
years· • 
4[3. Jales W Kuhn, @~tq~l~t~q t~ ~tt~y~~£~ ~~ttlt!~~tt t~~ eq~tt qi t~4y~ttt~l ~qtt ~tqY2~ (HeM 
York: Colulbia University Press, 1961), 31. 
This struggle explains management"s continued hostility to 
unionism. Kuhn concluded: 
Fractional bargaining, even lore than collective bargaining, challenges a deep-rooted concept 
of the business cOllunity that the lanagers, not the Morkers, should control the production 
process... That fractional bargaining allows workers so.e leaningful control over decisions 
affecting work and production and that Morkers light desire such control because they are len 
as well as lIorkers, are concepts t.oo al ien to business thinking 
to receive .uch 
consideration.49. 
Management thSrefore used periods of recession to try to re-
establish its economic pressure by trying to re-establish an 
unrestrained authority. When organizational and ideological tools 
Were available~ 
i 
minorities resisted what Aronowitz calls "the 
efforts of manageme nt to e xceed the historically acceptable pac e 
50 
of wOI"·k". When they were no longer available~ cii\ period of 
Working class defensiveness set in, accompanied by declarations 
of the onset of.:\ "new era" in indl.lst.rial relations. 
Section two critically examines aspects of the current 
debate about the development of managerial control in America 
OVer the last 50 years, and suggests that the lack of concern for 
thf? hi stor i cal dynami c of workers " resi stan'ee in the US 1 i es in 
the political failings of both the right and the left . 
. -..... 
----------------
5(1. Stanley Aronowitz, E!t!~ etq!ll~!t tn~ !n!~luq qi ~!!tl£!~ ~qtltUq £t!~! £qU~£tq~~U!!l (New 
Vork: KcSraM Hill, 1973), 409. 
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I I. Issues · 
Rigid structural determinism will be challenged at various points 
in the book, 50 it is helpful to outline briefly some general 
objections here. Implicit assumptions of national exceptional ism 
are often made by those who develop theories of managerial 
Control from economic variables. David M Gordon, Richard Edwards 
and Michael Reich, for example, pose the question which motivated 
their book as follows: 
Workers and the labour lovelent tQ t~! ~Qtt!4 ~t!t!~ have not yet been able to articulate 
and advance a progral for the resolution of the crisis that defends and furthers not only 
their own interests but also the general welfare. Why have US workers been so quiescent? 
[IY elphasis, SJ.l ~1 
Clearly such a qLlestion is predicated on an unstated and 
LIne>: ami ned model of ' other-" countries and their I abclLIF' 
5 2 
movements. But, as Montgomery has pointed out, while "it is 
qUite true ••. that u~ion s tructures, leaders and demands have been 
sUCces sfully incorporated into American capitalism time and 
again. So have workers ' parties (reformist and revolutionary 
alike). co- operatives, and workers' councils here and in 
---------------------------
51 • Gordon!t ~J, ~ £tt, 2. 
52. The error involved in evoking Ian undisclosed lodel of Other Countries l was put in 
Pickwickian terls by Edward Tholpson in his 19b5 polelic, 'The 
PeCuliarities of the English' ,: 
a'A nd ~t~!t countries,' said Kr Podsnap relorsefully. 'They do how?' 'They do,' returned 
Kessrs. Anderson and Nairn severely: 'They do - we are sorry to be obliged to say it - in 
Every Respect Better. Their Bourgeois Revolutions have been Kature. Their Class Struggles 
have been Sanguinary and Unequivocal. Their Intelligentsia has been Autonolous and 
Integrated Vertically. Their Morphology has been Typolitically Concrete. Their Proletariat 
hl i9S been Hegelonic.'· EP Tholpson, I~! eQy!tty ~f l~!~ty !Q4 qt~![ ~~!!y~ (London: Kerlin, 
791, 37. 
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ELlrope. " Thus Britain~ for e~·!i\mple~ entered the 1979 world 
recession by electing a radical right-wing government; the 
working class then collapsed into "quiescence" and in 1983 the 
same Thatcher administration was re-elected with the lowest 
labour share of the working class vote since 1918. l.<Jhat str i kes 
the Br"itish obsel~ver is that "'Klrking class "quiescence" and an 
absenc:e of a ""'Jorking class agemda" are~ not e>!clusively Americ.an. 
If an analytical model is to provide explanatory variables on 
both sides of the Atlantic~ then it must embrace shop floor 
resistance and accommodation. 
The failure tu capture the presence of both these two 
moments in working class history is the principal defect in 
Gordon §t ~1 explain working 
class behaviour in terms of major shifts in managerial control 
strategies related to long-term business cycles. The year"s from 
World War I to World War II were volatile years of transition 
from the earlier pha~;e of the "homogenization of labour" and 
"drive" control to the per' iod of "technic;",l" control when "the 
5>(~gmentati on of labour forged and .reproduced materially based 
diVisions among US workers that inhibited the growth of a unified 
54 
Working-class movement. II The three segments of the class are 
---------------------------
t:- .. ~. 
~~'. David Kontgolery, ·Spontaneity and Organization: sOle COllents·, ~!~t~!l ~!~~i~!, 7, no. 6 
(NOV-Dec 1973), 74. 
54. Gordon ~t !l, tae ~tt, 3. 
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the "i ndependent pl~ i mC'.-\ry" (professional~ manager i al ) ~ the 
"subordinate primary" <semi-skilled blue-- and white-collar) and 
th(~ "sec:ondary" sector (servi c€~ ~ peripheral manufacturing~ women 
and bl acks) ~ The 1970s are seen as the start of a new period of 
56 
transition. The analysis brushes aside evidence of continuing 
shop floor conflict in the post-war period - designated as a 
"labour trouce" - in the same way it ignores evidence that the 
19:30s "l i::"\bouro upsurge" II'la s much less II'ddespread than has gener-ally 
been assumed. Labour is viewed as a residual element left over 
after managers have finished managing. It is either "quiescent" 
Or in rebellion. Evidence that both moments coexisted throughout 
the last fifty years is ignored because it means that shopfloor 
Conflict has to be brought back to the centre of a theory of 
i ndLlstr i al relations from which their structural labour market 
det erminism and long-swing capitalist cycles theory has just 
PUshed it. The 'segmented-privileged' argument and jts corollary~ 
the assumption of a pure working class consciousness somewhere 
else , are unhelpful approach~s to the problem of changing levels 
and forms of strugQle, and tend to deny the validity of post-war 
57 
American working class self-activity. Since the activity they 
do acknowledge is either dismissed as inherently divisive or as 
det£':>rmi ned by outside economic forces~ thei y-
---
------------------------
!::re::o 
-.J-.J. l~lq, 202-6. 
56. l~i.q, 219-221. 
57. lHq, 185-239. 
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generalizations ultimately fail to come to grips with the dynamic 
of change that has taken place. 
Michael Burawoy makes an important contribution to 
understanding the political processes whereby the organization of 
Work helps control and indeed shapes workers' consciousness. But 
he goes on td ar<;Jue that the "manufacturing of consent" to the 
subordination of labour to capital is a process that takes place 
§~~!Y~iY§!Y in the workplace at the point of production. He 
desc:ri bes t.he .:'\1 m elf hi s study as "to demonstrate how con!sent. is 
produced at the point of production - independent of schooling, 
58 
family life, mass media, the state and so forth". While he does 
SUbsequently introduce the qualification that this "autonomy" is 
only "r-elative", and while his study does recognize that 
aCCommodation and resistance are intertwined, neit.her dissent, 
nor th~ possibility of it being mobilized through plant 
59 
committeemen or union stewards appear at all. It is not 
difficult to demonstrate workers are "conscious primarily of 
their immediate work milieu, thei r everyday e>:per i ences"; what 
Hyman has called "inhibitions against class consciousness in 
---------------------------
58. "i chael Bur awoy, ~~Qyt~~tY~j)lq ~QQ~~l1tt ~~~Qq~~ tl1 t~~ ~~~Qr. er.Q£!~~ YI1c!~r. ~Ql1qP'Ql'£ ~!Pi!!!!§! (Chicago: University Press, 1979), xii. 
59. In this o.ission the study is strikingly si.ilar to the daSlic Charles R lIalker and Robert H 
Guest study, Ib~ !!9 99 !b~ ~!~~!g!y k!n~ (Ca.bridge, "assachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
19521, 123-134, whose discussion of "The Norker and the Union" does not refer to co •• ittee.en, chief 
S~ewards, blue button stewards or how workers relisted the production standards and lanagerial 
dISCipline which caae out top on the list of grievances. 
60 
ElVer'yday i ndustr i al reI at ions" do shape wor kel~s' wor 1 d vi eltJs. 
BL.It. t.o look Q!}!.~ .. at the "inhibitions" falls into the error of t he 
' human relations' school pointed out by Child: 
••• a tendency to overlook the role of behavioural deterlinants which derive frol forces beyond 
the physical lilits of the enterprise and which therefore lie beyond lanagerial regulation.61 
Thi s study seeks to complement Burawoy's concerns about what in a 
62 
later ItJork he described as "the politics O,t production" and to 
show how important the outside world was in shaping and reshaping 
the limits of workplace legitimacy. The Roosevelt "rights :' 
e>: pI os i on " ~ l eftism~ anti - Commun ism and Slack Power all impacted 
massi vely on the key workers a nd manager s to give a distinctive 
6 7 
--' 
shape to SLIr' a woy :' s concept of the "factory I'"egime". 
An important c riti c i s m that can be levelled against Burawoy 
is that his method t ends to determine his findings. Herding 
explains the absence of extens ive research on the frontier of 
Contre)l in American plants as resulting from the more empirical 
American literature "s tenden~y to isolate i ssues of control a nd 
---------------------------
60. HYlan, QP. ~!.t, 42. 
61. Child [1969], Il~ ~it, 201-2. 
62. Kichael Burawoy, IBetween the Labor Process and the State: The changing face of Factory Regiles 
under Advanced Capitalisl·, ~~~r!f!n §2f!2!29!f!! B!Y!!~, 48 (October 1983), 587. 
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2 8 
64 
conflict from their "histor'ical dynamics". The sociological 
snapshot or, in the case of Burawoy's study, the comparison of 
two snapshots taken at different moments, has apparently 
satisfied most investigators. This approach illuminates the 
conformity and continuity that is always present in the single 
moment of history, and so inevitably leads to the conclusion that 
conformity and continuity (of management strategy or labour 
response) are the dominant tendency in labour relations. Burawoy, 
for example, spent a few months working in the small machine shop 
of a large steel works in 1975, and drew the conclusion that the 
Piecework system itself created "consent" among his fellow 
Workers to the labour-capital relationship he found intolerable. 
Stumbling across evidence that the famous post-war Roy 
participant-observation study had been based on the same firm, 
Burawoy then had to explain the shift away from the apparent lack 
Of "consent" in 1945. He squared hs circle quite deftly: 
As a consequence of changes in the systel of reluneration, lanagelent-Morker conflict has 
abated and individualisl has increased.o5 
But he ignores many key questions: how much "consent" was also 
present in 1945? How was that consent generated? How far had 
patt.erns of conflict been redistributed within the firm's 
---
------------------------
64. Herding, Qe. £tt, 2. Haking this valuable point at Mhat he believed Mas a til' of groMing 'rank 
a~d file revolt', Herding hi.self fell into the trap of viewing consciousness as essentially one-
SIded. His achievelent, hOMever, is to delonstrate the presence of worker resistance within the job, 
Seetingly independent of the forlal international union relationship Mith the elployer. It is not 
surprising that this ilportant book, not included in the bibliographies of Edwards R, 9~ ~!!, or 
Sordon ~! !!, 9~ ~!!, Mas not Mritten by an Alerican. 
6<:-
..,. Bur alloy [1979], Qe. £tt, 51. 
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production process as a result of technological and f.:?conomi c 
developments, creating different responses to management among 
workers in the machine shop, say, from those directly working on 
steel manufacture, or in plant maintenance? In what ways and why 
had the union changed? What impact did the retirement of the 
1930s generation of largely white workers and their replacement 
by blacks hav. on plant conciousness? Did management structure 
and ideology change during this thirty year period, and if so how 
and why? A grasp of the historical dynamics of the shop floor 
interaction of management and workers is crucial. 
The objection that there is no sense of the interaction of 
management and managed can be made to Braverman, whose i mport"mt 
Work initiated the current debate about the relatinship of 
capital, the labour process and labour beliefs. His endeavour to 
draw " i:'\ picture of the . IfoJorking CIC:{5;S as it e>:ists, as the shape 
66 
given to the working population by capital accumulation", 
however powerful and illuminating, is ultimately flawed by the 
assumption that it is possible to draw such a picture without the 
POlitical and organizational experience of the working class being 
incorporated from the beginning. The critique Lazonick makes of 
of "supervisory requirements and e~dst.ing 
-._-
------------------------
66. See Harry Braverlan, ~~~Qt ~~q ~Q~q~Q1Y ~~~it~lt t~! q!qt~q~ttqq q! ~qt~ i~ t~! I~!qtl!t~ ~!qtYtY (New York: "onthly Review, 1974), 27. In Braverlan's terls it is not possible to separate 
the study of "a class l~ it~!l!" frol "a class !qt it~!l!". 
30 
manageri a l structures" in the 19th century cotton industry bear s 
powerfully on Braverman : 
"arx derived his conclusion of the olnipotence of technology in the subjection of labour to 
capital frol an uncritical acceptance of capitalist ideology, instead of using his theoretical 
fralework for an elpirical investigation of the i~t!~!~ti~~ ~i t~! ~!l!tl~~~ !~q t~t£!~ qt 
~t~q~£tl~~ in cotton spinning.[IY elphasis - SJ.l 67 
Managerial control systems do not always correspond with the 
68 
dominant manag.r ial ideology of the moment. The interac tion of 
Workers with manage ment impacts back on management's response to 
technological change. Workers accept or reject t echnological 
cha nge a ccording to a workplace legitimacy which is also shaped 
by full employment or unemployment, and by the dominant political 
69 
idealogy of the day. Worker s are workers in a parti c ular 
historical context and accept and r eject the beli ef s of t hat 
period a ccording to their own experiences of life, organization 
and s truggle. 
Despite the quite different attempts by Gordon @t il, 
Burawoy and Braverman to come to terms with different aspects of 
---------------------------
6', • Millial LazonicK, "Industrial Relations and Technical Change: the Case of the Self-acting 
Hule", ~!!gr!gg! ~pYrn~! pf ~fPDP!!f?, no. 3 (19791, 238, 259. 
6El. Andrew L Friedlan, !~4~~t~y !~4 ~!~q~tt ~l!~~ ~tt~qql! !t ~qt~ !~4 ~q~Q!qlY ~!~tt!ll~~ 
(london: Haclillan, 1977), 80-2. This criticisl by Friedlan of Braverlan is endorsed; but it does 
not folloN that the only choice facing .anage.ent is 'direct cantral" or "responsible autono.y'; 
part of the argulent below is that pursuance of the forler strategy by Chrysler lanagelent helped 
create space for the elergence of the latter. 
69. Stephen A Harglin, "What do Bosses do? The origins and functions of Hierarchy in Capitalist 
:r:ductiont, Jh~ »!~!?!pn P! b~gpYr! Ib! b!~pYr ~rQ£!§! !D9 ~!!!! ~!rygg!! !D ~pg!rD ~!e!!!!!!! ed 
n re 60rz (Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester, 19781, 17. 
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the American labour process, they all share a common flaw. They 
all try to adduce workers ' consciousness~ the sets of beliefs on 
which they will act, 
determinant~ - the labour market, the plant or job technology. 
This approach conflicts with evidence of the wide range and 
dynamic of consciousness, organization and activity that develops 
within the §~mg industry among workers and managements facing the 
same technology and similar labour processes. By assembling 
eVidence at the frontier of interaction between management and 
managed, a highly complex pattern appears of internally and 
externally-shaped components that defies gross generalization but 
still permits the use of sensitive explanatory variables. 
Investigations of the historic dynamic of job-level labour 
relations in US plants are rare. Lichtenstein begins his 
important s tudy of American labour in World War II by referring to 
70 
lithe Vi:\CUUm in historical understanding". And Zabal a, a 
sociOlo~Jist with four years' e>:perience in GN"s California Van 
Nuys body shop, opens his recent doctoral thesis with more 
. 
aSSurance that would be justified fr om a British author: 
The industrial relations literature is devoid .of rigorous studies of the behavioural 
underpinnings of licro collective bargaining or of the ilpact of trade unionisl on the 
forlation and consciousness of Alerican workers.71 
--------------------------
7~. Nelson Lichtenstein, ~!~~(:~ ~!( !t ~~!~!. I~~ ~Lq til ~~(t~ ~!( H, (New York: Calbridge 
University Press, 19B21 2. 
~ 1. Craig Zabala, ·Collective Bargaining at UAK Local 645, Seneral Hotors Alselbly Division, Van 
uys, California, 1976-1982" (PhD thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 1983), 1. 
Why has there been a neglect of the dynamics of post-war shop 
floor' con f 1 i c t ? In part the lack of investigation is because of 
a narrow focus on deceptively similar formal institutionalized 
bargaining procedures; in part it results from a reliance on the 
US Bureau of Labor Statistics strike data that under-reports 
stoppages, and is not particularly sensistive to important inter-
72 
firm differenc.s. 
The most important element leading to the assumption of 
similarity has been, however, a political neglect by both the 
established American academics and, until very recently, ' by the 
left as w(;?ll. First, manager-i cd > "'Jel fari sm' in the 1910s 
'73 
1920s spawned industrial relations e>:perts in the 1930s 
---------------------------
'72. The BlS data is "based on all work stoppages involving six workers Dr lore and lasting at 
least a full day Dr shift·. In a systel where striking was largely illegal during the terl of the 
contract, this cut-off point of a whole shift out on strike under-reports the actual nUlber of 
strikes by a luch larger proportion than is true of the silUar cut-off point in the UK labour 
statistics. This is lade clear by contrasting cOlpany data frol Chrysler and 6" which indicates a 
total of 548 strikes in those two cOlpanies alone in the non-contract-year 1957 with the 178 
~ecorded by the BlS for the ~~ql! lotor vehicle and equiplent industry. The BlS insensitivity to 
lnter-firl differences is highlighted in its breakdown by nale of firl of large strikes involving 
10,000 workers or lore. This raises the strike frequency of General Kotors whose labour force is lore 
~han four tiles the size, for exalple, of Chrysler. The reality according to the cOlpanies' own data 
IS very different. Thus while between 195,9 and 1978 the annual average large-strike frequency rate 
of Chrysler and 8M as leasured by the BlS lias both 0.03 strikes per 1,000 hourly-paid workers, the 
all-strike frequency rates kept by the cOlpanies showed Chrysler at 0.46, nearly four tiles greater 
than 6"'s annual average frequency of 0.12 strikes per 1,000 workers. COlpany data: Chrysler and 6" 
~abor Relations Departaents; BlS data: BlS, ~9!!!~!iY! ~!rg!in!ng in !h! ~9!9r Y!hi~!! in!! ~gy!p!!n! 
-Uqq!tCY, Report 574, Septelber 1979. 
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.... '. Brody, Q2 £tt, 48-81. 
and 
and 
19405 who saw themselves as a part of the managerial personnel 
fLlnction: as advisors to management on the control of labour. In 
~iOiggmgnt made this clear: 
Protecting the status of lanagelent and preserving its essential prerogatives have not been a 
sufficiently definite objective of either union or elployers policy in building up our systel 
of industrial jurisprudence ••• 
The workers, though they have an interest in preventing arbitrary decisions by lanagelent, 
also need to have the lanagelent able to aaintain reasonable efficiency.74 
Twenty years later he made his managerial aims still more 
e>:pl i cit ~ writing that "in case of conflict" betlo'Jeen the needs 
management and the workers, the book's "orientation is 
75 
provided by the goals of management". Most social scientists 
Who examined American industrial relations in the 1950s and 19605 
aSSumed that open confl~ct was bad or unnecessary or both, and 
that the tendency of union organizations to emulate the 
01:l gar-di:l c 
76 
gOOd. 
structure of business was a necessary or a ,positive 
In Britain, wher'e the personnel function was 
pr"edom:i nantl y , women :. S Io'Jor k • before 1939, and i ndustr-i al 
relations and personnel specialists did not achieve significant 
77 
status within management until the 19605, although 
---------------------------
74. Slichter, ~ ~lt, 578. 
75. SUlner H Slichter, Jales E Healy and E Robert Uvernash, I!l~ l~!~t qf ~QU~~tlY~ ~!~q!ll!ll!q 
90 ~~0~9!!!n! (Washington DC: Brookings Institute, 1960), 6. 
76. Lichtenstein, ~ ~!.t, 4. 
77. H A Clegg, ln~ ~n!llq!.llq ~'t~t~~ ~t tIl41!~t~!.!t R~t!Wall~ ill ~[~!t Q~!.tl!'Q (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1979), 126-8. 
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strongly influenced by American "human relations"~ did not have 
to justify itself in quite the same utilitarian way. Neither did 
it have to bow its head before the obligatory altar of anti-
78 
Communism It could be more concerned with the causes of 
conflict and less with its resolution. 
Second, the post-war isolation of the Communist Party , (USA) 
and the dominance of Maoism and neo-Maoist ideas within the 
American New Left reinforced assumptions about the impotence of 
the American working class. The industrial proletariat, wrote the 
influential philosopher Marcuse in the 19605, was "no longer 
qualitatively different from any other class and hence no longer 
79 
capable of cr-eating a qualitatively different society". To 
those who accepted this thesis questions of differentiation 
within this class carried little interest. 
Instead of asking the detailed questions about changing 
patterns of worker and managerial conflict that have been forced 
'78. 'Do not listake us,' pleaded sociologists Scott and HOlans in 1947, ·there are cOllunists in 
Detroit, and cO.lunists are a danger to our for. of governlent, but sOle of the executives were, in 
effect, using cOllunisl as an excuse for not looking a second tile at the thing they had on their 
hands (the warti.e strikes)'; Jerole F Scott and George C Ho.ans, "Reflections on the Wildcat 
Strikes" ~!!tl£!~ ~~£l~l~ql£!l ~!~l!!, 12, no. 3 (June 1947), 283. 
79. Cited in Richard Polenberg, q~! H!tl~~ Ql~l~i.~l!!. ~l~!h ~!£! !1l4 ~t~lll£i.t~ til t~! ~~tt!4 
~!!!~! !!Df! jj}~ (New York: Viking, 1980), 225. 
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on Brit i sh academics, Braverman and his critics Burawoy and 
Gordon ~~ ~! appear to take the process of management for 
gr-anted. They cr e dit management with the capacity to conceive, 
develop and execute a universally effective labour control 
str-ategy. As Littler has pointed out, they look for "a total 
solution ... a conceptual search in order to pin-point the magic 
81 
strategy that successful I y stabl i zed capi tal / I abour- reI at ions II • 
Historians like Preis and Brecher tend to make the reverse error~ 
suggesting that an unproblematic "heroic' working class movement 
of the 1930s was somehow 'betrayed' by forces from within its own 
ranks in the 19405 - -by the 'Stalinists' and/or by Reuther and/or 
by prosper" it y. 
S ,..' ..::. 
The moment these impressions capture the 
moment of consent when subordination is accepted is not 
difficult to theorize around. But the complexity of continued 
worker resistance at the heart of the labour process has 
so. David Cox, "Living and Studying with Capitalisl: SOle cO.lents on the developlent of British 
Industrial Sociology·, Organisation of Sociologists in Polytechnics and Cognate Institutions, Paper 
no. 5 (Hatfield: Hatfield Polytechnic, 1978), 2-0. 
81. Littler, ~ £i.t, 3; Stephen Wood sees the Friedaan and Richard Edwards' approaches as also 
presenting ·.anagelent as olniscient, conspiratorial and able, at least for a certain period of 
tile, to get its ONn Nay - that is, to solve successfully its problel of control'; In! R!gr!~!!!9D 
g! ~gr~l §~!!!~ p!§~!!!!ng !D~ in! h!99Y! fr9f~§§ (London: Hutchinson, 1992), 10. 
B2 . Art Prei s, ~!~Qt:~ €i.!~t ~t!2t I~!llt'l 'lUti qf. th! ~!q, (New York: Pathfinder, 1972); JerelV 
Brecher, ~tti.!!i (Greenwich, Connecticut: Fawcett, 1972). 
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not been tackled. This neglect has meant that although many 
Detroit radicals who worked in the auto industry from the 1940s 
to the 1970s were aware of major differences in shop floor 
traditions, struggle and levels of managerial control between 
83 
Chrysler~ 8M and Ford, their evidence and its implications for 
84 
a theory of managerial control has been largely ignored. The 
challenge is to present the historical dynamic of Am~rican 
working class experience in such a way as to embrace both consent 
within resistance and resistance within conformity without 
idealizing workers by viewing these components of consciousness 
as incompatible. 
Chapter 2 suggests how this can be attempted in 
longitudinal study of one important company and its major plant. 
E33. Interviews by the author with Art Fox (Ford) and Pete Kelly (6H) in 1973; with Edie Fox 
(Chrysler) .in 1981; with Hartin Glaberlan (6K) in 1982; and with John Anderson (SH) in 1981 and 
1982. 
84. Recent ilportant studies not cited elsewhere include: David Noble, ~!~tl£! ~~ R!!lqUt ~£l~U£!L 
lffnng!ggy !ng !n! Bg!! gf ~g[pg[j!! ~!P!!j!!!! (New York: Alfred A Kelpf, 1977); Andrew Zilbalist, 
ed., ~!!! §!Y~i!! in !h! ~!~9r Pr9f!!§ (New York: Monthly Review, 1979). SOle of the lost 
interesting appear to have been triggered largely by the contradictions raised by worker resistance 
and organization during the Second World War: see Nelson Lichtenstein, "Auto Worker Kilitancy and 
the Structure of Factory Life, 1937-1955", ~QytU!l q! ~!!tl£tU ~t~tqt~, Septelber 19801 Hartin 
Glaberlan, ~!ttt!! ~ttt~!~l t~~ ~ttyqql! !q!tU!t t~! Uq:~tti~! 2l!qq! iU tU! ya~ qyttUq ~qt!q ~!t 
II (Detroit: Bewick, 1980); Ruth Hilklan, "Redefining MOlen's work: The sexual division of labor in 
the auto industry during World War II", E!!tUt~t ~tyqt!~, vol S, No 2, SUller 19S2. 
CHAPTER 2 
WHY CHRYSLER? 
Chapter 2 first outlines the methodology and sources used in the 
study. It then gives an overview of Chrysler "s exceptional strike 
rate and of the development of the international UAW "s b argaining 
str-ategies. Finally it poses the questions that introduce the 
narrative parts of the book. 
I. Methodology and Sources 
The importan t debate about the way i n which management exercises 
ccmtr'ol over the l abour process has largely dictated the 
methodology employed in this study. The theories of manageri al 
control exercised by separating the conception of work tasks from 
its e)~ecutic..")n (Braverman) ~ by choosing a direct control or 
responsible autonomy strategy (Friedman) ~ by a workplace-based 
relative autonomy ( Burawoy), or- by bei n9 ,constrai n ed to adopt a 
technical or bureaucratic control s ystem through the impact on 
tt~ labour market of long-term economic sw ings (Gordon ~i §l), 
raise hypotheses that can only be effectively tested in a 
specific historical context. Yet even before this debate focused 
concern on the relations hip of managerial s trategy to shop f loor 
industr-ial I'" e 1 at. i on::, ~ Child had aln~ady that 
organi zational decision-making was a n "essentially polit. ieal 
process" , and thi~t. th e " str" ategi c choi ce" aved. 1 ab 1 e to pm'ler-
holders "extends to the context within which the organization is 
to the s t an d a rds o f performance against which the 
pressure of economic constraints has to be evaluated, 
1 
and t o the 
des i gn of t he orgi..~ni z at ion" s structure i tsel f " • Thurley and Wood 
recent l y developed thi s provisional research framework in two 
di r-ecti ons: first to focus on the s pecific linkages between 
bLusi ness and industrial relations policy; and second to 
crit.icall y examine cl a ims that all act s of industrial relations 
management qualify for the description "strategy". Brea~d n <.;} down 
some of the issues involved in trying to establish a rel a tionship 
between business strategy and industrial relations strategy they 
"s uggest the following key theoretical and empiric.:\l reseal'-eh 
quest.ions: 
Ih~Qr~i!~~! gY~!i!Qn!: 
How far can the actual choice of business strategy be explained in terls of the 'rational' 
choice of lanagers given certain structures and conditions? 
Nhat links can be deduced between business strategy and industrial relations? 
What are the organizational conditions which allow and encourage 'strategic thinking' along 
tanagers? 
;!Pl[lf!! 9Y~~!19D~: 
Which structural constraints on lanage.ent and which structured conditions in any society are 
lore ilportant in shaping lanagerial thinking and action? 
Is there evidence to show the develop,ent of 'strategic thinking' in industrial relations in 
large organizations?2 
1. John Child, ·Organizational Structure, Environ.ent and Perfor.ance: the role of Strategic 
Choice", §Qf!Q!Qgy, h, no. 1 (June 1972), 1-2. 
2. Thurley and Nood, Q.2. £!.t, Table 18.2, 202. 
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These questions lead to three distinct~ although linked, 
areas of investigation: [lJ managerial control over the labour 
pr-ocess and constraints derived from workers' collective 
organization;[2J the constraints upon [lJ exercised by management 
structure and business strategy; and [3J the constraints on both 
[lJ and [2J provided by wider market and political processe~. In 
his study of the Brazilian auto industry, Humphrey has suggested 
groups; of condi ti ons "Olltsi de the workplace" that 
"cruci all y i nf 1 uence management ccmtrol strategi es": the s:.uppl y 
of 1 abour (including its political, ethnic and rei i <.;!i ous 
dimensions); labour legislation; and the form and extent of union 
organization and activity. To these must be added a fourth 
crucial condition:the form and history of management organization 
and activity. It is then possible to endorse Humphrey's argument 
that a factory study can become the basis of generalizations 
about capital-labour relations in society as a whole. 
When these influences are taken into account, the fattory is no longer seen as a subsystel 
largely independent of the wider society. Rather, it betoles a site at whith the relations 
between labor and tapital as a whole are brought to bear on the particular terrain of tontrete 
labor protesses and tontrete lanagerial prattites.4 
The research method adopted here is an historical reconstr-uct ion 
of the industrial relations pattern in a single plant. Detailed 
surveys of the industrial relations systems in single plants are 
3. John HUlphrey, ~!2tt!tt~t ~qQttqt !Q4 ~qt~!t~~ ~tt~qqt!~ tQ th! @t!~ttt!Q ~~tq lQ4~~tt~ 
(Printeton, New Jersey: Printeton University Press, 1982), 8-9. 
4. l~t4. 
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a recognized approach~ but this study is trying to understand 
the dynamics of change, so it has taken one further step. It 
presents a factory micro-historical account over a fifty-year 
period and so tries to overcome the weakness of most industrial 
relations studies that are too close to one situation and of most 
historical studies that are not close enough. 
A longitudinal historical section of Chrysler and Dodge Main 
has several advantages. First~ three generations of autoworkers 
and their managers worked in the plant during the period covered. 
Between 100,000 and 200,000 different men and women had all Dr 
parts of their working lives shaped within Dodge Main"s factory 
walls. By taking the long view and narrowing the focus to one 
plant over such a long period of time detailed consideration can 
be given to the process of change in their lives. A smaller plant 
than the average 20,000-30,000 strong Hamtramck-based complex 
would not have polled so many experiences; while the larger River 
Rouge is both already better known and, as a result of the 
idiosyncracies of Henry Ford I, is significantl y less typical in 
the 1930s of the general development of unionism than was 
6 
Chrysler and Dodge Main. Second~ the selection of a plant as 
central to Chrysler"s business activities as Dodge Main that 
employed between 10% and 30% of its entire workforce~ allows top 
5. Jales W Kuhn, ~ £~t; Batstone, Boraston and Fenkel, Q2 £~t; Beynon, ~2 £it. 
6 . Work in progress on the River Rouge plant and UAW Local 600 by Helson Lichtenstein should 
prOvide a valuable cOlparative study to the present one of Dodge Kain. 
41 
management"s company-wide policy to be fairly closely monitored. 
Third, since tenth largest 
corporation for most of this period, and a key "core" firm in the 
post-war economy before it made America"s biggest-ever loss of 
more than $1 billion in 1979, it is possible to make useful 
intra-firm comparisons with the other major automakers, General 
Motors and Ford. The comparative element is important because 
similar changes in technology and the business climate can b e 
shown to have impacted differently at Chrysler than at GM or 
For'd, highlighting the differences in managerial and shop floor 
responses. MacDonald "s twenty-year-old study of colI ect i v~? 
bargaining in the US auto industry had already observed that 
"under" collective bar"gaining ••• differences in labor practises 
wer e in large part attributable to the differences in the 
jLtdgment, skill and fewesi ght e>:erci sed by respective 
management.s". By put.ting Chrysler under this microscope it is 
Possible to go further and suggest reasons for MacDonald " s 
7 
"differences in t.he quality of mani.~gement". 
Finally, the concrete historical study of what Maitland 
8 
call s "processes at tht:: mi cr"o 1 evel " , also tests the relevance 
---------------------------
7. Robert M MacDonald, ~QU~£U't~ ~~~q~!.~!.~q !.~ t~~ al!tQ!Q~U~ t~ql!!tnt a !tl!c!~ Qf. ~~q~ 
~ttl!£tl!t~~ ~~c! ~Q!~~t!.t!.'t~ ~~l~t!'Q~~ (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), 396-7, 400. 
(3, Ian Maitland, lh~ ~!I!~~~ Qf. t~41!~t~!.~l ~!'~Qt4~tt a ~Q!~!t!'~Q~ Qf. ~ ~t!.it!h !rrc! ! €~t!!Q E~£tQt~ 
(London: Routledge, Kegan and Paul, 1993), lOB. 
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of the managerial control hypotheses outlined above and the value 
of the conceptual categories a dvanced in Chapter 1: that there is 
an important distinction between managerial power and managerial 
authority; that struggled-for restraints playa key role in 
creating the workplace legitimacy that limits managerial 
aLlthori ty; and that shop floor organizational independence from 
both management and the international union is necessary to 
s ustain those restraints. As Friedlander argues~ a Single-plant 
study allows "a ccmcreten~?ss" lacking in both institutional 
9 
and 
populist/syndicali st approaches. 
Sources 
The sources available for the study present another reason 
to describe it as an historical reconstruction rather than 
, hi story' . For while the archives of Dodge Local 3~ now at Wayne 
State University's Walter Reuther Library~ were a very rich 
source for the researcher, financial stringency at Chrysler 
Corporation had closed management's archives. The same crisis 
however~ a useful bonus: following the interest aroused 
by the biggest-ever federal bai 1 aLit, Chrysler'S management 
s tructure and business policy came under scrutiny in two very 
Useful studies by American auto industry journalists: 
---------------------------
9 ... Friedlander, QP. ~.!.t, 111. 
"+3 
R. Stuart, and the still more substantial §ging fg[ ~[9k§1 1b§ 
gh[~§!§[ §tQ[~ by Michael Moritz and Barrett Seaman. These 
accounts, together with the relevant archive material in the 
Reuther Library, 
Bernstein~ 
allowed 
Sidney 
and the studies of the period by Irving 
Fine, Nelson Lichtenstein and Howell Harris~ 
the reconstruction of Chrysler management's 
organizational structure~ 
the study. 
politics and business policy giv~n in 
The focus of the study on the frontier of managerial shop 
floor authority lead to a major concern with strikes as . a 
measurable indicator of conflict. It was greatly assisted here by 
two series of strike statistics made available to the author by 
Chrysler Corporation and by General Motors. These ran from 1940 
to 1980 and recorded the hours lost in both authorized and 
unauthorized strikes that were reported to their respective 
corporate labour relations departments. Combined with yearly 
average employment figures~ fairly sensitive strike frequency and 
loss ratio statistics could be developed, providing an important 
empirical basis for comparisons between the levels of open 
industrial conflict between the two companies. 
The reconstruction of management labour relations policy and 
the availability of these indexes of labour conflict were the 
starting 
between 
point for a detailed examination of 
this policy and the changing level of 
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the relationship 
conflict. This 
required extensive use of the Dodge Local 3 collection referred 
to above. The material researched included the very valuable and 
almost complete run of the QQ~g! ~i!n ~§~~. This local newsheet 
began as the QQ~g§ ~y!!!t!O during the 1937 st~ike and appeared 
on a tWice-weekl'Y basis from then until the plant was closed. The 
collection also included a complete set of local and local 
executive board minutes dating from the attempt to build an 
American Federation of Labor (AFL) local in the plant in 1933, 
.nd a set of minutes of stewards' meetings from 1937 to 1940. The 
correspondence files of the Local 3 president and recording 
secretary and the local ' s grievance files from 1950 until 1972 
were also used~ as were the miscellaneous Local 3 boxes that 
included material on the 1930s and on DRUM. The only restriction 
here was the library·s ten-year closed access rule, so it was not 
Possible to obtain as detailed observations for the period since 
1972 as it was for the period before. Important additional 
archive material was also made available to me by Ed Liska, Local 
3 president from 1968 to 1972: a nearly complete set of early 
DRUM bulletins, a daily diary he kept of the events around the 
May 1968 DRUM strike, and his personal files of notes on assembly 
grievances from 1969 to 1972. 
Other important UAW collections accessed at the Walter 
Reuther library were the following: Chrysler Department, Research 
Department, Local 51, Local 7, Local 889 and the Association of 
Catholic Trade Unionists. Individual collections that were very 
Useful included: Walter Reuther, Richard Frankensteen, John 
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Zaremba, Han-y Ross, George Addes, Emil Mazey, Arthur Hughes~ 
Frank Marquart and Bernard Hoffman. Together, these archival 
sc)urces a mass of material that v-Jas then pI aced j, n 
conte:-:t 
provided 
through contemporary, mainly Detroit-based newspaper 
accounts of the events, through reading many of the oral 
histories taped twenty years ago for Wayne State University's 
labour archive library, and thr-ough conducting additional' oral 
interviews myself. The most useful oral histories accessed were 
those of John Zaremba, HarTY Ross, Frank MarqLIC\r't, Richard 
Frankensteen and Arthur Hughes. others consulted included: 
Kenn(: th Bannon, Jack Beni, aoseph Ferris, Ber-t Foster, 
Jenson, Norman Matthews, Lew Mi chener', Patrick O'Malley, Nat 
Ganley and Carl Haessler. 
A contemporary assessment of industrial relations 
developments in the auto industry was provided in a series of 
interviews with corporate executives conducted in June 1982: at 
Gen er' a I l'lot or s (8M) with Fred Haubold, International Labor 
Relations Director, John Maciarz, Public Relations Executive~ at 
Ford: Ernie Savoie, Labor Relations Director, ~lack Barnes, 
Economic Analysis Director; and at Chrysler Dick Clancy, Labor 
Relations Executive, and Bob Heath, Public Relations Executive. 
The biggest problem for the present research into the labour 
process and shop floor organization with these interviews by Jack 
Skeel, i s that the questions he asked were primarily aimed at 
soliCiting replies about the !Dig~D~i!QD~l UAW. The resul tis 
46 
that the word II stewar-d", for eN ampl e, onl y appeiars c::mce or t.1o'.i ce, 
and he treated the sinews of shop floor organization as 
unproblematic. This omission was partly rectified in a small 
number of additional interviews conducted by the author in 1981 
,-and 1982: with former Dodge Main workers Gertrude Nalezty, Edie 
Fo>: , Ed Liska and Robert Jenson, and with former Dodge Main 
personnel manager Dick Clancy. These interviews were in turn 
assisted greatly by the earlier research conducted by the author 
on a joint oral history with John W Anderson, a Df'::troi t 
autoworker from 1927 to 1966. This study, covering in depth the 
life of a rank and file autoworker who was based in the GM 
Fleetwood Cadillac plant for thirty years from 1936, helped 
considerably in exploring the central themes of the present 
research: how and why was Chrysler different? And what does this 
di-fference tell us about the processes which shaped the wider 
American working class? 
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II. Chrysler strikes: 1937-1980 
Strikes are one measurable indicator of conflict about the limits 
10 
of workplace subordination of workers by management. Chrysler 
experienced significantly more large and more unauthorized 
strikes per employee than General Motors and Ford from 1937 to 
1958. These two decades of high strike frequency contrast with a 
much reduced strike rate during the 1960s and 1970s~ but even 
then Chrysl~r workers were on strike more often than 8M or Ford 
workers. 
Large Strikes 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) lists individual 
strikes involving over 10~OOO workers in the motor vehicle and 
11 
motor vehicle equipment industry from 1937 to 1978. Table 1 
aggregates this large-strike data by company~ providing a crude 
indicator of the differences between Chrysler~ Ford and 8M. 
During the four decades considered~ Chrysler experienced over 
twice as many big strikes as Ford~ and slightly more than 8M 
despite having a workforce smaller than Ford and less than a 
quarter of 8M's size: 
leI. KG J C Knowles, ~ttt~~~:! ~tY4Y tQ !Q4Y~ttt~l ~QQilt£t (Oxford: Blackwell, 19521, 210; 
Richard HYlan, ~ttt~~~ (london: Fontana, rev.ed. 1977), 112. 
11. BlS, ti~ (October 1959), Table 3, 5-11; BlS, ~Ii (Septelber 19791, Table 2, 6-12. 
48 
TABlE 1 
LARGE AUTO STRIKES, IIMI.YIIii OYER 10,000 IIORKERS, 1937-1978 
~![g~ !Y!Q ?![!!~? 
1937-1958 1959-1978 Total 
No. aFrequency No. Frequency 
Chrysler 20 .26 3 .03 23 
General Motors 10 .03 11 .03 21 
Ford 5 .04 4 .03 9 
Briggs 8 
Hudson 10 
Packard 3 
I. Harvester 2 2 4 
Studebaker 2 
Kaiser-Frazer 1 
Multi-corporation 2 
"Ierican Motors 3 
9~ ~~ 
-----------------------------------------------------------
SOURCE: BLS Reports 149, 574; coapany elployaent data. 
NOTES: a. Frequency rate is based on the nUlber of large strikes per 1,000 hourly paid workers. 
The cOlpanies average hourly eaploYlent is calculated on cOlpany data for 1940-1958. 
While Ford, 8M and International Harvester experienced large 
strikes right across the four d e cades, Chrysler ' s large strikes 
were concentrated before 1959 a nd its large s trike frequ e ncy r a t e 
12 
d r opped to the industry ' norm' after 1959. 
12 . There is a danger in over-reliance on the large strike data since Chrysler and Ford 
concentrated their productive facilities at Dodge "ain and the River Rouge frol the 19305 to the 
1950s. This will clearly have raised their propensity to have strikes involving large nUlbers of 
workers, since the effect of saall departlental or sectional strikes will naturally have a speedier 
lultiplier effect on lay-offs (the nUlbers directly and indirectly involved are not segregated in 
the BLS statistics) than in the slaller and lore geographically dispersed G" plants, where only the 
\ Chevrolet Division in Flint is in any sense directly cOlparable to Dodge "ain or the River Rouge. 
The frequency rates are also not strictly cOlparable since a higher proportion of Chrysler and Ford 
hourly paid workers were exclusively esployed in -autolobile asselbly than was the case in GK. They 
can therefore only be relied upon to provide a trend. 
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Authorized and unauthorized strikes 
Chrys l e r a nd GM c ount UAW-au t hor i zed s trikes s eparatel y from 
unauthor iz ed ones , and can provide t h e numb e rs of man-hours lost 
1 3 
from 19 4 0 to 198 0 . Table 2 outlines a p a t tern fam i liar to 
observe rs o f th e Brit i sh c a r indus try: a ll but 21. o f Chrys ler " s 
recorded s tr i kes between 1940 an d 1980 were unauthorized: 
TABlE 2 
... STI:I'PA6ES AT DltYSLER'S US LOCATlIIIS, 1940-1980 
Five yearly 
averages 
1940-44 
1945-49 
1950-54 
1955-59 
1960-64 
1965-69 
1970-74 
1975-79 
1980 
B~~M!! BY!f!9! ~M!g!f Q! ~!ri~!~ 
Unauthorized Authorized 
110 0 
120 a 
128 b 
289 1.2 
14 2.2 
46 1.6 
62 4.6 
33 6 
3 0 
B~nM!! BY!f!9! ~!nnQMr! !Q!! in ~!fi~!§ 
Unauthorized Authorized 
485,882 0 
1,118,437 a 
1.644,510 b 
2,471,528 1,458,212 
81,394 284,891 
359,975 514,749 
308,813 1,174,001 
215,179 120,532 
39,269 0 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL 
1940-1980: 
SOURCE: COlpany data. 
4,009 c81 33,467,861 90,964,399 
NOTES: [alOne authorized .strike in 1948 Nith 9,572,968 lanhours lost. [bJ rNO authorized strikes: a 
104 day strike in 1950 Nith 53,614,805 lanhours lost (tNO thirds of the total lanhours lost in 
authorized stoppages over the Nhole 41 yearsl, and one in 1952 Nith 14,700 lanhours lost. [cl There 
were only three authorized strikes [see notes (al and (bll frOB 1940 to 1956. Frol 1957 to 1980 
there Nere authorized strikes in every year except 1965, 1972, 1975 and 1980. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------
13 . Chrysler Corporation, October 26 1981, letter to author; G", Septnber 15 1982, letter to 
author. On the plausible assulption that these aggregated plant-level reports to corporate 
headquarters do record accurately the International UAN-authorized strikes, then although the 
relainder are lore subject to the subjective interests of local lanagelent to show up or cover up 
stoppages, they do provide a better index of the unauthorized strikes than the lore arbitrary lethod 
of assul ing that strikes Nhich last three days or less "during terl of agreelent " Nere by definition 
un~ onstitutional, as P Yo EdNards, Nas obliged to do; ~t~t~~! t~ t~~ YUtt~4 ~t~t~!L !~~!:!~I~ 
(Oxford: BlackNell, 19811, 190. 
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Unauthorized strikes predominated during the 1940s and 19505, 
with a dramatic drop in 1959 followed by a small but distinct 
recovery from 1966 providing four lesser peaks of strike activity 
- in 1968, 1970, 1973 and 1977. Two thirds of all strikes 
authorized against Chrysler from 1940 to 1980 occurred in that 
same ten year period. The sharp break in strike trend in 1959 
is repeated for man-hours lost. Eighty-four per cent of tHe 33.5 
million man - hours lost in unauthorized strikes over all four 
14 
decades were lost between 1940 and 1958. The year 1959 was 
also a turning point in the UAW's willingness to sanction 
official action against Chrysler outside of the national contract 
15 
negotiations. 
Chrysler's strike frequency rate (the frequency with which 
strikes occurred per 1,000 Chrysler manual employees), shown in 
Table 3, confirms a dramatic change in strike pattern after 1959: 
---------------------------
14. So were 85.91 of the total 81 lillion lan-hours lost in authorized strikes - a reflection of 
the lassive losses in the lajor contract strikes of 1948 and 1950. 
15. These negotiations took place annually until 1947 when the first longer-terl agreelent was 
Signed. Subsequently, long-ter. contracts have been negotiated in 1948, 1950, 1955, 1958, 1961, 
1964, 1967, 1970, 1973, 1976, 1979 and 1982. The 1982 contract was only signed in January 1983 after 
a strike by Canadian Chrysler workers. Before 1958 the UAN only authorized non-contract-year strikes 
tWice, in 1952 and 1957. But between 1959 and 1980, while authorized strikes took place in all seven 
contract-years (losing 6.5. lanhours), the UAW also authorized strikes in a further 11 non-contract-
years (causing Chrysler to lose 21.11 lanhours). 
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TABlE 3 
CHRYSlER AID 6EIIERAL IIlTMS, STRIKE FRECIlIIICY RATES PER 1000 HDlIIlY PAID IDlERS, 1940-1979 
Five 
yearly 
averages 
1940-44 
1945-49 
1950-54 
1955-59 
1960-64 
1965-69 
1970-74 
1975-79 
~b[n!~[ 
Unauthorized All strikes 
strikes/l000 frequency 
1.57 1.57 
1. 74 1. 75 
1.47 1.47 
3.50 3.52 
.23 .26 
.48 .50 
.62 .66 
.35 .41 
a 
§~~!H! ~g!g[§ 
Unauthorized All strikes 
strikes/l000 frequency 
.24 .24 
.13 .13 
.11 .11 
.10 .11 
.09 .10 
.09 .21 
.07 .11 
.02 .06 
--------------~----------------------------------------------------------------
SOURCE: Co.pany data. 
NOTE: a.S" data not available for 1940,1941 and 1975. The averages for 1940-44 and 1975-79 are 
therefore calculated on less than the full five year spans. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The average annual unauthorized strike frequency was five times 
higher in the 20 years from 1940 than in the 20 years from . 1960. 
From 1941 to 1958 Chrysler's a ll-str i ke frequency only fell below 
one per 1,000 hourly- paid workers in two years (1953 and 1954); 
While after 1958 it only reached 0.9 per 1,000 twice (in 1968 and 
, 
1977). At GM, by contrast, the average unauthorized frequency 
started at a much lower level and was merely halved over the last 
t"'JC) decades. 
Two graphs on the following pages demonstrate diff e rent 
aspects of the divergent strike rates between Chrysler and 8M 
s..ince 1940. Figure 1 graphs t.he Chrysler and GI'1 
ICr '"') 
...1 .<. 
t:'" -" W·._' 

strike frequencies on an annual basis and shows a major 
divergence between the two companies from 1955 to 1960. 
Chrysler"s unauthorized strike loss ratio (the number of manhours 
lost per worker) graphed in Figure 2, highlights the contrasting 
record between Chrysler and GM from 1946 to 1959 and the late 
19505 hiatus at Chrysler: the unauthorized loss rate only fell 
below 10 hours a year twice between 1941 and 1958, and onty once 
reached 10 hours in the years that followed. The narrative parts 
of the book explain the movement of the pattern of conflict at 
Chrysler from unauthorized to authorized strikes~ and then to 
virtually no strikes~ in relation to changes in management and 
union organization. What part did the international union play 
in this process, and how did its influence grow over time? 
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I 
III. UAW bargaining: An overview 
Shop floor orga nization in the Big Three auto makers and in their 
dif f erent plant s reflected both the dynamic . of particular 
man a g e ments and the changing policy and degree of intervention of 
the international United Automobile Workers of America CUAW). To 
the extent that it had the capacity to predetermine a policy and 
then consistently impleme nt it, the UAW · s bargaining strategy 
from its foundation in 193 5 to America"s entry into World War II 
was largely to win and then retain union recognition. In this 
pe riod local organiz a tion wa s only controlled very loosely by the 
international. From 1941 to the late 1950s, under both presidents 
R J Thomas (1939-1946) .and Walt e r Reuther (1946-1970) it foc used 
on s tandardising and improving wages and non-wag e benefit s in the 
major compani e s " plants. During these years the International 
Executive Board (IEB) only rarely authori z ed any local strikes, 
and the immediate struggl e ove r s hop floor managerial authority 
was effectively abandoned by the international: plant - by- plant 
and s e ction-by-section strikes did break out but they We r e 
16 
unauthorized and usua lly illegal. 
---------------------------
16. I.HoNe and B J Widick cOllented on the Nave of Nidlcat strikes that occurred against speed-up 
at all three lajor autolakers in the first quarter of 1949: "These Nildcats Nere due to speedup, 
Nhich, the union charged, had lade Norking conditions intolerable. For the UAW, hONever, they 
represented a serious problel and threatened to upset its entire 1949 Nage-and-pension strategy"; 
IQ~ Y8~ !u4 ~!lt~[ R~~tQ~[ (NeN York: RandOl, 19491, 182. 
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The consequences for shop floor and local union organization 
of this simultaneous centralization of collective bargaining and 
neglect of job conditions by the international varied according 
to the size and tradition of the different locals. Where a local 
was small or politically subservient to the ruling UAW faction 
and so highly dependent upon the international when conflict 
devel clped Io'Ji. th its management, then the effect o~ the 
establishment of collective bargaining at international level was 
debilitating for local union cirganization. As Hyman has argued: 
"The ability to negotiate with the employer(s) over a significant 
range of issues represents a source of power within trade 
unionism: centralised bargaining over the main substantive 
conditions of employment normally consolidates the control of the 
17 
central negotiators over the union member-ship." anI yin 
particularly large plants or where strong shop steward or left 
Political traditions prevailed was there a countervailing power 
SOurce which could turn the international ' s neglect of local 
working conditions to its own advantage by claiming them as a 
legitimate area for its own independent activity. For the most 
Part, the 1949 observation by Howe and Widick that because of 
"the changed relationship betli'Jeen the Llnion and t.he 
corporations ... the steward, while still important in the shop, 
seemed to be less powerful in the union than he had been in the 
18 
thirties" , appears close to the mark. 
---------------------------
17. HYlan (1975], 1lR. ~.tt, 116. 
18. Howe and Widick, IlR. ~tt, 239-240. 
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Following the 1955 achievement of contract standardisation 
and what was effectively industry-wide joint-employer bargaining, 
the terrain of bargaining shifted. The expansion of the industry, 
the desire of management to introduce automation and tighter 
production standard procedures and the resulting multiplication 
of grievances, created pressures on mangement to extend formal 
bargaining at the plant level whether the UAW liked it or not. 
So , partly to retain control over the local agreements that were 
becoming commonplace, and partly because the companies pushed 
them as supplements rather than alternatives to the national 
contracts, the Reuther administration agreed, experimentally in 
1958~ and throughout the industry in 1961, to allow locals to 
negotiate formal agreements with their managements. But this was 
not devolution of centralized union control: the agreements had 
to be ratified by the international and lasted the full term of 
19 
the national agreement. 
The extension of the UAW- authorized area of bargaining had 
an unintended con s equence: the international found itself 
obliged, not me rely to authorize local strikes at the termination 
---------------------------
1 (t. Jack Stieber argues that a 'Iajor difference' beween the British and Alerican industrial 
relations systels, is in the nature of these supplelentary agreelents: in the United States, 'these 
supplelentary agreelents are negotiated by local union officials or cOllittees, usually assisted by 
one or lore full-tile union representatives, and lust adhere to the standards negotiated in the 
overall agreelent at the industry or association level. Furtherlore, the local agree.ents lust 
Usually be approved by the national union as lust a strike over failure to reach a settle.ent.' This 
accounts for the greater frequency of authorized plant-level strikes in the US than in Britain, 
s ggests Stieber; 'Unauthorized Strikes under the A.erican and British Industrial Relations 
Systels', ~[ltl~~ ~q~t~!t qi l~~~~ttl!l R!t!tlqrr~, 6, no. 2 (July 19681, 235-7. 
58 
of the national contracts~ but also to authorize larger numbers 
of local strikes on strikeable issues that were effectively in 
defence of these local contracts. This spin-off effect of the 
greater participation by the international in local bargaining 
impacted on General Motors and Ford as well as on Chrysler. At GM 
only 10 strikes had been authorized between 1942 and 1956~ I.'Jhi 1 e 
in the five years after 1961 the international authorized ~4. At 
Chr"ysler, with less than a quarter as many separate locations, 
the totals of authorized strikes rose from three between 1942 and 
20 
1956 to 11 between 1962 and 1967 and 13 between 1968 and 1972. 
Plant-level conflict was increasingly channelled through the 
international - a tendency which became still more apparent 
after 1970 when the UAW ran deeply into debt in a nationwide 
strike against GM. 
The heavy costs incurred in the two-month battle led 
Reuther"s successor as UAW president, Leonard Woodcock ( 1970-
1977) , to centralize still further the UAW"s supplementary 
bargaining strategy. Since 1970 GM has not been challenged again 
in a head - on national struggle, and UAW policy there and at 
Chr-ysl er- whose economic position was considered too weak to 
select for a lengthy national strike - became to exert national 
---------------------------
20. COlpany data. 
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21 
leverage by a series of individual plant strikes. The ne~J 
international strategy of confronting the automakers locally 
rather than nationally meant~ as the figures for Chrysler and 8M 
show~ the numbers of authorized strikes in the second half of the 
19705 rose significantly above the level of the late 1950s and 
22 
early 19605: 
Chrysler Sea.rill IIotars 
1957-1967 1.8 7.7 
1974-1979 5.5 19.2 
Neither a sign of increased militancy on the part of the 
international~ nor of increased combativity by the automakers~ 
the greater involvement of the international in manifest conflict 
reflected the deterioration of what remained of local union 
autonomy within the UAW. 
The autonomy of the UAW's locals had been written into the 
constitution in 1939 when the UAW's second president, Homer 
Martin, was in the process of trying to split the four-year-old 
---------------------------
21. In 1973, for exalple, the international inforlally encouraged action by seven Chrysler plants 
(including a half shift strike at Dodge "ain instigated by president Andy Hardy) on the expiry of 
the 1970 contract. Noodcock, sti'll in negotiations, then called an official strike but did not 
break off talks with lanagelent. This lanoeuvre allowed hil to release the pressure building up in 
the rank and file, while keeping tight control of the strike lovelent and giving hilself tile to 
finalize agreelent with the corporation just one week later. Interview with Dick Clancy, Chrysler 
Corporation Labor Relations Executive and Personnel "anager at Haltralck Asselbly, 1969-1980, July 
28 1982. 
22. COlpany data. 
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4":" 
union. The regained autonomy came under threat during World War 
II when the IEB implemented the No Strike Pledge and took 
disciplinary action against certain local officers who defied it. 
Most accounts now endorse Cochran ' s view as to what happened 
after World War · II: "Reuther's take-over spelled the end of the 
auto union's turbulent democracy; it triggered a rapid internal 
bureaucratization~ and what had been a phenomenon of plGralism 
24 
was snuffed out." In 1949 Reuther got agreement from the 
convention for the IEB to institute disciplinary action against 
members when thei~ own locals wouldn't, and he first attempted to 
introduce biennial international conventions. He got these in 
1951. That year he tried to get biennial local union elections 
introduced but only won agreement for them to be held every two 
years if the local wished. He finally succeeded in getting two-
25 
yearly-elections made mandatory in 1957. In 1950 he tightened 
his absolute hold over the IEB by closing access to and 
centralizing his own caucus: afterwards it only met in full 
during conventions. Between conventions any policy decisions 
needed were taken by a national steering committee of 200 local 
officers, while smaller regional steering committees picked the 
---------------------------
2 3. Bert Cochran, ~!~Q.~ !1!4 ~Q.!!I!'lt~!t t~! ~Q.I!Utc;t t~!t ~~~1!4 ~!!~ic;!1! M'ltql!~ (Pri nceton: 
Princeton University Press, 1977), 143. 
24. t~t4, 279; John Anderson and steve Jefferys, "The life story of a rank and file autollorker" 
(Unpublished KS: forthcoling, 1984), Chapter 7; Frank Karquart ~'l ~~tq~Q.t~I!~~~ ~Q.~~I!!l (University 
Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 1975), 139: • ••• follolling Walter Reuther's 
cOlplete victory in 1947, the UAW's delocratic kind of factionaiisl lias rapidly transforled into a 
one-party state." 
25. Jack Stieber, qQ.Y!~l!t'lq t~! M~~ (Nell Yorkl Wiley and Sons, 1962), 132, 35-6. 
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26 
candidates the Reutherites would support. The 1950s also saw a 
considerable expansion of the numbers of full-time international 
staff: while membership rose 21% between 1949 and 1960~ the 
number of UAW staff based in Detroit and in the regions rose by 
40% to 660. This represented a major consolidation of Reuther's 
power: dozens of them were former militant opponents who were now 
27 
brought in line; and their average age by 1961 was 49 years with 
28 
an average service length of ten and a half years. From the 
rapidly changing international staff of the 1930s and 1940s~ 
Reuther had forged a permanent union bureaucracy that gave him 
total loyalty and was now too old to ever return to the plants. 
In the 1960s this apparatus effectively took over from the old 
Reuther caucus: he no longer needed a power base capable of 
acting outside the union machine once the old strongholds of 
oPposition in the massive River Rouge and Dodge Main complexes 
had been brought to heel and as the union began to recruit 
significantly outside auto. As the union grew to over 1.5 million 
members, its size and the monolithic character of its 
international apparatus ensured that opposition could be 
restricted to isolated locals. 
--------------------------
26. Cochran, ~ ~tt, 325. 
27. 
330. 
Hirvey Swados, "The UAN - Over the top· or over the hill?", ~t~~t~t, X, no. 4 IAutuln 1963), 
28. Stieber [1962], ~ ~tt, 92-4. 
62 
In the 1970s~ the greater involvement of international reps 
in plant issues and politics not only reshaped the strike 
pattern~ but it helped to influence collective bargaining in a 
way that prepared the ground for the later concessions and "non-
adVel'"'ScH- i al " bargai n i ng. While national contests of strength 
between the UAW and some of America"s largest employers remained 
a regular occurrence, the UAW remained in certain ideologital and 
organizational ways, a combative institution. National 'trials of 
strength" helped cover up the qualitative evolution of local 
bargaining away from questions such as track speeds~ control of 
overtime ~nd movement of labour. In the 1950s and 1960s local 
officers negotiated more widely with plant management on issues 
Which constituted less and less any real challenge to managerial 
But as long as there was a prospect the UAW would 
issue the automakers with a national challenge, then the 
international had to retain a confrontation capacity, and its 
local officers had to keep a certain distance ' from their 
managers. Industrial relations took the fQ~m of " advel'"'sary 
ban;Jai ni ng:' 
\ 
even if, cLlstomar i 1 y, they lacked any real 
bitterness. 
In the 1 ate 1970s as a.dver-sary bargai ni ng graduall y gave way 
t:o what Ford"s labour relations chief Ernie Savoie calls 
29 
"appl'"'opriate mutLlalism"~ national confrontations became less 
---------------------------
29. L!tt!r to author frot Erni! Savoie, Ford Labor Relations Director, Octob!r 23 1982. 
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likely and the role of local officers became less ambivalent. No 
longer required to adopt regular anti-managerial poses at the 
behest of the international~ it was a natural progression for 
them to increasingly emphasize the mutual interests their own 
considerably-privileged positions as full-time officers meant 
they shared with management. 
By the 1980s~ the internatibnal UAW·s central strategizing 
capacity had evolved to the point where all it could do was 
articulate an alternative business survival strategy (import 
controls to protect profits and jobs). The paradox of the UAW 
calling more authorized strikes as it both became more 
centralized and less independent of management was resolved as 
both authorized and unauthorized strikes seemingly withered 'away. 
Why and how this happened is one of several questions prompted by 
the Chrysler evidence; other issues are raised in the next 
section. 
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IV. Questions 
~------------
Chrysler's strike history was clearly very different from the 
other major American automobile manufacturers. Ch~ysler had more 
large s trikes between 193 7 and 1958 than its rivals Ford and 8M; 
unlike 8M, Chrysler went through a major labour relation~ crisis 
from 1957 to 1959; and over forty years Chrysler's strike 
30 
frequency averaged ten times 8M's. The three major national 
31 
post - war contract clashes between the UAW and 8M meant 8M's 
UAW- authorized loss rate was a little higher than Chrysler ' S: 
34.8 hours pe r worker compared to 28.2 hours. But the major 
difference between Chrysler and 8M was in the number and size of 
unauthorized strikes. For every hour a worker lost on 
unauthorized strike at 8M, the Chrysler worker lost 8.2 hours. 
Only twice in 40 years was thi s s trike loss ratio greater at 8M 
than at Chrys ler. While 29% of all lost manhours at Chrysler were 
incurred during unauthorized strikes, at 8M the proportion was 
just four per c e nt. 
Thi s book suggests the re is much that can be learned about 
the American working class, the labour process and managerial 
control by looking both at the changing pattern of conflict at 
---------------------------
3(1. Unfortunately cOlparable data was not lade available to Ie by Ford. 
3 1. In 1945-46 and 1970, and in the wave of authorized local strikes in 1958. 
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the point of production and at the changing political world 
within which managers and managers exist and which also 
structures workplace legitimacy. It focuses on what is seen as 
an exceptional company and an exceptional plant, Chrysler's Dodge 
Main, from the first trace of mass unionism in 1933 to the 
economic recession of 1979-82 when the plant was closed. The book 
demonstrates that a considerable degree of shop floor restraint 
over management and independent (from the international union 
machine of the United Automobile Workers) departmental problem-
SolVing existed in Chrysler until the late 1950s, some time after 
they were lost in 8M and Ford. It explains this early difference 
as a series of unintended outcomes that arose out the interaction 
of Chrysler management structure, labour relations strategy and 
market situation wit.h an increasingly "rights" conscious laboLlr 
force. The three years from 1957 to 1959 were a watershed in 
Chrysler labour relations, but aspects of the earlier tradition 
Survived through to a conjuncture with the black movement of the 
late 1960s and early 1970s. A second significant shift in the 
balance of forces between management and labour in Chrysler 
oCcurred in the mid - 1970s, finally eliminating the earlier 
---------------------------
.,.,'"'\ 
,-'..::,. Approaching a sililar analysis in his lost recent essay, Burawoy abandons hili earlier 
elphasis on the exclusive autonolY of the workplace in creating 'consent' (see chapter 1 above) and 
argues against 'theories of production that ignore its political 10Ients'. He suggests that 'the 
prOctss of production contains political and ideological ele.ents as well as a purely econolic 
10Ient". He now views the 'factory regile' as a "political apparatus' that regulates struggles over 
'the politics of production". Interestingly, frol the standpoint of this author, Burawoy's apparent 
change of heart has cOle about in the process of trying to reconcile his Chicago piecework shop with 
one in Kanchester; [1983] 9~ f!~, 587. 
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combative tradition and preparing the way for Chrysler workers' 
precedent-setting acceptance of concessions between 1979 and 
1981. 
Can Chrysler be simply dismissed as an exception? Or was it 
the tip of an ice-berg of post-war shop floor struggle that has 
remained hidden from history? By suggesti ng that the te'rms of 
workplace control were still in contention throughout the last 
fifty years at Chrysler the account challenges the insistence on 
a rigid tripartite periodization of recent American working class 
history into the "militant" 1930s, a passive continuity from 
World War Tw6 to the late 1960s, and a new "mi 1 i tancy" in the 
33 
late 1960s and 1970s. The Chrysler evidence suggests fewer 
divergences between the American and By- i ti sh workplace 
34 
experience than have usually been assumed. This would support 
the conclusion that the American working class is not 
internationally peculiar and would help explain why workers" 
responses to the late 1970s recession has been remarkably similar 
in both countries. This book will have done its task if it helps 
, 
persuade others to continue with the search to uncover the true 
---------------------------
33. This is the Idecay of hoaogenizationl, iollowed by the Iseqaentation of labor l followed in 
turn by the Idecay oi seglentationl presented in Gordon !! ~!, gp ~!!, 12-16. 
34. In an analysis that could have accurately described aany oi the problen faced by Chrysler 
lanagelent, Thurley and Mood pose the problel large British fir.s have in developing a strategic 
approach to industrial relations: IHost problels arise frol the unanticipated consequences of 
organizational structures and reward systels developed to solve specific tasks and problels or to 
leet 'inforlal' political pressures"; Thurley and Wood, q~ £it, 223. 
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contours of American working class resistance - as it happened 
and happening, and not to write it off if it didn't occur 
according to the researcher"s tastes. 
The evidence of Chrysler's "exceptional ism" forces four key 
questions. Why did such a high level of observable conflict at 
Chrysler occur outside the official UAW channels before 1959? 
Why did the years 1957-59 constitute so dramatic a turning point? 
What was the significance of the strike upturn of 1967-77? And 
the question we turn to first in Part Two: why did shop floor 
labour relations develop differently in the major automobile 
manufacturers? 
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PART TWO 
AUTOCRACY AND RESISTANCE 
1928-1941 
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CHAPTER 3 
PASSING ADVERSITY 
LABOR AND POLITICS IN THE 19305 
The years from the election of President Hoover in 1928 to the 
entry of the United States into World War II 
1 
in 1941 were 
momentous. 'Prosperity' turned to depression; federal government 
intervened in social and economic planning; and the structure of 
today's automobile tndustry was formed. But possibly the most 
enduring change wa s that which took place in the relationship 
between management and workers. 
I. Overview 
The change in .labour relations is seen starkly in the figures of 
trade union density. For, whatever other implications union 
membership had subsequently, in the 1930s it meant opposition to 
arbitrary dictates of management; and successful unioni s m, 
growth in members, meant workers actively placing restraints on 
---------------------------
1 • Irving Bernstein, !~~ ~~!rr Y~![~t ! ~t~tqty qf t~~ ~!~tt£!rr ~qt~~[L !~fQ:!~~~ (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1960), 47-82, de.onstrates that the benefits of the undoubted erono.ir growth of the 1920s 
largely .issed A.erican workers. 
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The number of union members fell from 3. 2 7 
million in 1928 to 2.81 million in 1933 before rising to 3.93 
million in 1936~ and then more than doubled to 8.41 million in 
Fi41 • As a percentage of the potential non-agr i cuI tLlr al 
workforce~ union density was 9.6% in 1928, 7.3% in 1933~ 9.8% in 
2 
1936 and 19.5% in 1941. Only once before, in 1920 and 1921, had 
it even approached the one in five mark. But this time, there was 
no going back: union density has remained above 20% ever since. 
Thi!s explosion in union membership differed from previous 
Upsurges by permanently marking American labour relations. 
Strike frequency statistics are also revealing. For although 
strikes per million non-agricultural workers were generally much 
more common before 1922, the velocity with which strike frequency 
increased in the 1930s has not been matched since. From an 
historical low of 24.7 strikes per million workers over the three 
years 1927-29, to around 96, nearly four times as high~ between 
3 
1934 and 1941. For labour relations this was indeed a period of 
high drama. 
Throughout the 1920s growing numbers of city workers (and 
Coal miners) had been switching from the traditional urban party, 
---------------------------
~. Ge,orge Bain and Robert Price, Et'ltU~~ 'It Yllt'lll ~t'll!t~t 8 £'lI!~!HtlY! !l!lt~tl£!l P-'l[lt!tt 'It 
!tq~t £'l~llttt!~ (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), 88. Union lelbership quoted here are those calculated by 
the National Bureau of Econolic Research • 
..,. 
'-'. Edwards P K, Q~ £tt, 254. 
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the Republicans~ to the Democrats. In 1920 the Democrats 
cornered just 30.5% of the New York vote~ but in 1928 they won 
62.11.; and in Detroit over the same years their share of the vote 
4 
alsC) doubled: from 191. to 37.11.. This twin trend to city-living 
and Democrat-voting reflected many factors: the slowing down of 
i mmi gr- at ion, the dawning of political maturity for the second 
gener.tion of 'new' pre-1914 immigrants; the migration of nearly 
20 million people from rural to urban areas in the 1920s; the 
severe income inequality that left mo.t wage earners' of ami 1 i es 
livinq bt'!low "the American standard" in the mid-1920s; and the 
defeat of the old~ rural~ Protestant~ southern and western, power 
base within the Democratic Party by its urban, 'new' immigrant, 
c:: 
..J 
Catholic, Jewish and eastern elements. 
The political trend hinted at in 1928 became a landslide in 
1932 . The new president, Roosevelt, polled 22.8 million votes to 
Hoover ' s 15.8 million. Urban workers and coal miners voted 
overwhelmingly for him and against unemployment, pay and job 
insecurity and Hoover's inactivity. In New York Roosevelt took 
73.41. of the vote, and in Detroit 59.4%. Michigan"s eight large 
cities all went Democratic, as did e ven the traditionally 
Republican black vote. Roosevelt took every major metropolitan 
---------------------------
4. Bernstein (l9bO), ~ £H, 77-80 • 
. " 
..J. l~lq, 47-50, 63-5, 76-7; Saluel Lubell, ·Revolt of the City·, ~l~£tQt~l ~~~~q! ~~q ~t~~lllty 
iQ ~!!tl£~~ eQlltl£~l ~l~tQty, eds. Jerole" Clubb and Howard W Allen (New York: the Free Press, 
1971), 9-16. 
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centre in the Midwest, the West and the South. American workers, 
without any direction from the American Federation of Labor, had 
6 
reconstructed the pattern of American politics. 
Roosevelt" s 193 3 New Deal administration was a balance of 
established Republicans with rich, 
7 
recently-established 
Df.~mocrat s . Almos t in spite of itself, it nonetheless played a 
major part in the process of change that its own election had 
8 
indicated was already underway. On June 16 1933 Roosevelt 
Signed the National Industrial Recovery Act, a measure crucial in 
legitimi z ing union activi~y. The previously stagnating American 
Federation of Labor instantly launched an appeal to unorganized 
Workers and called on it s affiliated bodies to launch intensive 
9 
organizing drives. But the progress of unionism was far from 
~"trai ghtforward. It had to overcome not only the intensely 
sectional, craft character of the AFL and the unremitting 
hostility of the employers, but the equivocation of Roosevelt 
himself. And the onset of depression in 1929 had presented another 
---------------------------
6. tHq, SOB-II. 
7. Arthur Karwick j ~l!~~t t!!q~ !Qq t~!ltt~ tQ @ttt!tQL Et!Q£! !Qq t~! ~~~ ~tQ£! !~~Q, (Glasgow: 
Fontana, 19B1l, 191-2. 
8. Irving Bernstein, !~t~~l!Qt Y!!t~t ! ttt~tqty q! ttt! ~!!tl£!Q ~qt~![L !~~~:!~!! (Boston: 
Houghton Kifflin, 19691, 35, argues that in supporting the National Industrial Recovery Act's fa.ous 
clause 7(al, Roosevelt and his ad.inistration "co •• itted the.selves, doubtless without realizing it, 
to a broad policy of govern.ent intervention in collective bargaining that was to lea~ far beyond 
7(al". . 
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uniquely American problem: underemployment of the large numbers 
of gangsters created by the 19205 ' combination of prosperity and 
Prohibition led organized crime in many major cities to 
deliberately infiltrate local and international unions whose 
semi-casual job markets and small employer industrial s t ruc t l.lr E'~s 
were ideal for job protection rackets. Physical intimidation a nd 
10 
corruption became a way of life in many unions. 
The size~ growth and diversity of American industry in the 
1920s had combined with the survival of predominantly craft - based 
unions to establish a wage structure with exceptionally high (by 
international standards) differentimls. Regional differentials of 
up to 90% were compounded by the common practice in much of 
manufacturing of paying skilled workers 100% more than unskilled 
a division often marked along racial and ethnic lines. 
These differentials could also be traced between unionized and 
1 1 
non-unionized industrial sectors. Union membership for many, if 
not all, of its nearly all-white, all-male memb e rs in the late 
19205, meant not 50 much an access to craft control on the job but 
to privileges denied to others. The AFL reflected this. Its 
affiliated unions wanted union growth without any reduction of 
di ·f ferent i al !:;, which they believed certain if skilled workers in 
--------------------------
1 ("I. Bernstein [1960], q~ ~~t, 338-41. 
11. ~~~~, 66-70. 
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the unorganized industries were encourged to join industrial 
unions with semi- and unskilled workers. This ambivalence 
sabotaged the AFL " s drive to unionize the auto workers in 1933, 
and weakened the rubber workers in 1934, the year that saw sharp 
clashes between strikers and the police in Toledo, and general 
12 
strikes in Minneapolis and San Francisco. Public figures, such 
as Walter Lippmann and Father Charles Coughlin, were among the 
many who attacked the AFL for refusing to empower its new Federal 
13 
Local Unions to form inclusive international unions. "'Jithin the 
AFL , John L Lewis, the president of the biggest existing 
industrial union, the United Mine Workers, having agreed a 
compromise resolution at the 1934 AFL Convention that changed 
nothing, moved into open hostility in 1935. 
In August 1935 the AFL called all Federal Local Unions in 
auto to send delegates to a meeting in Detroit. There, P,FL 
president William Gre~n issued them with a charter as the United 
Automobile Workers of America but announced they would not be 
allowed jurisdiction over skilled workers. When he failed to get 
the Convention to elect his choice for president, pattern maker 
14 
Fr'anc:is Dillon, Green simply appointed him to the job. 
-------------------------
1 ~, 
....:.. Bernshin (1969), 218-98. 
13. 'b'd 3L 3 LL, o. 
14. Prei s, ~ ~tt, 39-40. 
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At the 
October 1935 AFL Convention both the general case for industrial 
unionism and the United Auto Workers' appeal for approval of 
a broad industrial jurisdiction were defeated. But with 38% of 
the voting delegates supporting him~ Lewis decided there was a 
large enough core to press ahead anyway. He immediately organized 
a meeting of eight union presidents who had supported industrial 
unionism at the AFL convention~ and they set up the Committee for 
15 
Industrial Organization in November 1935. 
The formation of the CIe triggered the great formalization of 
union membership from 1936 to 1941. It broke the craft mold of the 
AFL unions and created an organizational framework for mass 
production industry unioni s m. Craft control ind job monopoly could 
be defended by a union structure external to the plant. But semi-
skilled restraints over managerial autonomy could only be 
maintained plant-by-plant by -a mass membership. And that required 
drawing all workers into the same organizational framework~ not 
drawing lines between them. The CIO, formed f~gm ~b9YB, offered a 
structure that met the needs of the spontaneous activity among 
rank - and-file worker s . And it brought with it a key role for the 
Professional organizer and for centralized policy- making and 
administration. 
---------------------------
Bernstein [1969], Q~ £tt, 386-400. The UAW's appeal Mas lost by 125 votes to 104. 
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The CIa was crucial; managements continued vigorously to 
oppose all forms of unionism, and the Ne\l'J Deal legislation was 
clearly not unionizing workers on its own. The ~esponse of most 
major employers to the 1933 NRA had been to launch their own 
compi.~ny uni ons. The National Association of Manufacturers had 
taken the lead in August 1933 by distributing a notice to 
employees telling them it was not the intention of the NRA that 
"employees should pay money into any organization". The National 
Metal Trades Assocation, whose Detroit branch secretary was also 
general manager of the influential Detroit Employers' Association 
and \l'Jhose members included GM cmd Chr-ysler, d~?clared: "The United 
16 
States is an Open Shop Nation. II Roosevelt endorsed this in 
March 1934 when he intervened to prevent a threatened strike and 
i. mposed a settl ement on the c~uto worke,'" s that "favor's no 
parti ~ular union or particular form of employee organization or 
17 
representati on". In Mjay 1935~ the Supreme Court declared the 
NRA unconstitutional. The employers' cheers had barely died down 
before Roosevelt signed the National Labor Relations Act in July. 
This • vJagner Act • ~ named after its principal architect, 
established a National Labor Relations Board CNLRB) with powers 
to rule against employers' denial of workers' rights to organise 
and enter collective bargaining. Violently denounced at first as 
an interference with the rights of management, the NLRB would 
---------------------------
16. t~t~, 38-39j Willial "cPherson, ~!qqr fttl!ttq~~ t~ t~t ~ytq~qqtlt tu~~~trY (Wa5hington DC: 
BrOokings Institute, 1940), 13-14j Sugar, q2 £tt, 117. 
1 '7. Bernstein (1969), q2 £it, 184-5. 
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1 ater- accustom managements to the benefits of i mpar-ti c~l 
arobi tr-ator- s . In two impor-tant ways the Wagner- Act laid down 
pr-ocedures which would wor-k in the long ter-m to encour-age 
industr-ial r-ather- than cr-aft unionism. It r-uled that the union 
supported by a major-ity of wor-kers in a unit would be the 
"£~>:clusive" legal body f(::lr- "all the employees in such unit for-
the pur-poses of collective bar-gaining". And it gave the Boar-d the 
power- to deter-mine the size of the unit. In a thir-d clause it 
Obliquely served to give some legal basis for-section shop 
stewar-ds: to pr-otect (non - union) minor-ity r-ights it declared that 
"any indjovidLlal or gr-clUP of employees shall have the r-i~~ht at any 
time to proesent gr-ievances t.o their emp 1 C)y+-~r- t.hr-ough 
representatives of their own choosing" - a clause that would be 
r-epeated later- in the major union contracts between GM~ For-d and 
Chrysler- and the UAW. At fir-st the Board did not count for much. 
Not until April 1937 was it declared constitutional and its 
effective role in regulating labour- relations in the automobile 
18 
industry really began only in 1939. 
Mar-e significant at the time was the for-mation of the CIO. 
The for-mal suspension of the ten CIa unions by the AFL took place 
in September 1936. But the CIO had already launched two key 
Organizing drives: in the steel industry it aimed to take over- t.he 
---------------------------
18. thq, 328-349, 515. 
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industry's works council-company unions from within; and in 
auto it sought to unite the four small existing unions. In 
December 1935 Adolph Germer went to Detroit for the CIa to try to 
bring the UAW~ Father Coughlin"s Automotive Industrial Workers ' 
20 
Ass ociation (AIWA)~ Matt Smith's Mechanics Educational Society 
of America (MESA) and Arthur Greer"s Hudson-based Associated 
Automobile Workers of America together. Several attempts ' failed 
. before Dillon stood down as UAW president .at the 1936 convention 
in South Bend and the election of Homer Martin s ignified a 
victory for local autonomy over the dictates of the AFL. This was 
fOllowed r a pidly by the merger into the UAW of the AIWA and of 
three left-wing Detroit MESA locals~ and in July by the 
affiliation of the UAW to the CIO and its subsequent suspension 
2 1 
from the AFL. 
In November 1936 the CIa vigorously campaigned for Roosevelt 
and the United Mine Workers ' $500,000 campaign contribution made 
it the biggest s ingle contributor to Democratic Party funds. The 
---------------------------
19. t~t~, 457, cites a CIO supporter's argulent frol the Chicago-Gary steel lills area in January 
1936: "It seels clear that where cOlpany unions are established, one of the best ways to fight thel 
is to elect real honest union len as representatives ••• • This strategy of taking over the e.ployee 
representative schele and turning in into a genuine union is pretty luch the pattern followed at 
Dodge Main between 1933 and 1936. 
2(1. Father Charles E Coughlin, the 'radio priest' whose Sunday night 5erlons were broadcast 
nationwide frol the urban Midwest over 26 radio stations, and whose Radio League of the Little 
Flower had 'contributed S5,000 to the 1932 Bonus Expeditonary Force's key political delonstration 
against Hoover; Alan Brinkley, YQ!f!! Qf frQ!!!!l Hy!y h9ngJ f~!n!r ~Qygn!inJ ~n9 !n! ~r!~! 
9!Pf!!!!9n (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1992), 44-5, 107-9; Bernstein (1960), gp fi!, 445. 
2 1 . th~, 504-9. 
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Roosevelt labour bandwagon ' pulled a massive 61% of a popular vote 
that was also rejecting the Liberty League Republican candidate~ 
22 
Alfred M Landon. The election result was both a confirmation 
from millions of American workers that they could successfully 
challenge the will of the world's biggest employers~ and a 
23 
legitimation of that I:hall enge. Many employers either 
recognised this ne\.-J consciousness voluntarily or \.-Jere soon forced 
to do so. In three successive months General Motors~ US Steel and 
Chrysler signed their first contracts with CIO unions~ whose new-
found legitimacy then gave rise to an immense mushrooming of 
24 
members. The UAW s igned with General Motors and Chrysler in 
February and April 1937. 
These agreements followed sit-in strikes that~ as e>:empl ars 
of a 'golden age' of American class struggle~ have obscured three 
important qualifications. First, they were won by the active and 
short-term participation of a small minority. At Chrysler " s 
biggest p~ant, Dodge Main~ where participation was greater than 
elsewhere, Gertrude Nalezty " s experience was common. A second 
shi ft \.-Jorker, she reported for work on March 8 when the sit-down 
---------------------------
22 • l' b' d 449 __ L, . 
24. Nelson Lichtenstein, ~~~q~:~ ~~~ !t ~q!~!. l~~ ~!Q !.!l ~q~H ~!~!! INew York: Calbridge 
University Press, 1982), 12. 
2~. David Kontgolery, 'Spontaneity and Organization: SOle.Collents·, R!4t£!l ~!~tt! 7, no. 6 
INov-Dec 1973), 73. 
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began and was denied admittance by the plant guards. Her 
participation was limited to passing her lunch box over the fence 
to the workers inside. After that she sat at home until the 
26 
company called her back. The speed of unionization and the 
r-esul ti ng lack of mass involvement would have important 
consequences for workplace unionism, encouraging bureaucratic 
tendencies in the UAW. The upsurge was formalised by a quite 
small handful of leaders. The union "s origins implanted both a 
27 
strong tradition of local autonomy and the roots of the 
28 
"popular bossdom" that set in from 1947. 
Second, this minority involvement in unionization among mass 
production workers was reflected in the mobilization of opinion 
in society at large. Thus the Supreme Court was confident enough 
by April 1937 to rule that sit-down strikes were illegal - an 
decision that contributed to the virtual disappearance of the 
tactic. Another r-eflection of unionism's minority support was the 
---------------------------
:';~6. Interview by author with Gertrude Nalezty, Detroit, August 10 1982. 
27. Fine, ~ £lJ, 94. 
2(3. HYlan (1975), ~ £ii, 71-2, referring to the 'New Union' explosion in Britain in the late 
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1 east as it appeared to the leaders thelsel ves) lias strong I eadershi p control and onl y Ii Ii ted Icope 
for rank-and-file autonolY. The govern lent of such unions has been given the colourful label 
'popular bossdol' (by H A Turner, I[~q~ ~~tQ~ ~[Q!t~L ~t[~£ty[~ !~q eQlt£y, (london: Allen and 
Unwin, 19621, 2911." 
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CIO's defeat in its unionizing drive in the five steel companies 
29 
known as Little Steel in the summer of 1937. But most revealing 
of the failure of the radical impetus of the sit-down strikes to 
generalize outwards and influence the four out of every five 
workers who remained non - union throughout the 1930s~ Were the 
1938 congressional election results. These showed a marked shift 
to the Republicans: the mobilization of an anti-radical backlash 
had begun. The days of the New Deal were drawing to a close. 
Third, the unionizing process was far from homogeneous: a 
tradition of departmental and sectional collective organization 
had already taken a firmer hold at Chrysler than at 8M. While the 
two firms introduced similar company union strategies in 1933~ 
they had applied them differently. Sections of the Chrysler 
workforce exploited the openings their management created with 
consequences not possible in GM plants, and established 
si gni ·fi cant 1 y higher levels of restraint over managerial 
authority. 8M used the 1937-1939 auto recession to eliminate many 
potential. restraints from formal agreements, but Chrysler was 
less effective. In both, the principal restraint was an 
obligation on management to abide by a union-policed seniority 
list for lay-offs and recalls. A UAW Local 3 organizing leaflet 
distributed in Dodge Main early in 1940 warned: 
---------------------------
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If you don't have the union steward looking after your interests, you light be overlooked when 
your turn arrives on the seniority list. A single week lost this way leans a week's wages. 
THAT KEANS THREE TIKES AS HUCH AS YOU WOULD HAYE TO PAY IN DUES FOR AN ENTIRE YEAR.30 
But the differences between 8M and Chrysler were already present: 
i n Chrysler plants, section al §t§~@Cg2 were already playing the 
key role of supervising seniority lists, while at 8M stewards 
played no recognized role at all. And, in Dodge Mai n, workers had 
also erected some res traints over management's unilateral ' control 
of the pac~ of work. These restraints and their organi zational 
b ase grew stronger with the upturn of the American e conomy in 
1939-41 as the European war stimulated order books. By then they 
:3 1 
had become a part of workplace legitimacy. In certain plants 
and industries this tradition survived for nearly 20 years. This 
survi val was despite the Stalin-Hitler Pact of 1939 that opened 
the flood-gates of anti-Communism inside the CIa and allowed the 
Roosevelt administration to attack the Communist Party for 
fermenting strikes in war industries in 1940 and 1941. It was 
despite the United States entry into World War II after Pearl 
Harbor in December 1941; and despite the CIa becoming a central 
wartime s upporter of the ' No Strike Pledge'. The survival of the 
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30. Leaflet entitled 'Soaething to think about' (n.d.1 in John Zarelba collection, Box 9, Wayne 
State University Walter Reuther Library. 
~H • It is wrong to assule that 'forlalization' of shop floor labour relations through the 
acceptance of collective bargaining and the recognition of plant cOllittees necessarily leads to 
bureaucratization and less conflict. In Britain in the late 1960s and early 1970s one study found a 
causal connection between fortalization of relations and the establishlent of full-tile shop 
stewards and the incidence of strikes; H A Turner, Geoffrey Roberts and David Roberts, ~!~!q!~!~t 
~b!r!~!!ri~!i~~ !D9 b!~g~r ~gDf!if!l B ~!~9Y gf !!D!9!ri!! grg!ni~!!ign~ !!!i!~9!~ !D9 iD9~~!ri!! 
r!l!!!gn! (Calbridge: Calbridge University Press, 1977), 39. 
32. Lichtenstein [1982], QQ. £!.t, 57-65. 
autonomous union tradition in Chrysler plants testifies to an 
often-ignored range of possible labour relations developments 
still open to American labour during and after World War II. 
II. Issues 
The account below of the origins of unionism at Dodge Main 
ques tions the argument that early UAW militants were located in 
technol og i (:all y similar ar-eas of auto plants and that 
unionization itself was a genuinely mass experience. These issues 
are taken up here to help develop a major theme of this book: 
that workplace consciousness is determined by the interplay of 
i ntarnal labour relations with the wider external political 
economy. Neither structural nor economic determinism provides 
sati sfactOl'-y explanatory frameworks for changes in the 
relationships of management . to managed; nor does wishful 
thinking. 
Nelson Lichtenstein has argued that the location of the 
"structure of \l'mrk in the aut.o industry largely det.ermined the 
char.u:ter of worker militancy in the factories". He makes tltJO 
r e lated but different assertions. First, that "collective 
resistance to manager-ial authority centered in most plants" among 
- --------------------------
3 :::, _ Nelson Lichtenstein, "Auto Morker l1ilitancy and the Structure of Factory Life, 1937-1955", 
~ggrD~! g1 ~!gr!f~D tl!!!gry, Septelber 1980, 335-353. 
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thf? "higher skilled wor'ker' s engaged in sub-assembly and in ' bench 
"'Jar k' ", and second: 
The greatest lilitancy in lost factories cale not along the alienated and atolized workers of 
the lain asselbly line, but along those elployees who laintained a high degree of verbal 
interaction and group identification and who retained a distinctive level of skill or 
collective experience.34 
The evi dence from Dodge Main, however, does not support the 
generalization that · parts and sub-assembly workers were more 
militant thah others. liThe grel-atest mi Ii tancy" wi 11 of course be 
shown by sections of workers who develop a collective spirit 
thl"'oLIgh tal ki ng, s haring the same work, the same grievances etc. 
But it is not immediately obvious why the chances to develop this 
collectivity should not occur to sections of workers on assembly 
lines. At Dodge Main the largest numbers of workers were 
concentrated on the crowded conveyor lines in the body-in-white 
and trim departments. Not surprisingly, Chrysler " s works council 
p 1.-an, its successor, the independent Coughlinite union and 
afterwards the UAW itself, were all dominated by individuals 
":*' C:' 
'_'oJ 
based in these key areas. And, unlike the wire room where women 
Working on the benches were not allowed to talk while they 
Work e d, foremen could not prevent "verbal interaction" in the din 
of the body shop or the crowded trim shop. 
It is not even clear that the sub-assembly and bench 
---------------------------
34. Lichtenstein (1980), 22 ~g, 336-7. 
":V t .. · 
.... '.:J. Friedlander, 22 £tt, 127. 
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~Jorkers were more highly skilled than those on the assembly 
lines. The 1924 breakdown of auto workers· occupations by Charles 
f~ei tell suggests that the 10-15% of "assemblers" had as great or 
as little skill as the largest group of auto workers, 
36' 
the 25-401. 
I-Jho were "machi ne tender s ". Both Henry Ford's own argument in 
1922 that 431. of his workers needed only one day ' s training 
while a further 361. could be trained in less than a week, ' and the 
1928 Chrysler estimate that 75% of its workers could pick up 
37 
their jobs in one or two days, confirm this point. The 
ove rwhelming majority of non-as sembly line workers had as much or 
as little 'skill ' as assembly line workers. The argument does not 
even hold ,for those "higher skilled" workers. Metal finishers, 
f Ol~ e)( amp Ie, ~Jere "higher skilled" workers, but not 'skilled ' in 
the sense of having served an apprenticeship. They might work on 
' benches' doing rectification or on the main body building 
cc:mveyor line. Sometimes these ~Jorkers were "militant", as in the 
38 
1933 Briggs strike and sometimes they were not. Their militancy 
Was not determined structurally but politically. 
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36. Cited in Robert N Dunn, ~~~Q~ ~Q~ ~ytQ~Q~l~!~ (NeN York: International Publishers, 1929), 61. 
3'7 . Quoted in Dunn, ~ £U, 61. 
:38. See below, Chapter 5, for the 1933 Briggs strike and John Anderson's analysis of the union 
activists at the 6" Fleetwood Fisher Body plant in Decelber 1936; John W Anderson and Steve 
Jefferys, ~ ~tt! Qt ~t(~qqt!t t~! ~tQ(~ Qt ~ [~Q~ !Q4 tt~! ~~tQ!Q[~!( (Forthcoling: typescript 275 
pages, 1984), Chapter 4. 
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This study of the unionization of Dodge Main finds two 
groups of workers played a leading role: the first was made up of 
those like Richard Frankensteen (in the trim department) and 
John Zaremba (first a clerical worker then an operator in the 
39 
heat treatment.)~ who had high school and college educat.ions but 
who had been unable to find white collar work because of the 
40 
Great Depression. This group included other men in ~emi or 
unskilled jobs like Leon Pody, a former businessman ruined by the 
Depression, and Richard Harris~ formerly an insurance salesman, 
and Harry Ross, whose father had wanted him to go to college. 
There were also Hamtramck Poles such as Walter Rogowski, a former 
41 
mechanic, and Joe Ptasynski, a former tool and die maker. The 
s econd group was made up of immigrants from contine ntal Europe 
or the British Isles, like the Probe brothers and Pat Quinn in 
the Dodge trim department or t.he skilled Bill Mckie at Ford~ who 
brought \foJi th them expectations of some form of union 
organization. Of course, many others from different backgrounds 
Played a part in the unionizing process; but these two groups 
---------------------------
::',9. Or like Walter Reuther who attended university part-tile and John W Anderson who WiS a full-
tile student under J R CO.lons in Wisconsin; see Anderson and Jefferys, 9P fi!, Chapter 3. 
4(1. This cOlplelents Ronald Schatz's findings, ·Union pioneers: the Founders of Local Unions at 
General Electric and Westinghouse, 1933-1937·, ~gYrn!! gf B!!rif!n ~i~!grY, no. 66 (1979), 596-602, 
that lale union organizers ·were lelbers of an elite stratul of the industry's work force·, but 
expands on the definition of "elite" to include social origins and educational backgrounds. 
41 • Friedlander, Q~ ~tt, 121-2. 
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provided disproportionately more organizers. They were young and 
had had less than five years" employment in the industry when 
they first began to organize. They also shared a greater 
responsiveness to the political indignities management was 
forcing people with their backgrounds to accept, and a closer 
acquaintance with needed organizational skills, than thei~ fellow 
wOI~kers. Neither factor was the monbpoly of any strategic group 
of 1930s auto workers. The incentive to collective organization 
was provided by the economic and work constraints of mass 
production; but the impetus came primarily as a QQliti£~! 
development triggered by the presence in the work force of a 
significant number of indi~iduals who were especially "rights 
Consc i ous" • 
This raises a second issue. Though David Brody has called 
42 
for research on the extent of rank and file activism~ radical 
historians usually exaggerate it. Daniel Guerin wrote of "the 
epidemic of factory occupations" 
43 
Wor ker"s ..• i nvol ved" in March 1937. 
with "nearly 200~OOO 
Art Preis found even more 
44 
"a couple of million in the 1936-37 sit-down wave". David Gordon 
§~ ~l come down in between; they cite uncritically (from Irving 
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4 ~> 4. David Brody, ~~t~!t~ tU lUq~~ttt!t ~~!tt~!, (HeM York: Oxford University, 1980), 134. 
43. Daniel Guerin, !~~ ~!!t~ ~! ~!q~t tu tU! ~~~, (London, Ink links, 1979) 113. 
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4 &:: . oJ 
Bernstein the Bureau of Labor Statistics data suggesting 
"nearly 400,000 workers participated in sit-dov-m stl~ikes at their 
46 
pec,k in 1936-37". This figure is also quoted by Jeremy Brecher, 
who shov-Is how thl si tdown "was used to chall enge management 
decisions" and "to combat a wide range of social grievances", and 
whose analysis of the significance of the sitdown concludes: 
Workers had used the sitdown to establish a direct counter-power to lanagelent - freedol to 
set the pace of Mork, to tell the fore.an where to get off, to share the work equitably, to 
deterline their share of the product, and the like.47 
If nearly half a million American workers truly had been ~£tiY~!~ 
and £QD§£iQ~§!~ involved in doing all these things the subsequent 
history of the American working class might have been very 
di ffer-ent. Unfortunately, things weren"t quite like that. The 
'golden age of militancy" is a myth. 
The sit-down movement was very important. The increasingly 
VOcal wish of managements in the 1980s to rid themselves of many 
of the limited obligations that are the pale legacy of the mass 
unionism of the 19305 is testimony to that. But it is important 
DQt to exaggerate the movement. To do so distorts reality 
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...J. Bernstein, Il~ £!.t, 500. 
'~6. Gordon lit !l, ~ £!.t, 177, 
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48 
which other sources present much more accurately - and makes 
it impossible to grasp the overall development of American labour 
through the 19305 into the 1940s and 1950s. If all those laid off 
as a result of a minority of workers taking over one or more 
conveyor lines inside the plant are counted as "participating", 
the essentially ~§f~D§i~§ character of the sit-down tactic is 
turned on its head. It was used because the activists ~ere too 
few to risk putting up pickets to keep the majority of workers 
out. As the Dodge Main strike bulletin put it on March 11 1937: 
If they Ithe workers) went outside, sale ?f~9 light cOle in and take their jobs, That is why 
we are staying in: !9 P[9!!f! 9M[ j99?~ 
At Flint the sitdown was used by a minority to stop the movement 
of dies out of the plant. And it depended less for its success 
on §tc§Dgth and §Qli~!Cit~ at the point of production than on the 
non-intervention of the state (police or national guardsmen) and 
on political support in the local community. 
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48. "are realistic estilates of UAW lelbership and levels of actual partiCipation in the auto 
industry sit-down lovelent are available: Bert Cochran, h~!9[ ~Dg ~9!!MDi!!1 !b! !![M99!! !n~! 
!h!P!g ~!![if~D !~!9[ IPrinceton: University Press, 1977), 114, suggests there were only 200 UAW 
lelbers out of the 4,500 workforce at Kelsey-Hayes before the Decelber 1936 sit-down there; he 
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Cadillac sit-downers, 49 Fleetwood Fisher Body sit-downers and 96 Guide Lalp sit-downers, 251. These 
were plants where lanagelent kept control of the gates and so workers who left the sit-down could 
not return or be replaced. In fact, the Fleetwood figure Fine uses was the nUlber who originally 
voted to sit-down, and the nUlber who actually stayed in Nas less than that; Anderson and Jefferys, 
9P f1!, Chapter b, Fine, i91g, 142-144, suggests only about 10% of the Cleveland Fisher Body 
workforce of 7,200 were UAW lelbers when its sit-down began in Decelber 1936, and 6" testified that 
only 259 workers actually disobeyed its order to leave the plant; he also reports the Flint Fiiher 
Body No,2 sit-down beginning with "not .ore than 50 workers on the body line·, Fine, Ib8, cites the 
recollections of sit-doNners on nUlbers in the No 1 plant varying frol over 'one thousand on so.e 
days ••• to a low of 90 on one occasion·; and the Michigan National Guard report listing 450 in the No 
2 plant on January 5 falling to 17 on January 26 1937. 
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Guerin, writing in 1968 from a neo-Trotskyist perspective, 
came close to idealizing the sit-down movement: 
The upsurge was a closely-knit cOlbination of spontaneity and planning; the ele.ental thrust 
of the lasses cOlplelented perfectly the experienced leadership of a linority of trade union 
organizers. The .ovelent was at one and the sale tile centralized and delocratic.49 
But this analysis makes it impossible to explain the subsequent 
history of the UAW and the development of industrial relations 
other than in terms of a crude "sell-out". The absence in 1937 of 
general solidarity strikes such as there had been in Minneapolis 
and San Francisco in 1934; the defensive sit-down tactic; the 
intimidatory violence used against scabs; the huge 86% o f 
potential union members who still did not join up in 1937; the 
les s than a million votes for the Socialist and Communist 
pr-esidenticAI candidates in 1936; the weekly radio audience of 
millions that listened to the anti-Semitic, anti-Communist sermons 
of Father Coughlin. Realities that don ' t fit simply into the idea 
of an "elemental thrust" are Simply ignored. 
For Brecher- , writing in 1972, there is both a forward move 
and its opposite: the C I 0 appe.:,,~ed "as the champi on of the gr"ec:"\t 
5i tdo\fom wave" whi I e at the same ti me "i twas systemati call y 
50 
Opposing and crLlshing si tdo\l'm movements". The contradiction 
in his argument, between the scale and depth of worker militancy 
and class consciousness and the apparent ability of a few hundred 
---------------------------
49. Guerin, 112 ~U, 111. 
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individuals who had risen to the top of brand new workers' 
organizations to "oppose iand cl~ush" this great upsLlrge, is not 
investigated. And so Brecher fails fully to explicate workers' 
"pov-Jerlessness" that is properly the starting point of his book. 
Yet tactical and numerical weaknesses at the moment of auto 
unionism's greatest advance were reflected in the essentially 
~~f~Q§iY~ character of the movement's principal demands: for an 
end to piecev-Jork and for a "fair"" rather than arbitrary selection 
of those who should get laid off. As 8M had partially grasped by 
1940, these demands did not challenge any crucial part of 
management power. They altered the fQem of control, but not its 
content. The sit-downers sought and achieved restraints on 
managerial authority; they altered the limits of workplace 
legitimacy but they did not change the law. As David Brody has 
argued, "The sit-down strikers perceived of themselves as fighting 
for legal rights already theirs; the company stood outside the 
51 
law, not they." The narrowness of the sit-down movement's active 
base, its limited aims and the recession of 1937-1938 meant its 
immediate impact on management's rights to layoff workers or to 
determine job classi~ications and rates was slight. But the GM 
and Chrysler contracts gave management " s blessing to union 
organization in auto. This new double-edged contribution to mass 
unionism was largely responsible for transforming the minority 
-------------------------
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into an overwhelming majority. "Powerlessness" for organized 
workers became a distant memory; bLit the "power" that was gained 
was only partial and remained conditional on managerial approval. 
III. Structure 
Chapter 4 examines the emergence of Chrysler as a major aLito 
manLlf actLirer ~ the working conditions of aLito workers in the early 
19305 and the widespread worker resistance that developed in 1933 
to which management responded with a company Llnion. Chapte ... · 5 
traces the emergence of an ' independent" Llnion at Dodge Main in 
the mid-·19:::"Os. Chapter 6 considers the circLimstances that led to 
the 1937 sit-down s trike and the significance of the first UAW-
Chr ysler contract and the 1937-1939 faction fight within the UAW. 
Finally, Chapter 7 looks at the workers' victory in the 1939 
strike and at the consolidation of the view that workers ' 
restraints on arbitrary management were 'legitimate rights " . 
CHAPTER 4 
MANAGERIAL CONTROL IN THE EARLY 19305 
The Great Depression of 1929-1933 underlined the extent of 
managerial control that had existed in the 1920s over semi- and 
unskilled workers~ and brought this home to most skilled workers 
too. The South Carol ina mi 11 owner ""ho decl cared, "We govern I i ~,e 
1 
the Czar of F:ussia~" was not an e>: cept ion. ManagemE?nt 
c:\bsolut i sm~ though never uniform~ ensured that workers' lives 
were dominated by an insecurity which the recession compounded. 
But even in an industry as hard - hit 
did not have a homogeneous effect. 
'" c· '"' .~ auto, the Great Depression 
Section one of Chapter 4 shows 
how Chrysler strengthened its market position from 1929 to 1933, 
while maintaining unilateral control over its workers. Section two 
traces the twin impact on workers and management of the start of 
economic recovery and the inauguration of the New Deal 
administration in 1933. 
---------------------------
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1. Management 
On May 29 1928 the 53-year-old Walter P Chrysler bought the 
ailing Dodge .Brothers Company and with it, Dodge I"'lai n, the 30-
acre plant in Hamtramck, a city-suburb of Detroit. Here, some 
30,000 workers were soon turning out about a quarter of a million 
cars a year, including the new Plymouth and DeSoto models as well 
as the existing Dodge. With two other plants at Highland Park and 
Jefferson Avenue, Chrysler overnight became America's third 
largest automaker. 
Compared with Ford and the largely local managements of 
several of the more expensive car-making firms in Detroit, 
Chrysler Corporation, like General Motors, had an 
3 
out-of-to~n, 
pr-c)fessi onal management image from the start. Chrysler himself 
c a me from Kansas, and had risen from apprentice mechanic to GM 
Bl_li c k pr-esi dent. I< T Keller' , who headed the management team that 
dramatically re-organized Dodge Main in 1928, had been an 
apprentice machinist in Pennsylvania and, subsequently, general 
---------------------------
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4 
manager of GM"s Canadian operations. But this GM background did 
not mean Chrysler adopted the multi-divisional decentralized 
organizational structure that characterized 8M after 1925. 
Chrysler had left GM in 1920, Keller in 1926. Formed in 1925, the 
Chrysler Corporation kept its centralized, unitary form of 
management structure until the second half of the 19505. 
In the early 1930s Walter Chrysler exercised the power of an 
autocrat. He was also near the end of his working career, 
turning over the presidency to Keller, who was ten years his 
junior, in July 1935. Industrial relations policy under Walter 
Chrysler had been a mixture of antiunionism and not especially 
6 
generous paternalism. A "Good Cheer Fund" had provided workers 
with company picnics and a legal advice bureau. When Chrysler took 
Ove r Dodge, he inherited its marginally better provisions: a group 
life insUrance package, free dances for employees, a welfare 
department that might give a worker a small loan, and legal advice 
---------------------------
4. R. Stuart, @!tlq~t (South Bend, Indiana: And Books, 19801, 39-51. 
5. Top executives used to leave their work to leet hi. at the Detroit train station on his return 
frot frequent business trips to New York City as they fought over the succession; Stuart, g~ ~!!, 
50; Howell John Harris, Ib! Higb! !g ~!O!g!! iOgY!!!i!! !!!!!!90} P9!i~!!! gi ~!!!!~!O §Y}!O!}} !O 
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7 
f or- \o'Jor k er~:.. 
Expansion in Depression 
Market conditions in the late 1920s proved ideal for 
Chrysler. With demand for cars jumping by 56% from 1927 to 1929, 
the Dodge purchase enabled Chrysler to more than double its output 
and to finance itself. Chrysler Corporation's first annual average 
pre-tax return for 1925-29 was 11.2% - enough, as Table 4 shows, 
to survive the recession and to continue to increase its market 
!:;hare: 
.TABlE 4 
DlRYSlER PRODUCTIOII[il, MRKET SIWE AD PROFITAlILITYlbl, 
1925-1945 
Five Passenger car Car larket Return on sdes 
yearl y production share (car and non-car) 
average (oOOs) IX) IX) 
------------------------------------------------------------------
1925-29 316 10.03 11.16 
1930-34 292 15.51 .34 
1935-39 724 23.14 8.36 
1940-41 907 24.24 7.95 
1942-45 6.13 
SOURCE: Chrysler Corporation, f!D!Df!!! !Dg §!D![!! f!f! ~gg~, June 1973; 
Nards Autolotive Vear Book, !~~~, 79. 
NOTE: a. Based on neM passenger car registrations frol 1925-34. 
b. Before tax operating largin as a percentage of net sales. 
In 1933, the first year of recovery, Chrysler built nearly the 
---------------------------
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same number of cars as it had in 1929 when its market share was 
8.2%~ but its share of sales had risen to 25.4%. The rapid boom of 
1927-29 followed by the deep recession of 1930-32 effectively 
eliminated much of the competition. The number of establishments 
in the motor vehicle industry fell from 210 to 122 between 1929 
8 
and 1933. The survivors~ GM~ Ford and Chrysler~ claimed the 
spoils: their combin~d market share rose from 59% in 1927" to 87.5% 
9 
five years later. 
Managerial control 
While Chrysler was expanding its market share~ its workers 
faced virtually unlimited managerial control. Control has two 
aspects: the power to lay down terms of subordination - the wage 
rates, hours of work and working conditions; and the authority to 
force workers to accept and carry out the methods and pace of work 
determined by management. During the three successive years of 
collapse of the American car market after 1929, the exercise by 
workers of restraints over either aspect of managerial control 
became extremely difficult. Restraint of output continued, as 
Mathewson ' s notable study demonstrated. He found that foremen 
often played an organi z ing role in holding up work so that lay-
offs would be postponed: 
---------------------------
8. Sidney Fine, l~~ ~~t~!~~tt~ ~~~~t t~~ @l~! ~!qt!, (Ann Arbor: University of "ichigan, 19631, 18. 
9. See Table 1 in A D Chandler, 2t!~t ~~t!~tt~! (NeN York: Harcourt, Brace' World, 1964), 3. 
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A worker in an auto.obile plant described how his boss, a bench fore.an, seelingly obsessed 
with the fear of lay-off, rushed around doing everything possible to slow up the work and thus 
postpone the evil day for hi.self and his subordinates.10 
In another example from a large automobile plant, where the 
workers agreed among themselves on a ceiling for bonus earnings on 
grinding valves, Mathewson quoted a worker who believed the 
for"eman and the general foreman suppor"ted the cei 1 i ng: "They don' t 
want the rate cut any more than we do. 
11 
and causes a lot of trouble." 
It just makes the ' men sore 
These, and the other examples Mathewson used from the auto 
industry in 1929 and early 1930, provide clear evidence that 
restriction of output occurred among the overwhelmingly non-union 
auto "'lor kers. But such restraints were not universal. Closer 
r e lationships did develop between skilled workers and formerly 
s killed worker foremen, or between workers and foremen in areas 
of the plant where superintendents and plant managers allowed a 
certain flexibility of output. But where the final processes of 
automobile assembly were involved, with continuously moving 
conveyor lines, and especially after 1928 as auto profits and 
production crumbled, pockets of arbitrary improvements in working 
conditions were eliminated. Another contemporary account provides 
a valuable corrective to any tendency to assume that workers had 
any systematic control over their working environment in the late 
1(). Stanley B Hathewson, ~~~ttt£ttQQ Q! · q~t2~t !~QQq YQQtq!Qt!~4 ~Qt~~t~, (Ne. York: Viking 
Press, 19311, 40. 
11 • t~!.4, 45. 
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1920s. Robert Dunn quotes a worker at Dodge Main in 1927 saying, 
"In Department 66 only the bosses and their friends are · working. 
12 
Thf? other workel~s ar"e s;ent home." Another man who worked in 
Department 64 in the year Walter Chrysler bought Dodge Main told 
Dunn: 
We are allowed to stop Nork about 15 linutes to bolt our lunch, but Ne are not provided with a 
place to eat it. We either sit at our benches in the dusty rool or, when there is nothing else 
for one to sit on, we have to sit on the floor. Besides, they work the sweepers on another 
shift and they are sweeping the floors right under our noses while we are trying to eat our 
lunches. 13 
Thus although there was some restriction of output, 
14 
and even an 
occiasi onal strike~ the general experience of auto workers 
involved in building and assembling the cars was that while 
conditions were extremely tough in the car market boom of the 
1920s, they became desperate in the years from 1930 to 1933. 
Insecurity 
As the Great Depression took hold, the auto industry 
employers cut drastically jobs and wages. The most loyal and 
hard-working employee was not safe. The proportion of auto 
workers laid off for anything from a shift to a few months rose 
from 49. 7% in 1930 to 86.2% in 1932. Still more devastating, and 
against the trend in US manufacturing, the number laid off who 
12. Robert W Dunn, ~~~Q[ !~~ ~ytq!qqti!~, (NeN York: International Publishers, 1929), 103. 
14; John Anderson recalled taking part in a three or four day strike of letal finishers against a 
cut in the piecework rate at Fisher Body Plant 18 in Detroit in the spring of 1929; see John W 
Anderson and Steve Jefferys, q~ £ti, Chapter 2. 
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"'Jere al SCI "separate d" ,- thi:\t is, told there would be no guarantee 
of mor e work in the future - rose from 70. 2 % in 1930 to 98.9% in 
19~~2 • The effects were con s iderable. Previously those regularly 
laid o'ff and separated had bee n the tr'aditional "disposable" semi-
s killed and unskilled sector. In 193 2, the entire workforce~ 
including the 10-15% of skilled workers~ was affected , creating a 
15 
common grievance. To j ob insecurity was added pay in's e curity: 
average weekly earnings for those still at work in automobil e ~ 
body and parts plants fell 43% from $35.14 in 1928 to $ 2 0 a week 
16 
John Zaremba, a graduate of Brown " s Busines s School, Chicago, 
had worked as a time study man for 8M in 1920 and as a clerical 
\ 
worker at Dodge Main from 1921 to 1923 . Unable to get clerical 
work in the depression, he started back in Dodge Main as an 
operator in the heat treatment department in 1932. He r' ecall ~-; 
ofte n qoing to work and b e ing told by the foreman or 
superinte ndent not to bother clocking in. But the bonus, or l a ck 
---------------------------
15. Dunn, Q£ ~tt, 6J, quotes the 1924 breakdown by Professor Chirles Reitell of the iuto industry 
I abour force: 
I 
Kachine tenders 25-40 
Asse.blers 10-15 
'Skilled' workers 5-10 
Inspectors 5 
Helpers ,15 
Labourers 15 
16. Fi net Q£_~tt, 20. 
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of it, was an even bigger grievance: 
The bonus was a farce at all tiles. We never knew what we were going to receive as pay, 
whether it was going to be 50c, 61c, 71c or 76c ••• the alount of the bonus was a 'secret'. 
Everybody would work and work and work. It seeled the lore we worked, the less bonus we got.17 
~John vJ '~nderson, a University of Wisconsin graduate, was hired as 
a metal finisher at Dodge Main on December 2 1932: 
To hold Iy job I had to work continuously frol 12 to 14 hours a day, seven days a week frol 
the day I was hired until 7 pion Christlas Eve... On Decelber 24 the forelan told Ie, 
·You're being laid off until further notice. We'll call you when we need you.· During those 23 
days I worked allost 300 hours and at 52 cents per hour I earned about $150. There was no 
preliul pay for overtile or working Saturday or Sunday, yet we letal finishers were along the 
highest paid in the industry. IS 
Auto managements treated the 1 abour of the "sui tcase bri gc:\de", the 
pool of 75,000 young unmarried men in Detroit, without respect or 
sentiment. 
In December 1933 a repo~t on the Dodge Main Drop Forge 
department highlighted three areas of uncertainty for its workers: 
the peak employment in the department had been 250, it w.:\s now 
23() , and in the "slow season" varied between 75 and 130; hourly 
rates ranged from 54c to 96c, and hourly earnings (bonus included) 
from 65c to $1.85; 
19 
the hours worked each week also varied between 
3(1 and 35. All three factors, whether an individual was laid 
---------------------------
1'/. John Zarelba, Nayne State University, Nalter Reuther library, Oral History Archives 
[abbreviated to NSU in future references], August-October 1961, 4. 
18. Harry Ross Collection, Nalter Reuther library [in future references abbreviated to WRl] Box 3, 
Report dated Dece.ber 11 1933. 
l<i. Anderson and Jefferys, ~~ £tt, Chapter 3. 
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off or recalled~ the rate and bonus, and the number of working 
hours, were determined by the foreman, general foreman or 
superintendent. 
Managerial power over workers' pay and hours was essentially 
arbitrary. Often the supervisor had the personal authority to 
recruit family or friends or workers from a similar ethnic 
20 
background. The alternative was to queue from 3 a.m. outside a 
plant's employment office that opened at 8 a.m. Those lucky enough 
to get inside might have to wait until 9 p.m. to be told whether 
21 
they were hired or not. Foremen had the power of :ins t.ant 
di smi ssc~l . Workers tied to a moving line were dependent on them 
for any relief. A Ford worker~ Kenneth Bannon~ recalled conditions 
at the River Rouge in the Fall of 1936: 
If you wanted to go to the bathrool, you would have to get perlission frol the forelan. At 
tiles this perlission Mas given and at other tiles it was denied. At the point it Mas denied 
there Mas nothing you could do about it. You were not alloMed to talk to your fellow 
workers.22 
In much of Dodge Main~ where other conditions were not quite as 
bad as at the Rouge, workers were also not allowed to speak while 
IfoJl':W' king. Gertrude Nalezty started in Dodge Main's showcase first 
fleor Wire Room in 1934: 
---------------------------
2(1. Anderson and Jefferys, Q~ £!~, Chapter 2; Greer, Q~ £!t, 89. 
21 • Harry Ross, tlSU, 3. 
2 2 . Kenneth Bannon, MSU, February 28 1963, 1. 
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Before the union you had to work fast. The supervisors were on your back all the tile. Once 
the whistle blew you could say "Good lorning' or "Good afternoon', but that was that. You 
couldn't talk to one another while you worked.23 
At Ford the debasing of workers" dignity went still further~ as 
B.'::Innon recall ed: 
The lavatories were upstairs. I should not say upstairs, but they were up off the floor on 
poles ••• They were laybe eight or ten feet off the floor and when you were allowed to go to 
the washrool, it was not unusual for a servicelan to cOle in and want to know what you were 
doing, how long you were there and also to ask you to stand up if you were sitting down to 
see if you were I ying or not. 24 . 
Here again was fertile ground for grievances. 
---------------------------
23. Interview by author with Gertrude Nalezty, August 10 1982. The Wire Rool was a show 
departlent because it was a relatively clean depart.ent situated on the first floor near the lain 
entrance to Dodge Hain and the predolinantly wOlen workers were issued with blue overalls with the 
Dodge lotif on thel. Zarelba, WSU, 3, recalled conditions in the heat treatlent departlent: 'It was 
a cardinal sin to speak during working to your fellow workers.' 
24. Bannon, NSU, 3. 
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II. Year of change 
In 1933 economic trends coincided with a political water s hed. 
Chrysler recovered its pre-depression production levels in an 
indus try producing 41% more cars than in 1932. US unemployment 
continued to rise until March 1933, but in Detroit the ~ituation 
improved. This was p a rticularly true of Chrys ler whose production 
of its principal model line, the Plymouth, at its Dodge Main and 
25 
new Plymouth Road plants, nearly quadrupled from 1930 to 1933 . 
Job s in the automakers and in Briggs, which supplied Ford with 
car bodies, seemed mor e secure. 
Political change 
1933 also saw the inauguration of Franklin D Roosevelt, the 
New Deal President, on I"larc:h 4. In November 1932 he had stood 
"for the bui 1 di ng o·f pl.ms that res t upon •.• the forgotten man at 
the bottom of the ec:onomic pyr-amid", promising federal relief to 
26 
pr e vent starvation, and unemployment compensation. Early in 
1933 the new political atmosphere was already encouraging a 
minority of workers to assert basic: democratic rights in the 
Workplace. 1933 saw the biggest strike wave in American labour 
-------------------------
2~. Chrysler Corporation, Et~!~£t!t !~q §!~!t!t t!£t ~qq~ (Detroit: 19731, 81r new PlYlouth 
registrations rose frol 64,301 in 1930 to 249,667 in 1933. [This source will be abbreviated in 
future to Chrysler, E~f!.] 
26. Cited in Irving Bernstein, lyt~Yl!Qt-Y!!t~, (Boston: Houghton "ifflin, 19691, 2. 
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27 
history. In Detroit it began in the Briggs body plants. 
Briggs plants were known in Detroit in the late 19205 and 
early 19305 as "slaughter houses". Working conditions were 
considered some of the worst in the industry. In January 1933 new 
1 abour hired at its Highland Park plant to cope with increased 
demand for- 1933 models quickly found management CLlt t i ng the 
hiring r,,,,te for metal finishers from the 52 cents promised (and 
being paid at Dodge) to "":"C:' 
-''''' 
cents an hour. After the thi rod 
reduction in successive weeks~ the men stopped work and demanded 
an <::n:p I anat i on. Their- foreman told them: "If you don't like your 
job why don't you quit '? " and~ when they kept stopping or working 
28 
slo"", i nsi sted: "Ei ther- gQ to wc)rk or qui t ! " They ""al ked out -
and the presence of a few Communist Party members in Briggs~ and 
the assistance of the CP's Auto Workers' Union (AWU) 
29 
flare-up into the first big -auto industry strike . 
turned the 
The strike showed that with organization workers could 
direct their anger effectively against the auto companies. It was 
a partial victory. Those who struck and stayed out were not re-
hired when the strike was called off on May 1. But their action 
---------------------------
27. P.: Edwards, Il2 ~tt, Table 4A, 258. 
2 8. Anderson and Jefferys, ~~ £ti, Chapter 3. 
29. For two co.pleaenhry accounts Ot the 1933 Briggs strike see Anderson and Jefferys, ~~ ~tt, 
Chapter 3 and Keeran, PP fil, Chapter 4. 
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forced Briggs and several other companies to increase their rates 
30 
and stopped the spate of price-cutting throughout the industry. 
It also led to the dispersal of several now-experienced strikers 
to other Detroit plants and helped encourage the wave of strikes 
that took off especially after August 26 1933~ when Roosevelt 
signed the "Code of Fair Competition for the Automobil f? 
Manu":acturing Industry". This code came under the term~ of the 
Nati anal Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA)~ and was published and 
distributed widely in Detroit as a 5c pamphlet. A strike of 
dingmen (metal repairers)~ one of the most skilled groups of 
autoworkers~ then broke out at Dodge Main against~ 
fChiselling by the Chrysler Corporation at all plants. 
'Trying to break in neM dinglen Mhile there are dinglen still out of jobs. 
fChrysler Corporation trying to flood dinglen labour larket and cut wages.31 
I t w.~s "squel ched" wi thi n 48 hours~ Zaremba recall ed, because even 
this group were scared of being marked out as troublemakers. But 
Chrysler"s refusal to listen to the fears of such a key group 
caUsed widespread resentment and determined many individual 
32 
Workers to try to c hange management·s attitude. 
The National Recovery Administration (NRA) code laid down 
minimum employment conditions which were entirely acceptable to 
the National Automobile Chamber of Commerce: a 43c an hour 
-------------------------
30 . Keeran, 9.2 £i.t, 95. 
31 • Frank Marquart Collection, IIRL, Box 3. 
32. Zarelba, IISU, 3. 
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minimum wage in cities with populations over 500,000; those 
employed not to be worked more than an average 35 hours a week; 
and a special clause~ exclusive to the automobile industry~ that 
allowed the employers to discriminate "on the basis of individual 
33 
merit". But the code did contain the NIRA's Section 7(a): 
E.ployees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of 
their own choosing, and shall be free fro. the interference, restraint or coercion of e.ployers 
of labour, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization 
or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other ,utual aid 
or protection.34 
This gave workers the confidence of knowing that their self-
organization had the backing of the law - whatever their 
employers said or did. Union membership became "American" and 
gained a formal legality overnight. In Detroit the Auto Workers' 
Union~ the Industrial Workers of the World, the newly-formed 
Mechanics Educational Society of America and the American 
Federation of Labor all recruited thousands of workers. Union 
activism did not instantly appear "legitimate' in all workers' 
eyes ~ however' . Union 'legitimacy' depended crucially not on the 
law but upon three other elements: some degree of management 
recognition, a high level of worker involvement and evidence of 
its effectiveness. In 1933 each of these elements was missing. 
---------------------------
3 3. Bernstein (1 969), Q! £tt, 95. 
34. National Recovery Ad.inistration, ~Q~! Qt t~tt ~Q~~@ttttQ~, No 1403-1-04, OJ in Ross 
Collection, WRL, Box 3. 
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AFL Activity 
In June 1933 when Roosevelt signed the NIRA~ AFL president 
I.<Ji 11 i am Gr een ~ under pressure from Un i ted Mine Worker s' pres ident 
John L Lewi5~ the only major industrial union~ a ss igned four full -
time organizers to recruiting the country's half a million auto 
35 
Workers. They were not exactly the most dynamic organiz~rs Green 
could find~ and they were given a hopeless strategy: to organize 
all t.he aub:>workers first. into fedelral (AFL) locals covering each 
plant; and then to divide up those recruited into their respective 
AFL craft un i ons. William Collins of the International Associat.ion 
of Ma chinists established his headquarters in Detroit~ and within 
a month of the launch of the Automobile Code~ the f irst AFL 
36 
meeti~g was held at Dodge Main. 
Nineteen workers attended the UAW Dodge inaugural meeting on 
Sunday afternoon~ September 24 193 3, but only five knew each 
oth(;!r. John Panz ner, one of Collins' staff, chaired the meeting 
and explained the Federal Labor Union charter~ Local No 182 Tl, 
that had been issued t.o Dodge employees. He then organized the 
election of officers. Harold Padget was ready to run for 
pres ident as he had been laid off from the trim department in 
1929 and was still not back at work. Jack L Andrews was elected 
:':',5 . Keeran, '!2 £tt, 100. 
:,6. The AFL leeting Nas preceded by an August 1933 leeting in the Cass Technical High School 
here tNO Detroit congresslen expl~ined Section 7A of the NIRA to an audience that included several 
auto Norkers, q~qq~ ~!t~ ~~~~, Kay 10 1952 [in future references abbreviated to q~~l. 
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vi I::e --pre~;i deni:, and wrote the names of those present on a 
blackboard so they could get to know each other. He was a company 
spy. Eight days later the five workers from the fifth floor 
trim department cushion line who attended the meeting were fired. 
Harry Ross recalls his foreman coming up to him and his partner 
on the cushions, a man who had worked 20 years at Dodge Main, 
asking, "What have you two guys been doing? I have Just got 
orders to fir'e both of you." Zaremba survived: he had given the 
38 
spy a fictitious name. 
In October Panzner spoke to the Union of Automobile Workers' 
second Dodge meeting, 
about how we should git the elployees to gether and about forling a council of all locals to 
work hand in hand and to git things a rolling in this City to git all Factorys organized and 
to have a strong~union in the Autolobil distric.£sic139 
The Dodge federal local drew up a programme of demands to submit 
to the management.They raised the issues affecting all autowork-
ers in the early and mid-1930s: the bonuses and the piece rate 
system; job security and employment; regulation of the speed of 
--------------------------
37. Frank Karquart Collection, WRL, Box 3, Local 18277 Hinute Book, Septelber 24 1933. In 
1933 Chrysler spent $61,627 on labour espionage. Andrews later befriended Richard Frankensteen, 
president of the 'independent' Chrysler union and sent daily reports to Corporations Auxilliary, the 
spying cOlpany elployed by Walter Chrysler ever since he had used its services while working for SK. 
They paid Andrews $40 a lonth for his reports and charged Chrysler $9 a day; ~~~, Kay 10 1952. 
38. Harry Ross, WSU, 7-12; Zareaba, WSU, 5. 
:39. Local 18277 Kinutes, October 6 1933. ' 
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40 
work; favouritism; and payment for lost time. 
But at the same moment handfuls of auto workers were uniting 
in federal union locals and drawing up demands~ two developments 
oCcurred to undermine these early moves to some degree of worker 
autonomy. First, the AFL Executive Council forced Green to issue 
instructions forbidding AFL organisers putting toolmakers~ die 
41 
makers, maintenance men and machinists in federal locals. The 
movement to build an industrial union was sabotaged by the 
42 
policies of the craft International Association of Machinists. 
Second~ the auto makers launched their counter-offensive. Ford 
tightened his repressive regime. The Edward G Budd Company of 
Phi l.:\delphia, body builders and owners of the British Pressed 
Steel Company plant at Cowley~ openly defied the new Labor 
43 
Board. But Chrysler and 8M, 
I 
---------------------------
40. ~~~, Kay 10 1952. 
41 • Bernstein (1969), Q2 £!t, 95. 
meanwhile, dressed up anti-trade 
42. John Anderson confirled the sense of betrayal experienced by young union-linded auto workers 
in 1933 when, having at first supported the building of federal local unions, it dawned upon thel 
that the AFl would soon split the workers up into their various trade groups; Anderson and Jefferys, 
gg fit, Chapter 4. 
43. For lany years Budd had produced a cOlpany lagazine called l~~ ~~~4q~tt~, full of interviews 
with "Buddites"; Dunn, 9P fit, 156. The cOlpany saw the way forward to turn its paternalist into i 
COIpany union. But when a strike by around 1,000 of its 4,000 worktrs took place to force 
recognition of the AFl, Budd successfully defied both Regional and National labor Board rulings that 
the co.pany should hold a proper election - a defiance which eventually helped lead to the 1935 
Supreae Court where the NIRA itself lias declared unconstitutional; Fine, gQ fB, 194-202. 
Paradoxically, the Budd COlpany's Cowley plant was the first in which production workers lIere 
unionised in Britain after a key strike in 1934; Dave lyddon, 'Workplace organization in the British 
Car Industry: a critique of Jonathan Zeitlin', ~!!!grY ~gr~!bgp, No.15 (Spring 1983), 135. 
111 
44 
unionism in legal clothes by launching company union schemes. 
These were essentially safety valves: works councils, usually of 
long-service employees~ would funnel grievances to management 
without the need for any bargaining. After the NIRA delivered its 
boost to union organisation in 1933, such schemes became very 
popular among employers determined to prevent "outsiders" 
interfering with their managerial prerogatives - the coritemporary 
'~5 
view of unions - but who baulked at outright law-breaking. 
There "'Jere~ however, significant differ.nces between the Chrysler 
and GM works council schemes which subsequently played a large 
part in shaping their shop floor union traditions. 
Works Councils 
In October 1933 Walter Chrysler put his personal imprint on 
the plan for "Employee Representation in the Plants of ChY"ysler 
Moton::," • In a letter distributed with the plan he wrote: 
As a forler shop-Morker I have long looked forward to the tile Mhen the Elployees and the 
Kanagelent of the Chrysler Corporation Mould sit dOMn around a table to discuss and decide 
latters of lutual interest to all of us.46 
And the proposals stated baldly: 
--------------------------
44. ShoMn in the October 2 1933 firings at Chrysler referred to above; and in the large SUIS 
spent by both Chrysler and G" on cOlpany anti-union spies between 1933 and 1937. Thus Dodge Morker, 
N. HontoMski, a letal finisher clock no T369, confessed to being paid $40 i lonth plus expenses by 
Corporation Auxilliary for reporting on the activities of successively Local 18277, the Dodge AIWA 
locals and then UAN Local 3, frol January 24 1934 until January 26 1937; Zarelba Collection, NRL, 
Box 9. 
45. Bernstein (1969), ~ £!.t, 39-40, cites a contelporary BLS survey of 593 cOlpany unions that 
found that 378 of thel had been established during the HRA period. The BLS survey found: "The great 
lajority ••• Mere set up entirely by .anage.ent. Kanage.ent conceived the idea, developed the plan, 
and initiated the organization." 
46. Elployee Representation Plan and letter in lare.ba Collection, NRL, Box 6. 
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Purpose, This is a Plan which provides an opportunity for the Elployees to have an equal 
voice with the Kanagetent in deciding jointly all latters affecting wages and working 
conditions, 
In fact the Dodge Main Joint Council was to be made up af 
appointed supervisors and staff workers and 53 elected employee 
representatives~ and issues could only be decided on a two-thirds 
maj ority. 
Neither the handful of AFL members at Dodge Main and 
Chrysler"s new Plymouth plant nearby and at the older Kercheval 
and Jefferson plants~ nor the e ven smaller numbers of AWU members~ 
tried to mobilize resistance to the company union plan. Its hint 
of coming improvements in wages and working conditions were too 
promising to be opposed. The plan was adopted with 95% in favor in 
a secret refe rendum and the first employee elections were held 
47 
earl y in 1934. In contrast to the fate of the 8M company union 
scheme ~ and certainly against the intentions of its creators~ 
Chrysler "s work s councils OVer the next three years a cted as 
48 
midWife to an active shop floor trade unionism. 
8M"s company union plan~ drawn up in July 1933 was much mor e 
---------------------------
4"7. Zarelba Collection, NRL, Box 1. 
48. Fine, ~2 ~~t, 161; while he ,isses the link between the Chrysler plan and an early and active 
shop floor trade unionisl, also notes the different ilpact the cOlpany union plans had on Chrysler 
and 6" workers, and puts it down to what can be sUllarized as a greater sophistication on the part 
of 6K: ' The difference in the reaction of the e.ployee representatives in the two corporations 
probably stel.ed frol a dissatisfaction with the joint-council type of plan used by Chrysler and 
frot the less intransigent attitude in dealing with their workers of at least sOle of the GK plant 
lanagers," 
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49 
modest. For several years it had operated an !Q~y§t~~~l ~ytY§l 
e§§Q£i~tigo gf Eliot which had provided club houses, bOVJl i ng 
alleys, billiard tables and all the trappings of ~ self-running 
50 
benevolent society that in practice was at 8M ' s beck and call. 
Confident from this experience~ 8M did not feel obliged to seek 
the double-edged legitimacy of Chrysler's plan by calling a 
51 
ballot. It simply imposed its plan. And the following year it 
issued a policy statement on labour-management relations which 
made clear that it!:; "collective bargaining" did "not imply the 
assumption by the employee of a voice in those affairs of 
management which management~ by its very nature~ must ultimately 
52 
ci+?cide upon its own responsibility." These early differences 
53 
Would later have profound consequences. 
---------------------------
49. The plan was drafted by the future 6H director of industrial relations, Herle C Hale, 
following a leeting of divisional lanagers. 
50. Dunn, ~~ £tt, 152. 
51. Fine, ~ £it, 155 • 
. "' ~ ~4. Cited, th~, 2BB. 
a::- ..,. ~J~,. Harris, ~ ~tt, 29, describes Chrysler lanagelent in the late 1930s as "ideolDgically 
antiunion and politically reactionary', But Harris' [23] three categories of 1930s lanagelent 
indUstrial relations policies: 'persistent antiunionisl; realistic accoIIDdation and adaptation; and 
the progressive approach" - don't quite capture the lixture of welfarisl, paternalisl and 
antiunionisl that led both Chrysler and GH to establish Works Councils. Indeed, perhaps instead of a 
rigid line between "antiunionisi' and "realisl", a better understanding would be reached if GH and 
Chrysler's policy were both seen as being "realistically antiunion" - with subsequent differences 
eterging frot the different realities the two firls faced. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE ROOTS OF RESISTANCE 
1933-1936 
The particular features of the frontier of control in Dodge Main 
in the 1940s and 1950s developed from the interaction of 
1 
management and workers in Detroit during the early and mid-1930s. 
The works council unified the highly-concentrated plant in a 
Period of rapid expansion~ and brought together potential 
organizers. But it did not provide the genuine representati on 
Chrysler had promised; nor was managerial authority significantly 
less arbitrary. In this situation the organizational encouragement 
of Detroit·s nationally-known 'Radio Priest', Father Coughlin, was 
decisive. Dodge workers formed an 'independent" union modelled on 
Coughlin"s National Union for Social Justice. The first section of 
Chapter 5 examines the complex wa y sectional representation gained 
Workplace legitimacy for both management and managed. The second 
section considers the "independent' union that rooted itself in 
DOdge Main in 1935 and 1936. 
---------------------------
1. Friedlander adds that it is only possible to understand the developlent of the UAN in the 
19405 and 1950s through "an analysis of its roots in structures set in lotion in the forlative 
years'; q2 ~tt, 112. 
I 
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I. The sources of militancy 
The sheer size and concentration of Dodge Main ensured that its 
Works council played a part in the unionizing process. An 
average, in the middle and late 1930s, of 35,000 workers occupied 
2 
5.1 million square feet of floorspace packed into 30 acres. As 
Figu~e shows (on the following page) the complex was highly 
compact with nine major buildings linked together. The eight 
story body building was connected to the pressed steel building 
on the second, third and fourth floors, and to the assembly 
building no. 2 on the fifth and sixth floors. 
Physical concentration 
Like Henry Ford, the Dodge brothers and Walter Chrysler 
believed in integrating the manufacturing process. Casting, 
forging and heat treating were carried out in single-storey 
bUildings that allowed adequate ventilation. Other buildings were 
mUlti -storey,parts being received and stored on the ground floor, 
which also housed the heaviest machinery. Higher floors carried 
the conveyors that snaked almost randomly through the complex. 
BOdY-in-white, painting, and enamelling processes were completed 
on different floors before being taken by other conveyors and 
---
------------------------
~ 
4. Hyde, ~ £tt, 23; he points out that the new General Kotors Cadillac plant being built on the 
sa.e site and scheduled to start operations in 1985, requires 465 acres for a plant of just 3 
lillion square feet. 
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elevators to the higher floors of one of the two assembly 
buildings for trimming. The cars then passed to the second floor 
final assembly lines. There~ the bodies were dropped on to the 
completed chassis before the cars were driven down a ramp and out 
to the test building. A reinforced-concrete construction was 
Supported internally by concrete columns which divided the 
working space - already confined to long segments no more than 
100 feet wide - into narrow aisles just 25 or 30 feet across. 
The high degree of integration and the physically 
constricting work situation facilitated contact between workers 
~ith a common interest in collective organi z ation. It ensured 
that news of dispute. and grievances was generalized throughout 
the compl e~·: ~ encouraging a heightened sense of plant-wide work 
group ide ntity. In this situation the works council then made its 
mark bringing together about 50 manual workers from all areas of 
the comple>:. Between the first works council meeting, 
4 
winter of 1933-1934, and the last~ in February 1937~ 
in the 
at 1 E~ast 
150 workers met in company time. It was a far cry from most GM 
5 
plants , where the chairman of an eight or ten person works 
---------------------------
.... 
..:\ • lHq, 20-25. 
4. While Fine writes, QR ~lt, 337-344, as if the Dodge Autolotive Labor Board "bargaining agency· 
was first iQt~~q in February 1935, there are at least two explicit doculentary references in 
Zarelba, WRL, Box 1, and "arquart, WRL, Box 3, to indicate a continuous presence of the Dodge "ain 
Norks Council ;rol late 1933 or early 1934, in addition to the circu.stantial evidence that Chrysler 
Mas unlikely to wait 16 .onths fro. the 951 approval of the plan before putting it into operation. 
I::' ~. Anderson and Jefferys, q~ ~lt, Chapter 5, for Fleetwood Fisher Body. 
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council would either conduct all discussions personally with the 
plant manager or invite him or a single management representative 
6 
to attend meetings. The Chrysler works councils fostered an ' us' 
against 'them' consciousness among a sizeable layer of manual 
workers. 
Job security 
Worker s' . collective confidence was also encouraged at Dodge 
Main by the knowledge that they were in a significantly different 
l~bour market environment than those at 8M and Ford. They 
manufactured most of the parts for Chrysler's top-selling Plymouth 
car~ and~ between 1928 and 1936 assembled the DeSoto and the 
DOdge. Ford's rival Model A and, from 1932~ V-8 were built mainly 
at the giant extended River Rouge plant~ while the Chevrolet was 
tUrned out from the tens of different plants that comprised 8M's 
Chevrolet division based mainly in Flint. Table 5 compares the 
annUal change in new registrations: 
-------------------------
6. Fine, ~ ~tt, 157-15B. kruchko also argues that the works councils GK organized at its Horwood 
ChevrOlet and Fisher Body plants ' provided the Horwood worker with a valuable nucleus of labour 
leaders'; 99 fis, 64. 
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TABlE 5 
CAR RE61STRATIONS OF CHRYSLER, 611 AIm FORD lEADllli IIOIIELS, 
1931-1941 
y~![ ~~[Y1l~[ ~~Il~[!l ~qtq[~ Eq[q 
PlYlouth DodgelDeSoto Chevrolet Kodel AlV-8 
t change t change t change t change 
-------------------------------------------------------------
1931 + 47 - 18 - 0 -50 
1932 + 19 - 35 -45 -51 
1933 +123 +101 +41 +20 
1934 + 21 - 5 +13 +71 
1935 + 27 +103 +23 +50 
1930 + 30 + 48 +42 - 9 
1937 - 7 - 13 -17 + 2 
1938 - 38 - 41 -40 -53 
1939 + 22 + 08 +29 +32 
1940 + 20 + 12 +43 +13 
1941 + 3 + 9 + 3 +11 
-------------------------------------------------------------
Average 
annual change 
1931-1941: + 251 +211 + 8t +4t 
SOURCE: Chrysler, E!~t~. 
Chrysler workers were concentrated in a single integrated complex 
that, between 1931 and 1941, expanded output nearly three times 
faster than GM"s Chevrolet Division and five times faster than 
the Rouge. This gave Dodge production workers much more regular 
work and skilled workers near permanent employment. The disparity 
with GM was particularly s harp in 1933, when both companies 
launched their company union plans. 
12 0 
Political contFadiction 
The expectations of a new era of democFatic Fights aFoused by 
FDR in 1933 weFe fiFst echoed by WalteF ChFysleF and then 
effectively dashed in 1934 and 1935. Though pFomised discussions 
on "wages and wOI"'kin~.:J conditions", the ""oFkeFs weFe fobbed off, as 
DistFict 23 employee FepFesentative Zaremba Ff?called: 
It was nauseating for us to listen to the co.pany recite about holes to be repaired in the 
floors and windows to be repaired in the departlents.7 
Dick Frankensteen had worked at Dodge fFom 1926 to 1928 while he 
attended night school at the UniveFsity of DetFoit, and had then 
graduated fFom the University of Dayton, Ohio. in 1932. He f ound 
. , 
himself back in the Dodge trim depaFtment in 1933 and was elected 
I 
District 7 employee repFesentative the following yeaF. A quarteF 
of a centuFY later he Femarked: 
As for the Works Council, we bargained for clean windows and floors without grease, and lany 
things that were ilportant but leaningless in take-hole pay. When it cale to dollars and 
cents, when it cale to econolics, we .were powerless.S 
This resentment was felt sharply by those taking paFt, and begim 
to sUFface when ChFysler" s growth got into full swing .:md 
individual workeFs gained the confidence to Faise issues on the 
Works council that challenged unilateFal manageFial authoFity. 
In July 193 5 one worker representative propose d Chrysler 
OpeF a te district - based seniority lists to govern lay-offs and 
--------------------------~ 
7 . Zarelba, WSU, S. 
fj. Richard Frankensteen, WSU, October 1959-Decelber 1961, 5 • 
• I 
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recalls. It was defeated on the Dodge Main works council by 50 
votes to 40. At the same meeting only 25 votes were recorded for 
the right of employee representatives to take a witness in with 
them when they met management. Only a small minority was ready 
to challenge managerial A week later, however, 
Frankensteen was amazed when he won the coveted two thirds 
m~jority after several staff workers used the cover of the works 
council secret ballot to vote for his proposal for a 10% rise in 
earnings. They felt entitled to challenge management on the t~~m§ 
of subordination but not on its content. The proposal was 
carried by 60 votes to 33 but was summarily rejected by Chrysler 
Vice President in charge of manufacturing, W J O' Naill, the Dodge 
Main General Manager who chaired the Joint Council. 
Ma nagement' s first reaction was to see the two facets of its 
control as indiss oluble. Its eg~§~ to set wage rates was defended 
as vigorously as its ~ytbQ~ity to lay-off or recall whoever it 
wished. Two months earlier O'Neill had instructed 
representatives: 
I don't Mant you 4ello"s to think because you don't get a J5~ increise, and 65c rate, that 
this isn't Collective Bargaining.9 
the 
To ma ke Chrysler"s refusal to negotiate collectively on wages 
still clearer, management then sacked J H Campbell, the chairman 
of the employee representatives ' side. A management 
representative explained: 
--------------------------
9. Frank Karquart Collection, NRL, Box 3. Dodge "ain Works Council linutes, Kay 2 1935. 
1?? ~~
He lade a slur on the President of the Chrysler Corporation when he lade the statelent that 
there were hidden profits. 10 
Instead of being a forum for management-employee togetherness, 
the Works Council fostered anti-management resentment among those 
workers who took part by legitimizing the articulation of certain 
demands while simultaneously turning them down. 
Catholic respectability 
The final element that made Dodge Main exceptional by 
comparison with most GM plants, was its location in Hamtramck, the 
' Poletown' of the United States. In 1940 there were 22 foreign 
1 1 
language publications being published in Detroit, and a hirJh 
proportion of Dodge Main's workers were Polish, Catholic or both. 
Many, including several who became Dodge employee representatives, 
were heavily influenced in the late 1920s and mid-1930s by an 
anti - Communist populist priest based in the Detroit suburb of 
Royal Oak. 
Father Charles E Coughlin was known throughout the . United 
States as the Radio Priest. His demagogic Sunday night broadcasts 
on the WJR radio station began in 1926 and continued with only a 
few interruptions until 1940. To an audience which, in the early 
--------------------------~ 
1 (I • lhq, Jul y 3, Jul y 11 1935. 
11 • Polenberg, QI!. £It, 3b. 
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12 
frequently reached up to forty million people~ he 
preached a virulent anti-Communism in harness with vehement 
denunciations of Prohibition and advocacy of the Catholic social 
philosophy of equality~ justice and class collaboration laid down 
in Pope Leo XIII " s 1891 B§~Ym ~QY~CYm& Qo tb~ ~QO~itiQO Qf tb~ 
This argued that Catholic clergy should fig ht for 
just and moral reforms in industrial society. Pope Pius X"s 
encyclical of 1912, took this further and 
acknowledged workers" rights to form trade unions, but added: 
Trade unions lust not engage in any act or theory which does not concur with the teachings and 
instructions of the Church or of the relevant religious authority.13 
Coughlin"s pitch was directed at workers hit hard by the 
Depression and who wanted to get good-paying jobs in the land of 
oppcw"tuni ty. He attacked e mployer s who deni ed worker s jobs or 
emp I oyed them as "mclder"n i ndustt'"" i al ~;:,l aves". In Jul y 19::.\0 he tol d 
a (:cmqt'""essi onal enquiry into domestic subversion that "The 
greatest force in the movement to internationalize (ie Communize) 
1 aboLtr" thn:JLlghout the ",mr 1 dis Henry Ford." In the 1932 
presidential campaign Coughlin strongly attacked Hoover's record , 
and in 1933 openly endorsed Roosevelt with slogans such as 
14 
"~:(:Jo£~evelt or" Ruin" i:H1d "The NevI Deal is Christ's Deal". 
--------------------------
1 ':/ 
.<;.. Brinkley, qll £!.t, 83. 
13 . Cited in Denis "oniere, ~! 4!y!lqllll!!!ut 4!~ t4!qlqqt!~ ~~ ~Y!~!£, (Montreal: Editions 
Quebec/Alerique, 1977), 257. I would like to thank Gregor Murray for this reference to the origins 
of Catholic trade unionisl in Canada. Coughlin hilself was born in and studied theology in Canada 
before being appointed to serve in Detroit in 1923; Brinkley, ~ £It, 84-88. 
14. Brinkley, qll £It, 97-102. 
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In 1934 as Roosevelt distanced himself from Coughlin~ the 
Radio Priest responded by trying to turn his Radio League of the 
Li,ttle Flower into a more organized political pressure group. The 
National Union for Social Justice~ launched in a radio sermon in 
November 1934~ was intended~ C(:lugh lin said, t.o allow his 
li st enE~rs "to organi ze for" social united action \o'Jhich will be 
15 
founded on God-gi ven soci cd truths". The National Union 's 
Pt-eambl e began: 
Establishing 'Y principles upon this prea.ble, na.ely, that we are all creatures of a 
beneficent God, .ade to love and serve Him in this world and to enjoy Hi. forever in the nexti 
and that all this world's wealth of field and forest, of .ine and river has been bestowed upon 
us by a kind Father, therefore, I believe that wealth as we know it originates fro. the 
natural resources and fro. the labour which the sons of God expend upon these resources. 
It is all ours except for the harsh, cruel and grasping ways of wicked .en who first 
concentrated wealth into the hands of a few, then do.inated states and finally co •• enced to 
pit state against state in the frightful catastrophes of co •• ertial warfare ••• 16 
The IJaticlnal Union nevel~ got off the ground, but the momentum 
carried over into his Detroit autoworker constituency. C(:Jughl in 
opposed his supporters joining the AFL in 1934 and 1935. The AFL's 
craft structure was hostile to Coughlin's Catholic constituency of 
unskilled or semi-skilled recent immigrants and~ in any case, the 
AFL was too distant from the Catholic church and was infiltrated 
by "rackete€~rs" and "gangsters". But Coughlin did encourage the 
transformation of Chrysler"s employee representation scheme into 
---------------------------
16 • lh~, 287. 
an " independent' union based on his Catholic principles of 
17 
industrial unionism. His contribution to the unionizing 
process was his Catholic legitimacy. It allowed native American 
and first and second generation Polish workers to accept that 
union organization was morally justified. 
-----------------
126 
,/ 
II. An ~Independent~ Union 
In the spring of 1935, frustration grew among the second wave of 
employee representatives elected in January and Feb~uary. It 
became increasingly clear Chrysler was not prepared to allow the 
Work s Council to become a bargaining forum. On Coughlin's advice 
the employee representatives met on their own on April 9 1935 and 
decided to issue dues cards for an Automotive Industrial Workers' 
Association (AIWA). An eight point charter~ probably drawn up at 
one of the regular Friday evening meetings of activists held at 
18 
Coughlin's house. was adopted. The objects of the AIWA were: 
To prolate the interests of those engaged in the autolotive and allied industries by ilproving 
Morking conditions, by fostering better cooperation between elployers and 'Iployees, and by 
proloting and fostering legislation tending to better the welfare and interests of the said 
elployees.19 
The expectations raised by Chrysler's Works Council company union 
plc'm had~ in the religious-cum-ethnic community-conscious world 
20 
of Detroit in the early 1930s given rise to a non-skilled ~ 
Catholic - led 'i ndependent" .union . The AIWA 's first year book~ 
issued on December 14 1935~ was dedi cated to "our advi sor cmd 
SUpporter Father Charles E Coughlin, the friend and educator of 
---------------------------
18: Zareaba, WSU, 14. 
19. Zare.ba Collection, WRL, Box Ii Minutes of Elployee Representatives Heeting, April 9 1935. 
20 . Friedlander, Q~ c;j1, provides an insightful description of this world. 
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21 
the masses", 
AFL eclipsed 
The AFL federal local based on Dodge still existed~ but its 
membership was tiny, Its activities were largely restricted to 
endorsing correspondence conducted by Collins or Green with 
Chrysler management or the Automotive Labor Board. In its fiy·st 
the only recruitment recorded in the minutes was of 12 
members in April and eight in May 1934. Such was its impotence 
that ~Jack AndrevJs~ the company spy~ was able to remain vice 
president until October 1934~ whereupon he turned his attention to 
Dick Frankensteen, the trim department worker who was soon to 
22 
'found the AHJA. On March 24 1935~ the local called a special 
meeting to take a strike vote. Twenty-nine voted in favour and none 
against, bLlt no strike ensLled. For in mid-1935 the AFL had only 
, .. ., .. ~ 
..::,.,::. 
178 members in all of Chrysler · s Detroit plants. In {~pY·i 1 19 ~3~:j 
the local i:'lgreed "shop stewards be appoi nted from 
department"~ but could only find ten men present (including the 
---------------------------
21. Harquart Collection, NRL, Box 3. There were ten locals of the AINA reported by this date. Six 
were in Dodge (including the Tril, Local 99, the Paint departlent and departlent 76, the body-in-
white), and one each for Chrysler's Kercheval plant, Packard, Hudson and the Hot or Products plants. 
22. Harquart Collection, NRL, Box 3; Local 18277 Hinute Book, April 10 1934, lIay 4 1934, October 
10 1934. Padget lias confirled as president, while Jack Cousins, one of the cushion rool workers 
dislissed the previous year, defeated Andrews as Vice President, and Harrv ROSi was elected 
Recording Secretary. 
,.,..,. 
....... ' • Fine, qI!, l;,it, 407. 
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ubiquitous Andrews) ready to serve. With attendance dropping in 
the Fall~ the local virtually disintegrated. Renamed Local 3 of 
the United Auto Workers after the August 1935 meeting of AFL 
Federal locals it called a special meeting to send a delegate to 
the UAW's first national convention in April 
24 
reached a quorum of nine out of its 50 members. 
1936~ and just 
So weak was it that some members~ including John Zaremba and 
Harry Ross. decided to work both in the company union scheme and 
in building the AIWA . Once the AIWA was established~ they found 
themselves paying it 25c and the AFL $1 a month. The joint work 
of Frankensteen~ Richard Harris, Mclntyre~ Ross, Cousins and 
Zaremba and, in particular, the regular meetings with Father 
Coughlin~ paved the way for the AIWA and UAW to merge in 1936. 
The merger occurred be cause the South Bend UAW Convention declared 
its independence of the old craft-conscious AFL and because 
Coughlin, who spoke at the Convention~ believed his AIWA, with an 
e s timated 10,000 members in Chrysler, could become a leading force 
in the union. Although the Convention did not bar Communists from 
hOlding office, it did unanimously express "unalterable opposition 
to Fascism, Nazism and Communism and all other movements intended 
to distract the attention of the membership of the Labor movement 
---
------------------------
24. l~l~, "inutes, "arch 24, April 5, Septe.ber 20 1935, April 17 1936. 
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25 
from the primary objectives 0+ unionism." The AIWA negotiators~ 
President Dick Frankensteen, Frank Szymanski and Dave Brann from 
Dodge Main and Vice President R J Thomas from Chrysler 
Kercheval, all destined to be important figures in the UAW 
factional struggles of the late 1930s, were cabled by Coughlin: 
"THERE CAN BE BUT ONE FOR SUCCESS STOP I URGE YOU TO 
26 
AMALGAI"IATE" . 
With Coughlin ' s backing~ the merger was assured - although 
members' fears of 'outside ' unions lead to a sizeable 35% voting 
27 
against in a referendum. The AIWA, the HLldson l'1otors • 
independent Llnion and parts of the MESA joined, 
28 
i ncr-easi ng the 
UAW's membership to some 25,000. Frankensteen was put on the 
International ExeCLltive Board (IEB) and on the UAW payroll. On 
Augu s t 2 19:,6 "a meet i ng of all Local sin the Dodge PI ant" ,,~as 
29 
held "to 'form ONE BIG UNION OF THE ENTIRE PLANT". Si >: months 
~~fgc~ winning recognition~ the UAW overnight gained a mass 
member s hip in Chrysler plants and inherited a continLlity of 
---------------------------
25. Cited in Keeran, ~~ £tt, 146. The CP tolerated this resolution since they didn't Nant to 
start a neN fight on the latter after they had already got the constitutional proposal to ban CP 
lelbers frol holding office relittedto the Convention Constitutional Co •• ittee Nhere they could 
bury it. 
26. Marquart Collection, WRL, Box 3. According to one account Father Coughlin also spoke to the 
South Bend UAW Convention; I. HONe & B J Widick, !h~ YB~ ~n~ ~~!!~r B~y!h~r, (NeN York: Da Capo 
Press, 1973) 13. 
''')-~ 
.... 1. Friedlander, ~ ~tt, 116. 
2 8. Wyndhal "orti.er, qr:q!'ll!.!~, (Boston: Beacon Press, 19711, 103. 
2 9. Leaflet in Ross Collection, IIRL, Box 3. 
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organization which had begun in 1933. 
Evolution of shop stewards 
A further contrast needs to be pointed out between the 
Chrysler and the 8M works council schemes. Chrysler provided the 
employee representatives with "their regular average pay from the 
Company for the time actually spent in serving on such Councilor 
Commi ttee". And soon after the Joint Council began operating~ 
the Chrysler workers' representatives were also allowed paid time 
off to follow up grievances. The "Policy for Works Council and 
Employee Repr-esentatives Meetings" alloll'led them a monthly paid 
meeting on their own in addition to the Joint Council and stated~ 
If for any reason the etployee representative feels that in the nortal discharge of his duties 
it is necessary for hil to leave his work during working hours the perlission of the forelan 
lust be obtained before he takes such leave.32 
In 1935 the AIWA organizers were able increasingly to use the 
pr i vi leges of cClmpany uni on representati veE> to act 
shop stE~war-ds. 
--------------------------
~:;O. Only in iI handful of other auto plants was there such a continuity of organization; one was 
Nhite Kotors, Cleveland, which won recognition in 1933, "ortiter, 92 ~!!, 66-67; another was kelsey-
Hayes, Detroit, where a core of at least 200 UAN tetbers and a shop steward organization was kept 
together frol 1933, Bert Cochran, ~!~~t !~q ~~!!Y~l~!, (Princeton, New Jerseys Princeton University 
Press, 19771, 114; Anderson' Jefferys, ~2 £It, Chapter 4. Exactly how big the Chrysler lelbership 
was is open to sOle doubt. Nhen the UAW bargaining cOllittee let Chrysler on "arch 3 1937 it clailed 
20,000 UAW lelbers at Dodge "ain, 9~~J ~!r!!! ~Y!!!!!n, "arch 9 1937. But larelba, NSU, 13, recalled 
that when Dodge local 3 called the sit-doMn only sOle 800 out of the 24,000 tanual workforce were 
actually paid-up lelbers. Given the level of participation in the sit-down, and the degree of shop 
steward organization already in existence by then, it is likely lilrelba's figure was those who light 
attend Local 3 leetings. Total lelbership was definitely over 5,000 in 1936. 
6. 
Zaretba Collection, NRL, Box 6. 
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The AIVJA constitution r-eflected the gr-ass r-oots "Amer-ican" 
democratic - individuali sm that appealed to its str-ongly ethnic 
member-shi p. A local could be set up by any gr-oup of 25 or- mor-e 
wor-kf.:~rs and: 
1. Every local shall have at least one shop steward and as lany lore as they find necessary. 
2. Each shop steward shall have contact len who shall report and be responsible to hii. 
3. The duties of the shop steward shall be to aid the Financial Secretary in collecting dues 
and to see that each leiber's grievances are properly taken care of. He shall report to the 
Local at least once a lonth.33 
By Octclbel'" 19:::':;6~ when the fir-st major- clash occur-r-ed between the 
UAW and Chr-ysler-~ management wer-e hoist on their- own petar-d. They 
wanted to stop the stewards going 8r-ound their- depar-tments 
Or-g~nizing meetings~ but had to agr-ee when a shop stewar-d-employee 
r-epresentative asked: "An;) the Repr-esentati ves permi tted to 1 eave 
their wor-k for- business r-easons as they have been per-mitted in the 
3 4 
past?" Far- fr-om the privileges accor-ded to the employee 
r-epr-esentatives leading to gr-eater- identification with Chr-ysler-, 
under- the political impetus of Catholic social justice in a per-iod 
of economic gr-owth they had been tr-ansfor-me~ into their- opposite: 
a tr-adition of elected depar-tmental r-epr-esentatives being paid by 
the company to pr-ogress gr-ievances and industrial action ~g~in§t 
---------------------------
33 . ~~yi~~~ ~U~ ~~~t~~ Q!~Q ~qU~tttytiqU, Karch 10 1936, in larelba Collection, WRL, Box 6. The 
constitution also provided that 'Any lelber serving full tile for the organization shall be paid no 
lore than he or she can earn at his or her occupation', reflecting both the AlMA's recruitlent of 
NOlen and a distinct anti-privilege sentilent. The Coughlin influence expressed itself in the 
clause requiring a tNo-thirds lajority for strike action. 
34" Works Council linutes, October 16 1936, in lare.ba Collection, NRL, Box 1. 
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the company. And that wasn"t al .l. Alongside these company-
recognized stewards had . developed a layer of union-recognized 
frequently oper~ting in the same way~ were often 
indistinguishable from them. The A IVJA , known in Detroit as 
"Coughl in :' s Uni on II ~ \.-Jas often called a "company union". But., 
events would demonstrate, it was much more t.han that. 
---------------------------
35. Brinkley is right to suggest "it did not deserve the label of 'i co,piny union'·; but he is 
wrong to argue in Chapter 4: "but neither was the Autolotive Industrial Workers Association at the 
center of the labour lilitancy that would ultilately produce the United Auto Workers·, ~e ~tt, 200, 
as 
CHAPTER 6 
REAL AMERICANS IN BATTLE 
1936-1939 
During the late 19305 the mass production industries were at the 
I 
centre of a major battle between American management and workers. 
The first section of Chapter 6 describes how the failure of 
Chrysler management's attempt in 1936 to curb the UAW establishes 
a shop floor union legitimacy. The second section shows how' the 
1937 sit-down and settlement bolstered the independence of 
Chrysler stewards from the UAW. Section three traces the impact 
of the factional struggles within the UAW from 1937 to 1939 on 
union organization in Dodge Main~ the union's largest organized 
pl ant. 
I. 1936: Year of advance 
The strength of the newly- amalgamated UAW was swiftly put to the 
test by Chrysler. On August 26 1936~ 3~OOO Dodge workers received 
letters telling them: "It does not appear at this time that our 
1 
r-equi rements wi 11 afford an opportuni ty to recall you to lIJork. II 
---------------------------
1 • Marquart Collection, Box 3. 
It was a deliberate attack upon the UAW. dismissed 
first in 1933 and then reinstated by the Automotive Labor Board 
in 19:::"4~ was thrown out once more. So were hundreds of other 
s hop stewards and union activists. Foremen were given special 
forms to record the name~~ badge numbers~ class of worker and 
date of original employment of "undesirable" workers and those 
"""e wi sh not to be returned". In the first category~ the 
Department 76 list contained 18 name&~ all men with between two 
and five years' seniority in Dodge. Somf~ of the "r-emar ks" fill ed 
in by the body-in-white foremen were: 
Talks too luch - continually objecting to the a.ount of work. 
Strong union Ian - hot headed. liable to cause trouble. 
Agitator. 
Elployee Representative. Active in Union. 
Trouble .aker - Walked off the job, hot weather, July 10 1936. 
COI.unist. 
Strong union Ian - Does a lot of talking. Contact for Sy.anski. 
Hard to handle - liable to cause trouble.2 
Against the names of a further 18 workers who no longer worked for 
DOdge~ were comments like: 
Gave infor.ation to ~Q4q! ~Q[~![ paper detrilental to Dodge - CO'lunist. 
Assuled nale. 
Discharged drunk - active in Unions. 
Conduct detrilental to Dodge. 
The firings came during the model changeover~ a bad time for 
any immediate re5ponse~ so the stewards waited until re-hiring 
for the 1937 model began. Then~ following a leafletting campaign 
On the theme, "What security have you? ~Qo.g unless you act NOvJ"~ 
LOcal 3 organized a series of after-work departmental meetings to 
-------------------------
", 
..::.. Lists in Ross Collection, WRl, Box 3. 
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take strike votes. They began on October 1 and were to build up 
to open mass meetings on October 14~ 16 and 18. By October 12 the 
trim~ warehouse~ hammer~ metal polishing~ heat treatment, foundry 
and pressed steel departments had virtually unanimously backed 
3 
the strike call (a total of just 11 workers voting against). 
The strength of resistance to this blatant discrimination 
flowed partly from growing economic confidence and partly from 
rising political confidence. Confidence had been growing among all 
car workers as year-on-year growth between 1933 and 1936 had 
4 
nearly doubled average earnings: 
Hodel Year 
Septelber-August 
Average annual lale earnings 
S 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
749 
1,014 
1,294 
1,399 
1936 was also K T Keller's first full year as Chrysler president, 
and he presided over the company's biggest operating margin on 
5 
sales (11.4% before tax) since 1927. Volume of output for Dodge 
Main's principal products, the Dodge and the Plymouth reached 
---------------------------
~'. Leaflets and reports in Ross Collection, NRL, Box 1. HOM .any Morkers actually attended these 
afterwork leetings is not known; but it WiS clearly enough to ilpress lanaglent. 
4. Reported to the Autolobile Manufacturers Association (that excluded Ford); cited in Nillia. H 
McPherson, ~!~Qr 8~!!!iQ~i i~ !b! ~~!Q!Qgi!~ j~~~!!rY, (Washington DC: Brookings Institute, 1940), 
99. 
~ 
,j. Table 4, page above, ShONS the decisive recovery in production and profits that occurred 
during Keller's first five years, frol 1935 to 1939. 
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what proved to be a recbrd for the 1930s as Table 6 shows: 
TABlE ,. 
SAlES OF ClltYSlER DODGE MIl Pl YIIOUTH CARS, 
1928-1941 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year Nell sales DodgelPlYlouth Chrysler Year Nell sales Dodge /Pl Ylouth Chrysler 
Dodge/PlYlouth % of Chrysler Market share I Dodge/PlYlouth % of Chrysler aarket share I 
(OOOs) production l (oOOs) production % 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1928 178 53 10.7 1935 562 89 22:9 
1929 201 58 8.9 1936 748 88 25.0 
1930 128 57 8.6 1937 718 81 25.4 
1931 147 65 12.0 1938 391 83 25.0 
1932 140 73 17.5 1939 525 82 24.2 
1933 336 87 25.8 1940 637 79 23.7 
1934 393 91 22.9 1941 668 74 24.2 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SOURCE: Chrysler, f!f!? 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Keller would dearly have loved to have kept the UAW activists out 
of Dodge Main on the 1937 models. But he had drastically 
underestimated the UAW's strength. Management faced a dilemma: at 
a time when every car which Dodge Main turned out was certain to 
be sold, was it worth risking immediate profits to defeat a union 
that nationally still had under 50,000 members? Keller decided 
not. On October 16 1936, rather than face a strike, he announced 
the recall of all 1934 seniority workers including those 
previously ·separated". The following week the retreat became a 
rout when all 1935 men were recalled, and on November 11 Chrysler 
6 
Conceded - three years before 8M - time and a half overtime pay. 
---------------------------
6. Works Council Minutes, October 16, Noveaber 11 1936, in Zarelba Collection, WRL, Box 1; 
Anderson and Jefferys, 9Q f!!, Chapter 6. 
Union 'Legitimacy' 
This un ~on success came just before Roosevelt"s re-election 
to the presidency in November 1936. If the Chrysler victory was 
the spark to the subsequent wave of sit-downs~ the flame was 
Roosevelt"s massive defeat of the Republican candidate 'Alfred M 
landon~ a notorious anti - labour figure who was leader of the 
right-wing American Liberty League. Of the six months from May to 
November 1936~ a Detroit Polish vehicle components worker 
reCi.'tll. ed: 
As far as organization was concerned, the word Y~tq~ was never lentioned in the shop; and 
Detroit itself was quiet.7 
But after the electoral confirmation of workers' rights~ there was 
a sudden shift in consciousness. In the components ' plant~ the 
solitary union member became dozens; in Dodge Main the few 
thousand became many thousands. The Dodge Main victory directly 
Contributed to that shift~ and s o helped lead directly to the 
recognition of th e UAW by GM and Chrysler in the following six 
8 
months. It did so partly because it showed many Detroit workers 
th a t the • Bi g Thl"'ee" coul d be for"ced to make concessi ons ~ and 
partly because it raised upward comparability. Conditions won 
from one major manufacturer were now frequently demanded from 
---------------------------
7 • Friedlander, Q~ ~!.t, 22. 
8. Bernstein, Q~ ~U, 553. 
'\. 
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another- • But the most significant con~equence was perhaps the 
ltz~ast tangible: the victory "legitimized" §hge fiQQe trade 
unionism at Dodge. 
Chrysler management was seen by its workers~ Ltnionists and 
non-unionists~ and by its supervisors and clerical staff~ to 
extend ~~ f~£tg recognition and respect to §hge fiQQt elected 
representatives and their organi z ation. In contrast to many other 
plants ~ the gains at Dodge were experienced by most workers as 
in a struggle. rather than 
reliance upon a tiny number of activists~ or upon the lithe 
Internati onal" or "enl i ghtened" management was seen to pr'oduce 
resul t5;. The legitimacy of "do-i t--yoursel f " 
9 
unionism became 
a(:cepted in the "plant consciousness" of Dodge Main and mast 
other Chrysler plants; a s did the right of workers to participate 
in rule-making in~tead of it being controlled by outside 
10 
offiCials from the international~ as it was later. 
Chrysler management had backed off a confrontation with the 
UAW in 1936 and then witnessed with distaste a tremendous 
---------------------------
9. Beynon, ~ ~tt, 98, develops the idea of "working class i!~tqty ~q~~~tq~~~@~~" in ways that 
ipply directly to the growing anti-boss politics thit developed in Dodge "ain in the 1930 •• This he, 
argues has three aspects: [11 it provides an understanding of "class relationships in terls of their 
direct lanifestation in conflict between the bosses and the workers within the factory"; [2] it is 
'rooted in the workplace where struggles are fought over the control of the job and the 'rights' of 
lanagers and workers'; and [3] it is "political" because it is concerned "with exploitation and 
power', but "it is a politics of the factory'; QIl fB, 20b. 
l eI. With this conception of what was 'legitilate', Chrysler workers would have a luch greater 
say in the shaping of what David Brody has described as the post-war "workplace rule of law" than 
workers without it. 
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expansion in union numbers~ confidence and organization. In 
December the Local 3 regular business meeting agreed to hold 
depal'- tmentc~l meeti ngs throughout the p 1. ant to "el +?ct thei r Chi ef 
Steward~ stewards and captains. Each elected man to be given a 30 
11 
dc:\y tr i al ~ if not competent then he shoul d be I~emoved." In 
January 1937 regular meetings of chief stewards (bl,:\ck buttons) 
12 
and sectional stewards (blue or white buttons) started up. The 
constituency of the ~bigf stewards tended to approximate to that 
of departmental general foremen and their superiors~ the 
Superintendents; stewards were elected by the section or appointed 
by the chief steward to cover every 2 5 workers or one for every 
1 ",. 
'-' 
se(:ti onal foreman or forelady. By March there were 180 Chief 
Stewards in Dodge Main - representing a ratio of one to every 111 
14 
Workers - and between 200 and 800 sectional stewards. The 
steward system had arrived. It was not an exclusive elite or 
actiVist-only organization~ . but was seen by all union members 
and many non - unionists - as a legitimate way of representing ~!! 
interests within the department or section. This gave the s tewards 
--------------------------
11. Dodge local 3 Collection, WRl, Box 3; Business "eeting linutes, Decelber 27 1936. 
12. ~~~~, Box 4, Stewards' leeting, "inutes January 25 1937. All the chief stewards fro. one unit 
<like the foundry or trill were supposed to leet and elect a ·Captain"; but this idea appears to 
have dropped soon after it was proposed. 
13 . larelba, WSU, 28; Nal ezty interviell. 
14. Stellards' Meeting Minutes, April 5 .1937. The nUlber of blue button stewards is difficult to 
estilate because their nUlbers varied enorlously frol area to area within the plant, and because 
their inforlal status has leant doculentary evidence is not as forthcoling as for the chief 
steward systl!l. 
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the authority not merely to speak for their members, but also to 
lead; and not only to propose but also to initiate action. 
During the next three years two major developments took place 
to help root this shop steward organization more deeply in 
Chrysler" plants than in those of 81'1 - the 19;"'\7 sit...:.·downs and 
result.ing contracts, and a bitter internal UAW factional 
struggle. The result was to differentiate the union tradition 
between Chrysler and 8M and to allow Chrysler workplace unionism 
to survive the 1938-39 recession and enter the war period of 
bitter conflict with management stronger than before. 
II. Sit-downs 
The apparent rapidity with which GM and Chrysler became reconciled 
to the presence of mass unionism after their defeat in the 1937 
sit-downs should not obscure two significant qualifications to the 
impression of a relatively painless transition. First, GM:' 5 
bitter resistance to the threat of workers exercising collective 
Y"e!s tr al nts over its managerial authority did not disappear 
OVernight. It merely manifested itself differently. Second, Walter 
Chrysler and many other Detroit employers close to the strike-
breaking National Metal Trades Association, whose Detroit branch 
secretary also doubled as the general manager of the Employers' 
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Association of Detroit~ remained openly hostile. The sit - downs 
and the settlements that followed changed workers' attitudes more 
than they did management ·s. 
The minority acts 
When it became clear GM was going to compromise in its 1937 
sit-down battle with the UAW~ Chrysler first tried to buy its way 
out of conflict~ and agreed at the works council to pay a 5% 
16 
premium to all second and third shift workers. But the UAW had 
17 
already won 46 o f the 53 Districts of the Dodge Works Council 
f 
and once the first UAW agreement - to-bargain contract was s igned 
with GM on Febru~r y 11 1937, it was determined to win full 
recognition from Chrysler. Walter Chrysler intervened to insist on 
~ 
resistance. The union "s strength was still untried; there was B 
chaRce it might crack. But even more important~ only by resisting 
the UAW momentum might Chrysler management retain any initiative 
in determining the form of future collective bargaining. In 
particular Chrysler had noted GM"s refusal to recognize shop 
stewards in its c ontract, and was determined to turn the tide back 
in it s plants. 
It was, however, too late. When Chrysler told Dick 
--------------------------
1~ ... ~ . 
, McPherson, Q2 ~tt, 13-14. 
16. Marquart Collection, WRL, Box 1: Norks Council Minutes, February 9 1937. 
17. Ross Collection, WRL, Box 3: Local 3 Melbership leeting linutes, January 30 1937. 
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Frankensteen on March 8 that it would not recognize the UAW as the 
bargaining agency for all its workers it took just one phone call 
to John Zaremba inside Dodge to set the sit-down in motion. 
Zaremba raised his right hand in the pre-arranged signal a nd his 
blue button stewards told their sect ions: 
'Shut it down!' Frol IY departlent it snicked around ••• lt crossed the docks again. People Mere 
waiting for a signal there too. 'Shut her' down!' And this is just how it happened. liithin five 
linutes after the signal was given frol the outside, there was not one piece of lachinery 
loving.18 
The Dodge stewards organi z ed the rapid closure of the plant and 
a l so ran the sit-down. The chief stewards became the Dodge Strike 
Committee on the first evening; and~ again in contrast to most of 
the other occupied plants, the stewards immediately decided to 
19 
bar 5uperintendents~ foremen and office staff from the factory. 
After about two weeks they also threw out the security guards~ 
then discovering the guards ' cache of handguns~ ammunition and 
20 
tear gas. 
The sit-down tactic was employed because a walk-out by the 
minority of union members could not have halted production for 
10n<;:l. So the unionization process represented a minority taking 
action with the passiv. support of the majority of workers. 
................ _ ..... _ .. _ .... __ .. _._. __ . __ .. _-_ .. _-_ ... _ .. _ .. -..... _-
18. Zaruba, IiSU, 28; larelba Collection, Box 9, Account written by Zaruba in 1947 on flyleaf o"f 
"The Many and the Few·. 
lli. Strike Bulletin, Karch 10, Karch Ij 1937. 
20. Zarelba Collection, IiRL, BOll 9. 
'\ 
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There 
were already some 10,000 UAW members in Chrysler plants when the 
8M sit-down began in December 1936~ and possibly up to 20~OOO out 
of the 67~OOO total workforce when the Chrysler sit-down 
21 
fOllowed. This proved most important. At 8M the proportion of 
UAW members before the sit-downs was tiny - and the layer of union 
activists who experienced the struggle was much thinner than at 
Chrysler. 
22 
In Chrysler plants~ as many as 6~OOO workers were actively 
inVOlved. After four days the 450-strong Dodge body-in-white 
Department 76 boasted: 
••• the best record of any group in Dodge "ain: over one third of its total lelbership sat in 
voluntarily. When one third of these were forced to go hale (by the Strike COllittee to cut 
the costs of feeding thel all), there was a fight for the privilege of relaining.23 
The same writer had explained in the first issue of the Dodge 
Strike Bulletin distributed to workers inside the plant and to 
those who came to offer support on the outside~ why the sit-down 
movement commanded such support: 
---------------------------
2 1. An indication of the nUlbers of UAW lelbers at Dodge "ain in 1936-37 is given by the nUlbers 
of workers laking the special trip to the Local 3 hall to vote in elections. In the elections held 
after the lerger of the AlMA into the UAW in late SUller or early fall 1936, 5739 votes were calt 
for the position of president. In Kay 1937 the vote for the three candidates for Local 3 president 
totalled 9,517 - an election which required a special trip to the Local 3 hall. cfl "arquart 
Collection, WRL, Box 3; Local 3 Executive Board "inutes [abbreviated LEB in futurel, Kay 20 1937. 
2:3. thq, "arch 12 1937. 
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The len in the factory see. to be real Alericans, good citizens, sOle property owners. They 
Kant to have real collective bargaining which rightfully belongs to thel and guaranteed by the 
US Governlent. They want to have fair play with the lanagelent; they have Delocracy within 
their Union. They want Delocracy within the autolobile industry as well as Delocracy within 
the whole country.24 
Its demands we~e legitimate; its aspi~ations we~e "Ame~ican". 
The movement could be supported by ~ll working Ame~icans~ -f~om 
Communists to Catholics. What had happened between 1933 and 1937 
was that the workplace legitimacy of un~est~ained m~nage~ial 
autonomy had been unde~mined. The politics of the New Deal and 
it s ke~nel of '~esponsible citizenship'~ and the eme~gence of 
union o~ganization capable of a~ticulating the new demands of 
'wo~ke~ citizens· accomplished the change thanks tCI t.he 
healthie~ climate in parts of the American economy. And at Dodge 
IVlain~ the longer histo~y of continuous o~ganization~ its o~igins 
in Catholic - backed movement and the legitimacy its 
~ep~esentatives were acco~ded as a ~esult of Ch~ysle~'s wo~ks 
c:ouncil scheme all c:ont~ibuted to a higher level of mass 
inVolvement in the sitdown than -elsewhere. 
Independence from the UAW 
The Dodge stewards' independence of the UAW headquarters 
Was shown when after the first week Chrysler began to process 
injunctions against the occupation. The UAW president Home~ 
--------------------------
24. iUI!, Harch 10 1937. 
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There are sOle people who are going around spreading the propaganda that we can win this 
strike just as well by leaving the Plants and forling a picket line outside the Plants. Boys, 
this is Treason. lets get these rUlours stopped, also the stoolies that are spreading it. Our 
Chief of Police, Patrick Quinn, a forler letber of the IRA, knows just how to deal with 
traitors. Get on your toes and let Pat do his stuff.25 
After Chrysler got its injunction the pressure to pullout got 
still. str"onger" • To avoid a confrontation UAW president Martin 
secured an agreement from Chrysler that it would not attempt to 
run the plants if the evacuation went ahead, and from Governor 
Murphy that if necessary he would place state police on the gates 
to stop strike-breakers. The activists in Local 3 still held out -
against the advice of the UAW 's Chrysler negotiators saying 
they would evacuate only if Chrysler conceded sole bargaining 
2 6 
rights and re-opened the plant within seven days. And when they 
finally left, after several votes at an all-night meeting 
27 
addressed by Homer Martin, they maintained their active strike 
sub-committees, including a flying squadron which kept up a picket 
on the UAW-Chrysler negotiations in the Michigan State capital of 
Lansing. On April 4 Martin wound up all the Dodge strike 
Committees because "third degree methods were being employed in 
qUestioning suspected different people", and their pickets "have 
by their actions delayed the satisfactory settlement of the 
---------------------------
26. tqt~, Harch 17, 19, 22 1937. 
2 "7. The paint shop worker Alfred HcNeil described Hartin is 'one of the finest orators that we 
have ever heard'; Q~~, Harch 22 1952. 
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28 
present strike". He blamed "the Communists"for the trouble and 
Used it to justify launching an anti-Communist~ anti-Socialist 
factional struggle within the swelling ranks of 'UAW staff. 
The wider layer of Dodge activists, the early tradition of 
self-reliance~ and Dodge Main's unique position as the UAW's 
largest unionized plant before 1941, added another feature to the 
form of trade unionism being rooted in Dodge and Chrysler: a 
degree of independence from the UAW headquarters' staff and from 
the bureaucratizing process that overtook the UAW as a 
consequence of its massive growth in 1937. Responsibility and 
status as a leader of Local 3 were often seen as comparable to 
(and in Hamtramck often more important than) those of a full-time 
UAW staff organizer. When Frankensteen, Ross and a few others 
became staffers~ there was still a large experienced cadre of 
1933-1935 vintage in the plant. Elsewhere~ in smaller plants~ and 
ones with a low proportion of activists, the effect of the 
massive UAW membership expansion~ from 88,000 in February to 
400,000 by October 1937, was often the appointment to a UAW staff 
POSition of the only really experienced shop floor organizer. For 
this reason, or because of the sheer volume of new members with 
no labour organizing traditions, many plants saw the development 
as early as 1937 of a ~§Q§O~§Oi relationship between their local 
Officers and the UAW machine which was absent at Dodge. 
The four-week Chrysler strike ended without a decisive UAW 
- .. - __ .. __ ..... _____ .N __ _ 
28. Dodge Local 3, WRL, Box 4: Stewards' leeting linutes, April 5 1937; qQqq~ ~~~~, April 7 1937. 
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victory. But management ha~ not cracked the solidarity of the 
workforce nor~ despite certain of its copy-cat 8M contract 
provisions~ did it eliminate or de-legitimize shop stewards. So 
although Chrysler merely conceded bargaining rights to the UAW 
for its own members in the seven struck Chrysler plants, the 
managerial ~gf§~1 had a disproportionate effect~ generalizing 
union consciousness throughout the entire workforce. 
The first contracts 
The first complete GM contract was signed four days after 
the Chrysler strike began. It e>:cluded any reference to "shop 
stewards" ~ and only recogni z ed a new body~ the "Shop Committee" 
of between five and nine (depending on the size of the plant) 
elected committeemen as the proper channels for grievances. It 
was, as Harris has I'"ecently called it~ "a combative, hard-nosed~ 
29 
but fundamentally legal I c.~boL\r reI ati ons strategy". One of 
local GM management"s fir s t tasks in the 17 plants where it 
recognized the UAW was to work out the shape of the new large 
cons tituencies with the local UAW leaders. 
In the Chrysler agreement~ management was as insistent as 8M 
that the word "steward" should be kept out. But it was forced to 
speak instead of "District Committeemen" and agree that the 
nUmbers of Districts should be the same as already in existence. 
---------------------------
29 . 6H-UAW Agreelent, February 11, and Supplelental Agreelent, "arch 12 1937; Harris, Q! ~tt, 2B. 
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When the UAW printed out the final agreement of April 14 1937 ~ it 
overcame the problem of terminology with an insert: 
District COllitteelen (Chief SteMird,1 lay perforl their duties of conferring with forelen or 
other designated representatives of the plant lanagelent, or with the Labor Relations 
Supervisor of the plant, during working hours without loss of tile or pay. A District 
COllitteelan shall always notify his forelan before leaving his work. [IY elphasis, SJ130 
The Chrysle~ agreement contained an anomaly: it provided for t~Q 
parallel systems of plant bargaining: the existing Chief Stewards 
ret .. ained their rights to time off work~ .. as did their "assistants" 
on other shifts; and alongside them~ in what was assumed to be a 
Superior position in the plant bargaining hierarchy but was not 
necessarily accepted as such, were the six Committeemen of the 
Plant (Bargaining) Committee. In reality the situation was even 
more compl e>(. To counter the rank and file criticism that the 
" t s O' evJard system" was being sold out by their negotiators~ Richard 
Frankensteen had to write an introduction to the Agreement which 
explained the continuing role of Chief Stewards and the continuing 
function of "regular" sectional (blue or- white button) stewards: 
Regular stewards have no authority to d~al with the Kanagelent but they have official capacity 
for the Union as contact len during lunch hour, before work and after work, and during this 
tile can pass out grievance slips to those who desire thel, collect dues, and serve other 
interests of the Union ••• Each District shall have' a recognized Chief Shop Steward to present 
grievances or, in the case of second ,and third shifts, an Assistant Chief Steward with equal 
power (to all effects and purposesl.31 
At Chrysl e r the "official capacity" of sectional stewards as 
grievance gatherers and general "contact men" and the status of 
Chief Stewards were confirmed in the 1937 strike settlement~ 
---------------------------
30. Chrysler-UAW Agreelent, b Apri 1, Supplelental Agreelent, Apri 1 14 1937. 
3 1. "bOd' 5 LL, . 
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while at GM the most that could be promised (by Walter Reuther) 
was that the steward system would be fought for in the next round 
32 
C)'f negotiatiom;. 
Two further significant additions to the GM f.9.r..me± .. 
collective bargaining agreements in 1937 and 1938 provide a 
POinter to the different character of !nf9.r..m~l plant-level 
industrial relations at 8M and Chrysler~ as well as indicating 
the presence of much more sophisticated planning by 
management. First, in response to a rash of wildcat strikes, UAW 
president Martin sent a 'management rights· letter to 
confirming the management"s right to discipline union activists: 
The Union agrees that it is the responsibility of the "anagelent to laintain discipline and 
efficiency in its shops and the right of the elployer to hire, discipline and discharge 
elployees for cause is expressly recognized, subject to the right of appeal through the 
grievance procedure.33 
GM 
Second, the 1938 8M contract not only provided an explicit ratio 
of "cme committeeman for- each 400 hourly-rated factory employees 
working in that plant", but also gave a negative ruling against 
shop s;tewar-ds: 
Shop Stewards shall have no function under the grievance procedure and can handle only their 
own individual grievances with the forelan, sale as any other elployee.34 
---------------------------
3 :.2 , Anderson and Jefferys, Q.1l ~.!t, Chapter o. 
33, Walter Reuther Collection, WRL, G" Agreelents Box. The confidence aroused by the sit-down 
Victory at 6" changed the atlosphere throughout the auto industry. Prilarily this was because it 
was the first tile that significant nUlbers had struck a lajor auto lanufacturer and then returned 
to their jobs afterwards, cf: Anderson and Jefferys, 2P fit, Chapter o. I al not arguing that G" 
workers were unaffected by this new confidence. Indeed, according to 6" there were 170 sit-downs in 
its plants between "arch and June 1937, Bernstein, Qil ~tt, 559. "y argulent is that in 6" this new 
COlbativity did not root itself so deeply. 
34. 1938 6" Contract, 2. 
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At the same time 8M added to the committeeman"s privilege of 
super seniority provided in the 1937 contract by giving them two 
hours a day paid by the corporation to pursue grievances. 
While most American managements in the 19305 were totally 
Opposed to "oLltsiders" negotiiating II'Jages and condi,!:ions for 
"thei r" wor key"s ~ after 1937 GM quite consciously operated a dual 
policy aimed at limiting the impact of unionism on the shop floor. 
Inside its plants it undermined the position of departmental and 
sectional shop stewards to the benefit of its large-constituency 
committeemen. And at the same time~ whenever possible~ it 
negot i ated II'Ji th ~ made demands on and insisted on the involvement 
of even more remote figures: the international officers. A 
quarter-century later Alfred P Sloan~ GMos President from 1923 to 
1937 and its Chief Executive Officer until 1946~ looked back: 
What lade the prospect seel especially gril in those early years was the persistent union 
attelpt to invade basic lanagelent prerogatives. Our rights to deterline production schedules, 
to set Nork standards, and to discipline workers lIere all suddenly called into 'question.36 
8M policy was no less hostile to union organization than was 
but it was significantly more flexible. It recovered 
very rapidly from the clear defeat it experienced in the 1937 
Sit - down strike determi ned not to allow the initiative to remain 
with its workers. Industrial relations was prioritized in a way 
---------------------------
Harris, Q~ £tt, 29. 
Alfred P Sloan, ~y y~!t~ !tt~ ~~~!t~ ~qtQt~ (london, SidgNick and Jackson, 1965), 406. ' 
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it had not been before; and while 8M finally only abandoned its 
hope to live entirely ~ithout the UAW in 1940, it instantly 
developed a pragmatic response aimed at forcing the UAW to accept 
responsibility for wildcat strikes and at maintaining 
management·s ~ights over the crucial areas of the labour process. 
Chrysler, on the other / hand~ lacked both the foresight~ the 
will and the means to develop a similar sophisticated strategy. As 
far as it was concerned most militant trade unionists were 
Communists - beyond the pale. Walter Chrysler told the UAW's top 
negotiator~ the Mineworkers' president~ IIMr Lewis~ I do not worry 
about dealing with you~ but it is the Communists in these union~ 
37 
that worry me a great deal. 11 The anti-union prejudice and 
autocratic structure of Chrysler management was not a good 
combination for dealing with the much more complex job control 
problems created in its plants by the presence of mass trade 
unionism. 
The contrast between 8M and Chrysler was soon shown in the 
negotiations that followed the 1937 contracts on ending piecework 
and moving to hourly rates. In 8M plants like Fleetwood Fisher 
BOdy, these negotiations involved the new plant committees 
establish ing a degree of authority on the pattern of job 
---------------------------
37 . Chrysler at the Lansing negotiations in 1937: cited in Bernstein (19&91, Q2 £tt, 554. 
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clas sifications right across the plant. This meant groups of 
workers who wanted to hold onto their piecework system were 
overruled by the general wish to get rid of the system"s 
:::m 
Ltnc:ertc~i nt i es. 
At Dodge Main~ the negotiations were conducted mainly at 
ciepartm£'.?ntal level and so included a much greater degree of 
discretion both for local management and for different sections of 
\o'~or- kers. The result was that although different departments in 
Dodge allocated job clas sifications in generally similar payment 
bands~ there wa s considerable diversity. In certain departments~ 
challenging job classifications and creating new ones soon offered 
an easier way of getting up-graded than going back to the plant 
Committee. By November 1938, of or f:~>: amp Ie, the Dodge Die Room, 
Depar-tment 57 ~ had 12 grades of skilled and high semi - skilled 
\o'~ork ers~ ranging from machine hands starting on 90 cents~ and 
rising in two 5c steps to a maximum of $1 an hour~ to die leaders 
starting on $1.30 rising to $1.40 an hour. In other areas of the 
Plant~ like the body-in-white, as Table 7 shows, pay increases 
could be won by doing marginally more skilled work on jobs with 
slightly higher job classifications: 
--------------------------
38. Anderson and Jefferys, 211 £it, Chapter 7. 
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Still icqaired 
in 3 tD 12 IDIths 
Skill iC .. ired 
-ithin i IDIth 
Skill icqaired 
_ithi, i !lefk 
TABlE 1 
IlAGES AND LEVELS OF SKIll, 
DODGE MIll BODY IIIIItITE, 1938 
Die setter 
Band saM operator 
Scrap repair.an 
Arc Melder 
Solderer 
S.all straightener 
Floor inspectors 
~i(!? 
Spot welding 
Asseably .an 
Laboring work 
Cleaner 
ij~y~b: ~!t~ 
_1_ 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.10 
1.00 
95 
95 
12 
90 
90 
75 
75 
SOURCE: List of wages paid at Dodge Hain in Nove.ber 193B; Zare.ba, Box B. 
The shift from piecework to hourly payment did not stop all 
bargaining over money. Rather it transferred that argument from 
being about the rate of production for a given level of pay to 
being about the kind of job - and who would get it. In 1 r:~37 and 
1938 the workplace union was st ill too weak to initiate bargaining 
about the work effort; but already~ the process of changing 
payment systems was restraining management from arbitrary 
decisions on job transfers and promotions. 
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III. Factional Struggles, 1937-1939 
Anot.her element that played an important role in rooting a 
sectional or problem- solving shop steward tradition deeper inside 
39 
Chrysler than in GM was the thirty-month factional struggle in 
the UAv.J from 1937 to 1939 diagr'amatically represented in '.Figure 4 
40 
(on the following page). Both at the local and at the 
---------------------------
39. Shop stellards, of course, lIere present in G" plants. Indeed, despite a tendency to overlook 
their role in the Flint GH sit-dolln [Keeran, 9~ ~!!, Ib8, describes the stellards IIho attended the 
leeting IIhich decided to sit-dolln as .erely ·unionists·], stellards existed in lost GH plants IIhere 
there lIere UAW tetbers frot 1937 until at least 1946 IIhen GH conceded the dues check-off systel. At 
the Cleveland Fisher Body plant, Bert Foster, a forler CP .e.ber, intervielled in July 19b1 said: ·We 
still have the stellard syste. in our plant although it is not recognized in the national agree.ent. 
We still have it and it is functioning. On the national agree.ent there is a part in there that says 
a Spokestan for the group can speak for the group if it refers to his job. That is the lIay lie 
1I0rked it in our plant." [Foster, NSU, 15] The physical characteristics of lines of six to 10 
presses and a history of both long-established left-liing involve.ent in the plant and continuous 
organization frot 1933 .ade Foster allare of hON exceptional this Nas in GH by 1961. And this was the 
only post-1950 reference to any for. of stellards' organization in GH plants I found. "y argulent 
here is not that stewards Nere absent frol GH plants frol 1937 to 1946-49, but that they were 
neither structurally located in the G"-UAN bargaining process nor legitilized in 6" Norkers' 
consciousness over tile .as a proper lIay of exercising restraint over lanagetent pOller. 
40. This is atteapted lIith Bernstein'sllarning in lind: "The danger in recounting this episode is 
that the historian, who is expected to be 'coherent, lIill create a state of order that is the product 
of his ilagination rather than of the real Norld·; [19b9] qR £it, 555. 
Left 
-
Right 
'1937 
·1939 
. 1940 
.'1941 
"' 
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inter-national level, the left-wing "Unity Caucus" was br-oadly 
identified with the gr-owth of shop stewar-d influence and its 
consequence, the development of a tradition of "independent' (fr-om 
the UAW machine) action. The r' ight-wing "Pr-ogr-essive Caucus", on 
the other- hand~ was seen as advocating tight centr-alization with 
all decisions on action being taken by the machine. The final 
decisive defeat of the r-ight-wing Homer- Mar-tin faction in 1939 was 
ther-efor-e a major political and ideological boost for- do-it-
your-self unionism. 
Break with Coughlin 
The battle between left and r-ight was nowher-e mor-e fier-c~ly 
fought and ~omplex than at Dodge Mai~. In 1936 the plant was the 
principal Coughlinite str-onghold in Detr-oit. But the demagogic 
Coughlin had become · incr-easingly opposed to Roosevelt and the New 
neal~ and in June 1936 br-oadcast that the Union Par-ty he had just 
set up would suppor-t congr-essman William Lemke for Pr-esident. 
Roosevelt~ Coughlin told a Cleveland meeting in July, 
"betr-c~yer-" , a "liar-" and a "double-cr-osser-". Coughlin pr-otnised to 
41 
deliver- nine million votes to Lemke or- retir-e fr-otn public life. 
Coughlin also tur-ned ,against the UAW when, in August 1936~ it 
joined the fledgling Committee for- Industr-ial Or-ganization just in 
time to be expelled fr-otn the AFL. Coughlin denounced the CIO as 
---------------------------
41. In Novelber 1936 the Union Party only got 892,378 votes for Lelke, and Coughlin carried out 
his prolise of retiring frol broadcasting ••• but only for a short tile. Brinkley, gp f!i, 252-261. 
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42 
"communistic"~ and Zaremba recalled: 
All of a sudden, like lightning out of the sky on a clear day (Me were visiting Coughlin's 
hOle) he said to Dick Frankensteen, 'Say, Dick, you know what?' 'What?' '1 guess 1 will have 
·to talk against your unions.' 'Why?' 'Because Fisher (Lawrence Fisher of Fisher Body) told Ie 
that if 1 do not speak against you fellows, he is not 'going to pay the balance for the organ 
in the church.' And Dick took it jokingly, he thought it was a joke between gentlelen. He 
said, 'Well, I guess you'll have to talk against us.' Lo and behold, the next Sunday a tirade 
cale frol Father Coughlin over WJR radio station against the workers.43 
Coughlin's sudden break with his mainly Roosevelt-supporting UAW 
followers in Dodge Main began a process of disintegration which 
Ultimately led to the isolation of what was still in 1937 the 
dominant, conservative anti-Communist ruling block. 
During the 1937 sit-down the right were able to stop the 
Q§!!y WQ~hg~ being allowed through the fence into the plant. 
Chief Steward Barney Hopkins also read a letter from Department 74 
at the Strike Executive Board: 
[wel protest against the COllunistic literature passed out to Union len at the plant gates and 
to the pickets. We deland that sOlething be done to prevent COliunisl fro. entering our rank 
and file. If COllunisl is to enter our ranks then labour's cause is lost.44 
After a considerable debate the Strike EB agreed that the outside 
Pickets should stop "all literature (being) indiscriminately 
Pecldled in the street in front of the plant". 
By the end of the sit-down strike, discontent with the 
evacuation from the plant and with the final settlement had swung 
---------------------------
42. !.~!.q, 200. 
43. lare.ba, WSU, 15. 
44. Zare.ba, WRL, Box 9; Strike EB Hinutes, Harch 23 1937. 
/' 
158 
the balance of forces among Dodge activists to the left. At the 
45 
first Local 3 membership meeting after the return to work~ a 
call by Dick Frankensteen~ the leading right-winger, to delay 
rushing into a new election was narrowly defeated by 300 to 290 
votes by those he call ed II a cl i ck who are tJ--yi ng to get contr'ol" 
But when the 9~517 votes for Local 3 president were counted on May 
Frankensteen polled 60%, C "Pat" QLli nn, .a centre group 
candidate who had been chief of security in the sit-down~ polled 
and the left slate candidate who had been Chairman of the 
Out s ide Strike Committee~ A J Walden (a CP member)~ polled just 
1,1 %. Tony Probe~ a former Canadian IWW member and well - known 
Detroit militant, got 12% of a smaller turnout in another three 
Way split for the posit·ion of vice president. This was won by 
another leading Coughlinite in Dodge~ 
46 
Ed McCann, with 65% of the 
vote. 
Frankensteen and Martin 
When UAW President Homer Martin launched his drive to reduc e 
the strong Communi s t Party and Socialist Party influence in the 
UAW leadership~ local faction organizations~ mirroring t .he 
national caucuses, sprang up at Dodge. The Unity Caucus including 
CP member Wyndham Mortimer and SP member Walter Reuther s tood for 
---------------------------
45. Local 3 Collection, Box 3; Business Meeting Minutes, April 25 1937. 
46. Marquart Collection, NRL, Box 3. Earl Reynolds Mas the center slate candidate for vice 
president. The left slate stood for "A solid united local based on REAL DEMOCRACY IN THE UNION". 
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breaking with the Democratic Party: "We want independent 
political action •.. We want to see a Farm-Labour Party in the US 
based upon OLW I aboLw movement." And it argued for stY-ong shop 
stewards' organization: 
We want enlarged powers for the shop stewards. We want thea a regular part of the union 
structure. They should have powers to decide on shop problels, clearly stated in the union 
constitution.47 
By contrast, the Progressive caucus of Homer Martin and the 
former AIWA leaders Dick Frankensteen and R J Thomas, ~Jas si lent 
on these issues. It focused instead upon "responsible" unionism: 
The UAW lust at all tiles protect its right to strike, its greatest weapon. However, we will 
fight tercilessly against any person responsible for using this weapon irresponsibly or 
without authorization, in such a way as to place it in jeopardy by giving our opponents the 
chance to take it away frol us.48 
The difference about whether shop stewards had the right to 
"decide 011 shop problems" or were al~Jays obliged to get 
"c:\l.tthorization" c,-ame up often ,-and quite sharply in Dodge, since 
l'1artin's "PY-ogY-essive" vie~J clashed diametr-ic:ally with the 
structure and tradition of Dodge unionism 
49 
experience of Chrysler management. 
and worker"s :' 
The March 1938 Local 3 elections were held in an atmosphere 
of extreme bitterness~ illustrated by these verses about Dodge 
-------------------------
47. ~tqqt!! qi t~t YQlty ~!~~~!, KilMaukee Convention, August 1937. 
4{3. Hartin-Frankensteen EtqQt!!!lY! ~!~~~! iqt th! ~t!!!tY!tlqQ qi th! M~~ !Qq t~t ~lqf 1938 Convention~------------------
49. The right-wing controlled Dodge EB warned letbers against attending 'unofficial" leetings, EB 
Kinutes, July 1 1937; and called for the exclusion of sectional shop stewards frol stewards' 
leetings, Steward Body Kinutes, Kay J 1938. Friedlander suggests Unity was also lore concerned with 
grievances affecting ethnic workers; QP fi!, lib. 
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Main's leading right-wingers from a Unity caucus poem circulated 
round the plant: 
Hitler bides bis face in shale 
His let bods are so clean 
Nhen co'pared to tbe tactics of 
The lonster "ARTIN-STEEN ••• 
And here's "cCann, a sorry specilen 
Without an honest breatb 
Besotted - Nindy - redbaiting yes Ian 
As sneaky as a cat 
With all his brains in his pratt ••• 
Brothers leet "r Frank SZYlanski 
That big little pot-bellied boy 
To whol the death of every 'Polock' 
Would be everlasting joy ••• 
There they stand, that happy lot 
Of dictators big and slall 
By tbe sword tbey all bave risen 
And by the sword they'll fall... 50 
The Progressi ve (Green) sl ate Ifolas "not endorsed by any Pol i ti cal 
P t ar .y, but .•. by R T Frankensteen~ International Vice President, 
President of Dodge Local 3". It stood on its AIWA credentials. But 
it failed to make any headway: against a joint center and left 
Unity slate, Frank Reid still won the Presidency vacated by 
Frankensteen with 60% of a turnout nearly a third smaller than the 
previous year~ and Ed McCann held on with 58% as Vice President; 
but the three other main local positions~ Recording Secretary, 
Financial Secretary and Treasurer (a CP member) were held by the 
51 
:left. In all si >: "Progressi veil sl ate chail engens 
defec:~ted . This set-back for the Progressive faction 
---------------------------
50. Ross Collection, WRL, Box 2. 
51 • "arquart Collection, WRL, Box 3. 
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"'Jere 
in 
Frankensteen"s home local coincided with his growing disillusion 
with Homer Martin and with approaches by the leaders of the 
Communist Party's auto work to Frankensteen, promising him various 
favours and positions if he switched sides and joined the Unity 
52 
Caucus. 
Frankensteen and ~Unity' 
The right forces in Dodge, hit hard by Coughlin·s. desertion, 
almost lost control of the local executive board when in May 1938 
Frankensteen finally switched to the Unity caucus after a deal 
with the Communist Party that permanently alienated the Reuther 
brothers who then formed a third camp inside the UAW. In June 1938 
Frankensteen found himself one of the five International officers 
SUspended by Martin. On the Dodge EB the right-wing majority 
slipped; they got only five votes to support Martin's action, and 
53 
a very modest protest was carried by 12 to 11. By November and 
December 1938, when the national factional struggle was reaching 
its height, the paper - thin Progressive majority on the EB and 
plant committees, tried to lower the status of the chief stewards 
and reinforce its power. The EB first ruled "that when a Chief 
Shop Steward has completed his business with the Plant Committee 
---------------------------
52. Keeran, 112 ~!.t, 196. 
53. Zilrelba Collection, IIRL, Box 1; EB lIinutes, June 16 1939. The CP alienated the Reuthers by 
switchi"ng to a Frankensteen protege instead of Victor Reuther for a staff position in the newly 
forled lIichigan CIO in April 1939. 
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member-s, he shoul d i rnrnedi atel y I ei:\ve the p I ant commi t tee room." 
Then ' it decided to give the plant cpmmittee the monopoly of the 
Use of industrial action and resolved: 
No Chief Shop Steward shall take any action without the knowledge or perlission of the Plant 
COI.ittee of Dodge local 3. That all Chief Shop Stewards shall receive orders in writing, sale 
orders lust possess at least ~ lajority of signatures of Plant COllittee lelbers.55 
And when this rule was ignored~ they threatened to discipline 
disobedient stewards: 
Any Steward of Dodge Local No. 3 who causes Dr sanctions any interruption in production 
without first receiving perlission frol his officers of his Unit and the Plant COllittee, that 
such a Steward be reprilanded, and shall be held fully responsible for the action taken, to 
th~ Executive Board of Dodge Local 3.56 
This so clearly laid the stewards open to managerial discipline 
that a second vote agreed to keep the resolution out of the 
minutes. 
The isolation of the Reid-McCann right-wing Catholic faction 
was finally completed early in 1939, when R J Thomas, the former 
AIWA Vice President and Pres ident of the Kercheval - Jefferson 
Chrysl er- plant, finall y deserted Martin, who then suspended 15 
members of the International Executive Board and set about 
bUilding hi s own UAW. Two months of heavy in-fighting followed; 
armed guards were put by the Unity caucus supporters on the Local 
3 hall; and Financial Secretary Harry Ross refused to countersign 
---------------------------
54. Zarelba Collection, NRL, Box 1, EB "inutes, Novelber 10 1938. 
C:;' a::." 
"-'''-'. t.~t.~, Deceaber 5 1938. 
5~. t.~t.~, Decelber 29 1938. Frank SZYlanski, a long-tile Coughlinite activist in Dodge seconded 
thi s lotion. 
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the check for outstanding international dues McCann wanted to pay 
57 
over to the Martin headquarters. McCann was found guilty of 
trying to pack the big Local 3 debate on the Martin versus the IEB 
58 
issue with black workers who weren " t even employed at Dodge. 
Defeat of the right 
The struggle culminated in elections for Local 3 officers 
and for delegates to the 1939 UAW-CIO Convention in Cleveland. The 
right mounted the first major red-baiting campaign seen at Dodge 
with leaflets attacking Zaremba: 
FACTS 
fPig-Y~Y~D~~ that the Departlent froa which our ailitant Recording Secretary John A Zarelba 
cOles is the only departlent in the Dodge Plant that is still unorganized. 
fPig_Y~Y_~D~~ that Zarelba clails that he does not belong to the Co.aunist Party. 
f~b~!~9_Y9y_!biD!1 
fLet's judge 'John' by the cOlpany he keeps.59 
In March 1939 the Progressives still inside the UAW-CIO's Dodge 
Local 3 argued: 
1. We are not opposed to the CID. 
2. Ne are strongly opposed to wild cat strikes and breaking of our contract. Ne believe those 
who are responsible for such acts should be disciplined. BUT we also believe being very firl 
in insisting that the Corporation lives up to its side of the contract.60 
---------------------------
57 • Harry Ross, WSU, 26. 
58. Zarelba Collection, Box 1; Dodge EB Hinutes, February-Harth 1938. 
59. Ross Collection, Box 3; Leaflet dated January 10 1939. This wal the first of lany election 
Calpa1gns at Dodge Hain in which anti-cOllunisl was the principle calpaigning issue for at least one 
51 ate. It was also the only one of such elections where the red-baiting appeared not to strike a 
chord in the wider plant consciousness. 
164 
But this "1'10r-e Unionism~ less Communism" slate sLiffered a total 
defeat. Reid was the only Pr-ogressive elected to the Cleveland 
Convent.ion OLit of 20 delegates. And the "CIO slate" pLishing Quinn 
for Pr-esident and Zar-emba for- re-elect.ion as Recor-ding Secretar-y~ 
complete with photograph of John L Lewis~ swept the election of 
local officers and plant committee member-so "The CIO is 
Amer-icanism" slogan won the day. 
In Mar-ch 1939 the split by Martin resLilted in the formation 
of two UAW organizations~ one affiliated to the CIO, the other- to 
the AFL. This encouraged 8M and Chr-ysler- to tr-y to recover- the 
manager-ial contr-ol t.hey had lost in 1937. 'BLick' Jones in the 
Pressed Steel Llnit, Department 74~ wr-ote a UAW-CIO "Reconstr-Llction 
Song" : 
Hold the fort for we will help you, 
UAW is strong, 
Frankensteen is one who will do it, 
Now that Hartin's gone. 61 
The UAW-6Eb was not seen as "legitimate" in Dodge because while it 
Was led by the old COLighlinites, it opposed the plant tr-adition of 
on-the-job problem solving. It failed to attr-act any significant 
---------------------------
60. Harquart Collection, WRl, Box 3. The leaflet, supporting Reid for President and SZYlanski for 
Sergeant-at-Arls cale out after "cCann's defection to the UAW-AFl and had his nale for Vice 
President crossed out and Joe Hehilic substituted. It presented the slate as repre5enting the true 
tradition of Dodge trade unionists: 'Each of these candidates was an active lelber of the old AIWA 
and has continued to be active in the UAWA. These len are proven Union Builders.' 
61. 'Bud' Jones' songs in Harry Ross Collection, WRL, Box 3. 
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group of activi s ts. Even Frank Reid kept a foot in both camps , 
staying in the UAW-CIO and reporting to the Dodge Executive Board 
62 
on AFL meetings. The breakaway union finally collapsed in Dodge 
after the overwhelming 8 5% vote for the UAW- CIO in a Labor Board 
el e ction on September 27 1939 Over the next six months all bar 
a handful made their peace and we re readmitted to Local 3 . 
The effect of this center - left victory on shop steward 
Organization in Chrysler plants , formerly a bastion o f right - wi ng 
POwer in the union, was con s iderable. The anti-steward rulings of 
the Re id-McCann pe riod were turned over in September in a n e w 
Local 3 constitution which reflected the mor e rank and fil ist tone 
64 
of the 1939 UAW- CIO convention and of another 'Buck " Jones 
Offering: 
Dh Frankensteen, Oh Frankensteen, 
We will vote for you but keep your nose clean, 
We'll go to the front for you, 
And you lust be good and true, 
Ne don't want one tan rule in the U.A.Wuoo. 65 
--------------------------
62 . EB linutes, Novelber 10 1939. Septelber 9 1939: one of the stewards criticized for 
"indifference" about the spread of HOler Martin buttons in Departlent 76 in February, was ,Barney 
Hopkins, who also perforled at other tiles a sililar role as 'honest broker'. 
~~3 . Out of 20,583 votes cast (22,000 eligible), 17,654 went to the UAW-CIO and just 837 went to 
the UAW-AFL. Across all 13 Chrysler plants where the Labor Board balloted there was an BOl lajority 
for the UAW-CIO, with 40,564 voting CIO and 4,673 voting AFl and 4,476 voting neither out of 54,000 
eligible voters: YD1!!~ ~Y!9 ~9r~!rl pg~g! bg~j! } ggl!ign, October 4 1939. 
64. One participant wrote later: "When, clause by clause, the new constitution elerged frol the 
convention lill, the authority of the president had been pruned, the powers of the exectuive board 
auglented, the yearly convention brought back, the rights of locals increased, and control over 
COllective bargaining protected through a structure of intracorporation councils of delegates frol 
the plants. The UAW cale out of the Cleveland convention the lost delocratic union in the country," 
Bert Cochran, ~!~Qr !Dg ~Q!!YD!!!l !h! ~9Df!!~! !hj! !hjp!~ ~!!r!~jD YD!QD!, (Princeton: Univesity 
Press, 1977), 143. 
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The new constitution restored the primacy of the steward over the 
plant committee in his or her own department, stating: "The Plant 
Bargaining Committee shall not invade the jurisdiction of a Chief 
Steward, except at his rir her invitation, or at the discretion of 
66 
the E>:ecuti ve BOiard." It built into the rules rank and file 
control over chief stewards' freedom of action, laying down that 
liThe Chief Shop Stewar-d cannot settle a grievance unless- it meets 
with the approval of a majority of the union men affected." It 
also explicitly pushed the sectional shop stewards: 
The Chief Shop Steward .ay appoint or elect, if the group wishes, as .any deputy stewards as 
lay be necessary to aid in his or her duties. There shall be at least one deputy steward for a 
group of 20 or less. In case of isolated groups there .ust be a deputy steward in the 
group ••• lt shall be the duty of the deputy stewards to attend all steward, unit and special 
.eeUngs.il7 
The constitutional advance of sectional bargaining helped create 
I 
the conditions for a major contest over workplace legitimacy in 
October and November 1939. 
---------------------------
65. Ross Collection, WRL, Box 3. 
66. Y!!.it!4 6'!tq ~q~l!r.1. ~q4q! ~q£~l ~ ;4iUQ!!., October 10 1939. 
67 . i~i4j June 7 1939, reported the dec~sions by the Dodge steward body that no .e.ber of local 3 
should contact .anage.ent without a chief steward present and that any steward who didn l t report 
dues collected within a 30 day period would have his button taken away. 
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CHAPTER 7 
EQUAL CONTROL OF PRODUCTION 
1939-1941 
The ground chosen by Chrysler for a major confrontation in 1939 
was its power unilaterally to determine production standards. The 
s trike outcome~ however, was a nearly unqualified victory for the 
workers. In contrast with the UAW victory over 8M in the summer ' s 
1 
" t s ' r'ategy stri ke", Chrys ler management learned nothing from its 
defeat . Its labour relations function remained an adjunct of its 
New York - based attorney, far removed from workplace realities. 
The strike established the custom and practice of myty~!!t~ so 
firmly in the determination of standards at Chrysler that it 
Would finally b e up - rooted only in the industrial relat i ons 
hiatus of the late 1950s . 
At 8M, the 1939 defeat caused manageme nt to re-org a nize it s 
s tructure so that labour relations became a top responsibility, 
wi t h a strong central staff allocated to negotiate and administer 
Contracts with the UAW. 8M was able to adapt because, as Harris 
--------------------------
1. So-called because of the strategy decided upon by l'Iortiler, John Anderson (the forler I'IESA 
lelber) and Reuther of striking 6"'s skilled workers during the period when the production workers 
were laid off and GH was preparing for the 1940 lodels; Anderson and Jefferys, ~ £tt, Chapter 7. 
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descr-i bes, it had "an ingrained habit of 'management by policy' -
the development of a program of concerted action - to handle all 
2 
important problems" and could review mistakes in a way not 
Possible in autocratically-managed companies. GM had massive 
power resources and could access them comparatively easily. 
Section one of Chapter 7 traces the history of the decisive 
1939 strike that tilted the balance of forces on the shop floor at 
Chrysler in the workers' favour. - Section two examines the 
consolidation of a tradition of mutuality in sectional bargaining 
in 1940 and 1941, despite the onset of anti-Communism. 
I. 1939 Chrysler strike 
Anticipating the market recovery of 1940-1941 Chrysler management 
seized the opportunity provided by the union split. But once again 
it underestimated the hold union organization had taken - even 
among the plant's pre-union 'old-timers', those hired before 1935. 
Management refused to extend the contract after March 1939 for 
more than a month at a time on the grounds that it didn ' t know 
which UAW it was really dealing with. In May, at the end of 
the 1939 model run, it fired leading leftist 'Pat' the 
plant committee chairman, for allegedly intimidating a 
--------------------------
2. Harris, ~ ~H, 29. 
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foreman. Then~ in September 1939 after calling the 1932 to 1934 
men back to work for the 1940 models, it announced that it would 
not renew the contract and introduced a major speed-up aimed at 
strengthening its control of production standards. 
4 
The Michigan State Unemployment Compensation Commission 
described the speed-up at Dodge Main as particularly harsh for the 
day and night shifts in three departments: the body-in-white 
(3~000 workers)~ the paint shop (1~800 workers) and the crankshaft 
department (150 workers). During the 1939 model year the body 
bUilding"s arc and gas welding lines had worked at 12 bodies per 
hour; the management now set a new rate of 20 and on October 6 
1939 fired 20 men for not fulfilling their production target. That 
day the paint shop superintendent fired workers on the body spray 
line, where the speed was raised from 46.5 to 48 an hour~ on the 
wet sand line, where the 24 men had been sanding "27 an hour and 
were told to do 36~ and some enamel sprayers who refused to spray 
eight more cars an hour than the 30 they claimed was their 
maximum. In the crankshaft department the line speed was the same 
as for the previous year "s model, but the crankshaft weighed 
---------------------------
3. y~tt~q ~~t~ ~~~t~~~ q~qq~ ~~~!l ~ ~qttt~~, June 7 1939: the forelan involved Mas in 
translission unit, departlent 107. 
4. Zarelba Collection, WRL, Box S; 1939 UnelploYlent COlpenlation COllission ~!~~~t, Novelber 3 
1939 into the eligibility of Dodge Morkers to clai. unelploYlent insurance on the basis that they 
Nere locked out. This report concluded in. the Morkers' favour; but Mhen ChrYller appealed this 
deCiSion to the Referee on August 6 1940,he ruled that a labour dispute had taken place so the Dodge 
Norkers Mere not qualified to receive unelploYlent cOlpensation. 
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901bs~ 3.51bs more than the 1939 model year crankshaft~ and so 
management fired some workers for handling three or four less an 
hour. It sent the rest of the workers in all these areas home. 
For the next two weeks the same thing happened every day in 
one area or another of the plant. Men would come to work, be 
instructed to work at the speed dictated by management~ , be told 
they had no right either to bargain about it or to put it into the 
grievance procedure because there was no contract in effect after 
September 30~ and then the foremen would fire a handful of 
Workers. In axle unit 113~ the supervision fired four assistant 
chief stewards, two chief stewards and two deputy stewards between 
October 6 and October 10. By the end of the second week Chrysler 
had fired a total of 105 and disciplined another 23 Dodge workers, 
and the UAW-CIO"s Executive Board (IEB)~ now led by former 
Chrysler workers R J Thomas and Dick Frankensteen~ finally decided 
to take a ~bC~§igc=~i~g strike vote. IEB politics meant Dodge Main 
Was not allowed to be isolated. 
Struggle for control 
The strike vote was held on October 15. In later years strike 
votes became used as bargaining ploys and were often poorly 
attended. But this vote was massive: 13,751 Dodge workers for 
strike action with 1~324 against - a 90% majority. 
defending the new frontier of restraints from 
They were 
managerial 
infringements. The top two strike demands were about workers' 
living standards and control of the labour process: 
1 '7 1 
1. A general wage increase with a bonus for afternoon and night shift workers. 
2. Joint fixing of production standards by the corporation and the union.S 
Management didn " t duck the issue either. General Manager Herman 
Weckler replied: "Production schedules are the management " s 
function. You may as well know now that we do not intend to give 
6 
your union control of production." The strike began on October 
18 1939 and lasted 45 days. Father Coughlin~ whose self-imposed 
Silence in November 1936 lasted just six weeks and whose 
7 
broadcasts were now strongly anti-semitic~ entered the ring with 
a blistering radio denounciation of the s trike. His broadcast 
included a speech by David Brann, the leading UAW-AFL man at 
DOdge, who stated that " s hl..")p stewards actually placed lockE; on 
8 
the conveyor to limit production." Coughlin was outraged: 
Along the delands which the union are laking through their leaders, they are asking for an 
~gy!! control of production standards and a !g!!! control of diSCipline over all worklen in 
the Chrysler Corporation.9 
Coughlin, of course, is not a source of f~~t on this or any other 
matter. But although his influence by 1939 was negligible compared 
with five years earlier, his broadcasts were still listened to by 
enough Chrysler workers to prompt an urgent discussion on Local 
---------------------------
6 • !.~!.~, October 25 J 939. 
7. Brinkley, Ill!. ~!.t, 265-6. 
8. Zarelba Collection, WRL, Box 1; Dodge LEB linutes, Novetber 12 1939. HcCann's suggestion of 
Such a high level of job control was treated as a total distortion both of the reality and of what 
the strikers were delanding on the Local Executive Board. 
9. Charles E Coughlin, I~! ~~t~~L!t ~tQ t~q~~it!.~L ~it!.t!, (Detroit: palphlet, Novelber 12 1939); 
in Ross Collection, NRL, Box 3. 
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10 
3 " 5 Executive Board. 
Chrysler's determination to defeat the strike finally led it 
1 1 
to the next step in the strike-breaking Mohawk Valley formula: a 
desperate at~empt at creating a back-to-work movement among some 
of the 1~700 black workers employed in the Dodge foundry and in 
low paid janitorial jobs. It was assisted by Homer Martin"s UAW-
AFL~ which had proved its capacity at mobilizing small numbers of 
blacks earlier in the year. After some rioting on Friday November 
24 between pickets and blacks trying to enter the plant to collect 
their paychecks~ several prominent black politicians and 
Organizations moved into action to prevent the movement growing. 
One pro-strike leaflet asked~ 
HON long Nill the Negro stand for Labor Dictation? 
What is happening is obviously on the part of the Corporation to get the Negroes to go 
into the plant to antagonize the Nhite workers. 12 
On Monday 27 November~ Chrysler and the UAW-AFL organized a group 
of 181 ' blacks~ six whites and a 1,OOO-strong police escort to 
march through a mass picket of more than 5~OOO workers carrying 
American flags. The following day the number of black strike-
---------------------------
l(l. Coughlin's folloNing in Detroit relained considerable until Alerica entered Norld War II, 
When he Nas disciplined by the Catholic hierarchy who saw his pro-Hitler relarks as an 
elbarrasslentj Dan 6eorgakas and "arvin Surkin, ~~ttqitt ! 4q ~i~4 4Yi~q : ~ !t~4Y i~ ~t~!~ 
!~yg!~!!gn (NeN York: St "artin's Press, 19751, 186. 
1 1 • The nine point forlula for breaking strikes and destroying t~e union used at Relington Rand 
in Hay 1936 and subsequently pro.oted by the National Association of "anufacturers and the A.erican 
Iron and Steel Institute. See Bernstein (19691, q2 ~lt, 478-9. 
12 . Leaflet issued by the black organization, the National Association of A.erican Workers, 
reported to the Dodge LED, "inutes, Nove.ber 24 1939. 
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breakers rose to 4 30. But this was not enough. Chrysler had 
neither recruited sufficient black strike-breakers to come even 
remotely close to a mass back-to-work movement that could mobilize 
white workers as well, nor had it provoked the white workers into 
anti-black rioting. Under mounting criticism from fellow 
employers and from Detroit and national politicians, Chrysler 
Surrendered the next day. 
Strike gains 
The 1939 strike established the formal recognition by 
management of the union's steward system and institutionalized 
sectional collective-bargaining tradition at the start of a two-
year boom in car production. The November 29 1939 contract was 
crucial in cementing a job bargaining tradition into the Chrysler 
Workers' view of workplace legitimacy because it came as a 
Chrysler was forced to recognize formally chief stewards and 
assistant chief stewards. These were given super seniority, as 
Were members of the plant committee and local executive board, and 
Won the right to move about their areas ~irtually at will: 
---------------------------
13. Zare.ba Collection, WRL, Box 6; Chrysler Corporation-UAW Agree.ent, Nove.ber 29 1939. A 
detailed account of the back-to-work .ove.ent is given in A."eier and E RudNick, ~!!f~ P!!rQ!! !n~ 
!h! r!~! Qf !h! y~~, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 67-71. 
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The 
Chief Stewards and assistant Chief Stewards, during their working hours, without loss of tile 
,or pay, lay ••• perfor. their duties of conferring with forelen or other designated 
representatives of the plant lanage.ent and of investigating grievances. 14 
agreement allowed the chief stewards to leave work to 
Confer with other chief stewards or to telephone the plant 
Committee. Shop floor trade unionism at Chrysler had thus been 
formally accepted by the management in a form that encouraged on-
the-spot bargaini~g between a small-constituency~ elected workers' 
rep~esentative and the immediate supervisor~ It was a form much 
more liable to encourage wheeling and dealing and a shop floor 
tradition of custom and practice~ accepted by both workers and 
SL\perVisors~ than was the much more remote individual - to-plant 
committee structure at 8M. 
The settlement on production standards was more ambiguous 
than the legitimation of chief and assistant stewards. But it 
still provided a new and formal basis for the blossoming of 
restraints on management in on-the-job bargaining. Section 3 
Of the contract referred to the rate of production being 
establ i shed "on tl .... e basi s of fai rness and equi ty" fol" "the 
reasonable working capaH:i ti es of normal operators". Section 
gave t.he foreman the pOlooJer to "adj ust the miat.ter" if the 
Workers (or their blue but.ton steward) complained the rate was too 
fast. And~ if the foreman refused, it allowed for negot.iations to 
take placf-_ between the Chl'=f t d ,- "" s ewar and (Jeneral foreman or 
---.-
-----------------------
14. LED Kinutes, Hove.ber 27, 29 1939. 
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sUperintendent at department level. Only then p " s hould a 
satisfactory agreement not result~ the matter in dispute shall be 
refer-r-ed to the bar·gai ni ng procedure" - that i s~ it would go to 
the plant committee. Finally~ "The management of each pl a nt is 
15 
authori z ed to settle such matters." Discretion was formally 
Placed in the hands of lower level management - a group without 
any training in labour relations. 
The UAW~ understandably~ exaggerated its achievement. 
Workers had got their first all-round general wage rise since 193 7 
<although rates tended to be less than at GM)~ and all 128 worker s 
fired and disciplined in October were reinstated. 
~!!D ~g~§ boasted: 
More 
The workers are nDW allDwed a say in the setting of productiDn rates, one Df the lain issues 
in the dispute. SDle bargaining rights are granted, squeezing Dut the rUlp and Dther cDlpany 
uniDns. SeniDrity is retained nD latter hDw IDng the wDrker is laid Dff. The 'nD strike' 
clause is elilinated.16 
important than the form of words was the confidence 
Chrysler' s defeat inspired in the shop floor union tradition. Thi ~ 
now con s olidated it s elf at Dodge Main, at the Plymouth and 
Jeffer s on (Kercheval) car plants and at the Dodge Truck plant. 
-.... -..... -
-----------------------
15. Chrysler-UAN CDntract, NDvelber 29. 1939, 14-15. 
16. q~~, Decelber 6 1939. 
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II. Consolidation, 1940-1941 
Frank Marquart, e ducation director of Local 3 from 1937 to 1941, 
later recalled an incident in the body-in - white that was common in 
1940. The superintendent ins tructed the welders to raise their 
prOduction; Art Shipley, their chief steward, suggested they 
continue working normally and so one welder was laid off. Shipley 
then called all the workers together to march down to the 
sUperintendent"s office where, faced with a boom in orders, the 
17 
s Uperin t enderit called the man back to work. Little wonder, then , 
tha t a new hire into the body shop in October 1940 was highly 
i mpl~ essed because "the foremen were very nervous about gi vi ng 
18 
orders to the wor-ker's" . 
The cons ider a ble extent of s hop floor restraints on managerial 
authority in 1940 and 19 41 did not mean that unattached militants 
Or Communist Par t y member s "controlled " Local The union 
tradition e s tablishe d at Dodge clearly owed much to "the left", 
- ..... -
------------------------
17. Harquart, WSU, 22-23. There is no way of knowing whether this incident was reported by the 
~uperintendent as a work stoppage. If the Dodge General "anager knew about it, it probably was. But 
If .he didn't, the superintendent lay well have kept quiet. The incident illustrates the problel of 
USIng strike statistics as an indicator of the true level of conflict, particularly in the early 
years of the UAW's existence before Chrysler created a specialist labour relations function. Chrysler 
later clailed there were 200 contract violations including 130 strikes in its plants between "arch 
1937 and Nove.ber 1939; 100 violations between Dece.ber 1939 and Dece.ber 1941; and 98 violations 
b1e9t4
Meen January 1942 and Hay 1943: Chrysler Corporation, §~Y9n~ !n~ f~f!! ~n~ !n~ B~f9r9!, (Detroit: 
31, 7-8. 
18. Interview by author with Ed Liska, August 11 1982. 
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its CP and SP members, IWW sLlpporters~ and hundreds of assorted 
socic.~list and socialist-influenced militants who articulated 
19 
democratic aspirations in class terms. But they were always a 
small minority, and usually did not even hold more than one or two 
key loccil offices. The §~~tiQni! bargaining tradition the left 
helped create became identified as a kind of democratic "right" by 
all Dodge workers. Before long it had become institutionalized. 
Unlike GM after the war where the defeat of the left and of the 
shop steward tradition were linked~ at Dodge Main the defeat of 
the left did not recast workers" views of trade unionism. 
The disintegration and dual unionism of the Dodge Catholic-
right early in 1939 was the dynamiC that gave Dodge CP members and 
their closest followers a temporary ascendancy - but even this was 
Conditional upon Frankensteen"s relationship with the CP at 
international union level and a pact with the center forces in 
DOdge i tsel f. Neither of these conditions survived the next two 
From mid-1939, the Quinn-Zaremba center-left coalition was 
pressured by the new Thomas-Frankensteen UAW leadership to assume 
the mantle of "Y-esponsible" unionism. In January 1940 the local 
endorsed the IEB"s latest pronouncement against unauthorized 
20 
strikes. This gesture was partly a public rejection of the new 
---------------------------
;,9., In the 1960s another ·outside· influence, the rise of black politics, also helped shape , 
InSIde" consciousness and organization, see Part Four below. 
20. q~~, January 24 1940. 
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CP line that followed the August 1939 Russo-German Non-Aggression 
Pact. And partly it flowed from the definition of the incumbent 
officers' role in the plant as ' servants of the contract'. 
By March 1940 the left-center coalition had broken down 
entirely and a new 'Left Platform' was formed to fight the Quinn-
Zaremba center in the Local elections. The left~ CP members and 
its clos e supporters~ asked Dodge workers~ "vJi 11 you put up a 
fight to remove the conniving hot-air politicians while you have 
21 
some democracy left? " But Recording Secretary Zaremba beat his 
left opponent by a two to one margin and "Pat' Patrick, the left 
candidate against President Quinn~ got beaten narrowly into third 
place with " 18% by the Progressive candidate~ who got 21%. On tf.JP 
Of thi s the incumbent 'left" vice president was defeated three to 
22. 
two by the Progressive (right-wing) candidate. 
Twelve months later the political atmosphere in Dodge (and 
elsewhere) had shifted further to the right as a result of both 
the Cpos self-isolationism and the launching of a consistent red -
2~5 
baiting campaign by the Reuther faction in the UAW. 
--------------------------
2 1 • Election palphlet in Ross Collection, WRL, BDx 3. 
22. Election results in Ross Collection, IrIRL, Box 3. 
"", .. ,. 
....... '. keeran, Q2 ~tt, 105-112. 
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Thi, s 
fUrther weakened the already weak CP in Dodge Main, and so it 
didn't run its own slate again. Quinn was re-elected Local "=" ~\ 
President with 76% support against the former Martin supporter, 
F'riank Reid; Zaremba secured 59% of the poll against another 
Progressive; but the CP incumbent treasurer was defeated 2~159 
24 
votes to 2,140 by the long-standing right-winger Barney Hopkins. 
The increasing strength of anti - Communism in Dodge was 
illUstrated by the debate around Reuther's con!5titutional 
amendment to the 1941 UAW Buffalo Convention. This would bar 
Communists and Fascists from holding international office. When it 
Came up at the Dodge membership meeting~ the CP's ' clever' 
amendment to make the ban appear ridiculous by widening it to 
inclUde "Socialists and ACTU members" "Jas defeated. The meeting 
Voted ins tead to hold a Dodge Main referendum on Reuther's 
Proposal. This took place .in July~ and showed 3~864 in favour of 
banning "Communists, Fasci s t .s and Nazis" from international rJffice 
and just 1~457 against. The following month the Local 3 
delegation split at the Buffalo Convention 27 to 10 in favour~ 
mirroring the two-thirds majority the rule change 'got on the 
Convention floor. The right versus left split in the Dodge Main 
delegation on the other key vote~ the seating of the Allis-
---------------------------
24. ~~~, Karch 1 1941. 
Ross Collection, WRL, Box 3. 
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26 
Chalmers delegates~ was virtually the same. The dominance of the 
right wing was re- established at Dodge Main in 1940 and 1941 on 
the basis of "outside" anti '-Communist politics and factional 
organization. It was to last for the rest of the decade. 
Dodge Main had its militants: stewards like Art Shipley and 
Albert Fanti. Shipley unsuccessfully opposed workers wearing 
Chrysler 10 badge numbers~ arguing: "I cannot see anything the 
Union has to gain by wearing the badge numbers on the outside~ but 
27 
it does simplify the job for the stool pigeons." And Fanti tried 
to democratize the steward system further~ aware of the dangers 
ariSing from a Chief Steward's privileges. He moved a resolution 
unsUccessfully on the stewards' council: 
That all blue button stewards be elected ••• That all districts having a chief steward, shall 
have a Stewards' Council (to leet weekly), consisting of elected Blue Button stewards and the 
Chief Steward.2B 
But while several Dodge workers had fairly developed rank and file 
strategies~ and while they helped create and root the §~~tiQn~l 
Union organization that developed~ they were not its principal 
-------------------------
26. ~~~, Odober 1 1941. Prolinent CP lelbers headed up the Allis-Challers delegation frol a 
plant that had just been involved in a controversial defense industry strike. 
27 . ~~~, "arch 15 1941. Shipley and Fanti were both stewards in Departlent 7b, body-in-white.F 
2(3. Dodge Local 3 Collection, Box 3; Stewards Council linutes, February 8 1941. Fanti's notes 
are contained in the linutes: 'I. Difference of opinions between Chief Steward and lelber - no 
appeal frOI Steward's decision - except by Special leeting. he can refuse to call Plant COllittee. 
;. "ore delocratic. Better chance of getting grievances settled. 3. Indifferent Chief Stewards will 
te reported. 4. The Blue Button Stewards as they are now have not any responsibility. We lust give 
he. a special r!!~9n!igl!i!Y and then we can hold any responsible for their work.· 
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SOurce of strength. Even at management's weakest point in 1940, 
When its unilateral control was most restricted and when 
SOcialism, communism or just anti-capitalism, were supported by 
several hundred individual Dodge workers, this anti-capitalist 
politics became a part of collective workplace 
consciousness. The legitimacy and durability of sectional unionism 
derived , in a political atmosphere supportive of democratic-
indiVidualism, from the interaction of management's ~@ f~£tQ 
recognition with workers' experience of the system working for 
them in conflicts. 
By 1940-41 Chrysler management had seen restraints imposed 
OYer its autonomy to determine both labour costs (wage rates, 
hours of work) and important aspects of the labour process (speed 
and allocation of work, discipline). In its plants a qualitative 
mOYement of the frontier of control, the exercise of collective 
restraint by workers over managerial power and authority on the 
Shop floor, had taken place in the workers' favour. By contrast, 
8M 's Alfred P Sloan reminisced some 20 years later in a way 
Unthinkable for a Chr ysler executive: 
So far as our operations are concerned, we have loved to codify certain practices, to discuss 
workers' grievances with union representatives, and to sublit for arbitration the few 
grievances that relain unsettled. But on the whole, we have retained all the basic powers to 
lanage.29 
Despit e the similar technology, product, marketing and casual 
--
-------------------------
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labour market conditions faced by 8M and Chrysler before the 
Second World War, the difference in union organization, 
management structure and workplace labour relations was already 
Considerable. Part 3 explains why this union organization 
interacted with managment in alternating boom and slump market 
Conditions to give Chrysler a consistently higher strike 
frequency after 1940 than 8M. 
183 
PART THREE 
OVERCOMING RESISTANCE 
1942-1959 
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CHAPTER 8 
LABOUR IN WAR AND PEACE 
Chapter 8 first traces the broad development of the American 
labour movement through the 1940s and 1950s~ and then considers 
Some of the debates raised by the Chrysler evidence. 
/' 
I. Overview 
Writing in 1940, a Harvard professor of government, Arthur N 
Holcombe , argued that class conflict in the United States was 
beginning to replace geographical sectionalism: 
Class-consciousness waxes as sectionalisl wanes along the underlying forces in Alerican 
politics, and the struggle of classes in sOle fori threatens to becole as ilportant in the 
years ahead as the intersectional struggles in the years behind.! 
'Tell yea r s 1 ater, as David Brody has pointed out, many would have 
endorse d the view that American labour had "firmly entrenched 
2 
itself in law~ industry and political life". The unionization 
--------------------------
"1 ~. Arthur" Schlesinger, ~~~~l~qtq~ Eq~t, January 1 1950, cited in Brody, q~ ~it, 173. Brody 
cites SchleSinger as an authority testifying to the reality of labour's post-war power. The argulent 
here is that while organized labour was clearly present post-war in lanagelent policy calculations in 
a way it hadn't been before 1935, this alone did not constitute 'power'. It is necessary to show how 
~abour's presence obliged lanagelent acros.s lOst of industry to Iilit the shop floor expression of 
Its own interests, as happened at Dodge "ain but not in GK plants, before the wider view of a 1946-
SO peak of union power can be accepted. 
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that had tentatively embraced semi- and unskilled workers in 
America ' s major manufacturing industries in the late 1930s had 
Survived as a force to be reckoned with. But this was not the 
dominance of class consciousness and struggle as Holcombe had 
predicted - and the left had hoped for. The business unionism 
that characterized AFL and CIa union leaders in the 1950s was 
different from the anti-employer ideology of CIO organizers in 
the 19::::0s; while anti-Communism and political conformity played 
the shaping roles taken in the 1930s by radical dissent. It "'u:\s 
neither unqualified power nor class struggle that other observers 
detected after the "'Jar, but the emergence of Llni on 1 ec~der- s as "the 
manager's of di scontent". Mills wrote in 1948 that "even as the 
labour leader rebels, he holds back rebellion. He organizes 
discontent and then he sits on it, 
maintain a continuous or-ganization". 
'':1' 
~, 
exploiting it in order to 
Yet the view of the war and 
post-war period as one of labour-management accommodation is also 
misleading, for it was full of contradictions. In the eyes of most 
employers.laboLlr became'iiI "power in the land" during WClrld War 4 . 
II. But it remained a limited form of power, increasingly 
legitimated by the very employers against whom it was supposed to 
be exercised. And while the labour leaders reached agreements with 
Corporate labour relations departments, an intense shop floor 
--.. -._-
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~. The president of the US Chalber of COllerce said in 1944: "Heasured in nUlbers, political 
~nfluence, econolic weight, or by any other yardstick, labour is a power in our land." Cited in 
rody, Q~ ~tt, 174. 
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struggle over effort and work discipline continued. 
Equally contradictory~ poverty remained widespread despite 
massive economic growth. And political freedoms continued to be 
denied blacks in the southern states while America trumpeted 
itself internationally c:~s the defender of the "free Ifmrld". The 
considerable growth in union membership and in status and 
personal pOIfJer of union leaders between 1942 and 1960 was not 
reflected in any major !:;hi ft in income distribution and in 
certain If Jays IfJas associated with more rather than felfJer 
restrictions on civil liberties. 
In America's first full year of war~ 1942~ t.he Nat.ional 
8ureau of Economic Research recorded 9.8 million union members; by 
1945 t.his figure reached 12 million and by 1950, 14 million. Ten 
later- it stood at million. Union density as a 
percent.age of the number of employed and unemployed civilians in 
the IfJor kf orce over these same years rose from 22.3% in 1942 to 
28.9% ' 194"'" 1 n ~I, and stayed in the range 28 . 3% to 31.6% until 1958 
5 
When it began a long-term decline. After 1957-59 the increase in 
total union membership was outstripped py the expansion of the 
labour I Sl.lpp y. Strike frequency in the 1940s and 1950s also 
reSponded differently to the 19305 and failed to mirror the 
---
------------------------
Bain and Price, lq~ ~tt. 
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absolute growth in union numbers. Excluding the strike- prone coal 
industry, the annual average fell from 105 strikes per million 
nOn - agricultural workers between 1937 and 1941 to 80 from 1945 to 
6 
1959. The more union members, it appeared, the less frequent 
the number of strikes noted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Union organization, however~ did make its mark. Once 
established in the mass production industries, it encouraged more 
strikes than in the years before its consolidation: between 1946 
and 1959 reported strikes outside the coal industry still 
And, oCCurred 27% more frequently than from 1931 to 1936. 
indUstrial unionism changed the shape of these strikes. Strikes 
Were either bigger or lasted longer than in the 1930s or during 
the war. Open conflict on the shop floor~ characterized by large 
numb e r s of short, s harp strikes, was less than in the late 1930s, 
but the re were more set~piece confrontations involving whole 
7 
Plant s or companies. This change resulted from greater and more 
effective federal intervention, more sophisticated management and 
--------------------------
6. Edwards P k [1981], Q! £i~, 254. 
7. P K Edwards, ·The exceptionalisl of the Alerican Labour Kovelent: the neglected role of 
Workplace struggle·, SSRC Industrial Relations Research Unit paper (Coventry: University of Warwick, 
February 19831, Table 2, 7. The loss ratio of days lost per thousand workers excluding coal Nas 
averaged 428 fro. 1937 to 1941, 289 fro. 1942 to 1945, 1070 between 1946 and 1949, and 658 fro. 1950 
to 1959. 
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greater centralization and less democracy in the CIO unions. Yet 
while open conflict tended to be channelled more within an 
institutional framework, it could not be suppressed and often was 
not effectively "managed ' . 
Government regulation of labour relations was greatly 
accelerated in the period of war preparations and during the first 
two years of America"s direct involvement in World War II. In 1940 
ROosevelt appointed major US business leaders and the influential 
CIa unionist~ Sidney Hillman, to key positions in the National 
Defense Advisory Committee and its successor, the Office of 
Production Management , 
8 
to coordinate the industrial defense 
program. In March 1941, Roosevelt established a National Defense 
Mediation Board to which he appointed Philip Murray, president of 
the CIO, George Meany, secretary-treasurer of the AFL, and 
Certain pro-New Deal industrialists like the chairman of Standard 
01' 1 and US Rubber " s director of industrial and public relations. 
Within three months, the Board announced that it would 'not 
9 
arbitrate in disput~s in the event of a strike. 
After the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor and America into the 
---
------------------------
~. GK president Millial Knudsen and US Steel chairlan Edward R Stettiniuswere the lost prolinent 
lndustrialists appointed to head production planning and industrial laterials respectively; Hililan 
WiS president of the Alalgalated Clothing Workers of Alerica; Lichtenstein [19821, Q~ ~tt, 38-41. 
9. t~t~, 5J-53. 
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war in December 1941~ the CIa gave Roosevelt a no-strike pledge. 
The Mediation Board, now reborn as the more powerful National War 
Labor Board (NWLB), could now include union security clauses in 
contracts so that worker s who did not opt out of the union within 
their fir s t 1 5 days on the job would be bound to pay dues, usually 
under a checkoff agreement, and abide by union rules. A standard 
formula to this effect was launched in June 1942 . Conceived not as 
a means of strengthening shop floor unionism, but as a device to 
strengthen the finances and authority of the senior union 
OffiCials , it was followed a month later by an NWLB ruling that 
the Little Steel wage award formula, limiting increases to 3.5% in 
1942 While inflation was running at 15%, would be a maximum. 
The No Strike Pledge, union security and what amounted to a 
"'Iage freeze, provided the context for the substantial but 
Contradictory war - time union growth. In return the union leaders 
institutionalized close collaboration with the government and the 
employers. The active backing of the CIa for the wartime mediation 
board s and the no-strike pledge proved crucial in establishing a 
uniform pattern of industrial relations - industry-wide wage 
agreements, grievance procedures and impartial arbitration, and 
strongly-centralized unions pledged not to sanction strikes during 
10 
the term of a contract. 
-.. --
------------------------
tiC!: !..h4, 51, 72-81. Ford and Chrysler joined 6" in securing a 'no strike' security clause in 
heir contracts in 1946 after the national No Strike Pledge had lapsed. 
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Unlike the struggled-for unionization of the early and mid-
1930s, workers joined up more by default than by positive 
commitment during World War II. This is not to suggest the new 
factory workers were necessarily less conscious of their rights 
and interests against management; the presence of a core of pre-
War militants ensured that the tradition would get passed on in 
1 1 
the older industrial centres. And once introduced to a tradition 
that denied management the right to act arbitrarily, the new 
Wartime labour force took over the pre-war frontier of control as 
if it Were its own creation. But the lack of conscious collective 
effort involved in establishi ng this new ·strength " encouraged a 
passive reliance on the existing union structure, while the draft 
tOok most of the earlier generation of union builders into the 
armed s e rvices. The centralized, bureaucratic "bossdom' these 
developments encouraged became characteristic of virtually all the 
indUstri a l unions in the second-half of the 1940s. 
DUring the war, when labour"s leaders were prepared to accept 
Wage restraint and to police their "no strike pledge', the 
employers had been persuaded - mainly by the government - to 
legitimize the union presence in their plants. After V-J Day 
manag e ments found they still had to suffer union legitimacy but 
Without the gYi~ QCQ gyg. They therefore resisted bitterly what 
---------------------------
11 • lU!t, 126. 
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were usually quite moderate catching-up demands made by union 
leaders anxious to renew their base among the rank and file after 
four years of opposing strikes. A great strike wave swept America: 
in the year following the surrender of Japan over five million 
workers st~uck to retain wartime job conditions and restore 
earnings levels seriously eroded during 1945. Managerial 
hostility, both to the extension of industry-wide bargaining to 
Planning and non-wage conditions, and to the continuation of the 
Wartime frontier of control, guaranteed strikes were big and long 
through the rest of the 1940s. The number of days lost in reported 
strikes between 1946 and 1949 averaged 15,000 per strike as 
against under 4,000 per strike between 1942 and 1945 and around 
13 
7,000 days per strike between 1950 and 1957. And, c.ritically 
for the politics of post - wa r America, these major confrontations 
remained isolated from each other. After more workers experienced 
strike action, in most in s tances without strike pay and for longer 
periOds, than in any other period of labour relations history, the 
unions secured some restoration of their members' real earnings. 
But they couldn"t move the employers on any of the other wider 
iSSues of consultation and control, and were forced to include 
"c.ompany s e curity· clauses in their contracts that made permanent 
----
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Preis, Q~ £tt, 279; Edwards P K [1991], Q~ £tt, 173; Lichtenstein [1992] ~ £tt, 113. 
Edwards P K [1991], ~ £tt, 254. 
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14 
the wartime no ~trike pledge for the term of the contract. The 
mass production industry unions survived this aspect of the 
employers" offensive; but the bitterness of the contest gave a 
boost to the fortunes of more conservative officials who openly 
advocated compromise and survival. The considerable shop floor 
confidence of the war years ended dramatically in a highly-
fragmented strike wave that _ failed to draw in the non-union 
majority of workers. This outcome, with a dominant wartime 
ideology of nationalism, created a basis for widespread political 
15 
apathy and popular support for anti-Communism. 
Entrenched employer resistance to post-war unionism was also 
reflected in new legal restrictions on the unions. 
16 
The right-ward 
electoral shift since 1938 became a landslide. The liberalism of 
the hi I'~ew Deal had come to a halt in 1939 when Wagner ' s health 
insurance scheme failed in Congress; in June 1941, when strikes 
----
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14. Preis, ~ ~g, 281, is clearly ",rong to refer to the 18 '1/2 cents agreed at GIt after a three 
lonths strike as 'a proud victory'. Anderson and Jefferys, Q~ £tl, ,suggest the failure to win 
lore than Chrysler and Ford ",here the sale settlelent ",as reached ",ithout strike action had a 
deloralizing effect along shop floor ",orkers. 
15: Hike Davis, "The Barren Harriage of Alerican labour and the Delocratic Party', ~!! ~!!1 B!y!!~, 124 (Nov-Dec 1980), 74, is right to point out the significance of ·the rise of ",artile 
nationalisl' on the subsequent course of labour history. But he oversteps the evidence in arguing 
that this 'ultilately created the basis for a neM cultural cohesion within the post",ar Alerican 
~orking-class·. Not only is that 'cultural cohesion' problelatic, but 'Martile nationalisl' doel not 
In itself explain the 1940s rightward shift of Alerican politics. In Britain, for enlple, it did 
~ot prevent the election of the Attlee Labour Governlent. Martile nationalisl, then, Mas ilportant -
ut as one of a cOlplex of factors that included the post-war strength of Alerican capitalisl, 
Alerican lanagelent's OMn history and dynalics, and the serious weakening of independent (frol the 
e'ploYers and the state) Morking class organizations. 
16. Lichtenstein [19823, Q~ £tt, 19; Harry Trulan Mas elected Vice President of the United States 
on the Roosevelt ticket in 1944 and assuled the presidency on Roosevelt's sudden death in April 
1945. 
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were made illegitimate and union dissent was suppressed under the 
Smith A t c , the liberals kept quiet; and in June 1942, when the 
Smith-Connally War Labor Disputes Act was passed, 
1'7 
they were 
Clearly on the retreat. But the 1946 elections were a rout. In 
NOVember 1946 the Democratic vote plummeted from 25 to 15 million 
as more than 60% of the electorate stayed away from the polls. 
This major political defeat for labour since ' Republ ican 
candidates like Richard M Nixon in California successfully red-
baited the CIO"s Political Action Committee on slogans such as: "A 
vote for Nixon is a vote against the Communist - dominated PAC with 
its gigantic slush fund." Only '75 of the 318 candidates sLlpported 
by the PAC-CIO won, and the Republicans gained majorities in both 
18 
hOuses of Congress and among States governments. Two years 
later Truman was elected President but once again Democratic 
Voters fled the polls. Rough surveys indicated that as many as 30% 
of voters who consider'ed themsel yes "strong Democrats" and 45% of 
19 
"weak Democrats" didn't vo'te. 
The congressional reinforcement of managerial antiunionism 
PrOVided a public platform for strident anti - Communism: in the 
--.. _-
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1'7. 'b' Ltq, b5, 153. 
18. David Caute, I~t q[t!t tt!U t~t !I!U:~q!!l!l!t~t ~I!tqt I!I!c!t[ Itl!~!1! !I!c! U~tl!~ql!t[ (London: 
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Angus Calpbell, "A Classification of Presidential Elections·, in eds Clubb and Allen, q~ ~tt, 
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79th Congress (1945-46) there had been four investigations into 
Communism; in the 80th Congress (1947- 48) there were 22; 24 in 
the 81st (1949-50) ; 34 in the 82nd (1951-52) and in the 83rd 
Congress ( 1953-54) when Senator McCarthy was chairman of the 
20 
Senate' s Go~ernment Operations Committee~ there were 51. Anti-
Communism strengthened the already powerful pressures that were 
conservatizing the CIa union leaderships~ and wea~ened the 
Confidence of those who advocated continued resistance. During 
liberalism~ as well as all forms of socialism~ 
21 
systematically denounced as "anti-American". Resisting the 
employer was difficult enough; 
state was usually impossible. 
resisting the full power of the 
By February 1947 there were more 
than 250 anti-labour bills pending in both houses of Congress~and 
on June 23 1947 Congress overrode President Truman's veto to 
enact the Taft-Hartley Act. This created a series of legal 
Obstacles to the continued growth of union density and to the 
effective exercise of union bargaining power: it gave the 
Nati Cln .. o\l Labor Relations Board powers to outlaw secondary 
boycotts and "juri s dictional' strikes and virtually ruled out the 
establishment of new closed shops; it prohibited strikes by 
government employees and gave the President the power to 
order "cooling-off' periods in disputes that he decided affected 
-'--
------------------------
:20. McCarthy chaired its Sub-COllittee on Investigations; Caute, Q2 £it, 85, 106. 
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the national health and safety; it allowed employers to file 
damage suits against unions for breach of contract; and it 
obliged both local and international union officers to file 
affidavits swearing they were not members of the Communist Party 
in order to secure NLRB recognition of union shops and 
22 
condemnation of illegal actions by the employers. 
After token resistance~ the CIa and AFL leaderships agreed to 
accept the Act. Ten years later the NLRB reported that 250 
international unions had made the necessary rule changes with some 
2~750 officers having completed non-Communist affidavits, while 
23 
21~500 locals were in compliance with some 193~500 affidavits. 
The implications for both organizing internal union opposition and 
Shop floor dissent, and even for the expression of political views 
independent of both the company and the union leaders, were 
Considerable. If 200,000 successful candidates for stewards, 
committeemen and local officers had filed statements that they 
didn "t belong to the Communist Party~ it is safe to assume that in 
the course of the 1950s at least four or five times that number of 
unsuccessful candidates had also done so. Across America, then~ 
Perhaps a million shop floor union activists joined the millions 
of federal employees whose past and present political views were 
---
------------------------
22. Preis, Q~ £tt, 314-5. 
~~ ~-~I. Caute, Q~ £tt, 356. 
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investigated under the loyalty programme~ Executive Order 9835, 
24 
that Truman issued in March 1947. Little wonder then that the 
Contours of shop floor struggle in the late 1940s and 1950s, like 
Political dissent itself~ re~ained largely hidden from view~ 
while anti-Communist factions in the CIa used the opportunity to 
Consolidate their power. 
Developments within the UAW were typical of what occurred in 
many CIa unions, although Walter Reuther " s Socialist Party 
baCkground gave his leadership a more radical rhetoric than most. 
Reuther was narrowly elected UAW president in 1946, having 
emerged from leading the 1945-46 8M strike with the reputation of 
a militant; but already his political support came from an 
alliance of his personal base of anti-Communist ex-Socialists with 
conservative anti-Communists mobilized by the Association of 
CathOlic Trade Unionists. As anti-Communism became a still bigger 
iSSue in 1947~ around the foreign policy stance of the Truman 
2 5 
Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, so Reuther consolidated control 
-----
----------------------
24. Caute cites an estilate that in 1958 about 13.5 lillion Alericans cale within the scope of 
!he loyalty progral; to this total he adds another 4.5 lillion Mho Marked in the private sector in 
efense related industries and in co.panies where the elployer or the union had inspired a security 
rrogra• to reach a conclusion that about one in every five Morking people in the .id-1950s had to 
ake an oath or receive clearance as a condition of elploYlenti lqlq, 269-70. 
~~ ~~., The 'Trulan Doctrine' in foreign policy was laid down by President Trulan at a joint session 
of Congress in Harch 1947. It cOllitted the US to support anti-Col.unist governlents anywhere in the 
:O~l~. Caute argues this full-bloodied adoption of Cold War policy set the pace for dOlestic red-
,iltlng; QP f!!, 30. 
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26 
of the UAW IEB and set about red-baiting any opposition. In 
1948~ when it became clear that the left faction in the CIa was 
SUpPorting Henry Wallace against Truman in the presidential 
election~ Reuther rapidly dropped the idea of a third party 
mobilized the UAW behind Truman and then used 
Wall ace ' s low poll of just over 1 million votes to isolate still 
27 
fUrther his internal union opponents. At the 1949 CIO 
Convention, Reuther attacked the leaders of the eleven remaining 
left-controlled or influenced CIa unions because "they are not 
28 
free men~ they are not fr-~?e agents". Subsequent I y the UAW 
joined in poaching members from the expelled union s or supported 
the right-wing union s the CIa set up to replace them. In 
1952~ Reuther allowed UAW officials in Detroit to testify before 
the House of UnAmerican Activities Committee to try and 
undermine the sole remaining significant dissident local in the 
29 
UAW, Local 600. Anti-Communism and bureaucratic manipulation 
Went hand-in-hand as Reuther restricted the exercise of the UAW's 
---.. -
-----------------------
26. Thirty years later the for.er Trotskyist Dert Cochran underlined the role of anti-Co •• unis. 
is Reuther ' s sale unifying policy in the late 19405: "For the Reuther faction the Red issue had 
becole the transcendent proposition that defined and de.arcated it in the union constellation and 
deterlined its outside alliances, the rallying point on which to larshal its troops, the axis around 
which the struggles for suprelacy had to be waged." qQ £It, 259. 
27. In this period Reuther changed the constitution to allow the lED to inHtiate disciplinary 
Charges against le.bers (1949) and established that local union newspapers couldn't print articles 
"detri.ental" to the international policy (1951); l~lq, 326-7. 
28. Quoted in Prei s, ~ £!t, 408. 
29. Millia. D Andrews, ·Factionalis. and anti-Col.unisl: Ford Local 600", l~~qt Hl~tQty, Vol 20, 
3 (Spring 1979), 229, argues that the COI.unist Party presence in Local 600 in the late 19405 and 
early 19505 was exaggerated by Reuther to provide an excuse for action against non-Co •• unist 
opponents. 
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traditional pluralist democracy. 
As Reuther consolidated control over the UAW and anti-
Communism and Taft-Hartley began to restrict the potential union 
challenge to managerial power, the auto industry employers 
gradually came to see the benefits of formalizing close company 
and indust ... oy-wide bargaining relationships wit.h his moachine. In 
1948 GM offered an escalator cost-of-living clause in exchange for 
a two yeiar contr act; iand :i. n 1950 Reuther neqot i ated the "Treaty of 
DetrOit", five-year pattern contracts first with GM, then Ford and 
ChrYsler that included properly-funded pension schemes. The role 
Of the international shifted perceptibly from supporting 
internally- resourced local union organizations, to taking all the 
31 
key decisions. itself. Two trends merged: the centralization of 
lInion powero in the hands of a few well-placed international 
Officers who then saw wildcat action as a threat to their 
Control , and the growing recognition by the larger employers 
that in a period of rapid growth and technological change, 
bargaining institutions were most favourable to their interests 
-- ..... -
-----------------------
3~1. Cochran, ~ £tt, 279; Frank Harquart, ~~ ~ytq!qt~!t~~ qt!t~ (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania 
Unlversity Press, 1975), 139, 
31 • Herbert Irvine's careful contelporary study of shop stellards and UAN deaocracy explained the 
~esuI~: o 'The leadership has established a thoroughgoing control in the real I of collective 
oirgalnlng and strikes, greatly liliting the initiative of secondary leaders and the rank and file 
~tself in these latters," "The UAW-CIO Shop Steward. A Consideration of his role as a force for 
elOCracy" IHA thesis, Univesity of Buffalo, February 1951), 9b. 
":" "'1 
H"'..o:.. Irving Howe and B J Widick, Ill! M~~ ~M ~!lt!t ~!ytl!!t (NeN Vork: Randal, 1949), 192; 
arquart, QP f!!, 109-110. 
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33 
if they were constructed outside the workplace. Amid the 
economic expansion and labour retreat of the po~t-war decade~ 
this merger encouraged the realpolitik of business unionism: the 
advocacy by the union"s leaders of contracts that gave increasing 
financial benefits to union members in return for shop floor 
PI:;)1 i c: i es that provided the best environment possible for 
profitable production. Marking the general acceptanc~ of this 
ideological approach by both CIa and AFL unions, and precipitated 
by the need for a joint response to the Eisenhower administration 
elected in 1952, AFL and CIO presidents Meany and Reuther 
symbolically shook hands and the two federations fused to form 
:::',4 
the AFL-CIO in December 1955. 
Business unionism, however, did not work well for everyone. 
1947 and 1960 the population of the United States rose 
from 144 million to 180 million and median family income rose by 
35 
40,%. In 1962 Michael Harrington wrote that "Millions and tens of 
millions enjoy the highest standard of life the world has ever 
kno\.<Jr'l. " But behi nd t.hat real i ty he al so uncovered another: the 
II ' 
:trlvisible" poverty of 40--50 million people, "the unskilled 
-.. -..... 
------------------------
'''' ''''' 
..::...:,\. Caute points out that the sophisticated approach of .any of the larger corporations on labour 
relations and the COllunist threat Mere not shared by lost slaller business groups. As late as 1949, 
the US Chalber of Co •• erce continued to see the CIO's support for New Deal federal intervention as i ~hreat to free enterprise: "In spite of a partial house-cleaning, the CIO has never rid itself of 
lts Harxist econolics. Virtually every ilportant speech and publication... is replete Mith class 
consciousness, hatred for e.ployers ••• ·; gp £11, 350. 
Preis, ~ ~tt, 512-7. 
'':!'c;' O·u. US Bureau of the Census, ~t!tt~tt~!l ~~~t[~~t ~t th@ Y~tt@4 ~t~t@~L l~~Q (Washington DC: US 
epartlent of COI.erce, 19BO), 6, 451. 
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the migrant farm workers, 
:;',6 
the aged, the minorities". 
And as Greer argues, "'Jhile "before World War II, the business 
CYCle and urban prosperity moved together, after the war they no 
37 
longer dic;l". America was large enough, geographically and 
economically, fpr both realities to co-exist for a time. But such 
mass povf=r"ty "'Jas not t.otally "invisible": it exerted a political 
hold on those closest to it, the semi-skilled black or migrant 
farmworker first-generation factory worker. And it was never far 
from the consciousness of the most recent immigrants. In 1940 
11.4 million Americans were first-generation immigrants; in 1948 
Some 205,000 European wartime refugees joined them, and between 
1950 and 1952 a special Displaced Persons Commission conducted 
"the most rigorous system of security and intelligence 
investigations in the history of American immigration" to admit 
390,000 post-war refugees, over 70% of whom came from the Eastern 
Bloc. The twin fears of Communism and po~erty played a 
Significant role in the political consciousness of these largely 
Llrban "'Jorkers, and for many of them McCarthyism became a natural 
Way of displaying their Americanism. Among poor or recently-
Poor white workers even American poverty appeared to work against 
di S!E'ent. 
-"---
-----------------------
Greer, ~ ~tt, 97. 
;8. Richard Polenberg, Q~! ~!U~~ @btti.Uu ~l!ih ~!£!L ~M !t~~t~i.tt til t~1! Ylltt!~ ~t!t!i 
~ll!~1! l~~~ (New York: Viking Press, 1980), 34, 121-6. 
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Blacks, however, experienced the contradictions of post-war 
I~meri can "freedom" most acutel y. In 1945 few blacks were allowed 
to vote in the 'Jim Crow' states of the old South; fifteen years 
later it still took courage for many blacks even to register to 
vote. And non-white median family income was still just 55% of 
white family income in 1960, having been 51% in 1947, despite the 
rapid migration of blacks from farm to blue collar jobs in the 
::',2 
1940s and 19505. In the South dynamiting took over from 
lynchings in the late 19505 as the ku klux klan fought to 
maintain white supremacy against the new black civil rights 
34 
movement. In the North racism continued inside the industrial 
labour force. Wartime labour shortages and federal policy after 
Roosevelt ·s response to the 1942 11arch on Washington Movement had 
enCOUY- aged the auto companies to hire more blacks the 
proportion in Chrysler"s Detroit plants rose from 2.5% to 15% 
within a year from May 1942. But it was accompanied by a major 
anti-black race riot by whites in central Detroit and in the 
Plants the upgrading of blacks out of foundry and unskilled work 
-.- .. _-
-----------------------
"!""j ~..::. • US Bureau of the Census, Ill! ~~~l~l ~!l~ ~~~!l~!l~ ~t~ty~ ~t til! ~l!c;,~ eqeYl~tl~!l l!l til! Ml!lt!~ pt!t!~t . !!l Ill~tqtlc;,!l Yl!~L lI~Q:l~I~ (Washington DC: Departlent of COllerce, 1980), Current 
opulatlon Reports: Special Studies Series P-23: No. 80, Table 14, 31; in 1940 38% of black lale 
;orkers, 14 and over, were in blue collar jobs and 41% worked on farls; by 1960 the proportions were 
4% and 11% respectively; Table 53, 74. 
' ''p~ 
..:.>\. David tI Chillers, tlqq~!~ eUtlc;,~!ll~!t tlJ.! Ill~t~r:~ qt til! ~y ~ll!~ n~!l (New York: New 
YlswPoints, 1981), 349-350. 
34. Philip S Foner, Qtq!!ll~!~ ~~~qt · ~!l~ til! ~l!c;,~ ~qt~!tL l~l~:l~I~ (New York: International 
PUblishers, 1976), 317. 
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took much longer. Blacks were fully accepted as semi - skill e d 
Workers, first in the physicall~-hard body shops and then in 
ass embly, by the late 1940s, but they were still not allowed to 
enter the skilled or white collar jobs. In the 1950s Chrysler 
employed only 24 blacks 'among 7~425 skilled workers and only one 
36 
among 350 apprentices. 
Black workers in all blue collar jobs except labouring or 
foUndry work held significantly lower seniority in the 1950s than 
most Whites. So when the big lay-offs occurred at Chrysler almost 
eVery two years through the 1950s, they also t e nded to be laid 
3 7 
Off more frequently. This was particularly true in the national 
1957-58 that was used by many labour relations 
3 8 
depar-tme rits to establish a nevI "hard line" on 'work discipline. 
M,-anagement.s, for a time, discovered that unemployment and lay-
offs were much more effective in policing shop floor practices 
---------------------------
'":t' ~ '-'~. August "eier and Elliott RudNick, @l!£~ Q!tr.l1tl !l1q tn! Rt~! 11{ tn! M~~, (Nell York: Oxford 
University Press, 1979), 213. 
36. Jales A GeschNender, ~lUh ~!£! !Ilq ~Qr.~!r. !11~'!r.q!ll£yt tn! ~!!q,!! Q! ~!,!ql'!UQIl!r.'l n!£~ ~Qt~!t~ (Nell York: Calbridge University Press, 1977), 41. 
37. B J Widick, "Black Workers: Double Discontent", ~'!tQ ~Qt~ !Ilq tt~ qt~£l1l1t!l1t~, ed. B J Widick 
(Baltitore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 197b), 56. 
38. This is discussed in three articles by Frank C Pierson, H R Northrup and Jack Barbash in !n~M§!r!!! E!!!!!9D!, Vol 1, No 1, October 1961. 
39 
than was a close relationship with union leaders. These 
Were often reduced to running after the employers reminding them 
of how useful they had been to them in the past. Between 1957 
and 1958 while total employment at four Chrysler Detroit plants 
fell from 45,584 to 22,776~ 
40 
black employment fell from 20.3% to 
14.'7'1.. In the recession that ended the 1950s~ many black 
Workers appreciated that business unionism had not provided them 
With anything like equality or opportunity of earningi. A mass 
base was being created in the black community that would support 
the militant civil rights movement and black riots of the 1960s. 
For black workers the disillusion with business unioni s m was 
still more complete since the pro-civil rights UAW only elected 
41 
its fir s t black IEB member in 1963 . 
1''It?anwh i 1 e, white workers' support for the 'strong, and 
honest ' ~ Republican candidate, e>: -"'Jar I d War II commander 
Eisenhower, first in the Korean War election of 1952 and again in 
1956 led to the up-and-coming Democratic presidential contender, 
the millionaire Catholic Senator John F Kennedy, taking an active 
Part in the proceedings of the high-profile anti-racketeering 
MClellan Commission where his younger brother Robert was chief 
c:oLlnsel. The Commission, set up in 1957, soon resulted in the 
-- .. -
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39. leonard R Sayles and George Srauss, I~! ~~~!t Y~i~~ (NeM York: Harcourt, Brace, 1967), 161. 
40. SeschNender, ~e ~!.t, 40. 
'~1. Detroit Free Press, ~t!~~! i~ ~!tt~it (Detroit Free Press reprint, Decelber 1980), 44. 
204 
AFL-CIO expelling three unions and suspending five others. In 
1959 L,o' d r',enne y became a le~ding protagonist of the 1959 Landrum-
Griffin Act. This was ostensibly aimed against the gangster 
element in the unions~ but its provisions vastly increased the 
POWer of the centralized union bureaucracies to compel dissident 
locals to observe contracts signed with employers. Eleven years 
after Truman had won the presidency on a platform that included 
the repeal of Taft-Hartley~ the Democratic Party stood squarely 
On a program of more rather than less state control of union 
42 
organization. 
II. Issues 
The significant institutionalization of American labour relations 
in the 1940s and 1950s is not in doubt. But the evidence from 
DOdge Main outlined in the following chapters questions how 
universal this process was for shop floor relations. It also 
Suggests that management was much less in conscious command of 
its labour relations strategies than is often assumed. At least 
three questions follow: first~ how far was labour weakened On the 
Shop floor by the support union leaders gave to Roosevelt and big 
bUSiness interests in World War II? Second, was there really a 
---------------------------
42. Guerin, ~ £tt, 186-196. 
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labour truce in the 1950s? And third, were the changes in the 
Conduct of labour relations throughout the period the result of 
Conscious~ deliberate management policy? 
vJor I d v.Ji:\r II is an inevitably controversial area of study 
since it divides two periods that have spawned incompatible myths 
- a "golden age of militancy" from the "labour compromise". But 
sUch r-igid periodization ignores the continuity 'of labour 
resistance~ and oversimplifies comple>: processes. Recent views of 
labour in World War II have been somewhat one-sided~ stressing 
great spontaneity and political 
44 
advance 
4 7 
-' 
or 
labour's wartime weakness that allowed management to formalize 
labour relations on its terms. The argument here is that both 
WorkPlace unionism ~n~ corporate management were strengthened in 
World War II. The conjuncture of a tight labour market with a 
largely unstructured s hop floor unionism strengthened 
American workers' shop floor self-confidence. But simultaneously 
strengthened American capitalism internationally, 
----
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43.. Kartin Glaberlan, ~!~u.~~ ~t~t~Ut t~~ ~ttl!qql~ !Utillt t~~ Ill!:~ttt~~ 2l!qq~ til t~! M~~ ~l!tlUq ~qtl~ ~!t II (Detroit: Bewick, 19BO), 133-4, counter poses a ·political' resistance by wartile 
s~rikers to the rapid growth and bureaucratization of the UAW, but larries the two in a bureaucratic 
V~ctory explained by 'sufficient concessions' and the 'quick incorporation of the accululated 
Illitancy'. But how 'political' was the Martile wildcat resistance if it could be so easily and 
rapidly overcole? 
~4. Roger Keeran, 1!2 'itt, 235-6, argues that the war 'underlined labor's pOMer'; Nelson 
liChtenstein, 'Industrial Unionisl under the No Strike Pledge: a study of the CIO during the Second 
World War', (PhD thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1974), 334, suggests it weakened UAW 
locals. This argulent explains the shift to the right in the union and the nation at the end of the 
Mar and the resulting consolidation of lanagerial authority, but plays down the advance of workplace 
restraints over wartile lanagelents. 
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introduced American employers to close working relations with a 
state apparatus they had for merly regarded with sU5picion~ and 
reduced the independence from both state and employers of the 
recently- established CIO national !:.tructures . The post-war 
balance of forces tilted cleariy in favour of the employers~ but 
it remained complex and contradictory. 
The evidence Glaberman marshals to suggest that the war years 
undermined the auto employers' shop floor authority is confirmed 
by the strike statistics and analysis of strike causes made by 
45 
the wartime employers' Automotive Council. For three months, 
December 1944 to February 1945~ they locate strikes by plant and 
corporation and suggest a high level of worker combativity at a 
time when all strikes were unauthorized and opposed publicly by 
46 
all the members of the UAW IEB: 
.--.-
------------------------
45. Glaberun, QP. c;it, 35-61-
4,6. Privately there appears little doubt that certain IEB .e.bers encouraged, or at least didn't 
dIScourage, several of the unauthorized strikes. See Chapter 9 for the 1943 and 1945 Dodge "ain 
strikes. 
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TABlE 8 
IlARTIItE STRIKES, STRIKE FREIIlDCY AID CAUSE, DECEJIBER 1944-fEBRUARY 1945 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Fir. No. of stoppages Frequency per 1000 : Strike issue 
IiInual workers 
Strikes 
No. I of total 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Chrysler 33 .42 : Against disciplinary leasures 50 34.5 
General Kotors 15 .05 : Job problels: standards, tools 25 17 .2 
Ford 31 .27 : Working conditions 21 14.5 
: Union issues: solidarity 14 9.6 
aBriggs 17 1.21 : Classification, delarcation 12 8.3 
Packard 8 : Pay, piecework 9 6.2 
Hudson 4 : Seniority 7 4.B 
Internatl. Harvester 3 : Racial discri.ination 2 1.4 
: lIanning levels 2 '!.4 
18 others 22 : Overtile, lay-offs, cleaning 3 2.1 
133 : bTotal 145 100.0 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SOURCE: B!p~[!!~ ~~[! ~!~PP!g!~ in BY!~!9~i!! P!!n!~, cited in Kartin Slaberlan, ~![!i!! ~![i!!~! ~5Thl! ~![ygg!! !g!in~! !h! ~~=~![i~! P!!~g! in !h! YB~ ~yring ~~r!~ ~![ 11 (Detroit: Bewick, 19BO), 
-bOa 
NOTE: a.Briggs plants had a reputation for bad conditions and an antagonistic lanagelent (lee p 
35 above), and the tulti-plant local which organized thel, Local 212, contained several leading 
wartite Trotskyists such as Ernie Kazey IElil's youngest brother) and Senora Johnson (forlerly 
organizer of the Flint WOlen's Auxilliary), cf Anderson and Jefferys, • The 1937 Briggs contract 
had explicitly recognized shop stewards and the existence of a powerful shop stewards' systel in the 
thirteen Detroit Briggs plants taken over by Chrysler in 1953 added to Chrysler's own proble,s. 
b.Several strikes were reported as having lore than one cause, so the total nUlber of issues 
analysed is 12 lore than the total nUlber of strikes. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Tt1 "" 
'" table confirms the particularly high strike frequency at 
ChrYS ler, while the detailed analysis of their reported causes 
makes it clear that managerial authority was the biggest single 
iSSue in contention: one third of all strikes were protes t 
stoppages against management disciplining workers. 
I<eeran suggests this "intensification o ·f class conflict" led 
t.o a gr-ovJi ng ch VOrCf? betvJf.:len "the ranks" and thei r uni on I ei:\ders 
47 
that helped undermine labour"s power. 
---------------~-----------
47. Keeran, ~ ~U, 235-7. 
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But strikes in defence of 
struggl ed-·for restraints over arbitrary management are an 
unlike ly §QYC£§ of labour weakness. More to the point, this upturn 
in rank-and-file struggle dispelled management"s hopes that it 
could entirely rely on the union leaders. As real wages declined 
in late 1944 and in 1945, the No Strike Pledge became more 
unpopular and many secondary union leaders reflected the wave of 
48 
frustration - a development that confirmed management " s 
determination to launch a post-war offensive. This was not a sign 
of weakness. Even the most sophisticated management at 8M still 
genUinely believed the UAW was stronger after the war than before 
- preCisely because of its shop floor strength: 
••• union representatives are delanding and succeeding inch by inch in obtaining the deland 
that they exercise judglent before lanagelent can act ••• To yield to such a deland would lean 
the end of free enterprise with efficient lanagelent ••• 49 
The independence of "the ranks" was, from management"s viewpoint, 
the most threatening form of union strength: and it was a central 
problem for it in the second half of the 1940s. 
Lichtenstein [1974] pointed to three other- ·factors weakening 
auto unicm locals during War' 1 c/ War I I : the disorganization of the 
llnion resulting from the conversion to war pr-oducti on; a gr-owi ng 
di Ssati s ·facti on \l'Ji th t.he !JAW becaLlse of its inability to resolve 
grievances under the No Strike Pledge; and the role of the War 
-.. --
------------------------
4.8. Reuther, too, abl y bui It up luch pol i tical capital through hi s end-of-ur Ii Ii hncy in 1945; 
lIchtenstein [1982], 9P f!!, 214-215. 
49. Walter Gordon Merritt, GM counsel, ~!~ Y~t~ It~!~, Dece.ber 29 1945, cited in the 1948 study 
by Neil N Chalberlain, I~! ~~t~~ ~~!ll!~q! t~ ~!~!q!~!~i ~~rrttql, (New York: Archon, 1967), 3, whose 
assesslent it is that this was the ·prevalent· lanage.ent view. 
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Labour Board in delaying the resolution of disputes. Each of 
th(~se can, however, be interpreted differently. The conversion 
effect dispersed the existing layer of union activists across a 
much larger labour force and so helped to spread union 
consciousness. The No Strike Pledge did tie the union leaders 
closely to the industrial - military alliance, and encourage 
consti t utional changes that formally restricted local union 
autonomy. But the ties were neither universal, as John L Lewis " 
51 
wartime record shows, nor did they work homogeneously on all 
union I eader-sl-Ii ps. Also, the shop floor experience was 
Contradictory. "For while locals benefited from the government·s 
"gift' of a st~ble and growing membership~ very large numbers of 
auto workers experienced wildcat strike action and a degree of 
self-reliance in numbers far greater than those involved in the 
auto sit-downs of 1937. Finally~ while it is clear that in 1943 
management used the WLB to shelve grievances, by 1945 the balance 
of forces in some plants had clearly shifted, and it was often in 
ths workers" interests to delay the hearing of a grievance so the 
gyg prevailed as long as possible. The valid argument 
th a t both the NWLB and the impartial umpire systems tended to 
take problem-solving away plant has to 
---------------------------
50. lichhnshin [1974], Q~ ~it, 334. 
51. Preis, QP. ~tt, 174-197. 
52. Edwards P K (1983), Q~ ~a, 7, shows that the nUlber of workers involved in reported strikes 
outside the coal industry rose 23% frol 33.8 per 1,000 etployees frat 1937 to 1941 to 41.6 per 1,000 
frat 1942 to 1945. . 
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.f 
be 
counterbalanceci, during the period of the No Strike Pledge, by 
the increased scepticism with which workers viewed both the 
intervention of the international UAW representative and the 
53 
performance of the "impar-tial" umpire or "'JLB officer. 
Wartime restraints on managerial authority did not evaporate 
OVernight. In some areas of industry they were largely eliminated 
in the late 1940s, as union leaders bargained away the job control 
eXercised by semi-skilled workers for more tangible economic 
retLlrns. Their elimination was not, however, a peaceful process. 
Many employers isolated unions in major confrontations, decimated 
-.. _-
------------------------
t:;o • .". 
~~. In his broadest treatlent of the subject, Nelson Lichtenstein, ~!~q~~~ ~!~ !t ~q~~t t~~ ~!g 
10 ~9!!g ~~! 11 (New York: Calbridge University Press, 19821, presents a luch lore satisfactory 
account of the wartile coexistence of enhanced shop floor power over front-line .anage.ent with 
national labour subservience to the lilitary-industrial alliance. This contradiction could not 
outlast the wartile elergency and when this ended, Lichtenstein argues, lanage.ent's wartile 
strength allowed it to generalize its ascendency over the national leaderships of the CIO to a plant 
level ascendency over workplace union organization. 
2 11 
the socialist base inside the unions and then extended legitimacy 
t.o the limited form of business unionism that. survived. 
Restraints were not eliminated everywhere. Other employers failed 
to grasp the nettle of the permanent arrival of a labour presence 
and conducted a vigorous anti-unionism that in turn bred active 
resistance; and still others lacked the financial base to take on 
their unions in those first important confrontations. As Robert 
MacDonald's study of labour relations in the post -war automobile 
industry concluded: "Under collective bargaining, differences in 
labour practices were in large part attributable to differences in 
the judqement, skil l and foresight exercised by respective 
54 
managements." At Chrysler, despite a series of management 
aSSaults during World War II, a strong tradition of sectional 
union activity s urvived that allowed the custom and practice of 
mutuality to operate over many aspects of job organization until 
55 
the I ate 1950s. The survival of such struggled-for restraint s 
in a major American 
characterization of 
about "core" corporation raises doubts 
/ 56 
period as a "labour truce". 
the 
The 
"trucE~" and "compromise" imply voluntarily-entered 
agreements by two sides to cease hostilities in e>:change 
- ..... --
------------------------
54. Robert" HacDonald, ~QU!~u.'!! ~!tq!l!!t!!q l!! t~! ~l!tQ!Q~U! ~'lc!I!~ttY.t . ~ ~tl!q'i Qi ~!q! §ttl!~tl!tt !!!c! ~Q!2!tltt'!! ~tl!ttQ!!~ (NeM Haven: Yale UniverSity Press, 1963), 396-7 • 
."..". ~~. Sililar restraints by seli-skilled workers over lanagerial authority were largely eroded in G" 
plants by the late 19405, and i~ Ford by the lid-1950s; Anderson and Jefferys, 9P f!!. . 
Gordon et aI, Qe £t!, 216-9; Brecher, Qe £It, 342. 
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for mutual benefits. Yet there was nothing voluntary about the 
movement of the frontier of control between management and 
managed in this period. Hostilities never ceased; 
Were certainly never genuinely mutual. The picture is one of 
consistent struggle in which, when the workers were defeated in 
One area of job control, management stepped up hostilities to try 
remove other restraints fr"om \l'JOrkpl ace legitimacy. 
Hostilities only ceased temporarily, after a management defeat, 
as if to give time to allow a further attack. Managing shop floor 
resistance was thus a major problem for management during the 
1940s and 1950s. Some companies did so with less open conflict 
than th o ers, but the problem was the same for them all. (4t. the 
point of production, workers experience was not of a "labour truce 
but of continuing managerial pressure. How visible open conflict 
Was depended on the interaction of management with the workplace 
57 
union traditions. 
This analysis of a shifting and contested frontier of control 
in the post - war period cuts through the suggestion implicit in the 
one- sided "tr"uce" periodizaticln (:If the post - war years thiat 
management behaviour on labour relations was determined by some 
master plan; that the most sophisticated long-term view of what 
were its own best interests was played out in a game whose rules 
--------------------------
57. Macdonald concluded: "The effect of collective bargaining during the period of the 19405 and 
early 19505, lias to reinforce, as it lIere, differences in the quality of unagl!lent, placing thereby 
an added strain on the cOlpetitive positions of less favoured firls"; Q~ £It, 400. 
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Were exclusively determined by management. Seniority has been 
properly identified as a mechanism by which management can both 
gain additional power over certain groups of long-servic~ workers 
58 
and divide their interests from more recently-hired workers. But 
it did not~ and indeed does not, always operate that way. Five 
Years of continuous growth at Chrysler from 1947 to 1951, like the 
earl i er- Dodge Main boom from 1933 to 1936, reduced job 
uncertainty among production workers. It confirmed collective 
restraints on departmental and sectional supervision's right to 
USe the lay-off and call-back system as a disciplinary mechanism, 
forced many departmental superintendents to agree :'no 
eXceptions' to the strict seniority rota. Seniority was a right 
in Workers' eyes; but as long as it still had to be struggled for, 
it was seen as a component of YOiQO legitimacy, rather than as a 
g e ner"ous "concessi on" or as a skillful scheme to establish 
59 
bureaucratic managerial control. Much of its legitimacy stemmed 
from the formal and informal 
.. _--.. 
------------------------
58. Herding, qQ.1;!.1, 19-20. 
acknowledgement given it 
""' 9 ~ ~ Edwards R, ~~ £It, posits what is virtually a conspiracy theory of lanagerial behaviour, 153: 
To llple.ent bureaucratic control, capitalists acceded to or independently introduced a series of 
job protections and personnel policies that tended to shield workers frol illediate displacelent ••• 
Grievance procedures, seniority provisions that concentrate layoffs along workers in entry-level 
jobs, and the general policy of fostering ION turnover create expectations and real experiences of 
long-terl, perhaps lifetile, elploYlent ••• Capitalists introduced the new schele for their own 
purposes, yet they could not control all -of its consequences." At Chrysler, however, during the 
19405 lanage.ent respected seniority agreelents only because it was actually forced to or because of 
the threat of industrial action if it didn't. 
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by 
60 
management at various times. But "felir" movement from job tel job 
and lay-off patterns were part of the shop 
floor ' S collectively-perceived frontier of control, restr"ai ni ng 
arbitrary acts of management. And in 1949 and 1950 they were not 
vi ewed as "concessi ons" because they vJere st ill struggl ed over. 
It is not just that conditions like s.niority ag~eements 
which began life as struggled-for restraints on manadement are 
now being interpreted as originally servi ng their pre~!j.ent 
function. The view that management had a strategic plan to 
aCCommodate and segment labour exaggerates greatly both the 
forward-planning capability of the 1940s and 1950s, 
and the way most managers responded to crisis . Thurley and Wood 
Suggest that "strategic thinking" by management is only possibl e 
\o-lhen four sets of conditiclns are pY-esent: (lJ a direct 
I~el ati onshi p between industrial relations and business 
strat~?gies; (2] the organizational c:apaci ty to moni tOI'" and 
eXPlain the strategy; [3] the employees accept the legitimacy of 
management's contr"ol systems; and [4] top managers have 
61 
SUfficient educational training. It is doubtful whether any of 
these conditions were ~ully met in Chrysler before the mid-1950s . 
Chandler suggests the pressure of major growth or new market 
-'-'-
------------------------
60. In Septelber and October 1945, Chrysler wanted a slooth launch of the first post-war lodels, 
so it ilplelented full departlental seniority provisions in all 30 departlents. In the tril shop, 
Departlent 99, this leant telporarily laying off all workers elployed after August 25 1915; cf ~~~, 
Septelber 29 1945. • 
61.' Thurley and Wood, ~ £it, 223. 
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Conditions on top executives can force changes in the form of 
management structure: 
The inherent weakness in the centralized, functionally departlentalized operating 
cOlpany ••• bec(ale) ·critical only when the adlinistrative load on the senior executives 
increased to such an extent that they were unable to handle their entrepreneurial 
responsibilities efficiently. This situation arose when the operations of the enterprise 
becale too cOlplex and the problel of coordination, appraisal and policy forlulation too 
intricate · for a siall nUlber of top officers to handle both long-run, entrepreneurial, and 
short-run, operational adlinistrative activities.62 
Williamson e>:plains how these pressures build up to the 
PSychologica~ and temporal limits of effectiveness of individual 
e>:ecuti VE?S. What he has called "bounded rationality" lays down 
"f i ni te spans of control" - a rather fancy way of sayi ng :. an 
executive can only do so much". He shows how growth itself can 
undermine managerial efficiency and agrees that top management·s 
initial reS',pClnse to the "radi al e>:pansi on of the enterpri se" is 
often to insert "additIonal hieral~chical layers". Thus in 1950 
keller appointed L T Colbert Chrysler president while hanging on 
himself to the chief executive position of chairman. But extending 
the existing managerial hierarchy rather than drastically 
r-eformi ng it, Williamson suggests, leads to "control loss 
63 
Phenomenon" , precisely what happened at Chrysler during the 
Years of joint Keller-Colbert management from 1950 to 1956. Even 
the period in which Chrysler manage~ent deliberately fought to 
aChieve the advantages of the GM labour relations system, from 
-.. _-.. -
-----------------------
6 r ) , ~. A D Chandler ~t~!t~qy !~4 ~t~y£ty~~, (New York: Doubleday, 1966), 282-3, cited in Nillialson, g~ fB, 134. ' 
63. IIi 11 i alson, Ill!. ~tt, 126. 
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1956 to 1959, was one of essentially reactive management rather 
than one where Chrysler finally implemented an inevitable master 
Plan. 
III. Structure 
Chapter 9 traces the unsuccessful managerial atte~pts to reassert 
managerial authority during World War Two. Chapter 10 examines 
the factors behind Chrysler management"s apparent incapacity to 
regain control in the politically more favourable circumstances of 
anti-Co,mmunism and Reuther faction control of the UAW during the 
Post-We." ... · decade, and it details the workplace legitimacy created 
by the network of restraints over management"s "right to manage ' . 
Chapter 11 examines the watershed years from 1956 to 1959, when i:\ 
consistent drive by Chrysler management to redraw the shop floor 
frontier of control was ultimately successful. 
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CHAPTER 9 
WORLD WAR II 
SOUND AMERICAN UNIONISM 
Chapter 9 has three sections. Each considers a major attempt by 
Chrysler management to regain autonomy over the setting of 
Workplace rules during World War II. Section one considers the 
Changeover from peacetime to military production and the first 
opportunity for management to reassert its unilateral authority. 
Section two examines the 1943 attempt by Chrysler to re-impose 
unilateral management prerogatives over what w~. by then a 
largely new workforce. Finally~ section three looks at Chrysler " s 
adoption of a new intransigent strategy in 1944 aimed at rolling 
baCk war-time restraints by its semi-skilled workers in 
preparation for the resumption of mass peacetime production. 
I. Changeover to war production 
changeover from civilian to wartime production was 
Particularly traumatic at Dodge Main. The first US Office of 
PrOduction Management order cutting schedules for the 1942 model 
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year by 20% was issued in July 1941; and passenger automobile and 
1 
light truck work ended in January 1942. Chrysler took well over 
a year to complete the changeover and attempted to use the mass 
laY-offs and dislocation of union organization to reassert 
Control over the movement of labour and working conditions. With 
Federal funds providing the means to build a new tank plant and 
tool up its Chicago plant for aircraft assembly~ Chrysler felt no 
hurry or necessity to concentrate its war production at Dodge. 
In July 1941 it refused to transfer laid- off Dodge Main 
workers to its new Tank Arsenal at Warren~ ten miles to the 
north. In September 1941 it gave 36 Dodge Main paint shop workers 
a two week penalty lay-off for refusing to give up the tradition 
of a 20 minute relief period ~t the shift changeover. Each time~ 
management was forced to abandon its new hard line under threat 
2 
of strike action. More effective in suppressing the Dodge 
workforce's resistance was a 25% collapse in average. Chrysler 
manual employment between 1941 and 1942 that coincided with the 
UAW' s No Strike Pledge. 
As car production ran down~ the threat of industrial action 
carried decreasi ng weight, so Local 3 turned to propagandistic 
---
------------------------
1. p~~, July 15 1941; P~!rgi! Ii!!!, January 21 1942. 
2. p~~, July 15, Septelber 15 1941. 
~. Chrysler Corporation, Labour Relations Office, Average US ElploYlent 1940-80, October 26 1981, 
In Iy possession. 
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means of fighting back - but was still capable of mobilizing 
substantial numbers of wor~ers. Just after Pearl Harbor, on the 
Friday before Christmas Day 1941, 15,000 Dodge workers left their 
Work or came in from lay-off to attend a mass meeting called by 
Local 3 to protest agai nst "the \o'Jar sl acker" Chrysl er. Bill 
Hill, acting Local 3 President after Pat Quinn took a job on the 
UAW staff, argued that 75% of Dodge's machining facilities were 
idle. A UAW Chrysler Department report gave the ' following 
breakdown of the ' low numbers of Chrysler workers engaged on 
4 
defense work: 
De Soto 
Jefferson 
Dodge Hain 
150 Highland Park Engines 
1500 Alplex 
Dodge Truck 
25 (on gun jobs) 
2B6 (B61 on defensel 
400 (90~ on defense) 
(43~ on defense) 
As late as June 1942, when 5,000 of the 19,500 employed at Dodge 
Main eight months earlier had still not been called back, 500 
maintenance workers staged a Saturday morning "work-in", 
Completing half a shift "s work for nothing as a protest against 
5 
Chrysler's half-speed plant conversion. 
-.-.. -..... 
-----------------------
4. ~~~, Decelber IB 1941, January 1 1942. Chrysler's draughtslen, by contrast, were able to use 
their bargaining strength designing the new tools and lay-outs for war production to Nin the 
~:~~gnition of their union, the Society of DeSigning Engineers in Decelber 1941; HarriS, QP fi!, 
5. q!ttQlt ~!!~, June 14 1942. It should not be assuled this skilled workers' action represented 
a ,high level of patriotic enthusiasi. Overtile was one of the two issues which always provoked 
skIlled Markers into action [the other Mas contracting out]. 
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The UAvF s "Vi ctory throuqh Equal i t Y of Sacr if ice" programme Ii'laS 
endorsed at a special UAW Conference of selected delegates in 
Apr il 1942. Potentially it threatened to undermine the exercise 
of workers' collective shopfloor power. The UAW agreed: 
1. No strikes during warti.e. 
2. Saturday, Sunday and holidays were to be treated as ordinary working days - overti.e 
pre.iuls Mould only be paid after eight hours had been Morked a day or after 40 hours worked a 
Meek. 
3. To increase the production of war .aterials. 
4. To operate arls plants on a 24-hour, 7 day a Meek basis.b 
The "Equality of Sacrifice" programme would clearly limit the 
restraints union members exercised on managerial rights to 
determine the hours and conditions of work. But ~bQ would carry 
the No Strike Pledge in the plants? It was available as a 
POWerful propaganda weaponn against action~ yet if no-one raised 
it at the moment workers decided to strike~ or if the only person 
who did was a discredited non-unionist~ then the No Strike 
Pledge would not work. 
The steward system could only help raise production if a 
large proportion of stewards Ii'Jere ideologically and 
organi zati onally committed to the No Strike Pledge. In 1942 and 
1943 this would have required a much larger Communist Party 
presence . D d I~' 1n 0 geli::\ln • 
..... _-.. 
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b. 
The nearby Chrys ler Plymouth plant did 
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have a strong CP presence among its Local 51 officers and shop 
stewards and this clearly had an impact during the war: it was 
Virtually str-ike free - although even there the ste\l'Jards "Jere 
unable to convince the membership to agree to restore the 
7 
incentive payment system being pushed by the CPo Yet at Dodge 
Main, the AIWA origins of men like Earl Reynolds, who was elected 
LOcal 3 president in 1942, meant that although they supported the 
No Strike Pledge at first, they were unprepared politically for 
the hard task of sacrificing their own constituents ' immediate 
inte~ests. Between December 1941 and January 1943 66 work 
8 
stoppages took place in Chrysler plants and in its bitter 
pamphlet, ~~~Qn~ tb~ Ei~t§ iD~ th~ B~~QC~§, Chrysler commented, 
"Pearl Habor' , labour's no-strike pledge and the national policy 
against striking did not change this Union~s attitude and 
9 
practices." 
-.. -..... -
-----------------------
7. See Local 51 Collection, NRL, Box 24; Stewards Council linutes, April 12 1943, where a lotion 
Nas carried unanilously: "that the Stewards' Council go on record to support the incentive plan and 
the EB of the Local to work out plan and present it to the leabership." As the linutes go on to 
show, however, the lelbership did not accept the incentive plan even though it was recollended to 
thel by the EB and the Stewards' Council. 
8. Chrysler Corporation, tQ ~![ h!~q[ ~~~q[t~, August 27 1943, 552, cited in Nelson Lichtenstein, ~U~~!t[~!l ~~lq~l!~ ~~4~t t~~ ~q ~ttl~! El~4q!t ! !t~4Y qi tU! ~lQ 4~[l~q t~~ ~!£q~4 ~qtl4 ~!t, PhD, 
nlverslty of California, Berkeley, 1974, 357. 
~. Chrysler Corporation, ~~yq~4 tU! · t~£ti ~Q4 t~! t!£qt4it ~~t ~~qqt ~q!t4 E!Q!l !4~ltt!4lY 
tq~qtt! t~t ~~l4tU~t !U4 ~!~![4! ~UlqU l[[!~~qU~l~llltY (Detroit:1943), B. 
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II. The 1943 Offensive 
After management fully re-opened Dodge Main on war production in 
1 ate 1942, it hoped to use the dispersal of union activists to 
other plants, into the services, and into new departments and on 
new work, to recover some of its lost control. Jimmy Solomon, the 
militant chairman of the trim unit (department 99), ,and ,:\ pI ant 
CO~mitteeman, reported in April 1943 on the whereabouts of former 
trim department workers still working in Chrysler"s Detroit area 
10 
Plants: 
BOlber plant 400 
Lynch Road 50 
Highland Park 200 
Tank Arsenal la nUlher) 
Scattered through 
Dodge Kain 1000 
Tril Shop 125 
But management found the union tradition at Dodge still dug in. 
Among those still in the trim shop were Solomon and four chief 
stewar-ds. Super seniority had allowed a few of those who carried 
the tradition of organization to survive. It was not the 
flIaj or-i ty. There was a high turnover, for- e>: amp Ie, in those 
hOlding Local 3 office: of the 41 candidates who ran for election 
in February 1941 only six stood for office again in February 
11 
1943. But a £Q~~ survived. And in the tight labour market of 
-.-._.-
-----------------------
~(). Q~~, April 15 1943. The six Dodge units had a chairlan, recording secretary and other officers 
Ilrroring the plant-wide organization of Local 3. The stewards' and unit elections took place on the 
5ile day. 
11 • Q~~, Karch 1 1941, February 15 1943. 
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1943 they taught the new labour force where to draw the 
established line marking the ·frontier of control · on the new war 
jobs. 
The switch to war production tipped the balance of forces on 
13 
the shop floor towards the workforce. This was because on cost -
plus arms contracts, managerial emphasis shifted fro~ quantity 
and low labour costs to quality virtually irrespective of labour 
costs. Gertrude Nalezty, a Dodge Wire Room worker~ recalled: 
It was very different during the war. Conditions working on tank wire Nere luch better. They 
stressed quality. No-one cared about quantity. There were always relief people ready to help 
out. We were working six days a week but we used to get off early as often as we liked. We'd 
just ask the foreaan and nine tiles out of ten he'd agree. It was during the Nar we elected 
our first Noaan chief steward, Angie Neulan.14 
ChrYs l e r attempt e d to prevent this relaxation of workplace 
diSCipline from taking place. It launched a general attack on 
prOduc tion rates on war work~ trying to reclassify and redefine 
them at rates below those on civilian work. If the issue was 
written up as a grievance~ lower-level management would simply 
refuse to bargain on it with the stewards and refer it to the log-
----
-----------------------
12. lichtenstein [1982], ~2 ~it, 126, confirls this analysis: 'Of greater long-range ilport was an 
OPPOSitional infrastructure and a preexisting tradition of struggle into which these new recruits 
COuld be acculturated.' 
::~. Nelson lichtenstein, 'Conflict over Workers' Control: the Autolobile Industry in World War 
I, ~g[!!Dg:~l!!! ~!![!f!l 5!!!Y! 9D h!g9[£ ~Q!!Yni!Y ~ng ~!![if!D ~Qf!!!Y, eds. Kichael H Frisch 
and Daniel J Walkowitz (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 288-90. 
14. Interview ~ith author. 
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15 
jam already before the War Labour Board (WLB). In March 1943, 
Local 3 President Reynolds argued workers should resist the 
managerial offensive despite the No Strike Pledge: 
It is the position of the Local Union that they are lOOt behind the progralle of President 
Roosevelt and the War Effort, but we are not going to let the Dodge Kanagelent use this as an 
excuse to break down the lorale of our lelbers. 
Elployees who work on a job for a good nUlber of years, and have seniority on the job, 
should not be loved, unless it is IUtuilly igretd, and they are given a job that pays a higher 
rate.[IY elphasis, SJ] 16 
"Rates 
still being chiseied - Chrysler Manager rejects all appeals for 
17 
Fair Dealing." It seemed Chrysler was using the No Strike Pledge 
unilaterally to redraw workplace rules and habits of rule-making. 
Provocation 
In May 1943 Dodge Divisional Manager Otto Franke precipitated 
major confrontation. He hired six new workers to go directly 
into Dodge Main"s department 229, the Signal Mount, which was 
known as having good jobs mounting radios and searchlights into 
casings. This was seen as a deliberate challenge to an 
earlier seniority agreement under which management had to offer 
new war work to existing employees before it took on new labour. 
There was an immediate walkout, retaliatory firings by Chrysler 
and then sympathy stoppages in all Chrysler~s Detroit plants. 
Earl Reynolds saw Chrysler's action as a deliberate provocation 
_ ..-..... 
------------------------
15. Lichtenstein [1974], 9P fit, 353-4. 
16. P~N, Karch 15 1943. 
17. p~~, April 1 1943. 
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and the QQgg§Lt::!~1[L!~§~a headl i ne was II Treason ". Reynol ds condemned 
management and the attack on the strikers by Leo Lamotte~ the ex-
PlYmouth plant worker who was the UAW's Chrysler Department 
Direc:tor; c:oming from Frankensteen's home base, Reynolds deeply 
resented LaMotte's c:harge of "Reutherism': 
It is unfortunate that Mr Weckler (Chrysler General Manager) was able to bring to his 
assistance in his efforts at union disruption, certain union officials who chose to ignore the 
union issues involved ••• I brand the charge that this dispute was caused by followers of Walter 
Reuther as an unlitigated lie. I have never been a follower of Reuther. This dispute was 
caused by Chrysler Managelent and by no-one else. LaMotte tried to lake a poli tic'al football 
out of our difficulties ••• We want to sit down and negotiate latters, but if the Dodge 
~anage.ent want us to get things the 'hard way', 'getting things the hard way' will be the 
policy of Dodge Local 3.19 
The ' ' t' 1 n1 1 al walkout, and the support it got, r'ef I ec:ted the 
strength of Dodge Main's • do-i t-yoursel f ;' pr-ob I em-sol vi ng 
tradition and the c:ontentiousness of the seniority issue in a 
Complex where 90% of the workforc:e had just been moved to new 
departments or other plants and where there were wide divergences 
in the type of work and rates of pay. 
Stewards at the other old AIWA stronghold~ ' Loc:al 7~ the 
Jefferson-Kerc:heval Avenue plant and several smaller and newer 
Plants where the CP had little influence c:alled solidarity strike 
19 
action. This Detroit-wide industrial ac:tion by 27,100 worker s 
COincided with War Labour Board hearings into the state of 
.- ......... -
-----------------------
lB. P~M, June 1, June 15 1943. 
19. Lichtenstein (1974), QR £It, 353-356. 
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Collective bargaining at Chrysler, set up following a break-down 
in negotiations on a new contract. LaMotte did not believe it was 
a cOincidence and neither, of course, did Chrysler - who were 
certain the strike was an attempt to influence the War Labor 
Board to establish an impartial umpire system. They quoted Ed 
Carey. the Local 7 president, as saying, "I have been asked what 
20 
it is the men want. The men request an impartial arbit~ator." 
In 1940 8M had introduced an umpire as the final stage of a 
21 
centralized grievance procedure in a move advocated by Reuther; 
Ford had done the same in its first contract in 1941 . Reuther 
reCognized . the double benefits accruing from the system: on the 
One hand an external restraint on arbitrary management to adhere 
to a standard set of workplace rules; on the other, a mechanism 
to create an appearance of judicial "fairness" that would help 
channel rank and file anger away from the potentially dangerous 
Conflicts he saw as a threat to the survival of the union. 
After the Communist Party line changed in mid-1941 to all-
out support for the war, this view of the importance of a rigid 
grievance procedure ultimately legitimated by an "outside' 
---------------------------
20. 
Lichtenstein [1982], Q~ £tt, 54. 
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umpire holding the power of redress~ became common to all 
factions of the UAW ' s IEB. For the same reasons~ the WLB 
22 
composed of New Deal interventionists also encouraged the 
erection of 8M-type appeal ~tructures. It saw them as a means of 
persuading workers against taking immediate action by holding out 
the promise of an impartial enquiry by an · outsider". 
The incorporative aspects of the umpire procedures can, 
hOwever , be e>:aggerated. This is because they are often 
COnsidered separately from their context: some resulted from 
management, international union or WLB pressure; but on other 
occaSions procedural changes were only conceded after struggles 
The ' defusing " consequences of a ' struggled-
for " umpire system were not necessarily identical to those where 
LIInpi re system was delivered as part of management " s labour 
relations strategy. With two top managers and two UAW IEB 
members sitting on its existing final appeal board, Chrysler 
VieWed " independent" umpire systems as a get-out for the UAW to 
aVoid di s ciplining workers who broke the No Strike Pledge and the 
UAW- Chrysler contract. lt~ and most other wartime managements, 
saw the 'outside" umpire system as a threat to managerial 
---.. -
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22. ' b L!.~, 51-3. 
"')"';t' • ~~. t~!.~, 179, writes: "Despite its concrete advantages and hopeful potentiality, the grievance 
prOcedure worked to defuse union power and legitilate lanagerial authority." As a description of the 
;ffect of the ulpire systel over a period of 20 years this is fair cOllent, but it could not be said 
o have had such a dralatic effect on Chrysler labour relations in its first few years. 
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24 
prer"ogati'les. 
Management defeat 
The strike action by other plants was a direct expression of 
SOlidarity and a bargaining mechanism through which both local 
officers and certain international officers let the WLB know 
what was on their mind. Frankensteen's links with Dodge Main and 
R J Thomas' connections with the Jefferson plant may well have 
had mare bearing on this action than has yet come to light. As it 
an umpire system did indeed turn out to be one of the 
outcomes of the strike. On August 27 1943 Directive Order No 
~~9~S()CS-D issued by the National War Labor Board extending the 
grievance procedure at Chrysler to include an impartial chairman 
at the final UAW-Chrysler appeal stage. BL\t two other outcomes 
proved more significant in the shorter-term: those fired for 
leading the walkout from the Signal Mount were reinstated; and 
renewed transferring workers into Department 229 in 
25 
aCCordance with the transfer agreement. 
The May 1943 confrontation ended in a fairly decisive 
management defeat. This was not a political ant i -If Jar 
militancy; nor was it the "balkani zation" of Chrysler plants into 
"--
-------------------------
24. t~t~, 20. Chrysler held the dOljnant lanagelent vieN described by Harris, Q2 £tt, 51-52, that 
the NNlB was an intrusion and should confine 'recognition of the union's institutional existence and 
legitilacy to an absolute linilul.' 
25. ~~~, June 15 1943. 
229 
competing sections. The QQ~gg ~~iQ ~g~§ carried the Stars and 
Stripes and the slogan - "Give it your best!". Reynolds summed 
up Dodge Main's politics when he wrote~ "ThE? only faction we 
propose to tolerate in our Local Union is a faction that stands 
27 
for' good~ sound American unionism." Chrysler was brought to a 
halt by "sound "'meriean unionism" wit.h the organizational base to 
defend restraints over the movement of labour and manning and 
production levels. And Dodge workers continued to do so: in 
September the 600 workers on day and afternoon shifts in the gun 
Plant walked out when a steward was disciplined for refusing to 
move from one machine to another; in December, 150 day shift 
machine operators in the Gyro compass department, some 60% of the 
total, quit work 90 minutes early to protest the delay in getting 
28 
a WLB hearing on a disputed job classification. lI-Jhen the Gyro 
Workers actually got the WLB directive it was in Chrysler"s 
favour. This also provoked a strike and the inevitable management 
denunciation: "This is.a strike against the government and the 
29 
War effort." But for the workers the reality was quite 
---------------------------
26. Glaberlan is wrong to argue that all the wartile wildcats were "political" because they defied 
the No Strike Pledge and ailed to influence the governlent, 92 f1!, 128; but equally, lichtenstein 
[~9831, is wrong to argue "these job actions lacked the overall union-building context that had 
glven prewar strikes of this sort a lore consistently progressive character"; ~~ £!~, 297. The 
~irtile strikes, like those prewar, occurred on issues dictated by lanagelent, and silultaneously 
lncluded and could reflect both class-wide !~q fractional reactions. 
27. P~N, June 15 1943. 
2B. q!tt~tt ~!~!, Septelber 16, Decelber 15 1943. 
29. 
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different: for them it was a strike about work rules - how much 
a job would pay, who would work it and how the decisions were 
taken. These issues became even more important for the 
management as the end of the war approached. 
The significance of the Gyro strike at Dodge Main and the 
1944 strike wave in the auto industry should not be 
Underestimated. There is little evidence that the WLB's umpire 
system and national grievance procedure encouraged the drift of 
bargaining away from the shop floor during the peak years of 
30 
wartime employment, as it did after the war. Similarly~ neither 
, the No Strike Pledge nor disciplinary efforts by the international 
to impose external regulation of job behaviour appear to have had 
mUch impact on the tradition of internal job regulation and local 
union autonomy at Chrysler. 
---
------------------------
3(1. Certainly, what Lichtenstein £1982] describes as ·the bureaucratic ilperative·, Q2 ~tt, 178-
202, was only rarely visible at Chrysler, and when it was it was not particularly intilidating. 
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III. End of the War 
In 1944 Chrysler began planning for the post-war period. Highly 
conscious of the 'drift" in production rates and workplace 
diSCipline that had occurred since 1941, management initiated a 
new labour relations strategy: plant managers were instructed not 
to negotiate with strikers - a policy they could not always 
operate, particularly in those plants increasingly hostile to the 
31 
No Strike Pledge. Managers were also told 
standards and manning levels to pre-war levels. 
to restore work 
In May 1944, the stewards' council at the Dodge Truck plant 
in Warren decided to ban overtime to prevent management from 
bUilding up "a bank that will be detrim~ntal to the ma npower 
Set-ups in the various departments on civilian production". In 
OCtOber this issue flared into a strike when management made 
OVertime compulsory for repairmen, and tried to use the resulting 
strike to reintroduce civilian production standards. An exchange 
between Mr Anderson, the Labor Rel~tions Supervisor~ and the 
Plant shop committee led by Arthur Hughes~ Local 140 president 
---------------------------
31. S ee Arthur Hughes, NSU, 20-22. 
32. Arthur Hughes Collection, WRl, Box 2/20. Hinutes of Joint Heeting of local 140 Organizing 
COllittee and Stewards' Council, Hay 11 1944. 
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and secretary of the UAW's "Rank and Fi I e Caucus :' IfJh i ch 
Campaigned against the No Strike Pledge~ illustrates the gap 
between the two sides: 
~~~~t!~~: Before returning to work we lust have an agreelent that when returning to Nork our 
elployees will produce at the production rates and the quality standards laintained on both 
Civilian and ArlY Production prior to 100l ArlY work. 
tl~q~~!: They could not go along on an agreelent of this kind because conditions are not the 
sale as pre-war... If it requires two elployees to perforl a certain operation on arlY 
vehicles, it should certainly require at least the sale nUlber of elployees to perforl the 
sale operation on civilian trucks.33 
The transition from army to civilian production at Dodge Truck 
did nat involve a transformation in the plant lay-aut or a 
diff erent kind of work. So the pressure exerted by its 
management was primarily on manning levels. 
At Dodge Main~ where wartime production was characterized by 
i nd i vi dUed bench assembly and machining IfJor k ~ the new 
manager· i al control strategy had twa aims. First~ to speed up 
prclducti on and eliminate t.he wartime pr-c.~ctice of wor ker-s 
producing at what they considered a "fair" rate while a disputed 
standard went through the grievance procedure. And second~ 
- ---. 
33. 
34. 
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Arthur Hughes Collection, WRL, Box 2/17. Plant shop cOllittee Minutes, October 11 1944. 
~~tt~tt ~~~!, February 27 1945. Dodge Main's facilities in 1944 were allocated as follows: 
Production of engines for light and 
heavy trucks, tank translissions 
X 
and rocket shells: 68 
Manufacture of parts for aircraft: 22 
Manufacture of Navy bofors anti-
aircraft guns: to 
tOOl 
to 
Overhaul the plant's facilities as early as possible to prepare 
for the reintroduction of automobil e production. Early in 1945, 
as demand for war production began to slow down, Chrysler made a 
third wartime bid to reassert managerial autonomy. What happened 
is Worth considering in some detail since the dense steward 
network at Dodge Main, the supportive role of the local"s 
OffiCials and their relative independence from the international, 
and the struggl e"s outcome - the confirmation of m~tuality 
Would epitomize Chrysler"s industrial relations over the next 
ten year-so 
Ultimatum 
On February 7 19~5 management issued a new work standard to 
the oil pump gear cutters working in the 8-29 bomber engine parts 
It based on a new time 
36 
inc:luded a "Non-Production Time Schedule": 
Personal use 
Unavoidable delay 
Fatigue 
Tooling up 
Per B hour shift: 
---------------------------
Of working day 
III (Iins) 
3 14 
3 14 
5 24 
9 43 
20 99 
study method 
35. This Mas the interpretation of .anage.ent's actions given by Hike Novak, Local 3 President, 
P!!r91! ~!~?, February 24 1945: 'The lanage.ent wants to transfer the 8-29 bo.ber parts Mork to the 
DOdge plant in Chicago. The Corporation Mants to use the space here in preparation for civilian 
autolobile production." 
3b. 
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that 
The time study showed an automatic machine was capable of 
prOducing 225 parts a day. So~ taking the 20% non-productive time 
the workers were set a daily rate of 184 over the full eight 
hour shift. This was a dramatic increase, since the workers had 
begun turning out the job at 108 per day and when the new time 
stUdy came out were completing an average of 150. The 
stewards in the 1~100-strong 8-29 department advised the men to 
igno~e the new production standard and filed a grievance. Two 
days later the seven machinists were given a three-day suspension 
for not working to the new standard~ and the whole Unit 234 
workforce stayed away with them. The grievance was rejected at 
stage one on February 10 by their superintendent and at the 
37 
seCond stage on February 21 by the Labor Relations Supervisor. 
The following morning at 9.30 am, without waiting for the 
third stage involving an international UAW officer, the 
SUperVision sacked the seven machinists and a stock handler for 
"1 oafing, insubordination and refusing to keep up production". 
The machinists had refused to report their previous day ' s 
prOduction, and the stock handler had refused 'to count it and 
report on them. One of the gear cutters was Earl C York, the 47-
year-old Unit 234 chairman and World War 1 veteran who had worked 
DOdge Main for 12 years and had a son in the army in Belgium. 
All 743 workers on the dayshift immediately walked out, many 
----
-----------------------
37. 
passing through other parts of the complex to let the stewards 
there know what had happened. By midday another 725 workers from 
other departments had also stopped. Pickets then appeared on the 
main gates and all but 550 of the 3,450 on the afternoon shift 
stayed out.. By the following morning only 500 out. of 9,400, 
mostly maintenance and a few tool and die workers, crossed the 
Pickets. Cr-ucially, only 18 of the 100 Dodge Main-based inter-
pl.:int. drivers who t.ransferred parts and equipme~t between 
Chrysler's 13 Detroit area plants~ reported for work on Friday_ 
And one of t.hese was beaten up by two of the striking truckers 
after completing his shift. By Saturday afternoon just seven out 
of 54 interplant drivers reported and all Chrysler's Detroit 
Plants began to grind to a halt. On Sunday a Local 3 membership 
meeting voted to complete the stoppage by calling out all t.he 
38 
maintenance workers still working. 
The UAW's intervention followed a classic pattern. Chrysler 
immediately contacted the international~ complaining of war 
sabot.age: "Those who are leading this strike are apparently 
deliberately trying to sabotage the war effort because some of 
t~eir members were disciplined for refusing to do their war 
:$9 
\.>Jclrk. " H J Thomas was in Lcmdon, so acting-president George 
Addes instructed the strikers to return within hours of the 
strike starting: 
---
------------------------
38. 
39. 
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You are hereby ordered by the International Executive Board of the UAW-CIO to return to work. 
The strike is unauthorized and is a violation of the union's constitution and no-strike 
pledge. Failure to co.ply with this order will necessitate i.mediate action by the 
International Executive Board.40 
The Local 3 Executive Board only got invol ved formally in the 
strike that afternoon, when a special EB meeting was held to 
discuss the Department 234 strike. But their recommendations to 
the special business meeting of the strikers convened afterwards 
make it clear t hey were fully in support of the action. Their 
advice to the strikers was: 
1. Stay out long enough to force the ArlY to take over Departlent 234. 
2. Deland a Congress investigation of Chrysler. 
3. Cal} for the dislissal of the three Departlent 234 supervisors involved.41 
This support from the centre- right Dodge local leadership 
reflected its opposition to Chrysler's new time study methods and 
their d f f e ence 0 the status quo custom and practice that had 
develop~_ d Ol~ war ' obs 
, I I J , . Mike Novak had just been re-elected for a 
SeCond term. A second generation Pole whose defeat of Reynolds in 
19' 44 reflected the growing involvement of Hamtramck's Polish 
Community in running Local 3~ h e was the first Dodge president 
42 
Without a background in the Coughlinite AIWA. A strong anti-
Communist, he was closer to Reuther's qualified support for the No 
Strike Pledge in 1944 than to the militant anti-pledge Rank 
and File Caucus initiated by Trotskyists. 
---------------------------
40. 
41. local 3 Collection, Box 3; Business Heeting Hinutes, February 23 1945. 
42. Friedlander, q2 ~lt, 127. 
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The strike occurred a week after the UAW's No Strike Pledge 
referendum - and was possibly precipitated by Chrysler's forecast 
of a two to one vote for its retention. But in February the result 
Was still not known and~ as it turned out~ it was very close in 
4::::; 
Detroit. With his own re-election just accomplished and 
interpreting the situation as a kind of policy interregnum while 
the referendum votes were counted~ Novak didn"t he~itate. 
threw himself entirely behind the strike: 
We strike because Me can't relax our principles. We've got to keep thel as high as they Mere 
just before the Mar, so veterans can cOle baCk to good Morking conditions. 
Service.en are fighting against Mhat Me're fighting against. We are against speed-ups. 
We are against racial discrilination. We are against abuse of for.er service.en. We are 
against IOMering of our Morking conditions.44 
He 
Aft"-'r th th f ~ more an ' ree years 0 war, patriotism and collective 
restraints over arbitrary management had become fused in the 
Workplace consciousness of both the "new" war workers and of many 
UAW secondary leaders. 
Generalization 
In another plant the dispute could possibly have been 
Contained among a small group of gear cutters. But at Dodge Main 
it generalized to a struggle elver' a key "principle": the dismissiid 
Of workers and stewards for refusing to work to what York called 
---------------------------
43. Glaberlan, ~ £tt, 116-119. About 25% of the UAW's le.bership participated in the postal vote 
and Mhile the vote Mas 178,824 against rescinding the pledge and 97,620 in favour, in the Detroit 
.etropolitan area the voting Mas .uch closer: 54! against and 46% for. 
44. 
an "unreasonabl e" producti on standcird whi 1 e it was bei ng taken 
through the grievance procedure. Secondary issues were workers ' 
rights to negotiate with the company and the War Labor Board 
while on strike. The generalization took place despite directives 
to return from the international and the Regional War Labor Board 
because the strength of the "do-it-yourself" union tradition 
meant the striking workers spread the action and set up picket 
lines themselves; and because this tradition had also constructed 
an organization and organizers in its own image. 
The strike lasted 11 days. It was Chrysler"s longest wartime 
Wildcat. Dodge Truck and Chrysler's Highland Park plants were 
clOsed through lack of materials~ while I~050 were laid off at 
Chrysler's Windsor plant and the Tank Arsenal. On March 1 the 
stoppage spread to the Chrysler De Soto-Warren plant where the 
Workers stopped in protest against the use of the railroads to 
transport critically-needed items usually carried by the striking 
DOdge interplant truck drivers. Nearly 19,000 Chrysler workers 
were on strike and another 5~250 were laid off. And on thf-2 same 
day~ in another wildcat strike~ 11 Detroit Briggs plants voted to 
strike or were closed down by pickets from the Briggs Mack 
Avenue plant in protest against the firing of a committeeman and 
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six shop stewards on February 27. By the time the Dodge 
strikers finally went back the Q§tCQit_Iim@§ reported as accurate 
the opinion of most UAW IEB members that "Every current strike in 
46 
Detroi twas i nspi red by the Dodge wal kOLlt. II 
The Dodge strike impressed other workers because of its size 
and strength. But it inspired them because of its success. The 
Dodge workers openly defied the management, the Regional War 
4"7 
/ 
Labour- Board and the threat of being drafted. They i gnor-ed 
Patriotic bluster from the Under Secretary of War and forced a 
SPeCial meeting of the National War Labour Board to be held in 
WaShington while they were still out on strike. This agreed to a 
sPec: ial enquiry into the dismissals and the 184 production rate. 
Three weeks later it found that the men should be reinstated but 
48 
that they should produce 184 parts a day. Thus while the 
management did eventually get its speed-up, it was only after 
·dUe process' had been adhered to - including the entry into the 
Plant of time study experts approved by the UAW. And the workers' 
---------------------------
45. QgtrQ!t !!!~~, Karch 3 1945; Q@![Qit ~@~~, Karch 2 1945. 
46. g~![g!! !!!~~, Karch 5 1945. 
47. ~!tt~tt ~!~~, Karch 1 1945, qUDted Dne Detroit Draft Board chairlan as saying, 'It was the 
policy of his Board to go through there 2-B (deferlent classification! lists whenever a war plant 
strike Dccurred and to contact the cOlpany involved to see if the lanagelent wished to withdraw its 
request for deferlent for elployees within jurisdiction of the board ••• This was now being done by 
these boards in the Dodge dispute.' 
48. 
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resistance to management"s reassertion of YQi!~~g~~! rate- fixing 
Was effectively condoned. 
The NWLB was not alone in feeling impotent before this 
Strike. The workers and the Local 3 officers also got away with 
rank defiance of the IEB. After their original instruction to 
return to work was ignored, the dominant pro-No Strike Pledge 
faction on the IEB worked full out to bully the Dodge 
baCk t I o wor t~ . The CP was beside itself with rage, accusing the 
DOdge workers varioLlsly of being "enE~my agents", "followers of 
Reuther" and "reactionaries" playing into the hands of anti - labour 
elements. A Q~!!y WQ~t~~ editorial stated: 
The strike of 14,000 at Detroit's Dodge plant which now threatens to shut dOMn the entire 
Chrysler chain of plants is absolutely indefensible ••• Only Nazi Serlany and Tokyo can profit 
by its results ••• The responsibility lust be fixed whether it is frol labour or lanagelent. If 
it should be proven that not enelY agents, but folloMers of Reuther incited the Malkout, the 
effect is none the less serious in terls of lives of our fighting len. 
Responsible labour and governlent leaders should step in and act. If drastic leasures are 
not taken, lore of such strikes Mill be encouraged and reactionaries Mill exploit thel to pass 
lore anti-labour bills.49 
the publication of the 
Detroit and Wayne County AFL was ~ven more pointed: 
Hitler's helpers do it again: The Dodge strikers, Mho are dodging their obligation to the 
Arled Forces - not bullets - have again run out on the Mar ••• 
Adolph shouldn ' t Morry. His little helpers in Alerica Mill take care of hil.50 
UAW acting-president Addes chaired one Dodge strike meeting and 
ran straight into the hostility engendered by the Cpos attack on 
---
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49. ~!1r9i! b!~9r ~!!!, Harch 2 1945. 
50. q!tt~ ~~t~~t, February 27 1945. Keeran, ~~ £tl, 226-7, suggests the result of the CP's Martile 
~ro-Mar policy Mere 'Iarginal rather thandecisive" in terls of CP influence in the UAII. This viell 
1S clearly not supported by the evidence at Dodge Hain. 
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After he, Reuther, and Frankensteen had spoken, all 
Urging a return to work, he opened the meeting to contributions 
from the floor and called a known " leftist'. As a I'"esul t, 
There were cries of "It's a frale-up!" "They've lade a deal with the COllunists." 'Don't let 
thel seli us out!· Several fist fights broke out on the floor, and the word went down the line 
to prevent "this deal with the COllies" by voting to stay out.Sl 
Novak, who had previously come to an agreement with Addes that he 
WOuld support the call to return, was swayed by the anger of the 
meeting to speak against. Addes himself then left the meeting in 
a fury sayi ng he had ""'Jashed hi s hands of the local" . It "'Jas 
Reuther who finally fixed up the deal to which the WLB and 
ChrYsler agreed~ and he and Frankensteen who met the National War 
Labour Board in Washington. 
In May 1944 when Local 490 officers had supported a wildcat 
Btrike at the Chrysler Highland Park plant~ the International put 
the local under trusteeship for three months. But the offending 
preSident, an old Socialist Party member, Bill Jenkins, and hi, s 
52 
entire slate were re-elected in July. That experience taught the 
IE=~B to be wary at Dodge eight months later. It was still 
Frankensteen"s home local, but Reuther"s unholy alliance of anti-
communist socialists and anti-communist Catholics had helped him 
bUild a base there, too. So despite Novak "s open defiance, 
-.. -.-
------------------------
52. Glaberlan, Q~ ~~t, 101-103. Lichtenstein [1982], Q2 ~~t, 193, also reports the ilposition of 
Leo Lallotte as adlinistrator of Local 490, but he hils to cOllent on the re-election of the 
previous inculbent. 
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no 
action was taken against him or any of Local 3'5 officers: they 
were merely reprimanded. Chrysler management had effectively 
lost this one, too. If it could not count on the UAW disciplining 
its members in wartime, what could it expect in peacetime? A 
Chrysler consultant speculated wildly in public: 
As industrial tur.oil increases, lore and .ore people will see the evils of collective 
bargaining and we should look to the ti.e all federal labour laws are repealed. 
I conde.n collective bargaining as an evil thing which is against public interest and 
which will increase poverty.54 
BrUised b th " tl" " Y : elr war . me experlences, Chrysler executives still 
reacted as if they could simply eliminate shop floor union 
organization. The consultant·s speech was no accident: it 
cOincided with the formation of a coalition of anti-union 
managements led by Chrysler's chairman~ B E Hutchinson~ aimed iat 
stclPpi ng the accommodationist (to unionism) tendency being 
promoted by the US Chamber of Commerce. 
In Chrysler's plants, where supervisors faced union stewards 
every day, it was a different story. There~ a tradition of 
compromise and accommodation by mutual agreement had taken hold. 
F"ar from "additional . c")uthority" being removed from lithe local 
55 
union and t.he rank and file" during the war~ the opposite 
---
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53. P!![Q!! 1!!!~, Karch 9 1945. 
5~. ~!it~tt It~!~, Harch 4 1945; speech by John W Scoville, an econo.ic consultant to the Detroit 
K~wani club. Chrysler naturally denied his speech reflected corporate policy, although as Harris, ~~ 
fA!, 110-111, shoMs, the speech which Mas reproduced as a palphlet Mas actually part of a calpaign 
against the 'Charter' for post-war industrial relations signed by the US Chalber of Co •• erce, the 
AFL and the CIO. 
t:"o:::-
o..J-..I. Lichtenstein [19823, ~~ £tt, 202. 
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appears to have been the case: the limits of workplace legitimacy 
were extended. It was to be at least another ten years before 
Chrysler management developed both an effective labour relations 
strategy and the organizational capacity and front-line 
SUpervision to execute it. Only in the late 19505 did Dodge Main 
management finally remove many of the restraints en its authority 
that dated from the war years. 
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CHAPTER 10 
UNIONISM, SOLIDARITY AND MILITANCY 
1946-1955 
ChrYsler slipped from second to third in the US auto league in 
post - war decade. These boom years allowed its iautocr at i <: 
stYle of management to survive acute problems. Its ,rigid 
management "empires', united only by an all-powerful emperor, 
meant Chrysler lacked the flexibility and sophistication to 
relate to new consumer tastes. Chrysler's share of an expanding 
market fell. 
Within 20 months of the end of the war the political 
environment turned from being supportive of union organization to 
being markedly hostile. The Taft-Hartley Act and the unleashing 
Of the House Un-American Activities Committee helped bring 
major changes in how American workers viewed their 
COllective organizations. So did the victory of the Reuther 
, 
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faction in the UAW. By 1949 Reuther had effectively destroyed 
1 
.the UAW democratic tradition. These were reflections of a wider 
defeat for the independent representation of workers' interests. 
But the extent of the defeat in different industries and 
companies depended upon the contours of workplace legitimacy. 
At Chrysler, the shift in the wider balance of force s 
be~ween employers and workers had little immediate impact. The 
lOcal union tradition was more resilient than in 8M; the 
weakness of the CP at Dodge Main meant it was less of a target 
than was Ford's River Rouge plant; and Chrysler management failed 
to undertake the structural reorganization imposed by Henry Ford 
such that within six days of his becoming president in 1945~ 
the labour relations staff function was upgraded to a Labour 
Relations Department. Chrysler continued to manage resistance 
With combination of top-level autocratic intransigency and 
---------------------------
1.. Harquart, ~ C;.!J, 139, an old ti.e SP .eaber IIrites: "Follolling Walter Reuther's co.plete 
Victory in 1947, the UAW's de.ocratic kind of factionalist lias rapidly transforled into a one-party 
state, and the Reuther ad.inistration lIorked hand-in-hand lIith lanagelent to discipline lIorkers." In 
SUpport of his argulent he quotes a statetent lade by Beorge Lyons, the Education Director of Local 
174, a less controversial source, 119: "1'1 the education director of Walter Reuther's ho.e local 
and I'. glad the Reuther group nOli controls the UAW. Yet I don't think it good when one group 
dOli nates the union ••• We no longer have the kind of delocracy lie once had. Our delocraey is 
becoling lore and .ore controlled ••• that's IIhat lIe've got - controlled delocracy." Even the sotellhat 
apologetic 1949 offering frol Irving Howe and B J Widick, Q2 fA!, detected potential proble.s, 263-
4: "What is .ost disturbing about the curr.ent situation in the UAW and IIhat constitutes the greatest 
Possible source of bureaucratic .alfortation is that, for the first tite in the union's history, 
t~ere is no significant opposition to the leadership ••• The deloeracy of the UAW of 1935-36 is not 
likely to reappear in the UAW of the eo.ing few years." 
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lOW-level managerial discretion. It was only in the mid- and 
l a te 19505 that a dramatic worsening of Chrysler's market 
SitUation forced a change in management structure and then a 
major reassertion of managerial power. 
Chc~pter· 10 is concerned with the complex of pressures 
Shaping Chrysler labour relations in the post - war period: 
management ideology and structure, market forces, the local union 
tradition and international union politics. Section one focuses 
on the ways in which management style provided opportunities for 
Continued worker resistance. Section two argues that Chrysler 
workers were able to seize the opportunities provided because 
their tradition of sectional bargaining was largely independent 
O·f international union pressure. Section three e:·: ami nes 
deVelopments after 1950 as management developed a more consistent 
labour relations strategy of trying to force key local UAW 
officers to acknowledge the validity of the external regulation 
elf ~jor· kp I ace behavi or vi a the i ncreasi ngl y detai 1 ed neat i anal 
--..... 
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2. 0 E Wi 11 i alson, tt!t~~t~ !nq Ht~t!t&~i!H en!l'l~i~ !nq enUttl!~t l~li~1tiQn~, (Nell York: The 
Free Press, 1975), 135, suggests stresses on the unitary fori of lanagelent structure can provide 
• opportunities for discretion ••• deliberate distortion will be introduced into the hierarchical 
infor.ation exchange process in support of subgoals. Perlissive attitudes towards slack lay also 
~evelop." The book argues that under certain conditions neither product larket co.petition nor the 
Intervention of stockholders in the capital larket will autolatically correct the "discretionary 
outco.es· which can arise: "If, however, the firls in question enjoy sale degree of lonopoly in 
their respective larkets and if, realistically, stockholders have insufficient knowledge or are 
otherWise indisposed to effect lanagelent displacelent ••• a lanagerial discretion proble. plainly 
eXists. • 
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I. Managerial crisis 
ran Chrysler from 1935 to 1956 as a classic 
Central. i zed, management autocracy. He dabbled in virtually 
eVerythi.ng~ from insisting that only initials were used in the 
company directory to preventing the styling department from 
fOllowing the 1950s trend of cars with low rooflines - "We build 
cars to sit in, not piss over-II w .. ~s just one of his styling 
-:r 
~, 
instructions. The weakness inherent in this managerial style was 
compounded , parado>:ically, by Chrysler"s immediate post-war 
SUccess. The explosion of demand for cars that followed World War 
Two allowed Chrysler to sell virtually all th~ cars it could turn 
and by making only a few facility , changes, such as moving 
most of the work in the Dodge wire room from benches onto a 
mOVing conveyor, keller found he could outproduce Ford each year 
4 
from 1946 to 1949. This increase in production - from 540,000 
passenger cars in 1946 to 1,120,000 in 1949, shown in Figure 5 
(see following page) - took Chrysler to a peak some 2 0% higher 
than the 940,000 pre-war heights of 1937 and 1940. Bu't:, thi s 
SI-II:cess exposed Chrysler"s managerial weakness: what was 
essentially the same management structure was managing 95,000 
- ..... ..... 
------------------------
-.,. 
~' . Stuart, q2 ~tt, 50-57; Michael Moritz and Barrett Sealan, ~qt~q tqt ~tq~!t t~! ~~tY~l!t ~tqty 
(NeM York: Doubleday, 19S1J, 47-52. 
4. Stuart, q2 ~tt, 55, points to Ford; s $2 bi Ilion investaent on plant lodernization ~nd c~p~ci ty 
:xpansion betMeen 1946 and 1950 while Chrysler invested as little as possible; N~lezty interview; 
ard ' s Autolotive Yearbook, j~2~' 79. ' 
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employees in 1949~ spread out over more plants and including tank 
production and engineers working on the atomic bomb and missile 
while in 1940 it had only organized 68~000. This 
rapid growth led Chlrysler to e>:hibit sympt.oms of "control 1055 11 
in its financial and employment. policies. 
Control loss 
A signific:ant area of "control loss" was dividend ,and 
investment policy. Walter Chrysler's financial right-hand man 
from 1920 had been B E Hutchinson~ and the tradition of non-
interference in "hi s" department "'Jas car"ri ed on after Chrysl er'~:. 
death in 1940. Hutchinson viewed profits as primarily the 
6 
disposable income of executives and shareholders~ and he 
operated a consistently high dividend policy. Table 9 shows how 
he heralded the onset of a declining market share in the early 
1950s by doubling the distribution of dividerid payments: 
5. lIillialson, QQ ~tt, 126. 
6. stuart, QQ ~!t, 52,61. 
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Five 
yearly 
average 
TABl£ 9 
(3YSlER PRODUCTION, IlARKET SHARE AID PROFITABILITY, 
1910-1959 
a 
Passenger Car earket Return on 
car share Sales (car and 
production non-car) 
(lillion5) m m 
Dividends 
per share 
a) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1935-39 .724 23.14 B.36 .75 
1946-49 .B16 22.45 7.96 .82 
1950-54 1.072 19.30 6.7B 1.62 
1955-59 .955 15.81 2.4B .65 
SOURCE: 
NOTE: 
Ward's Autolotive Yearbooks; Chrysler Corporation (1973), QQ ~i!. 
a. Before tax operating largin as a percentage of net sales. 
Hutchinson strongly resisted the reinvestment of 'his" profits in 
new plant and equipment and as dividends soared~ Chrysler stock 
became increasingly popular. The number of shareholders rose from 
7 
54,378 to 89,307 between 1946 and 1954, but Chrysler "s front -
line s upervision found itself increasingly reliant upon older 
machines and facilities. 
A second area of "contr'ol loss" was in labour productivity. 
Chrysler's "right to manage' was exercised under restraints 
maintained by the repeated use of the "right to strike". The 
8 
crude productivity index shown in Figure 6 (on next page) and in 
7 . Chrysler Corporation (1973), ~Q. ~~.t, 51. 
8. It is a crude index because it includes all lanual Morkers elployed by the 'Big Three', not 
.erely those involved in passenger car production. This distorts the absolute value of the car 
output per Morker figures, but although there Mere changes over tile in car design which also 
affected productivity, the index does give a rough guide to changes over tile and the cOlparative 
perfor.ance of the .ajor lanufacturers. 
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GRAPH 6: INDEX OF PASSENGER CAR OUTPUT PER MANUAL EMPLOYEE, 1946-80 
Table 10 of passenger car output per "Big Three " manual worker, 
point to substantial differences between Chrysler, 8M. and Ford in 
the 1950s: 
TABlE 10 
pASSEJIiER CAR OOTPUT PER IWIIAl EIROYEE AT 
CHRYSlER, &It AD FORD, 1946-1959 
Car output per lanual worker 
Average 1946-49 = 100 
Five 
yearly 
average Chrysler General Motors Ford 
1946-49 
1950-54 
1955-59 
100 
103 
89 
100 
129 
146 
100 
155 
186 
SOURCE: Corporation data; Ward's Autolotive Yearbooks. 
GM"s crude output per worker rose in the early 1950s by more than 
and Ford's by over a half above the post-war recovery 
years of 1946-49, while at Chrysler output per worker only held 
its own and then collapsed between 1953 and 1958. 
The output evidence of control loss in employment policy 
i s supported by a comparison of Chrysler and Ford employment 
levels between 1946 and 1954. While Ford and Chrysler annually 
within 100,000 cars of each other from 1946 to i954~ 
their recruitment patterns were very different. Tabl e 11 
compares the change in Chrysler"s annual average employment 
levels with those at Ford: 
.. 
'.C···T 
"::',J"':" 
TABlE 11 
CHANGES IN DlRYSlER AND FORD US EJIPlOYIDT, 1946-1954 
------------------------------------------~--------------------------------------------------------
Year CHRYSLER FORD 
~~!!r.b: ~!l!r.t~4 ~~!!r.tt ~!l!r.t~4 
(OOOs) Ichange (OOOs) Ichange lOOOs} Ichange (0005) Ichange 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1946 59.9 15.7 B2.2 19.3 
1947 b4.9 + B.9 16.0 + 1.7 96.7 +17.6 22.7 +17.6 
194B 65.3 + .6 16.4 + 2.5 106.0 + 9.6 25.B +13.7 
1949 7B.2 +19.7 16.7 + 1.B 100.2 - 6.2 26.3 + 1.9 
---------------------------------------------------.--------------_._-----
1946-49 67.1 16.2 96.3 23.5 
1950 72.B - 6.9 17 .1 + 2.9 112.3 +12.1 29.7 +12.9 
1951 92.6 +27.1 19.2 +12.2 102.1 -10.0 34.9 +17.5 
1952 B2.2 -11.1 21.6 +12.1 101.9 - .2 37.9 + B.6 
1953 103.0 +25.2 24.7 +14.4 133.6 +31.1 44.4 +17.2 
1954 8B.2 -14.3 27.7 +12.3 124.5 - 6.B 53.1 + 9.9 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
a1950-54 87.B +30.B 22.1 +36.2 114.9 +19.3 40.0 +70.2 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SOURCE: Co.pany data. 
NOTE: a.Percentage rise of average 1950-54 over 1946-49. 
Chrysler management used 3 0% mor e hourly-paid workers in the 
first half of the 19505 than in the late 1940s while Ford 
expanded its hourly paid labour force only by 20%. 
The contrast in the recruitment of salaried staff was even 
more dramatic: Ford took on one third more salaried worker s 
between 1946 and 1949~ against a mere 6% recruitment by Chrysler; 
and while Chrysler recruited salaried staff more rapidly in the 
.earl y 1950s~ its overall expansion of these technical~ 
Supervisory~ clerical and managerial workers remained only half 
Ford's. The r-esul t was that whil e Ford recruited more 
Supervisors, engineers, planners and sales staff to alter the 
structure of it s labour force from one salaried worker for every 
4.3 hourly worker s in 1946 to one for every 2.7 by 1954, 
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salaried- to- hourly structure remained virtually 
Unchanged. It employed one salaried worker to 3.8 hourly-paid 
Workers in 1946 and one for every 3 .2 hourly-paid by 1954. In 
1955~ Chrysler ' s historic employment high~ when it employed an 
average 132~668 hourly- paid and 32~059 salaried workers~ the 
9 
ratio returned to one for every 4.1. Not only did Chrysler ' ~ 
management structure not clearly separate policy-forming from 
day-to- day decision-making~ but by comparison with its chief 
rival it was critically short of salaried staff. 
The "sl ack" in the Chl'""ysl EH" manc:-\geri al system meimt manc:,ger"s 
could and did hire new labour to raise overall output rather than 
attempt to rai s e the productivity of the existing labour force. 
Chrys ler had overtaken Ford as the second biggest automobile 
manufacturer to 8M in 1936. In 1950 Keller~ without first 
b ed anci ng the 
10 
costs of resistance against the cos t of 
con cE":ssi on ~ took on the UAW in a 104-day strike over pension 
rights, and Chrysler lost second place. It recovered temporarily 
in 1951 but then permanently took third place from 1952 . By 
comparison with its riva ls~ Chrysler was not only under -managed~ 
but poorly manag e d as well. 
9. The configuration of the Chrysler labour force differed frol 6K's in particular in one further 
Significant respect: its concentration in Detroit. In July 1955, for exalple, 814 of its of its 
total labour force was based in Detroit plants; and in the recently created Autolotive Body Division 
the concentration was even greater - 87.64, cf: UAW Research Departlent Collection, WRl, Box 79. 
1 (I. Harri s, qe £U, 154. 
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Managing management 
The managerial rigidity of the late 19405 and early 19505 
was masked by the substantial profits generated by the high 
production~ low investment policy. Chrysler "s operating margin 
as a percentage of s~les actually averaged a higher figure over 
1949 and 1950 than it had done since the early company expansion 
of 1925-28. But the precipitous decline in Chrysler's share of 
production after 1951~ from 23.1% to 13.1%~ could not be covered 
up. Soon after he was appointed president in 1950~ Colbert 
persuaded Keller to agree to hire management consultants~ 
McKinsey & Company~ 
wrong. 
to undertake a major study of what was going 
The McKinsey report took nearly two years in depth study and 
then proposed major changes in virtually every area of Chrysler's 
management. The existing corporate str~cture with seven totally 
independent vice presidents co-ordinated merely through a twice-
weekly meeting with Keller~ 
wide strategic planning. 
was to be recast to allow corporate-
The influence of the engineering 
department was to be curbed~ allowing car design to be 
modernized. Domestic production was to be decentralized away from 
Detroit and Detroit's labour relations problems. Management was to 
ensure its new plants started to operate in the manner of Ford 
and 8M plants, and was to plan the redrawing of the frontier of 
control in its existing plants to achieve the same goal. r ot 
proposed the const~uction of two new transmission plants, one 
Sizeable stampings plant and three new assembly plants a nd , in 
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1953, the purchase of Briggs Body. Chrysler was also recommended 
1 1 
to follow its competitors overseas. 
Knowing what should be done was not~ however~ the same as 
doing it. Although Chrysler's labour relations strategy did become 
more consistent in the early 19505, this was primarily because 
the disastrous 1950 strike and the 1950 five year contract forced 
the newly-appointed president Colbert to consider the lessons. 
The McKinsey report did not have a major impact on Chrysler's 
management until major changes in top Chrysler personnel were 
completed: Hutchinson retired in 1953, Keller in 1956. This left 
'Tex' Colbert~ the lawyer turned automobile manufacturer~ 
president ~Q~ chairman of Chrysler with sufficient authority to 
implement the new strategy in full. 
11. Horitz and Sea.an, qR ~it, 47, 55; Stuart, qR £it, 61-62. 
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II. Union tradition 
The relatively low number of s up e rvisor s in Chrysler plants~ the 
greater discretion plant and departmental managers had over 
recruitment than their counterparts at 8M and Ford~ and the 
restrictions on new investment encouraged section~l bargaining. 
In this climate the independent union tradition forged in the 
1930s and hardened during wartime flourished. It did so because 
the Chrysler workers' secti onal and departmental union 
organization and relative autonomy within the international UAW 
preserved the legitimacy of the right to strike. 
Steward organization 
Departmental (chief) stewards and sectional (blue button) 
stewards co-existed at Dodge Main throughout the 19405 and 19505. 
In large departments where the steward to worker ratio was very 
high~ like the trim department with perhaps only six chief 
steward s on each shift representing some 4~000 workers~ the blue 
12 
button steward system was much more important than in areas 
Where there was a chief steward for every 30 workers. In these 
big departme nts line stewards s urvived at Dodge Main well after 
the 1950 contract when their role of dues collectors was 
12. ~~~, June 1956; Edith Fox, recently elected to the publicity cOllittee frol the tril 
departlent, Nrites of sOle "40 blue buttons" on the line "a feN years back", 
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dispensed with by the check-off system - some nine years after 
Ford and four years after 8M. The blue buttons played a key 
role as passers on of instructions and information when line or 
department strikes took place. 
Blue button s tewards were also the first tier of negotiators 
with management about production standards. Informal bargaining 
Usually took place at model changes when management hoped to use 
engineering changes to reduce manning levels. The supervisors 
were often caught in a dilemma: if they insisted on formal 
procedures they would have to bring the time study man onto a new 
job within hours of production starting up. Their 'scientific ' 
study would then take place ~~f9~@ the worker had progressed 
aiong the job learning curve. On the other hand~ if they wanted 
to fix manning levels without the assistance of the time study 
they were forced to bargain with the line stewards. 
It ~as a problem that the uncertain eco~omic situation of the 
early 1950s increasingly brought to the attention of the more 
far-sighted members of management. Edie Fox was hired in the 
---------------------------
1:5 . The role of the dues check-o~f in killing the (blue button) steward systel in Ford and G" fro! 
1941 and 1946 .respectively, has been often cOllented on as the strategic love that took the guts out 
of the purpose of being a sectional steward. Since Ford and GK refused to negotiate with sectional 
stewards, after the co.panies collected workers' dues there was very little point left in acting as 
one.Writing in 1951 Irvine, QR £tt, 128, lade a point that was lore applicable to Chrysler in the 
longer-terl. Before the check-off was introduced in the plant he was studying, each steward would 
have to collect between $25 and $250 a lonth, as the steward's constituencies varied frol 15 to 211 
len. "It is obvious," Irvine wrote, "that he has been relieved of an allost constant burden. Yet 
part of that burden WiS to convince the rank and file of the union that it was worth their while to 
pay their dues." , 
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Dodge stock room in June 1948: 
The blue buttons were bargaining all the tile. If there was a grievance they wo~ld either get 
the chief steward or, since you could never find the chief steward, in the interia they'd act 
as steward.14 
Without an effective organization around him or her, a steward who 
took a militant line would be quickly isolated and dismissed. 
Chi e·f stevJards who were aware of this encouraged their blue 
button stewards to take on as much bargaining as the foremen would 
sw.-allow. As late as the 1955 model year boom~ t .he trim unit 
chai ,'-man wrote an arti cl e 'for the Q99.9§ t:!§.\.;to. N§~§ call ed ~ "Ti ps to 
BI ue Button Stewar-ds on Bargai ni ng": 
IDon't be sidetracked ••• 
IKeep the penal elelent out of the picture as luch as possible ••• 
100 not quarrel alongst yourselves ••• 
IHake sure that All Morkers know what the UNION is all about ••• 15 
Its basic rules could have applied equally to chief stewards in 
negotiations with foremen or superintendents. 
But beneath their apparent recognition, the blue button 
steward"s role was changing. In the late 1930s many sections 
regul c.~r· l y elected their blue buttons: they 
representatives of the rank and file. The institutionalization of 
the chief steward system had changed this: blue button elections 
became a rarity in the 19405. They were always appointed by the 
area's chief steward - and they tended to be those who had 
14. Fox i ntervi ew. 
1""" ..J. ~~~, Decelber 11 1954 • 
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16 
Campaigned hardest for the chief steward's election. This 
gradually weakened the representative basis of the system 
especially in th~ 1950s when the internal politics of the plant 
Was dominated by right (green slate) versus left (blue slate) 
factional battles. Workers increasingly accepted management·s 
view that blue buttons were less 'legitimate' than the chief 
stewards, and the flow of grievances upwards via the blue buttons 
SllJwly dried Lip. 
By the mid-1950s the direct involvement of blue button 
stewards in negot i at i C)I1S with their foremen became, 
paradoxically, another factor responsible for their eclipse. The 
Super-seniority and full-time negotiator status of the chief 
steward increasingly became for many the reason for taking on the 
job. From the late 1940s chief stewards started coming to work 
wearing a white shirt and a tie like the foremen; they were only 
ndminally attached to a job and in certain cases management would 
17 
only insist they weren"t caught sleeping too often. When major 
lay-offs began to occur cyclically every two years from 1952 to 
1958, several chief stewards found they were opposed for election 
by workers who they themselves had appointed blue button stewards 
16. Liska interview. 
17. Interview with Robert Jensen, Adlinistrative Assistant to l1arc stepp, UAW Chrysler Vice 
PreSident, April 7 1981: "It was considered so good to be a chief steward then, a lot of thel wore 
white shirts." UAW-Chrysler, ~~q!~t, 6-15: 1949 case of Dodge l1ain Chief Steward Jones discharged 
for sleeping on the job after being disciplined for the sale offence t~t£! previously. Jones had 
clailed "he had sat down for a 10lent until other len working on a lachine loved away so he could 
clean up. While sitting he IOlentarily dozed off.' 
261 
and who had gained their union and negotiating experience in that 
job. Increasingly, they preferred not to risk creating potential 
rival~5, and so simply failed to give out new blue buttons when 
18 
eXisting ones dropped out, were transferred or were laid off. 
The Chrysler chief stewards believed in the union tradition 
19 
but preferred a quiet life. The 180 at Dodge Main through most 
of the 1950s rarely worked. Edith Fox recalled the situation in 
the trim and final assembly: 
Our chief stewards never worked. If they put our chief steward to work we would all stop. It 
was part of an established tradition: it cale right out of the early years.20 
Dodge Ma in stewards were probably quite similar in 
background to a group of 40 Buffalo-based UAW stewards 
21 
interviewed in 1950. The transmission of the local union 
tradition from one generation to the next occurred through the 
blend of old and new stewards: a third had worked for between 
seven and fifteen years before being elected a steward and a 
small core had held office for between seven and twelve years. 
Shop - floor democracy was still very vigorous: half the sample 
were opposed in every election and half of them had been in 
18. Liska interview. 
19. Edith Fox recalled: "By the tile 1 started in the final asselbl your chief steNard had already 
learned not to appear.' 
2(1. Edith Fox interview. Sale skilled chief stewards representing siall departlents would work 
part-tile. 
21. Herbert Irvine, "The UAN-CIO Shop Steward: A consideration of his role as a force for 
delocracy" (KA thesis, University of Buffalo! 1951). 
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office for less than a year. The turnover was considerable 
Perhaps helped by the claim by a quarter of the stewards that 
they held frequent sectional meetings. The level of involvement 
in strikes by the Buffalo sample was probably considerably lower 
than their fellow stewards at the strike-prone Dodge Main~ but it 
was still quite high: over three quarters had personally 
experienced a strike~ and a third of them had actually been on 
strike for between 14 and 19 weeks. Nearly half had been on a 
picket line for a sister local and five had been on a 
demonstration other than a strike meeting. 
Who were the Buffalo stewards? Two were college graduates 
and 68% of the sample had attended high school twice the 
proportion of 39% of the US adult population in 1950. What did 
they think about unions and politics? Four times as many (24) 
believed business was out to break the unions as believed (8) 
22 
that business accepted the unions. And they did not hold 
Significantly different views on Communism than the American 
public as a whole at that time: with only one exception they were 
in favour of barring Communists from holding office. In the 
1950s these stewards~ like those at Dodge Main~ could share the 
national anti - Communist ideology while their plant consciousness 
~~2. Their views sOlewhat qualify Harris' argulent that by 1950 linagelent generally had learned 
to live with the unions; for this Mas not the general experience of these stewards; Harris, 9P fi!, 
Chapter 5. 
23. Irvine, QA £tt, 109-110, 118, 145, J47, J52-3. 
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justified an anti-employer ideology that to the wider world 
represented "CommLtni sm". While anti-Communism made it very 
difficult for radicals to function within the labour movement~ it 
was , not impossible while the right to strike against " unfair" 
management was still seen as legitimate. 
The Right to Strike 
The strength of Dodge Main"s "independence" from company 
dictates and international UAW pressure lay in Chrysler workers" 
belief that it was legitimate for them to respond to management "s 
disregard of workplace-established rules by striking. I~t Gi"1 and 
Ford~ by contrast, although wildcat strikes did occur from time to 
time~ they represented a departure from the norm. The difference 
between Chrysler and the other auto companies did not, however, 
appear in the contract. in the 1937 Chrysler contract, 
striking was ruled out altogether: 
The Union shall not cause or perlit its lelbers to cause, nor Nill any lelber of the Union 
take part in, any sit-dONn or stay-in strike or other stoppage in any of the plants of the 
Corporation during the terl of this Agreelent."24 
Following the strike victory of 1939 the second contr'act. 
acknowl~?dged "authorized" str-ikes, but only after "all the 
bargaining procedure as outlined in this agreement has been 
e>:hausted ~ and in no case until after the negotations have 
continued for at least five days, and not even then unless 
---------------------------
24. UAIi-Chrysl er Contract, Apri 1 b 1937, Clause 4. 
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sancticm€~d by the International Union UAW of Americc:.~." In the 
sL·:th contriac:t.~ signed in May 1950 after the 104 day strike~ the 
'right to st.rike' was once more virtually ruled out. It became an 
offence to stri ke "upon a mc"att.er· on v-Jhich the Appeal Board... has 
26 
power . to rul e". And that. constit.uted virtually everything since 
at Chrysler between 1943 and 1955 the Appeal Board chairman could 
rule on product.ion st.andards where t.he complaint Was t.hat t.he rate 
27 
\o'J a !E", "too fast". 
The const.itutional 'illega l ity' of wildcat.s was clear. Yet 
between 1946 and 1956 Chrysler corporate headquarters recorded 
1,434 un a uthori zed strikes. This large t.otal did not mean that the 
contract provisions were irrelevant. They were available as a 
sanction to be used against strikers. Especially from 1950~ when 
Chrysler management slowly shifted from its total opposition to 
union organization to trying to shape its union environment to its 
Own liking, t.he sanctions led to a growing proportion of wildcats 
ending in the dismissal of t.hose the management decided were 
troublemakers - although management often still conceded the point 
---------------------------
UAW-Chrysler Contract, Novelber 29 1939, 4. 
26. UAW-Chrysler Contract, .Hay 4 1950, 6. 
2'7 . Chrysler-UAN, ~lq~~t Q! M!Rl~~ q~£l~lQ~~ (Detroit: UAN, 1980 edition), 7-1,7-3. Production 
standards were always excluded frol the ulpire's jurisdiction at 6" and Ford. 
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28 
at issue. This made t he leadership aspect of a steward " s job 
much more difficult. Stewards had to find ways of calling strikes 
they couldn " t be disciplined for. Claiming to be doing what 
everyone else was doing was ruled " no defence" as far as a 
29 
steward was concerned by the umpire as early as March 1945 . 
One body-in-white steward, Steve Wisnieski, used to walk beside 
the body line with his hand in a particular position scratching 
the back of his head to give the signal. Another, Mike Kroll, 
always used to make s ure he was in the department office talking 
30 
about some trivial matter when a strike started. Worker s would 
---------------------------
28. In Karch 1952, for exalple, a few weeks after Chrysler fired hlo alleged "Collunists· on what 
the u.pire later decided were insufficient grounds, lanage.ent fired two headliner section workers 
frot the trit depart tent for leading a sectional stoppage of 18 workers against the detanning of the 
section. Forty workers then struck in protest and the cotpany laid off 9,000 workers and fired 22 
tore headliners. Their sacking provoked a Departtent 99 strike - and a week later the cotpany 
partially backed down, reinstating the second group of 22 (there was no way it could train up that 
nutber of headliners rapidly even if it had wanted to fire thel all pertanently). apparently backing 
dOlln on the tanning issue, but leaving the first two workers fired. See ~!![9i! f[!! f[!!!, Karch 25 
1952; P!i!Y ~9[~![ , April 1 1952. 
29 . Chrysler-UAW, qlq!~t, 2~1. Dodge Kain Departtent 171 Chief Steward, Riley, quit early with 
his section when they all defied an instruction not to leave their work to wash-up before finishing. 
He alone was given a one day layoff and when his section walked out in protest he was distissed for 
his part in that. The utpire ruled against hi. on Karch 16 1945: "Riley showed no disposition to use 
the tachinery provided hi. under the Contract. He chose to substitute his own judg.ent as to what to 
do, to' the judg.ent of the Union as set forth in the Contract ••• No latter how good his intention, 
trouble followed. Riley offered hi.self as a subject for discipline by disregarding the orderly 
procedure established under the Contract.· In June 1951, after 06 final assetbly Morkers had Malked 
out on Friday Hay 28, the utpire upheld the discharge on the Konday after of a Dodge Kain asselbly 
line Chief Steward, his alternate and the section's blue button steward. They had Mal ked out after 
being given slocks but not the overalls they de.anded for working in the pits beneath the cars, and 
after the distissals the 10,000 Markers on the afternoon shift refused to cross a picket set up by 
50 of the final asselbly workers; Q!![9i! f[!! fr!!!, Kay 29 1951. The ulpire ruled, Chrysler-UAW, 
Pig!!!, 2-3: "All knew of the coverall dispute, and lust be credited with knowledge of the grievance 
procedure. All lust be credited with knowing of the Union's obligation regarding unauthorized 
strikes, No substantial showing has been lade that they counseled against the strike, its 
enlarge.ent, or its continuance. None of thel faced up to the responsibility which was theirs," 
:,(~) • Li ska i nhrvi ew. 
" 
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often carry out the steward's wishes by going slow, refLlsing to 
work overtime, leaving to wash-up early or sitting-down on the 
job, without the formality of a meeting that could lay the 
steward open to discipline. And, as an extra-legal protection~ 
the foreman would have to know th~t if a steward was fired his 
section and possibly the whole department wOLlld walk aLIt in the 
steward ' s defence, making dismissal a costly procedLlre for the 
Company. The strike weapon was used most regLllarly to limit 
management·s interference with the straight seniority rotas and 
to defend workers disciplined for maintaining 'fair' production 
standards. 
On Wednesday November 30 1949, the Dodge Main paint shop 
Simmons, called back some lower seniority workers while 
older ones were still laid off, saying, "he would not call back 
in 100 men when all he wanted was a dozen or so sanders". The 
resLllt was a 10 am walk-out to a union meeting where the whole 
Paint shop decided to strike. The decision was particLllarly 
difficult because the unemployment benefit of those laid off was 
aLltomatically stopped if a strike broke out. But it was taken -
and soon afterwards Simmons' superiors backed down. 
M ' 
,·,,&:10. headlined the victory: "Attempts to Break 
The QQQg~ 
Seniority 
Smashed. Company backs down in face of militant action". And 
the report ended: "Unionism, Solidarity and Militancy does pay 
26'7 
:::.\1 
off 01. 
A 'fair ' production s tandard was anot~er part of Dodge 
Main 's plant consciousness during the 1940s and early 1950s . What 
this actually meant on the s hop floor 1· c-.::> very difficult to 
reconstruct. Jobs ch anged~ sometimes every year; the technology 
changed~ usuall y more slowly ; and man agement production targets 
c: h anged~ often from wee k to week. But many~ if not most workers 
Worked on job s wh ere it was possible either to get ahead of the 
product ion target or to "double up ' with another worker so as to 
provide extra relief time. As one wor ker wrote of conditions i n 
the body-in-whit e in 1949: 
We ran the job just as Me saN fit and Nor ked 40 Dr 45 linutes each hour. We'd get production 
ahead and then sit dONn to talk or rest or kid around. We never Morked lore than 45 linutes 
out of an hour, and sOletiles, only 35.32 
---------------------------
31 • ~~~, Decelber 10 1949. The following year a carbon-copy incident repeated itself in the tril 
shop at a tile when 18,000 of the 32,000 Dodge "ain workforce Mas laid off. This tile it Mas the neN 
ChrYSler President, L T Colbert, .Mho intervened to instruct 10Mer-level lanagelent to adhere to 
strict departlental seniority as both production and Chrysler ' s larket share looked in good shape 
for a recovery frol the doidruis of 1950. The neN Local 3 preSident, Reuther supporter Art Grudzen, 
interpreted Colbert ' s appointlent and intervention as an indication that Chrysler nON fully endorsed 
the union presence in its plants. He wrote, ~~~, Decelber 23 1950: 'After about 14 years of 
continual struggling, fighting and bickering to lake supervision and lanagelent understand that the 
Dodge Plant was operating under Union conditions, apparently, THE CHRYSLER CORPORATION HAS FINALLY 
ACCEPTED OUR UNION.. The new attitude cale in when Vice President Herlan Weckler went out of the 
labour-relations picture in Chrysler ••• The efforts of one Ian in Chrysler lanagelent has had a 
prOfound effect in bringing about this neN era. That Ian is Ted Colbert, foraer President of Dodge 
and nOM President of Chrysler Corporation. " This eulogy for Colbert reflected Reuther's appreciation 
of Colbert's agreelent in Decelber 1950 to redraw the bitterly-contested Kay 1950 contract in the 
light of the neN five year contracts signed at GK and Ford. And it drew an iltediate criticist frot 
Jilay Sololon, the Tria Shop and Plant COllittee chairlan, anxious to lake it plain that direct 
action had Non the victory rather than Colbert's lagnanility, t~tq, January 20 1951: 'At NO tile did 
the officers cOle in and tell "r Johnson (the Dodge Labour Relations chief) in no uncertain terls 
that the union Nas insisting on straight seniority." 
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One of the first women tr ansferred to the fi nal assembly line in 
1949 recalled: 
The conditions on the asselbly line, to Ie learning it, Mere really tough. But the standards 
Mere pretty luch decided by the Markers on the job. We would decide hOM luch Me could do. 
There was only one cOlpany tile study Ian in the plant, so we didn't see luch of hil. 
We didn't have any relief - and we Manted it that May. We lade our own relief. Without 
jeopardizing Iy job I could lake 15 linutes for Iyself every hour. The forelen knew what was 
going on. But there was tile to do good quality Mork.33 
Ed Liska~ who returned to the body-in-white in 1946 after five 
years in the Army~ recalled standards being very slack at least 
until the 19505. "We h.-ad people just reading books~ sitting 
de"'m," he s aid. "We had enough lOi:\npower to do anything." 
How did they secure these conditions? Gertrude Nalezty 
remembered workers' readiness to sit down and refuse to work as a 
common bargaining practice: 
Host of the tile people just sat down and wouldn't work until they got Mhat they Manted. 
For a Mhile this was a real .ilitant bunch at Dodge Hain and they really stuck together. 
Hanagelent tried to get us to speed up. Sale cases they got .ore work. Other cases the Markers 
banded together and upped production to where they thought it was fair. ~~ 
In the final assembly it wasn"t sit-down strikes that were most 
c:ommon~ but slow-downs, "falling back down the line": 
If any work Mas added the workers Mould just go back down the line. We would just keep it up. 
To .aintain control, Me just didn't do the extra work. Generally the workers won. When I 
started on the final asse.bly in 1949 it was really unheard of to have a worker fired for a 
production standard dispute. SOletiles they would draw a line by the side of the line and if 
we fell back to that point then they would discipline or fire us. But if anyone was fired 
everyone would walk out. It only began to happen a lot in the late 19505.36 
--------------------------
33. Interview by author with Edith Fox, April 20 1981. 
~A . Intervi ew by author with Ed Li ska, Jul y 21 1982. 
35. Nalezty interview. She relelbered one such incident: "Hanage.ent tried to get us to wear 
laundered gloves. The workers just refused to use the •• Those Nho couldn't work without gloves just 
spent half an hour sitting down and then got their new gloves.' 
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Sectional action~ or the threat to use it was the answer. 
In December 1949 time study men set a rate of 640 pieces on 
the h ei~vy gear 
transmission unit. 
case job in Department 
The three workers~ 
10'7~ the Dodge I"lain 
one on each shift~ were 
turning out only an average 513 at the time~ but under pressure 
raised this to 540. In the steadily deteriorating labour 
relations atmosphere that existed just prior to the 104-day 
national Chrysler strike, they were given one-day disciplinary 
lay-offs just before Christmas. Eighty fellow workers stayed 
of 'f wi th them. Then, in January 1(~50, when they persisted in 
thEd r :. gO-51 0\1'1" , management suspended them again for two days. 
The whole transmission unit then walked out at 9 am to a meeting 
in the Local 3 hall and- decided to strike until the ~anagement 
backed down. The EB, to the surprise of the transmission unit 
37 
c:h i ef steltlard, informally supported the strike, and management 
qUickly backed down, di !:;coveri ng "they may be wrong in the 
38 
fatiglle time they allow". Foremen and superintendents had 
Considerable autonomy from higher management as to how they ran 
--------------------------
36. Fox i ntervi e\ll. 
:3 '7. The Bartelbort regiae of 1949-50 \lias a centre faction that opposed Reuther froa a parochial, 
Dodge Hain standpoint. In January 1950, just before the national UAW strike began the EB \lias keen to 
Publicize Chrysler's evil deeds - and this \lias \IIhy it gave space to John Hudak to \IIrite up the 
strike in the pg~g~ ~!!n ~~~? 
:,8. ~~t~~lt H~~!, Deceaber 21 1949; ~~~, January 28 1950. 
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their departments as long as they kept production flowing. So 
Considerable bargaining strength remained with the work group on 
39 
the shop floor. The 'fair' production standard was maintained 
by the right to strike. Only when the right to strike was no 
longer a legitimate activity in the eyes of most Dodge workers 
was management able to regain its authority over .tandards. 
Local 3 politics 
The tradition of lo~al union autonomy at Dodge Main came 
Under increasing pressure from the international after the 
Consolidation in power of the Reuther faction in 1947. But from 
1945 to 1948~ and from 1949 to 1951~ although the presidents of 
Local 3 were Reuther supporters~ the international's attempts to 
assert control over wildcat strikes at Dodge Main failed. The 
local union tradition was still too resilient to be handled in a 
Period when management was overtly hostile to ~!! union activity. 
Only when Chrysler management began to practise a more civilized 
relationship with the international, in the first half of the 
1950s~ did the international's influence come to count for a lot 
-------------------------
39. The 'fair' production standard was elbodied in UAW policy by the IEB on April 28 1949: 'The 
UAW-CIO ••• insists that reduction .in the unit cost of production lust be lade possible by ilproving 
technOlogy and production processes, and by efficient engineering and lanagelent, and not by placing 
an unfair load on workers •• , It is our policy to authorize strike action in any plant, large or 
slall, big corporation or slall shop, when the facts show that an elployer is attelpting to drive 
his workers to lake the. produce lore than a fair day's work," Reproduced in ?PQ!!!g~!! ?P~f!~! 
~hrY?!~r ~M!!!!!n, Harch 1957. ' 
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40 
on Joseph Campau Avenue. 
Mike Novak was re-elected Local 3 President every year on a 
pro-Reuther ticket until 1949 when he took a ' ob 
.J \o'Ji th the 
international. During his period of office, Dodge Main, like all 
the other Detroit Chrysler plants, had shut down completely in 
41 
the April 24 1947 strike against the Taft-Hartley Bill. And 
When Reuther decided to comply with the anti-Communist provisions 
of the Act, including the s wear ing o f non -Communist affi davits by 
42 
all candidates for local union positions, Local 3 fell in line. 
LOcal 3 had also backed Reuther in first toying with the idea of 
labour supporting an independent presidential candidate in 1948, 
and then, when Reuther changed hi s mind , in plumping for Truman 
43 
and the Democrat Party. The year 1948 ~as the high point for 
---------------------------
4(1. The tension between the international and the Chrysler locals was, of course, noted by the 
Corporation which initiated a new attelpt to place restrictions on the steward systel in the lajor 
,contract battle of 1950. Dodge LO,cal 3 Collection, WRl, Box 9. Undated letter "To all Chrysler 
workers" frol Norian Matthews and Yictor Reuther on the 1950 settlelent: 'It was not until the 99th 
day of the strike that the Corporation withdrew frol its position on this issue Ililitations on the 
steward systell and agreed to continue the steward systel intact.' Indeed, Chrysler was only 
sUccessful in securing UAW agreelent to first consider and then ilplelent changes in the syatel in-
1961 and 1964, after the shop floor defeats of 1957-59; see below, p • 
41. ~~~, April 19, Kay 3 1947. 
42. See Non-Collunist Affidavits in Dodge Local 3 Collection, IIRL. Certain left stewards lay have 
aVOided cOlpleting these affidavits until it becaae an issue. Thus Edith Yan Horn, the wire rool 
chief steward who was dislissed by Chrysler on Karch 3 1952 after she was naled as a COllunist in 
the House Un-Alerican COlaittee hearings in Detroit, only SNore a non-Co.aunist affidavit herself on 
Harch 10; Local 3 Collection, evidence to ulpire. 
43. ~~~, August 9 1947, contained a report frol the Locd 3 delegation to the Wayne County CIO 
Convention on its endorselent of Henry A Wallace for President by the delegation's secretary, Edith 
Van Horn; in 1948, however, Yan Horn resigned as Local 3 Political Action COllittee chairperson 
~ecause she continued to support Wallace while the Local EB went for Truelan, see: Iu@ ~@q@ ;@[U@[, 
!larch 1950. 
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the Dodge right-wing. They swept the board in the February 1948 
elections, finally removing John Zaremba from the lo~al Executive 
44 
Board on which he had sat since 1936. These post-war political 
Changes in Local 3 ' s leadership are represented in Figure 7 on 
the following page. 
Within a year of the rout of the left, the Local 3 leadership 
were in disarray: anti-Communism could cement an alliance on the 
UAW's IEB, but not necessarily sustain one in a plant where the 
left were no serious threat. Once a strong personality like Novak 
was out of Dodge Main, the right-wing split. Novak ' s closes t 
SUpporters campaigned on a Green slate around Art Grudzen that 
got the support of Reuther and the Association of Catholic Trade 
Unionists (ACTU): 
Think Right - Be Right - Vote right 
Vote the Srudzen-Reuther slate for 
Pensions, Health Insurance, Job Security 
li ving Wage 
Your Job Depends on 
Sood Leadership45 
But they were opposed by ,::\ centre "Trade Uni on" 51 ate around • £Ii g 
Ed' Bartelbort from the machine shop and Ed Domanski from the 
---------------------------
44. The post-war resurgence of the Dodge Kain right-wing was due in part to the alienation of Dodge 
workers frol the anti-strike policy of the Tholas-Addes-CP wartile UAW leadership, and in part 
because of the large nUlbers of politically very right-wing Poles who eli grated to Haltralck as 
wartile Displaced Persons after the Russian occupation of Poland. As early as April 1945 Zarelba 
coaplained to Addes about the role of extre.e right-wing Poles on a Polish Alerican Council [opposed 
to the UAW's Alerican Polish Labour Council] who, "with the aid of the Reuther Brothers ••• are causing 
disruption along the Polish workers·; Addes Collection, WRL, Box 107, File 17, letter dated April 5 
1945. 
45. Ross Collection, WRL, Box 3; Sreen slate election card, February 1949. 
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lieft I 
1944 
FIGURE 7 
Politic al Sympa thies 
of 
Loc a l 3 Presidents' 
I RightJ, 
Novak 
1949 
1950 
Bartelbort----______ __ 
Grudzen 
1953 Cheal: 
I 
1956 Quinn 
1960 Pasica 
1964 ])omaneki 
196&, Liska 
I 
1972 Hardy 
I. 
1974 ])avJ.s 
1978 Smith 
:: 
119801 I ]!)odge Main closes I 
274 
IUS Pres ident-j 
Roos,eve1t 
Truman 
Eisenhower 
Nixon 
Ford 
I 
Cart'er 
IReaLI 
Pensions 
CIO policy 
Revision of contract 47 
The lack of clear political differences between these two slates 
was brought out by the Zaremba-Van Horn left slate of "Fighting 
leaders for a More P ... ·ogr-essi ve Uni on": 
30c hourly wage raise 
Pensions and health insurance progral at cOlpany expense 
All out fight against speed-up 
Halt to discri.ination in hiring and on the job against Negroes, wOlen and workers over 35 
COlplete, honest repeal of Taft-Hartley 48 
The black foundry steward who had played a key role in preventing 
a return-to-work movement developing in 1939, Curtis Davis, ran 
for treasurer on this left slate. They got nowhere, but the 
Widespread feeling among Chrysler workers that they had been sold 
short with the 13c rise negotiated in 1948 led to the election of 
49 
the Bartelbort slate. 
Bartelbort had started at Dodge Main in 1934 and was first 
elected chief steward for department 108 in 1943. He had been 
elected machine shop division plant commi~teeman in 1946 and 
rep ... ·esented the "good sound Amer-i can uni oni sm" that domi nated the 
---------------------------
46. Harvard Business S.chool, L~i~ ~qllt[!£t ~~qqtt!Uqll~ ~~t!!~11 ~~[t~l~t ~q~qt!tlt~1l !Il~ t~~ y~~, 
(Harvard: 1948), 17-18. 
47. Ross Collection, WRL, Box 3 
= 
49. ~~~, Karch 26 1949, clailed it was the biggest turnout ever in a Dodge Local 3 election. 
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activists' consciousness. But in 1948 he was not fQ[ Walter 
50 
Reuther, so by definition he was seen as being Eg§. .~ . .!J§!;,. · During 
the 104 day strike between January and May 1950 the voting 
strength of the Dodge Main delegation to the Chrysler Conference 
was cut from 201 to 12, although it represented one third of the 
51 
89,000 strikers. This followed a protest by the Chrysler 
stewards' council against Reuther's decision to allow maintenance 
52 
and other wo~kers into the plant during the strike. 
At the first Dodge Main stewards' council meeting following 
the strike, Art Hughes, the former war-time opponent of the 
---------------------------
5(). The alienation of the Local fros the International was confir.ed in August 1949 when the 
Executive Board and PAC endorsed Dick Frankensteen for "ayor of Detroit as against Reuther's 
no.inee, forler SP .e.ber George Edwards. It took this stance after learning that Frankensteen's 
refusal to stand down had led to Reuther sacking Don Frankensteen (Dick's brother) after 13 years as 
the UAW's Chief Auditor; ~~~, August 8, 20 1949. 
51 • ~~~, February 18 1950. 
52 . UAW Local 3 Collection, WRL; Recording Secretary's files, Stewards' Council .inutes, January 24 
1950. Several accounts describe the passivity of the 1950 strike. The B!99ri![, April 25 1950, for 
exa.ple wrote: .~ strange strike. Instead of keeping .orale up by .ass picketing, the locals left 
that problel to the radio and recreation divisions and the counselling service.· Irvine, ~ ~lt, 
wrote, 84: ·While the strike teant heavy losses in wages to the .en and hardships of .any kind, it 
was a co.pletely different type of strike than those of 1937-39. Control of the strike never left 
the hands of the top leadership. Picket lines were either not had or very sparsely .ounted. The 
89,000 workers supported the strike fro. start to finish. There was no back to work love.ent, no 
bloodshed, no violence of any kind." The undoubted passivity arose out of several different factors: 
the luch tighter control by the Reuther faction than during previous strikes leant it was conducted 
their way; this was the first UAW strike where strike relief was provided for the strikers -
alounting to Sl.1 lillion at Dodge "ain; the strike itself was pri.arily over the funding of 
penSions, not directly for lore tangible ailS; and Chrysler .anagelent itself recognized for the 
first tile that it was not possible to generate a back-to-work lovelent with any chance of success. 
Despite these factors laking for a lack of participation In_ the strike, a lass picket at Dodge "ain 
on Friday April 14 drew 10,000 Dodge workers, ~tt~, April 22 1950. Irvine's conclusion frol the 1950 
strike, overstates the case, 86: ·The leadership has established a thoroughgoing control in the 
reall of collective bargaining and strikes, greatly liliting the initiative of secondary leaders and 
the rank and file itself in these latters· 
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No Strike Pledge~ presented the UAW case for curbing 
Unauthorized strikes. Grudzen used the occasion to open his 
Campaign for office~ the elections having been delayed by the 
His was a very careful balancing act. He supported the 
IEB but continued to acknowledge the justice of responding to 
What Dodge workers saw as infringements on their 'r ights ' : 
I want you to know that I al in accord with the International policy on unauthorized strikes. 
When a group of workers take the law into their own hands and walk off the job without 
following the delocratic procedure of the by-laws of Local No 3 and the Constitution of the 
International Union, they are often, actually, doing a disservice to our Local Union ••• 
I wish to elphasize that I al not speaking of the lany unauthorized strikes that are 
brought about by the arbitrary, dictatorial attitude and sOletiles deliberate provocation of 
aany by supervision and plant lanageaent. These situations we lust fight when and where we 
find thea. 54 
OPPosed to~ and a defender of~ unauthorized strikes~ Grudzen won 
the pr-esi dent' s primarily because the Bartelbort 
administration was already in trouble. The battle fatigue that 
had set in during the five months' strike~ the probably accurate 
rumours that Bartelbort had mishandled the strike finances~ and 
the emergence of a rival centre-left ' Blue Slate' from among 
Bartelbort · s own supporters allowed Grudzen and one other Reuther 
55 
SUpporter to be elected in July 1950. 
--------------------------
53. See Chapter 9 above. 
~~~, Hay 13 1950. :: 
~55. Ross Collection, "RL, Box 3; a July 1950 Green Slate leaflet asked: ·liere you satisfied with 
the way the $1,500,000 of welfare checks were P!!h!p out during the last 100 day strike? Was there a 
confir.ed welfare set up in our Local, or was it a political patronage depot?· 
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Grudzen's first speech as Local 3 President reflected the 
contradictory character of right-wing Dodge unionism. Grudzen was 
a Reuther supporter whose election address promised "responsible 
leadership in the settlement of the workers' grievances without 
56 
resorting to 'wild-cat' strikes". Yet Chrysler management made 
this an extremely difficult if not impossible task. It continued 
to deny the international union organization the public 
recognition and private wheeler-dealer relationship which~ by the 
ear 1 Y 1 950s ~ the UAW was accustomed to receiving from GM and 
Ford. In 1952, Chrysler attorney Theodore Iserman still used the 
language of anti-unionism when he testified before a Senate 
labour committee: 
The obvious answer (is to lilit> the lonopolistic powers of labour unions as luch as we do the 
lonopolistic powers of business. 
. We should forbid great international unions to control the bargaining throughout an 
entire industry, require thel to restore bargaining powers to Local unions, or other 
constituent units, each of which would represent elployees of a single coipany and its 
subsidiaries and would be autonolous in its bargaining and striking. And we should forbid 
these units to cOlbine and conspire along thelselves, directly or indirectly, or to strike in 
concert.57 
This continuing vocal hostility to the UAW meant it was not much 
Of an advantage to be a Reuther supporter as Dodge president. 
Against the backcloth of the Korean War~ Grudzen was forced to 
balc:\llce "responsibility" with the language of mobili zat. ion: 
--------------------------
56. ACTU Collection, NRl, Box 23; Grudzen-SzYlanski Green slate leaflet. 
~37 • Q!![Qti U!!~ "ay 22 1952. 
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I stand four square behind President Phillip Hurray of the CIa in supporting President Trulan 
and our Arted Forces in the struggle which appears close at hand ••• ' 
Host of the unauthorized work stoppages have been and are caused by the Chrysler 
Corporation's refusal to directly negotiate with the union on a problel, preferring to hide 
behind the delayed action of the ulpire procedure. 
So our big job in the cOling year lust be in the day to day negotiations. We lust 
continue the fight to take the Chrysler Corporation bargain with our stewards, plant COltittee 
and officers on our plant problets and use the i.partial utpire only as a court of last resort 
in fewer and fewer cases, as it was always intended.58 
He found he could not openly break with the sectional bargaining 
and problem-solving which Local 3 members , believed 
, le(;)itimatf?'. He was even forced to defend many of the 
Unauthorized strikes in the last half of 1950: 
I caution those tetbers who tay unthinkingly blate their fellow-tetbers for plant shut-downs; 
get the facts first, before jutping to the sate conclusions that tost newspapers do, that 
union workers are always at fault. 
Only a slall nutber of unauthorized strikes have been caused by the workers, and your 
union has taken active steps to elitinate the •• 
After all, I consider IY lost ilportant responsibility is to keep you working every 
tinute, until you, by your detocratic ballot, decide to stop work as a group.59 
Chrysler man agement entered the 19505 with a ma jor problem: even 
"responsible " unioni s ts in its plants spoke the language of 
confrontation. 
---------------------------
S8. q~~, August 5 1950. 
59 • q~~, October 7 1950 • . 
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III. The early 19505: changes 
As long as top management remained firmly antiunion~ its lower 
echelons were caught between the pressure to produce and the need 
to accommodate to the strong union tradition among Chrysler 
Workers. The res ult was that labour relations were conducted by 
intuition: on the one hand sectional and departmental shop floor 
bargaining flourished; and on the other top management insisted 
on two bitter national confrontations with the UAW in 1948 and 
1950. After 1950~ the considerable impact of the national five 
year contract combined with a more professional managerial 
approach to labour relations gradually established greater 
consistency. But it was certainly not smooth progress toward s an 
accommodation with labour; nor was it the work of a sophisticated 
management control strategist. 
Hundred-day strike 
The first signs of a new, more considered management labour 
relations strategy appeared after Chrysler' s disas trous 
intransigence during the four month 1950 strike. The strike wa s 
eVer the UAW·s demand that Chrysler guarantee to pay a $100 a 
month pension to worker s aged 65 under a scheme such that if 
federal social s ecurity benefits went up, so would the worker ' s 
280 
total entitlement. Previously, Chrysler's l .iability had fallen 
when federal benefits were increased. To underwrite the new 
scheme the UAW also called on Chrysler to pay 10c an hour per 
60 
Worker into a properly · administered pension fund. But Keller" 
refused to negotiate. He was determined to demonstrate that 
Chrysler would not be pushed around by the UAW. After Chrysler 
Workers had spent four months on strike~ Reuther came under 
growing pressure to r"etreat. For the first time the UA(,IJ had paid 
strike benefit to its Chroysl er members; and on May 29 
negclt i at ions were due to begin Io'Ji th 8M. Chrysler, too~ had been 
61 
hit hcwd: it estimated a sales loss of $:Lbn. While 8M and For"d 
Car sales in 1950 jumped 38X and 47X respectively over 1949, 
Chrysler ' s only moved up 8X. For Chrysler this was disastrous: in 
1949 Ford had produced the same number of cars as Chrysler~ but 
the loss of three months' production could not be made up, and in 
62 
1950 Ford made and sold four cars for every three of Chrysler's. 
Keller ' s obduracy did not even result in a major defeat for the 
UAW. The outcome was a contract stalemate: Chrysler did not agree 
to adjust benefits above the $100, but it did agree to a 
establish a special pension fund. The exhaustion of both sides 
also expressed itself in their agreement to extend the contract 
63 
for an unprecedented three-year term. The 'one hundred day ' 
---------------------------
62. Chrysl er, E!~t~. 
281 
strike triggered significant changes in top management: Keller 
tried to cover up his res ponsibility by p l.ltt.in<,;} , "fe:-:' · Colbert 
int:o the Chrysler president position and giving him more 
execu tive power than that post h ad previously possessed. 
~ive year contract 
Within weeks it was clear the Chrysler strike had been a 
major manageria l misjudgement . Th e pr inciple of non-interferen ce 
by the UAW in actuarial matters that Ke l l~r had sacrificed 
soo~ooo cars to defend was conceded by GM after a week of talks. 
GNI ,. iagreed to pay its pension obligations on top f o the federal 
benefits - gi v i ng workers $117 a mont h ; to establi s h a properly-
funded pension scheme; to pay a 50% disability p e n sion to workers 
inj ured in its plants; and to pay half of wor kers' admission fees 
to the Blue Cross and Bl u e Shield medical care sc h emes. The best 
Publicised feature of this "Tr-eaty of Detr oit " ~ as it II'las called~ 
Wa. its five-year term coupled with a cost-of-living bonu s whose 
downward movement was limited to 3c an hour~ 
64 
and a guaranteed 
annual rise of 4c an hour. For Keller t h e GM settlement was a · 
bitter p ill t o s wallow - althou g h the benefits promised of stable 
i ndll!;tr i a l relaticlns over the n e)·:t. five years were highly 
appealing. So on l y seven mon t.hs after the May 1950 strike 
settlement~ it was Colbert wh o con tacted the LJAW for new 
f1eqotiations and qu ickly Signed a five- year contract that 
.... _._-... _ .._ .......... _ .._ ...... _--_ .. _----_ ... ----
64. ihc1, June 3 1950. 
Colbert was determined Chrysler should benefit 
from the more orderly labour relations system operating in 8M, and 
the Dec:ember 1950 contract marked the start of a "pattern-
bart;jai ni ng" process that 1 asted unt.i 1 1979, in which the 'Big 
Three' gave almost identic:al benefits to all their UAW workers. 
The long-term contract helped regulate Chrysler's labour 
relations in several important ways. It provided an unprec:edented 
degree of certainty about future wage casts~ and so encouraged 
management to look at how to exercise control over labour 
productivity. The pattern-bargaining process gave Chrysler a 
direct incentive to catch up with the level of managerial control 
operated in its competitors~ plants. And the 1950 contract also 
provided more assurance of opposition to unauthorized strikes by 
the international than Chrysler had ever had before. This, too, 
acted to focus attention upon the shop floor organization in its -
Plants. Chrysler was aware that the existing tradition would be 
e>:tremel y difficult to crack as long as the whole union 
organi z at i on ~ 
(:: hai nnan dO\.o'm ~ 
l.\sed 
fir-om the 1 acal president and plant committee 
openly supported sectional industrial action. 
the five- year period of peace with 
It 
the 
international to insist on the external regulation of the actions 
of top-level UAW representatives in its plants. 
At Dodge Main~ the targets for management·s push to secure 
the honouring of the contract by local officers, plant committee 
2 8 3 
members and chief stewards included both supporters and opponents 
of the Reuther regime in the UAW and its policy of contract-
legality. After his 1950 election victory~ Grudzen ' s discomfort 
as a prisoner of a non-Reutherite EB and the disunity of the 
right-wing in Dodge were the subject of an ACTU report in May 
1951: 
What appears to be a split is lore of a continuation of the slow disintegration of the right-
wing caucus that was never too strong to begin with. The trouble seels to be a lack of 
leadership - at present the caucus has just two lelbers who are local officers, 6rudzen and 
Schuk - they have a voice but no vote.65 
But this diagnosis of the right's problem of having "a voice but 
no velte" was only partially true. The local president had a great 
deal of influence~ particularly if he could pick up the telephone 
and get the automatic backing of the UAW's Chrysler Department. 
When the Department 123 'smocks' walkout took place at the end of 
May 1951 ~ and three stewards were sacked~ lithe Dodge Local 
Executive Board took the position that no strike existed and asked 
66 
all "'JOI~ ~: ers to report on thei r" regul ar sh i ft. II Grudzen argued: 
We could have won that grievance without losing tile frol work if cooler heads had prevailed. 
And "hen I say that, I lean along both Union and Managelent Personnel.67 
---------------------------
60:::-~. Association of Catholic Trade Unionists Collection, WRL, Box 23; ~Q~q! ~Qt!~, May 23 1951. 
66. ~~~, June 2 1951. See note 86 on pl72 above. 
61. ~~~, June 9 1951. 
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management seized upon the division in the union ranks. Clarence 
Johnson~ the Dodge Labour Relations Director~ issu~d a threat to 
local 3 officers and plant committee members that he would take 
68 
"drastic" action to end unauthorized walk - outs. 
l"lcmagement :. S threat wesimmediately denounced in the 
a militant Catholic steward in 
the paint unit~ Department 91: 
Kay I relind our International Officers and the Officers of the Corporation that it was, in a 
large part, due to these so-called 'wild-cat strikes' that our UAW-CIO was built ••• We are not 
in Russia, and as free Alericans we will not tolerate Dictatorship by either the Chrysler 
Corporation or our International.69 
But Grudzen remained s ilent and with sales of the 1951 model s 
falling off~ management launched its offensive. At the end of June 
two blue button stewards were fired when a shortage of bumpers 
made a stoppage not unwelcome - and when the section returned 
after a protest strike their chief steward was fired for not 
70 
preventing it. 
---------------------------
68 • ~~~, June 23 1951. 
69. ~~~, June 23 1951. McNeil, iI Scot, reported in the ~~~ on October 20 1951 on a big Catholic 
service that took place at the Briggs (Detroit Tigers) stadiuI, writing: IReligion is the answer to 
COllunisl". He was defeated as a chief steward in the 1952 election, but was elected to the Local 3 
Publicity COllittee as paint shop representative, writing regular paint shop reports. He was one of 
the founders of the 1957 'Rank and File' caucus; see Chapter 11. 
7el. ~~~, June 6 1951, reported one of the blue button stewards was fired for swearing when he was 
told the first one was being dislissed. 
2135 
An important dismissal 
These dis~issals were just a warming-up exercise. On July 24 
1951 ~ a turning point in Dodge labour relations took place when 
Chrysler fired Jimmy Selemen. As plant committee chairman and a 
committeeman for the largest of Dodge Main ' s six divisions~ the 
trim unit and wire room, since 1942, he was a key figure in the 
DOdge union or-gani z at ion. Solomon was fired in circumstances 
which led many act.ivists tel believe t.he UAW~s "top leaders, it 
71 
seems~ al'-e ' involved' with thf? auto cor-porations" • The 
sUpervision in the trim department had imposed new production 
standards, and then given two-day penalty suspensions to a team 
of two workers on the seat cushion line for not reaching a new 
7 2 
OLltPLlt t.arget. The first and the second shifts on their line 
walked out and pickets appeared at the plant gates before the 6 
a.m. shift the following morning. No-one crossed the picket line 
and the whole plant shut down. Grudzen and the EB, under 
. pressure from the international to end the wildcat, immediately 
called a mass meeting to hear the international reps~ Arthur-
Hughes and Harold Julian~ argue that the issue should be t.aken 
through the grievance procedure. I~ was attended by about 3 ~OOO 
Workers mainly from other areas of the plant since most trim 
department wcirkers stayed at home~ 
follow the international's advice. 
--------------------------
71 • q~~, Septelber 15 1951. 
72 . Seven zig-zag springs an hour instead of five. 
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and those present voted to 
Grudzen then ordered t.he 
'73 
removal of the pickets and the stoppage ended. A vote of ·the 
whole plant had been used to force the cushion line ~o accept new 
standards. 
Five days later~ Chrysler followed up its advantage. It. 
r-efused to allo\o'J the two men · te) WOF· k at the· 01 d product i on 
standard while their grievance went through procedure and sacked 
them for not working to the new work schedule. Both shifts on 
their line stopped again~ and Solomon then followed the normal 
practice of calling a mass ~eeting to consider their next move. 
Chrysler~ clearly aware that Grudzen had advised him against this~ 
promptly fired Solomon. Once again pickets shut down the plant but 
this time Grudzen failed to convince a mass meeting to return to 
war·· k. Three days later~ a very noisy meeting of 11~OOO workers~ 
agreed to go back on condition that the EB would immediately 
organize a strike vote so the plant could stop officially. This 
turned out to be the finish of Solomon. One steward believed 
internal uni c::m di sun it Y cau~~ed the vote to go bac k: "the stench of 
the Right and Left Wing Factions have finally reached the nostrils 
"74 
of t.h£~ membership." 
It was early November 1951 and lay-offs and short. time 
Working were in force before Grudzen finally called a strike 
-------------------~-------
7 ~;. q~tr:.~lt ~~!~, July 19 1951. 
74. q~~, August 11 1951. 
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vote: 11~691 workers voted~ but the majority for a strike was less 
than the two thirds required by the UAW constitution. Solomon was 
75 
out -for good. By proving it could dismiss the plant committee 
chairman (previously only done to the AIWA in 1935 and in the 
76 
) ~ Chrysler forced every steward to act with 
greater caution. 
Plant committeemen and chief stewards had been taught a 
significant lesson by the international's cooperation with the 
management. The consolidation of the Reuther faction in office and 
the Signing of the five-year contracts removed any remaining 
ambiguity about the international's attitude towards locally-
generated stoppages: it was now publicly and privately committed 
to bringing the strike weapon under its exclusive control. 
One i mmedi at~? Cl:lnsequence of Solomon:' S successful 
Victimization was the dismissal in March 1952 of one of his chief 
SUpporters~ wire room day shift chief steward~ Edith Van Horn. She 
was fired for distributing leaflets and holding meetings in the 
rest room to attack the Detroit hearings of the House Un-American 
Activities Committe .. :? (HUAC) .:\fter- she Wii:\S niamed as a "Red". Her 
--------------------------
75. q~~, Novelber 3 1951. After the vote Sololon Mas voted onto the local payroll by a Local 3 
bUSiness leeting until such tile as he would be reinstated. This, of course, never happened and in 
June 1953 after Sololon lade his peace with Reuther, he was taken on the International staff; y~~, 
June 26 1953. The two Tril Shop cushion builders fired were reinstated by the ulpire on January 9 
~952 without pay for the period .of lay-off on the argulent that 'to discharge two elployees and not 
lnflict any penalty on others indicates an unbalance'; Chrysler-UAW, Pig~?!, 2-4. 
"76. See Chapters 4 and 7 above. 
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di smi s~~al was followed by a walk - out of virtually all the wire 
room workf:rs a reaction quite unlike what had happened to 
another leftist Paul Henley~ the Friday before. He had been 
subpoenaed to appear before the HUAC and had pleaded the Fifth 
Amendment. When he returned to the Dodge Foundry, he was 
Physically threatened by other workers and was escorted from the 
Plant by security guards. The next day leaflets were given out at 
the plant gate attacking the witch-hunt against Henley. t~Jhen he 
returned again to his job other workers refused to work with him 
and Chrysler then fired him for "violating the long-established 
rule against inflammatory and objectionable literature in the 
plant". 
In Henley"s and Van Horn " s case~ however~ the NLRB umpire 
ruled some three months later that Chrysler had not respected its 
own "legality". It had nc) evidf:mce thclt Henley had distributed the 
leaflets~ and had never previously warned Van Horn against 
distributing them. Both were reinstated~ Henley with back pay~ Van 
77 
HOI~n II'Ji thout. These rulings were virtually unique during the 
Korean War. At that time employers who dismissed workers because 
of the unrest caused by their political views were upheld in 80% 
--------------------------
77. Caute, Q~ £H, 373. 
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78 
of the cases arbitrated. The reasons the NLRB acted differently 
at Dodge Main were complex: there remained considerable support 
for Van Horn in the wire room and it was possible there could be 
another walkout ; Chrysler had not prepared its case well, charging 
both ,with specific offences of which they were both innocent; 
neither Chrysler nor the UAW believed there was a serious "Red" 
problem in Dodge Main; and the credibility of ~he whole umpir e 
system was still weak in Detroit and would not be helped by 
blatant disregard of the legalities. So these reinstatements 
Played a part in shaping Dodge Main"s labour relations.' Somethi ng 
of a £@y§@ £§l@~c@ they legitimi ; ed those in Dodge who were 
echOing the international"s message to take grievances to the 
Umpire. In the 1940s umpire decisions were overwhelmingly against 
Local 3: a crude breakdown shows 39 clear rulings against Local 3 
and only 14 in favour from 1943 to 1949. But as Chrysler"s labour 
relations strategy moved away from simple union-bashing in the 
1950s~ so umpire decisions began to reflect more balance: from 
1950 to 1959 there were only 16 against to 13 in favour of Local 
79 
~ ~. The umpire system had to be legitimated as a source of 
"fairness' and "justice" in work~rs" experience as well 
---------------------------
'78. Chrysler-UAW, ~tq~!t. 6-20,21; q~~, Harch 29 1952. Nalezty clailed that when Van Horn Mas out 
of the plant, the wire rool voted one of the three lost vociferous anti-Col.unists~ a wOlan called 
Catherine, to take over her job as chief steward. She failed dislally to do the job, so Gertrude 
Nalezty was elected in her place, and when Edith Van Horn returned to the Wire ROOI, Nalezty loved 
OVer to berole afternoon shift steward to allow Yan Horn to take up her position as day shift 
steward again; Nalezty interview. 
79. Analysis of Chrysler-UAW, ~tq~€t, Dodge "ain decisions. 
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as on 
paper before it could offer a genuine alternative to industrial 
action. 
Local politics 
The growing acceptance of contract-legality was threatened in 
1953 when frustration with the 1950 contract erupted. Unauthorized 
80 
strikes broke out across the auto industry~ fuelled principally 
by the discontent of skilled workers with the long - term contract. 
They had seen the Korean war boom send wages and overtime 
rocketing in the open shops not bound by the auto indus try 
pattern, and many skilled men joined the breakaway Independent 
81 
Skilled Trades Confederation. In Dodge Main~ the anti-Reuther 
"Blue Slate" won every position in the local elections. The 
skilled plant committeeman~ Joe Cheal~ defeated Art Grudzen to 
become president~ and the veteran Pat Quinn was elected vice 
82 
president. When Dodge Main employment fell below the June 1953 
record of 32 ,000, management responded with a new hard-li ne 
attitude, confident the local officers wouldn "t be sup~orted by 
the international. So in August~ the Cheal administration called a 
strike vote~ arguing that Chrysler had torn up the traditional 
---------------------------
8(1. See Figures 1 and 2 [Chapter 21 for the 1953 upturn in 6K's strike frequency and especially in 
its unauthorized strike loss ration. 
81. Anderson and Jefferys, q~ £it, Chapter 9. 
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"Amel'- i can" bar-gai ni ng by mutual agreement that had been used at 
DOdge: 
Collective bargaining, as it is known in A.erica, has cOlpletely broken down in Dodge Main 
Plant. It has been replaced by a dictatorial .anagelent who insist that they and they alone 
shall dictate teras of e.ployaent, in hours of work, wages and working conditions ••• 
Continual hounding of workers for lore work see.s to be the general policy throughout the 
plant ... 
Certain rights, such as wash up ti.e, enjoyed by workers since the beginning of our Union 
are slowly taken away frol the •••• 
Ne .ust re.ind Dodge Hanage.ent that we did not organize to be apple polishers, nor did 
we organize for the greater glory of Chrysler Corporation; but we organized for the autual 
protection against the dictatorial .anage.ents in Dodge Hain Plant and elsewhere.83 
84 
But although they got an 80% majority for a strike~ the rapidly 
worsening economic situation that set in with the 1954 model year 
85 
caused first 12~OOO and then 20~OOO lay-offs. The strike call 
Was deferred while the local called unemployment demonstration s 
86 
demanding "A Public Works Program Now". Management ' s tightening -
up s trategy survived - at least until the model year boom of 1955 . 
Resistance pays 
In June 1954~ despite the attempt by Norman Matthews ~ the UAW 
--------------------------
8 "'" .... \ . ED state.ent, ~~~, August 22 1953 • 
84. ~~~, Septe.ber 5 1953. The vote was taken on a rag-bag of 31 issues that suggest the growing 
.anagerial confidence induced by the 1954 recession and the Mckinsey report. The first five 
grievances were: The Assistant labour Relations Supervisor spying on len in latrines; transferring 
operations fro. Dodge to locations outside Michigan; .anage.ent providing inaccurate infor.ation on 
Work schedules; the use of outside contractors; and 'fore.en and supervisors intilidating stewards 
and refusing to allow the. ti.e to take care of grievances'. 
E35. ~~~, Dece.ber 5, Deceaber 26 1953. 
E36. ~~ttQ!.t Et~~ Etll~~, Apri I 14 1954. 
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87 
Chrys ler Director~ to rebuild a viable anti-Cheal caucus~ the 
centre-left Blue Slate was re-elected - and~ for the first time 
following constitutional changes brought in by the Reutherite 
majority at the 1951 UAW Convention~ 
88 
their period of office was 
two years. What was seen by management as a s et ·-back for 
Chrysler-UAW relations caused it swiftly to issue a new challenge. 
Two trim department workers were fired for refusing to use a new 
method of installing window trim when the company refused to time 
89 
study it. Supervision was again trying to break with the cus tom 
practice o ·f sectional collective bargaining on the 
introduction of new work methods. 
Thi s ti mE~~ hOvJever ~ the ES responded to the challenge and 
called a plant-wide strike, using the dormant strike vote of 
September 1953 as j ustification. Five days later the IES pulled 
the rug the feet of Local 3 and ruled that the 
90 
previous strike vote did not apply. Chrysler immediately pointed 
---------------------------
87 • q~~, Kay 15 1954. 
88. 6rudzen, while still Local 3 President, had spoken in favour of two yearly elections at the UAW 
convention. He defended hilself in the ~~~, April 18 1953: "First I spoke of the enorlous cost to 
the Local Union and second, the political bitterness which is created... I feel that He have grown 
up. We are now 17 years old, and should be no different in a Local level than the entire public. It 
is the policy in local governlent to have tHO year elections." The other aain argulent used by 
Reuther in support of this love was the cost of having annual elections, estilated at $90,081 for 
Dodge Hain alone in 1952. 
9C·'. q~i[Qti It~~~, July 24, July 26 1954. 
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out the lessons to Joe Cheal. The Dodge Main Operating Manager~ 0 
W Franke~ warned him and the international that unless they acted 
to "prevent a r-ecur-rence" of the un author i zed str- i ke~ Ctlf:c., 1 woul d 
be "terminated" (full-time L.ocal 3 officers were paid by the UAW 
but were on a leave of absence from Chrysler) and Chrysler would 
"ColI ect i nformat i em neces!:;alry to f i I e a I aw sui t reqLlest i n9 
91 
damages against you and the Dodge Local Union." 
The IEB expected the issue to die there. But the Blue Slate 
administration at Dodge Main stood in the classic tradition. Joe 
Cheal had been chairman of the AIWA"s maintenance workers· local 
92 
in 19:35 and~ like his vice" president Pat Quinn~ had nE~ar 1 y 
twenty years of sectional union activity behind him. They were not 
gOing to let management have the victory so easily. llJhen 
Production began to boom again on the 1955 models~ the EB 
threatened a renewal of a~tion unless man~gement negotiated on 
production standards as well as on seniority. Chrysler~ 
by its lowest share of passenger car registrations since 1931~ 
a seniority agreement laid down that for every eight 
---------------------------
91. Dodge Local 3 Collection, WRL, Presidents' files; Letter fro. 0 II Franke to J Cheal, July 30 
1954. 
(12. ~~H. Septuber 14 1957. 
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seniority workers recalled in any one department~ management would 
have to take two workers off the plant-wide "Master Seniority 
Li st". Particular problems that arose would be sorted out "by 
9 3 
mutual agreement between the Uni on and the !v!anagemen't." Part-
forced by union pressure~ part-conceded under a less antagonistic 
labour relations strategy that recognized it did not raise labour 
costs (by 1954 at least 20% of jobs in most departments could be 
learned within minutes), this resolution of the seniority issue 
at Dodge Main was essentially reactive. Management, after a brief 
Panic over the threat to its 1955 model cars, adopted a set of 
seniority rules its workers felt, 
9L~ 
by a seven to three majority, 
were 'fail~ :·. 
In October, the two sacked Department 99 workers were 
reinstated with back pay, and the two Dodge Main labour relations 
e>: ecut i ves, Clarence W Johnson and Lewis B Larkin signed two 
documents accepting 'certain restraints on managerial rights would 
oPerate through the end of the 1955 model year. 
~!~§ was exuberant: 
The Chief Point in the agreelent is that once the rates of production are set ••• they cannot be 
changed unless a technological change takes place. Under this set-up fore.en cannot, every feN 
Neeks, deland lore production resulting in confusion and Mildcat strikes.95 
Almost as important for the assembly line worker was management ' s 
.......... -
------------------------
93. Local 3 Collection, WRL, Box 5, File 107: Dodge Division/Local 3 Seniority Agreeaent, 9-8-54. 
9~. q~tt~tt Et~~ Et~~~, Septelber 13 1954. 
95. q~~, October 161954. 
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agrE:ement t.hat "on assembly line operations employees "Jill not be 
96 
Y-equi red to make up sk ips" • So if there were breakdowns or 
Short.ages~ the s upervision couldn " t t.ry t.o make up t.he lost 
production by running the line faster than the maximum scheduled 
speed. The company also put in writ.ing a promise not to ob s truct. 
Workers and stewards from complaining "about a job being too 
f .:tst" by i nsi st i ng the prote!:.:; t was i n "JI~ i ti ng be'f ore the company 
would negotiate on it: "Facts will be made available for 
e:':.-amination "Jhen ia vE~rbal compLaint is made"~ 
9"7 
the "memorandLlm of 
L1nderstanding" added. This~ of CCILw'se ~ was a key concession~ 
since it confirmed ~~ f~~~g recognition of t.he blue button 
St.ewards, who were the ones most likely to bargain verbally with 
the super-vi si on. 
A second memorandum addressed the permanent aggravation of 
Skilled workers: the use of outside contractors while some 
s killed workers were laid off. This agreement acknowledged the 
l.ln i on request "that si nce thel'"e art? mai ntenance emp 1 oyees 1 ai doff 
t.hat no work be contracted out on which t.hey have cust.omarily 
Worked"~ and said it "Jould "r-eview the sit.uation in Cc~St?~S of this 
kind and give due consideration to calling back 1,:\i d - o 'ff 
---------------------------
(~6. Dodge Local 3 collection, WRLi Helorandu. of Understanding (regarding the production dispute 
at the Dodge Hain Plant), October B 1954. 
97 . tqt~. This agreelent was called ·Notation of understanding or intent as to the application of 
the lelorandul·. Johnson and Larkin Mere clearly not going to adlit they had signed an actual 
!9r~~!~D! with Local 3. The stress by lanagelent on locally-negotiated written agree.ents only 
developed frol the early 1960s once the balance of forces was clearly in lanagelent's favour. 
296 
98 
E?mp I c)yees" • This was Cheal paying his debt to the Dodge Main 
ski ll ed workers whose growing discontent had been a major feature 
of the Korean war period~ when skilled workers in the 'Big Three' 
found their rates falling behind those in Detroit's open shops, 
and so demanded more overtime. The two agreements together were 
Chrysler's version of 'peace in our time', holding operations that 
reinforced the legitimacy of struggled-for restraints. 
They show the extent of Dodge Main workers ' f y·ont i er' of 
Control ten years after the end of World War II. The workers were 
essentially defending custom and practice, but managemf.:mt 
continued to undermine the tradition on which they were based. The 
threat to "terminate" the Local ::;; prf~sident, f c)r s>( amp 1 e, had 
Some ef ·f ect . In May 1955, when a group of 14 trim shop workers 
Picketed the plant in protest against a three d ay disciplinary 
laY-off of three women for failing to do their job, the DodC;:Je EB 
tried to stop their strike spreading: 
Union sound trucks frol Dodge Local 3, UAW-CIO, appeared at the scene early today to urge day 
shift workers to go to their jobs after it appeared the trouble light spread to the day shift. 
Despite the Local's statelent that walkouts were never authorized, a group in the tril 
shop left their jobs at 10 ai, resulting in the lay-offs of 7,500 other in the plant.99 
Where sectional stoppages continued at a high rate in 1955 and 
1956, pressure from the international to keep to the contract and 
the threat to activists' jobs meant strikers were increasingly 
--------------------------
98. Dodge Local 3 Collection, IiRLj Kelorandul, Septelber 301954. 
99 • ~l!t~Q.!.t ~I!~~, Kay 6 1955. 
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isolated. By 1955 strike action was still part of rank and file 
conscious ness but the Local 3 leaders no longer o~enly defended 
its legitimacy in prese~ving custom and practice. Neither the 
local 3 president nor the Dodge Main plant committee chairman 
Would openly challenge contract - legality again. The ground had 
been laid for the major managerial clawback of 1956-1959. 
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CHAPTER 11 
A COLD ONE 
1956-1959 
Lack of investment and poor product policy were primarily 
responsible for Chrysler's deteriorating market position in the 
mid-1950s. But the workplace control issue was the one that could 
unite management in a way the highly contentious questions of 
1 
product design and investment did not. By 1955~ when Ford and 8M 
produced 115X and 70X more cars per manual worker than they had 
aVeraged between 1946 and 1949~ Chrysler produced 15X les s. 
Chrysler management was acutely conscious of the 'standards gap' 
and closing it became the operational cutting edge of its 1956-
1 <;>59 s;trab=gy. Management's restructuring and the sense of 
urgency created by the staccato effect of the four 1950s 
production slumps~ led to an unprecedented consistency in labour 
relations policy. Chrysler approached. for the ( . 
I fir s t time, the ' management by policy ' that had characteri z ed 
8M's labour relations since 1939. 
........... -
------------------------
-, . 
.:.\ 
This development was a s sisted 
1. Hill points out "that all levels of lanagelent have an interest in the preservation of 
lanagerial prerogatives, because these effect the scope of their own jobsM; Qe f1!, 84. 
2 If See Table 10 above. 
", 
. .:.\. Harris, Q~~g, 29. 
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by the agreement of the "Big Three" auto manufacturers to conduct 
4 
what amounted to joint bargaining with the UAW in 1958~ and by 
the onset of what industrial relations academics called a "hard 
5 
line" in management thinking. For four years from 1956 the 
frontier of control moved in management"s favour. There were 
moments when that movement was slowed~ but it was never halted or 
reversed. 
Section one traces the sharpening conflict between 1955 and 
1957: management made its preparations in 1955; Colbert formally 
declared war in 1956 and a furious battle began in 1957. Section 
two considers the traumatic year 1958 when the Dodge Local 3 was 
taken on and defeated in a stand-up fight. 
---------------------------
4. Frank C Pierson, 'Recent Elployer Alliances in Perspective', tQq~~ttt!l ~~l!ttqQ~, I, no.l 
(October 1961), 39. 
~ ,~. For one exalple see: Jac.k Barbash, 'Union Response to the 'Hard Line'·, tQq~~ttt!l 6!l!ttqQ~, 
I, no.l (October 1961), 25. He noted four elelents in lanagelent's 'hard line': a deterlination to 
extract the laxilul benefits of autolationl delands for radical changes to Nork rules; forcing 
strikes; and a lajor public relations calpaign against Nage rises and 'feather-bedding'. 
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I. Preparing for conflict 
After the acquisition of Briggs Body in 1953~ and the initiation 
of expansion away from its Detroit concentration, Dodge Main's 
share of the total Chrysler workforce decreased from about a third 
to a quarter an~ then a fifth. But it still remained a crucial 
SYmbol, both for management and for local union activists, of what 
Was respectively worst and best in labour relations. It natur.:.dly 
became the principal battleground in management"s late-1950s bid 
to reassert its autonomy. The time study department was 
mOdernised; new work standard s were drawn up and imposed; and rank 
and file opposition was contained by the international. 
Time study 
Early in 1955, the Dodge Main time study department was built 
up ':'1nd a ma jor influ>: of "crewc:ut~~" undertook a complete time 
stUdy of the lines in all departments. 
6 
At first many workers 
treated them as a joke. But this systematic time st~dy operation 
Was very different from the previous single job studi es. As a 
Plant-wide exercise, it threw into question dgQ~~tmgnt~i custom 
.~ nd pr'C\c:tice. One department to experience this early on was 
Dep;artment 73. During the war the heavy press shop workers won a 
relief agreement, "where the ",~or-kers work ed 50 minutes every hour 
----------------~--------
~). ~~~, February 5 1955, reported Mith surprise that 17 tile study len Mire nOM operating in 
DOdge Hain. They Mere knOMn at the tile as ·creMcuts", Liska interview. 
\ 
::;;(11 
'7 
and then ShLlt dO\t'm te) r"est for" 10 mi nutes. II In 1955, the pressure 
/ 
to standardize conditions throughout the plant meant supervision 
began to insist the press lines stopped for only three minutes in 
every hour and that production increased accordingly. Custom and 
practice that allowed heavy press workers 80 minutes personal 
relief a day was not compatible with "scientific' time study that 
8 
only allowed for 24. 
The 1955 time study exercise also provided management for 
the first time with a total view of the labour input and costs of 
the press, body, trim and assembly lines. If production could be 
speeded up and/or manning levels reduced in these areas, 
management reasoned, pressure would be automatically increased on 
the sub-assembly, machining, off-track assembly and repair 
sections that fed the main lines. But 1955 saw Chrysler hit a new 
production peak of 1,361,8::::'5 cars, and this postponed any 
managerial interest in precipitate action. The 1955 contract was 
Signed after a mere s ix hours' strike by salaried UAW member s to 
Secure their inclusion in the new Supplementary Unemploymen t 
Benefit (SUB) pattern established by the Ford contract. Chr'ysl er" 
also dropped its demand to limit chief stewards to three hour s a 
--------------------------
7 • q~~~ Hay 7 1955. Ironically, this was sililar to the shop agreelent that operated in Chyrsler 
UK's linwood press shop in the early 19705, 
8. In the walkouts that resulted frol lanagelent's unilateral ilposition of the new relief 
arrangelent, and in a tril shop walkout the following week that resulted in workers being fired, Joe 
Cheal argued against strike action. Under pressure frol the international, gearing up for the 
national contract negotiations, he believed aanagellent was "trying to provoke a strike at Dodge", 
Q~~, Hay 7, Hay 14 1955, 
day bargaining. 
The drive to improve productivity only took off when demand 
for cars began to fall in January and February 1956~ and after' 
Keller's departure left Colbert in complete control. By early 
the Local 3 EB called a strike vote against the speed-
LIP: 
Our patience is at an end. We will not go back to the good old days, for the bosses, before we 
organized a union. We will not knuckle down to crackpot delands for lore and lore production. 
We will fight back with the one weapon we have at our coeland. We will strike if necessary to 
preserve decent working conditions in the Dodge plant.l0 
1 1 
The workers voted massively for strike action: 
For 9,376 
Against 408 
Invalid ____ 1 
~s.Z~~ 
But falling demand and lay-off s were not conducive to action, 
despite the 95.7% vote in favour. Management maintained its 
Pressure and introdl.\ced the pl~actice of issuing "tickets", li'Jritten 
Warnings, to workers for not working faster. 
....... -
-------------------------
1 '-, ..::. 
In June 1956~ amid 
9 . q~~! August 20 1955, viewed the restriction upon chief stewards as particularly threatening 
because Chrysler was insisting they should not bargain during the first hour in the lorning or the 
first hour after lunch: "These are the hours when the forelen jockey .anpoNer around to suit their 
purpose. During these two hours the boss would be supreee and no latter what the boss was doing the 
steward would have no right to protest.' This restriction had been in force on cOI.itteelen in 6" 
plants for sOle years; Anderson and Jefferys, Q~ ~t~, Chapter 9. 
10. q~~, February 18 1956. 
11. Dodge local 3 Collection, WRL, Box 1. Letter, Cheal to Assistant Director, UAW Regional 
Director, Karch 10 1956. . 
1.2. q~~, April 4 1956, reports "tickets· being issued to six door-ja.b paint sprayers in the 
fIfth floor Departlent 91 paint shop. 
these deteriorating conditions~ Pat Quinn became the Blue Slate 
candidate for pr e sident to succeed Joe Cheal , who was not 
identified with production workers" problems. Running against the 
f=;:eLltheri te~ Quinn"s anti-speed-up slate had no 
and Quinn was elected to the position he had first held 
1",' , ~, 
in 1939. It was as if he had been s elected to personify the old 
tradition in the coming battle with the new. 
New work standards 
Hostilities were formally announced by Colbert in a letter 
to all employees in September 1956: 
We have developed new work standards. These standards are co.parable to those of the sa.e jobs 
at Ford and G", and they are fair in the.selves. "eeting these new work standards .eans only 
that each one of us will do, on his own job, as luch work as the e.ployees doing the sa.e work 
at Ford or SH. It takes that luch effort to give us the job security and progress we are all 
shooting for. 
By .easuring up to our new work standards each one of us will be able to do his and her 
part to .ake sure that no one at Ford Dr G" is taking over work that could be done in Chrysler 
plants. "14 
The l e tter was a d e claration of war on a tradition of mutuality in 
e s tablishing standards to which both workers and their supervisor s 
had be en a party for nearly twenty years. What made it 
Significantly different from lower key declarations of intent made 
previously was that this s tatement of position accompanied a ma j or 
reorganization and took place at the ~§QiDDiD9 of the 
1957 model year. 
---------------------------
:L :3 . ~~~, June 16 1956. 
14. Colbert letter, "To the "en and Wo.en of Chrysler Corporation", Septe.ber 5 1956, in Dodge 
Local 3 Collection, WRL. 
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Skirmishes over work standards took place from 'September 
1956 through until March 1957~ much longer than was customary on 
These months were characterized by supervision 's 
readiness to ignore the contract when it gave the workers a 
degree of restraint over their actions. The provisions in the 
1955 contract stipulating advance notice of time study and 
s uggest i ng thf~ el i mi nat i on e)f sLlpervi sory "esti mated standa ... ·ds II 
15 
Were disregarded when inconvenient. The UAW response to the 
added intensity of management pressure was to carryon as u s ual: 
a Chrysler Conference condemned Colbert's letter, there \l'JaS an 
84 ·/. " majority for strike action in a Local 3 ballot~ iand 
Certain rights, such as relief ti.e, negotiated work standards and wash-up ti.e enjoyed by our 
.elbers since the beginning of our Union are slowly being taken away frot the •••• Since the 
start of the 1957 .odel Dodge workers have been subjected to a barrage of threats, 
inti.idation and abuse. Tile study .en have been hired by the dozens and placed in the various 
depart.ents to breath down the workers' necks.16 
thf:1 
Reuther himself acknowledged there were more strikes pending on 
I 
production standards in Chrysler plants than in the rest of the 
17 
LJAl.<J c:ombi nE·?d. 
---------------------------
15. ~~~, October 27 1956: when a section walked out in protest at the sudden i.position of a 
ti.e study on a job in the piston departlent, the lanagelent issued all the strikers with written 
warnings. p~~, Novelber 25 1956: the tria shop walked out in protest against ·piles of tickets· 
issued by forelen to workers who refused to accept the ti.es the fore.en had "esti.ated". 
16 • ~~~, Septnber 29 1956, January 26 1957. 
17 . ~~~, Harch 16 1957. 
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But Reuther~ having successfully dealt with the main pocket 
of mid-1950s opposition at the River Rouge~ had no interest in 
sLIppor"ti ng strikes in defence of pre- Time Study production 
standards in Chrysler plants. He told the Chrysler Conference in 
OctOber 1956 that "the leadership in the Chrysler plants must face 
this question (of production standards> 
realistically •.. in line with a fair day's work.u 
pl~act.i cally 
18 
and 
NOI~ was theY"e 
any likelihood of the kind of s olidarity action between Chrys ler 
19 
plants that had occurred in 1943~ 1945 and 1947. Whi lei t 
protested against the speed-up, Pat Quinn ' s Local ::.:; EB was 
iSOlated both as one of the few remaining ant i -Reutt1f~r" 
administrations and from its own member s hip. The blue button 
steward system had fallen away in most areas and~ foIl owi n<';J the 
introduction of two-yearly terms of office in 1954~ the position 
of chief steward had become still more remote. Li ke ,)oe Cheal 
before him~ Quinn therefore pres sed for compromise on Chrysler " s 
demands rather than for the lengthy plant-wide strike that could~ 
in the last year Chrysler ' s share of the market achieved 20%, have 
had s ome chance of success. 
'Rank and File' opposition 
There was a general understanding among Dodge workers in 1957 
-------------------------
18 • ~~~ ~IlQUtqht, Speci al Chrysl er Bull eti n, !!arch 1957. 
19. In the early and .id-1940s, infor.al factional links through the Chrysler locals had been 
able to organize joint action or exert collective pressure on the International. After Reuther's 
consolidation in power in 1947-49, these no longer existed. Each plant was totally on its aNn. 
3 06 
that - this was not an old-time quarrel over a few production 
standards: it was an argument about the frontier of control. 
Management had made this clear in Colbert ' s letter, and repeated 
it during the negotiations on the 1957 agreement. Chl~ysl er Vi ce 
President Frank W Misch~ in a speech to potential shareholders, 
told the New York Society of Security Analysts that Chrysler had 
completed a major cost-cutting exercise and, More explosively~ 
that the UAW's leadership had co-operated: 
In Septelber 1956 we took another lajor step in the direction of laking our cOlpany lore 
cOlpetitive on costs and ilproving its overall operating efficiency. For two years our 
industrial engineers had been leasuring our lanufacturing operations with a view to raising 
our plant productivity, which was not in line with that of our lajor cOlpetitors. With the 
start of production of our cOlpletely new 1957 cars, lost of the asselbly line operations would 
be basically changed. This change-over period was the only appropriate tile to realign the 
asselbly-line tasks. For lany lonths preceding the start of Production of the 1957 cars, the 
analysis of work lethods and standards was carried down to individual operations. The 
leadership of the UAW-CIO had been inforled of our plans, with a full background of what was 
at stake.20 
The international was stung by this revelation into producing a 
. 
special four page bulletin denying the charge of "co--
21 
<:)pel~ at ion" • Its .denial was not of the substance of Misch ' s 
argume nt that the UAW had known what was going on - but was 
instead directed at Misch's argument that "the tightening- up of 
pr-oduct i on standards Wii:\S a mcd n f actor-" in Chrysl el~ :' s "r-ecovery". 
''(''he LJAW preferl~ed to argue "to the e>:tent that it hal:; made any 
reCovery ... it was brought about by too long delayed technological 
improvements .:md a start towar'ds prodLlct i on rati anal i z ati on." The 
---------------------------
20. ~~~:~\!.Q.tllq~t, Speci alChrysl er Bulletin, Karch 1957. 
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element of truth in this applied more to the machining areas, 
where automatic transfer equipment had been introdu~ed, than tel 
the production lines that were under the greatest pressure. 
The hi gh level o'f eli scontf:nt wi th management and the 
international led in 1957 to 512 reported unauthorized stoppages 
in Chrysler plants. At Dodge Ivlai n, four or five workers from 
areas experiencing the worst speed-up, the body shop and trim 
depew tm€~nt s, had begun meeting together after being elected to 
local 3"s Publicity Committee in 1956. They included Edie Fox, a 
SOcialist Workers" Party member who had worked at Dodge since 
22 
1948. They formed a 'Rank and File' caucus to fight on the 
production standards issue and, to their surprise, they tapped 
a great well of anger and frustration. Quinn finally got Chrysler 
to agree to a compromise on February 27 1957. The agreement gave 
management considerable increases in production while promising 
not to change standards again in the 1957 model year. This did 
not amount to much since the 1957 models had only another five 
month~; to ... ·un. Dodge vice president and former trim department 
chief steward, Pete Tel i !s key, described the benefits for 
department 99. Out of the 900 operations in the department~ he 
Suggested production standards had only been increased on 28~ 
--------------------------
22. Interviews with Edie Fox, Ed Liska. Dodge Hain was also exceptional in the UAN because it 
didn't appoint the le.bers of the local's standing cOllittees (veterans, education, publicity etc), 
but continued to elect thel. 
::':;08 
while they had been decreased on 14. And he argued that since it 
Was a written agreement: 
You know when you go to work how lany pieces you are to do each hour for the balance of the 
'57 10del ••• Work standards are to relain 'as is' for the balance of the 1957 lodel year ••• No 
lore tickets, no lore threats, no lore disciplines on rates of production.23 
Those . who had to work the new standards~ however~ didn :'t Sf.."!8 
things the same way. 
At the first mass meeting on the new agreement~ the former 
Plant committee chairman, now international rep, Jimmy Solomon and 
the local officials were virtually shouted down and the meeting 
Was taken over by opponents of the agreement. Thousands of the 
24 
workers wore the "Rank and File" buttons. Table 12~ listing the 
hourly production rates on ten trim department jobs before and 
after the 1957 agreement~ illustrates why such anger remained: 
-------------------------
23. Q~~ Karch 23 1957. 
24. Fox interview. 
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Operation 
TABlE 12 
DODGE MIN TRlft DEPARTllENT SELECTED PRODOCTIIII STANDARDS, 
. BEFORE AU AFTER THE 1957 A6REEJIENT 
Alount perf or led COlpany deaand Alount laid 
~~fQ[~ Winter 1951,/57 dOlin by 
1957 agreelent 1957 agreelent 
Actual increase 
Morked 
m 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
liindlace 7 9 8 14.3 
Door loulding 15 22 18 20 
Cloth headlining 2.5 (teal) No deiand 2.5 (teall" 0 
Installation of instrulent 
panel to body I, (teal) 9 (teal) 7.5 (teal) 25 
Chrole windshield loulding 
on hardtops 12 23 15 25 
LOMer belt chrole 1,.5 9 1,.5 0 
Glass vent I, 10 7 11,.7 
Door pads on South line 30 31, 30 0 
Door pads on North line 21, 31, 28 7.7 
LaMer chrole windshield 
loulding 11, 23 19 18.8 
SOURCE: UAW Research Departlent Collection, WRL, Box 79: data related to Chrysler speed-up dispute, 1958. 
In sections where standards were not raised~ the company's demands 
had made workers realize tbg~ could be next. It took Quinn and 
Solomon, who negotiated the 1957 production standards agreement~ 
ten days and several mass meetings to persuade the membership to 
accept it. A few week s later the Rank and File caucus put up a 
full slate in the election of delegates to the 1957 UAW Atlantic 
City convention - and~ to their amazement and the fury of the 
international and the Local 3 officer corps who were denied their 
26 
customary vacation, the White Slate outsiders picked up 22 of 
:25. ~~~, February 11" Harch 9 1957. 
2~. Attendance at the week long UAW convention was increasingly seen as a vacation by lost 
delegates after 1949 and the consolidation of Reuther's faction in power and the introduction of 
biennial conventions; Liska interview; Anderson and Jefferys, Q~ ~~t, 
the 35 pI aces. , 
The Dodge Main 1957 Rank and File delegation to Atlantic City 
27 
created one of the last big stirs at any UAW Convention. Heads 
began to be turned when they opposed the dues increase. The 
outspoken Scot from the paint shop~ Alfred McNeil~ lashed into the 
UAW officials: 
I a. opposed to a dues increase because of all the trouble that we have had in the Dodge 
co.pany. We have had representation that does not a.ount to 50 cents. I don't think any of 
our International reps will go hungry.28 
When it came to a resolution commending the IEB for "unwavering 
adherence to the policy of authorizing strikes where collective 
bargc\ining has proved futile", Reuther deliberately called Edith 
Fox to the microphone. She attacked the resolution~ arguing that 
"we, the rank-and-file members of our Union, have demonstrated a 
willingness ' to fight back but we are being discouraged in our 
efforts by our International leadership." Her five minutes was 
immediately followed by a lengthy piece of red-baiting by Norman 
l'1atthews~ the director of the UAW Chrysler Department. "Where was 
th is Fa>: gi 1"'1 ?" in the hundred days ~ stri ke of 1950~ he asked. He 
accused the "so-called rank and file group" of only getting 
elected because they passed out leaflets while the blue and green 
Slates had agreed not to conduct an election campaign this year. 
2 7. The view of Ed liska, who has either attended or received detailed reports on all the 
subsequent Conventions. He did not attend the 1973 Convention with its rows over dues and the three-
yearly scheduling of all elections. 
2 E3. UAW, l~t~ ~Q~y~~ttQ~ EtQ£~~qt~q~, April 7-12 1957, Atlantic City, New Jersey, 198. 
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And ~H? .H-qued, "I think it is about time t.his Ccmvfmtion should 
give us the authority to deal 
29 
with these people "in quick 
The UAW's own figures did not support the argument that the 
international had backed its locals. In February 1957, 12 Chrysler 
plants requested strike authorization, but onlY one authorized 
5tl"" ike Y'"f?sul ted, and only two other authorized strikes took place 
30 
in the whole of 1957. To cover up this poor record, Mi.~tthews 
conceded the opposition's demand that overtime in all Chrysler 
plants be stopped while the month-long strike by 4,000 workers in 
the Chrysler Los Angeles plant, was taking place. 
"NoIfoJ," he asked rhetorically, "who is milit.ant? Are these fakers 
that sit in this audience militant, or is the leadership of the 
Chrysler plants militant, plus the International Union, my 
friends?" Reuther himself then wound up the debate, accusing the 
Dodge Main delegation of wasting time and justifying 
intolerance of dissent shown by Matthews and himself: 
If the people who provoke these kinds of discussion will just think before they do, we would 
save a lot of tile of this Convention. But they are not going to get away with untruths, 
because we are going to answer the •• 31 
the 
Reuther's convention bullying had nothing in common with the 
---------------------------
29 • t~t~, 311-328. 
:::',0. Figures in ~p'qUtq!lt, Harch 1957, and Corporation data. 
3 1 • t~t~, 311-328. 
'democratic' left reputation he cultivated outside the UAW. 
II. Decisive struggle 
The 1958 recession was traumatic. Chrysler only produced 581~244 
its lowest output between 1947 and 1980~ ~ level 29% below 
its average yearly production from 1946- 49. In line with this 
dramatic market collapse~ mass lay-offs and severances cut its 
hourly-paid labour force to 59,440 - a post-war employment figure 
1 OWf~r than at a ny time except for the 1961-2 and 1980 
recessions. The slump was made worse by the legacy of 
Chrysler " s managerial crisis. Colbert had rushed the new 1957 
models into production before they had been properly tested, and 
3 4 
they hcid "numerou!:; str-uct:Llf- al of 1 aws and rampant: rust pr-obl ems II • 
As the complaints multiplied, Chrysler lost its reputation for 
engineering quality at: the precise moment the bottom fell out of 
:~2 . Not surprisingly, the IEB ended up with its cOllendation frol the UAW Convention. Yet the 
public argulent that sOlething could and should have been done to prevent the loss of lutuality over 
production standards during the 1957 bool was relelbered in the 1960 elections in Dodge Hain. Then, 
after a lay-off affecting the lajority of production workers for between 12 and 18 lonths, when 
workers finally returned to discover working conditions quite unlike those they had experienced 
before, several of the prile lovers of the 'Rank and File' caucus such as Edie Fox and Ed Liska were 
elected chief stewards for the first tile; Fox and Liska interviews. Liska resigned as steward 
shortly after being elected since the existing organization in the body shop had lade it clear they 
were out to lake life as difficult for hi. as possible if he cale frol nowhere to take the steward's 
privileges. 
33 . COlpany data. Gil and Ford were also hit in this recession, but not nearly so dralatically. 
Thus Gil's 1958 production level of 2.121 cars was only its lowest since 1952 and was still 30t above 
the average for the late 1940s; and Ford', production of 1.221 cars in 1958 was 38t up on its 
average production frol 1946 to 1949. 
34 . Stuart, Qe ~U, 65. 
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the market. 
The severity of the recession presented Chrysler~ and many 
other managements , with both ideal conditions to exercise near 
total .intransigence in labour relations and the incentive to act 
35 
deCisively. Chrysler ' s all-time record number of strikes in 1957 
was repeated in 1958, despite a 40% smaller fabour force. The 
strike frequency rate therefore shot up. More than eight strikes 
took place for every 1~OOO Chrysler workers in 1958, compared to 
Over five in 1957 and an average of 1.5 during the previous ten 
years. The argument that this greater strike frequency was the 
outcome of a conscious determination by management to reassert its 
authority is supported not merely by this counter-cyclical rise in 
36 
the number of decisions to stop work, but also by the still 
greater increase in the average number of hours lost while on 
unauthorized strike. Chrysler workers lost an average of 17.4 
hour s a year on unauthorized strike between 1947 and 1956; in 1957 
this figure rose to 25.1 hours and in 1958 to 91 hours. If the 
4.55m man-hours lost in the two authorized strikes that year 
(including the Dodge Main one) are added to the 5.41m man-hours 
lost in unauthorized strikes~ then each Chrysler worker lost on 
35. Northrup, q~ £t~, 9, argued that 'eanagelent's tougher stand vis-a-vis unions is not a 
latter of tactics or, in eost cases, even philosophy, but is rather the result of sOle ugly econoeic 
facts of life which lanagelent has all too belatedly recognized.' 
36. See above: Table 3 and figure 1. for this interpretation of a rising strike frequency, see the 
argulent by P K Edwards, "Britain's changing strike problee ', lngY~!r!!! B!!!!!9n~ J9Yrn!!, XIII, 
no. 2 119S2}. 
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average a month"s work: 21 full eight hour shifts. 
This high strike loss resulted from a three~6ld managment 
stroategy. Once it realized there was little to be done to improve 
Chrysler's sales position in the 1958 model year~ rnanaqement 
accompanied mass lay-offs with a renewed offensive on the 
production standards of those still at work. Fortuitously for the 
"Big Three'~ the 1955 auto industry contracts expired that summer, 
so Chrysler seized upon the UAW tactic of "working without a 
contract" to tear up the remaining custom and practice agreements 
that still restrained its "right to manage". And finally, 
that for a decisive defeat to be registered, a battle must be 
fought, Chrysler engaged the Dodge Main workers in a stand-up 
authorized strike, and beat them. 
Man Assignments 
Local 3 president Pat Quinn and plant committee chairman 
Steve Pasica became aware of the new management strategy on 
January 7 1958. They were summoned to a meeting by the Dodge 
Labour Relations Director and given two days' notice of a lay-off 
of a further 3,500 workers. This was not unexpected, since the 
same number had already been laid off since the start of the 1958 
model year and it would bring the number of Dodge workers down to 
around 10,000. What was unexpected was the news that the plant 
would be shut down for two weeks and that those called back on 
37 . COlpany data. 
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January 22 would have to work to a new method of determining 
38 
product i em I~ at !:?!s call ed "1'1an '~ssi qnment. Progr ams " . 
Militants like Ed Li ska in the body-in-white had continued to 
, 
complain about the pressure , at t.he st.art of t.he 1958 model s: 
The working conditions at the Dodge Plant have been at its lowest ebb since our Union was 
organized. Work schedules have been changed, not only in 1957 but 1956 as well. Nearly every 
worker has been putting out approxilately 40! lore production than in the' past years.39 
But by comparison with what was to follow, the initit.ial pressure 
was quit e s liqht. Manaqement used the January 1958 two-week s hut -
dovm to unvei I plant-wide man assignment schedules that 
increased produciion in t. he trim shop from 92 to 97 cars a n hour 
40 
with 26% fewer workers . But. those working we re t.he luck y ones: 
the 9,000 workers laid off didn 't start getting recalled until 
41 
September 1959, 20 month s ' later. 
The man assignment.s finally finished off the old custom a nd 
pr-actice of establishing a "fair" standard between the wor ker , 
t.he blue button steward and the foreman. It allocated work on a 
different basi s to the old ~yst em. Before, the jobs came fir st and 
the labour force was divided up to cover them. The system created 
considerable since certain jobs took a 
:::::8. ~~~, January 18 1958. 
:39 • ~~~, January 11 1958. 
4(1. ~~~, Harch 8 1958; in Decelber 1957 1,649 tria departlent workers produced 736 cars per shift; 
fro. January 20 1958, the relaining 1,225 workers produced 776 cars a day. 
41 • ~~~, February 25 1961. 
:::':;16 
great 
deal of time, while others could be finished much more quickly. 
Under the new system, the total available labour time c~me first, 
and the work was then divided up so each worker"s time was as 
close as possible to fully occupied. The man assignments were 
prepar~ed :i n the Indus"txi al Engi nt?ers" (IE) department, c.'\way f room 
the shop floor. And they were u niversal across the plant, tying 
all di r-ec:t p r-od uct ion wor kers to a common ef fort 'and outPLlt. The 
increases in individu al productivity demanded from the assembly 
side of t h e plant were considerable. A UAW document used in the 
negotiations that took place at the end of February 1958 gave 
figures of a speed-up of between 17 and 43%: 
TABlE 13 
1958: INCREASED PRODUCTUII DEllMDS MDE BY CIIlYSlER AT DODGE flAlN 
Deparhent 1957 1958 Increase 
Production Hanpower Requested Prod. Manpower t 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Body in white 1504 23B4 77b 933 31.9 
Tri l (day shiftl 744 Ib50 776 1201 30 
Final Asseably: 
Departaent 12i 720 3BO 77b 342 19.b 
Deparhent 123 720 490 77b 450 17.3 
Hotor Asselbly BBO 355 720 200 43.3 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SOURCE: UAW Research Departlent Collection , WRL" Box 79; doculent dated February 24 1958. 
Workers throughout Dodge Main tried to defend the old system 
by refusing to work to the new standards and in the second week of 
\ 
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the new system hundreds were sent home for failing to keep up to 
4 2 
the new man assignments. In the trim shop at the . center of the 
stt~ ugg 1 e ~ five workers were f j.red during the fit'"st two weeks of 
Ft::l bt'"Llary. Four others were dismissed in other areas of the 
4 "'" ~, 
pl':'II'1t. ItJhen so 1Ili.~ny worker's had been sent home that it \l'1i::15 
impossible to ccmtinUE;? to run the plant~ management simply sent 
the other workers home. In the 22 days ' following the 
introduction of the new man assignments~ the trilll shop only 
worked an average of three hours and 35 minutes a day. But during 
those hours~ the actual production rate~ 68 an hour on the 1957 
standards~ rose from 75 an hour on Januarv 22 to hit 80 an hour 
44 
regularly in February 1958. 
Aware that management was trying to provoke strikes Quinn 
tried to keep everybody working - and so he made it known that 
anyone who was fired on a production standard issue would be put 
on the Local 3 payroll. Chrysler responded in kind~ by announcing 
that it would oppose the payment of state unemployment benefit to 
on the grounds that the local ' s support of those 
disciplined for refusing to work to standard was tantamount to an 
admission of an industrial dispute. 
4 2 . ~~~, February 8 1958. 
4 :3. ~~~, February 22 1958. KcNeil described lanagelent's tactics as "terrorist·, t~tq, Karch 1 
1958. 
44. UAW Research Departlent collection, Box 79; data related to Chrysler speed-up dispute 1958. 
The !£!~!! figures were, of course, significantly below the capacity figures laid down by lanage.ent 
on the assu.ption of no break-downs, shortages, or other forls of interruption, given in the 
·production delands" lade by Chrysler above. 
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On this occasion~ Reuther and Colbert person~llytook over 
the negotiations. Their agreement~ on March 3~ was an even 
sharper declaration of management's rights than had been contained 
in the 1957 production standards' agreement. This time Chrysler's 
concessions were merely notional. It agreed to withdraw its threat 
to the unemployment benefit of those laid off~ "to reinstate the 
nine sacked workers and to restore the earlier production 
standards except where improvements in method had been 
introduced. Wherf.;? "improvements" had occLlI'Ted <and they were 
fairly widespread since the 25% cut in the labour force in January 
had necessitated a major redistribution of work) IEs would look 
at the assignments again if there were any problems. In retur"n, 
the UAW formally agreed to allow management to continue to revise 
45 
production standards during the model year. Management had won a 
significant victory. Table 14 illustrates the effect of the 1958 
agreement on the same ten trim department jobs considered in Table 
1 2 iabclve: 
4 ':::-..J. Q~~~ Karch 15 1958 • 
~519 
TABlE 14 
DODGE "'lIN TRI" DEPARTIlENT SElECTED PRODUCTIIII STANDARDS, 
BEFORE AND AFTER THE 1957 11M ASSISIIDTS 
Operation Alount perf or led 
after 
1957 agreelent 
lrIindlace 8 
Door loulding 18 
Cloth headlining 2.5 (teal) 
Installation of instrulent 
panel to body 7.5 (teal) 
a.Chrole windshield loulding 
on hardtops 15 
b.Lower belt chrole 6.5 
Glass vent 7 
Door pads on South line 30 
c.Door pads on North line 28 
Lower chrole windshield 
loulding 19 
COlpany deland 
January 1958 
13.96 
31.4 
S.8 (teal) 
15 (teal) 
38 
12.5 
17.6 
48 
48 
40 
Alount 
worked 
/larch 1958 
9 
19 
3 (teal) 
10 (teal) 
15 
6.5 
12 
30 
30 
34 
Actual increase 
worked 
It) 
12.5 
5.5 
20 
33.3 
0 
71.4 
0 
7.1 
78.9 
SOURCE: UAW Research Departlent Collection, WRL, Box 79: data related to Chrysler speed-up dispute, 
1958. 
NOTES: a. This job's production standard had been increased 251 in 1957. 
b. One of the few jobs to shoH no increase in either 1957 or 1958. 
c. Over 1957 and 1958 the standards for door pads on the North line were raised to equal 
those on the South line which didn't change. 
The speed-up begun in 1957 was continued in, from management"s 
point of view, the much more favourable circumstances of 1958 and 
produced an average rise in productivity on these ten jobs of 28% 
46 
over the two model years. While it is not possible to 
reconstruct any completely reliable comparisons between the pace 
of work in 8M and Ford plants as against Chrysler, the marked 
difference that was frequently commented upon in the 1950s had 
46. This is on the assulption that these jobs, which were selected by the UAW Research Departlent 
at the tile for negotiating purposes, had fairly stable lanning levels. 
32() 
4"7 
undoubtedly been substantially eroded by 1959 and 1960. 
No contract 
In June 1958 the Chrysler workers~ like those at 8M and Ford, 
stayed at work after the expiry of the 1955 contracts. L.eonard 
Woodcock, head of the UAW 8M Department~ 
48 
said~ "vJe are goi ng to 
rock and roll all summer." Reuther told the ~~li §t JgY~Q~l: 
I think it's good for the union's soul to work for a while without a contract. It'll lake the 
lelbers aware of a lot of things that used to be autolatic.49 
Car sales were so low~ the argument went~ there was no possibility 
of extracting any concessions from the employers until the start 
of the 1959 models. But like mud ... of the "strategy" bargai ni ng 
Which emerged from Reuther in the post - war years, it was an 
analysi$ which looked at the industry from the vantage point of 
access to the boardrooms rather than from the stance of shop floor 
worker s having to live with the consequences. Colbert sent a 
letter to all Chrysler workers letting them know there would be 
"SOmf? chi.-tnge in c~rr"angements for" handling gr-ievanc:es" and 
reminding them that "shop rules forbid collection initiation fees~ 
4 "7. Argulents such as the following one by Edith Fox, reporting frol the qqqq~ ~~!~ Tril Shop, 
~~~, Harch 15 1958, no longer appeared in the 19&05 Dr 19705: ·Now let us say that if the cOlpany 
could get away with establishing standards in the Chrysler plants like those of its cOlpetitors, 
what then? Would they then not point to the .en and wOlen in the unorganized shops and say to us, 
that these are your fellow len, all of you letbers of the hUlan race, that they are working harder 
than you, and we therefore deland standards co.parable to those of these unorganized workers? Nhen 
they have cOlpleted speeding up the Alerican workers they can begin looking around in other areas 
and point to the lany e~ploited peoples elsewhere on this earth. With the conquest of space, there 
is no li.it to what Hr Lacy (Chrysler VP) lay discover on other planets in the cOling years as a 
basis to speed up the Chrysler workers." 
48. Quoted in Willial Serrin, lh~ ~q~~!~y !~q th~ M~!q~ (New York: Vintage, 1974), 175. 
49. Quoted approvingly in q~~, June 28 1958. 
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50 
dues and assessments during working hours." Reuther's idea may 
well have been that what the workers lost in the "no contract · 
period they could regain subsequently. But in Chrysler plants 
what was lost was lost per~anently and, since this included the 
51 
tradition of sectional bargaining~ it was never recovered. 
Two days after the contract expired~ Chrysler tore up the 
departmental relief agreement that still operated in Dodge Main 's 
body-in-white~ and laid off the 35 workers who acted as the 
additional tag relief men. The relief agreement in Department 76 
had been introduced in 1938 on the grounds that the heat and dust 
in the body-in-white was much worse than in other department s . It 
provided each worker with a total of 70 minutes' relief a day: the 
7t h and 8th floor production lines stopped for five minutes' relief 
every hour and workers were also relieved by tagmen for two 15 
minute breaks~ one in the morning and one in the afternoon. 
Rather than strike immediately in defence of this agreement, which 
would have jeopardized Supplementary Unemployment Benefit payments 
to those laid off, the body shop agreed to work the new system of 
12 minutes' relief in the morning and 16 in the afternoon. The 
QQQg§ ~~io. ~§~§ approved: 
5<). Quoted in Q~~, June 7 1958. The result of this harasslent and the collapse of its working 
lelbership Mas so considerable that after four lonths without the check-off local 3 was forced to 
lake slall cuts in its wages and expenses. 
51 . Reuther subsequently acknowledged, President's Report to UAW's 17th Constitutional Convention, 
Atlantic City, October 9-16 1959, 22: "It was at Chrysler that working conditions becale lost 
difficult." 
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The Norkers, sensing this trap refused to take the bait and decided at a lee.ting to leet the 
probl eI head on - knoNi ng that IIhi I e the co.pany is having their turn at bat no'lI, the workers' 
turn would cOle sooner or later and that they lIould get their just relief tile back.52 
But thf? "\I'JorkE~rs:' time" didn't come in September when they were 
called back for the start up of the 1959 models. Steve Pasica 
then warned that "the Company said they would discharge employees 
if th~?y did not stay on the job '60 minutf?s out of every hour"~ 
and by the end of the month 24 men had been disciplined for 
54 
taking the extended breaks and six had been discharged. Liska 
reported that these men "were picked by management to show fear 
to other workers in the department. All production workers did 
exactly the same things that the [first] 26 men did but they were 
not penalized." By October the 'just' relief system had gone. 
In June, on Day Three of 'working without a contract " , 
management instructed all chief stewards to work on their assigned 
jobs for six hours a day including the first hour of the shift~ 
56 
the first hour after lunch and the last hour of the shift. At 
this provoked a show of resistance from the Dodge stewards 
5:2. ~~~, June 14 1958. 
~:;3. Local 3 Collection, WRL, Executive Board Meetings, Box 2i EB leeting Septelber 25 1958. 
54 . Q~~, October 4 1958. 
56. Q~~ June 14 1958. The restriction on chief stewards and plant cO.litteelen had been seen in 
1955 as a very serious threat to the shop floor organizing role of the stewards since it was at 
these 10lents in the day that lost lanagerial decisions about lovelents of labour were taken. See 
above: note 173, page 237. 
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and EB. Within a week a majority of stewards and cqmmitteemen had 
received first a one-day penalty lay-off and then three-day 
penalties for refusing to abide by the restrictions. The situation 
was moving fast towards mass dismissals of the Dodge stewards. The 
international reps, Solomon and Addis~ advised the EB to accept 
Chrysler'S terms. But the EB wanted to show m6re fight and 50 
launched a new ·strategy ' . The stewards and plant committeemen 
were to work for @ll eight hours a day and so effectively withdraw 
frClm all grievance machinery with the management. The unreal 
approach of ' fighting' management restrictions by self-restlriction 
didn't go down well. Two days later~ swamped with complaints from 
stewards not ready to work full-time or who saw the move as 
dangerous for the future of shop floor union organization~ the EB 
57 
rescinded its decision and accepted Chrysler"s terms. These 
amounted to a re-drawing of the bargaining map. Blue button 
stewards were no longer to be recognized, and foremen and 
SLIP(~F· i ntendents were tol d to ignore "the chi ef stewards when they 
to settle a grievance without reducinq it. to 
58 
writing". Io.f.Qr..m~!.. b i:'l rgaining Wi"'S banished - and with it the 
Scope for lower - level managerial discretion on which the tradition 
of sectional negotiations had developed. In future~ !!! sect.ional 
and departmental grievances would have to be registered in the 
57. Local 3 Collection, WRL, Executive Board Meetings, Box 2; EB Minutes, June 10, 12 1958. 
58 • q~~, Novelber 29 1958. 
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labour relations department so that settlements would no Idnger be 
determined by the individual supervisor but by cor~orate policy. 
The labour relations department had finally become an authority 
59 
within the corporation. 
In August, Pat Quinn summed up the results of the "working 
without a contract" strategy: 
Quinn, 
Since June 1, the date our contract with Chrysler expired, the nUlber of lanagelent-provoked 
walkouts has steadily increased as Chrysler lanagelent continues to put on the pressure and to 
take away tany recognized practices - such as relief tile, Mash up tile, seniority rights etc. 
Up to this point there has been no walkouts in our plant, but lany of our negotiated practices 
have either been drastically changed or elilinated altogether.60 
however, was still in favour of seeing things through. 
Although Chrysler"s Twinsburg~ Ohio plant had finally struck 
rather than work under the new conditions on the start-up of the 
61 
1959 models, Quinn was opposed to such a move at Dodge Main. 
There was an undercurrent of feeling that even a long strike would 
be preferable to the permanent erosion of working conditions. 
Liska reported from the hard-hit Department 76: 
---------------------------
59. Northrup, ~ £tt, 13, suggests that the growth of the industrial relations function in the 
1950s was partially responsible for the lore conscious attelpt to re-shape labour relations out of 
the opportunity provided by the 1958 recession; luch of industry, he wrote, "had, by the lid-1950s, 
built up a capable core of industrial relations executives and technicians; these experts were lore 
than anxious to perforl on the basis of their training and ability rather than to accept passively 
top lanagelent's views on sales and profits." 
60. p~~, August 23 1958. 
61. Local 3 Collection, WRL, Executive Board Meetings, Box 2; ED August 14 1958. ) 
We do not know how other departaents' workers feel about the Morking conditions, but the 
consensus of Morkers in our departlent reveals that they are Milling to go on a long strike to 
bring back the huaane Morking conditions in our departlent, and I light add, that if a 
contract is signed and the Morking conditions are not ilproved, the lelbers of our departlent 
Mill be very luch disappointed at our union leaders.b2 
But despite his recent re-election (in June) as Blue Slate 
candidate for Local 3 president~ Quinn was increasingly dep~ndent 
on Reuther for advice. In September he argued against precipitate 
s i:t'- ike action "becau5.e of the present ( n c~ t i on a 1 ) contY-act 
negotiations and a request b y the International Union that the 
6 _:·' ...;. 
wOl~ kers be kept on the; ob" • It was not that Quinn believed 
they s houl d accept the ne\oOl condi ti ons. He tal d the \oOlor'kf orce : "No 
honest union member could stand by and watch the gains they have 
made over the past 20 years go down the drain in a few short 
64 
months." But his strategy was to rely upon Reuther to restore 
these II qid ns" in the nat i anal. contr-act negoti ati ons. 
The argument that the "worker'!:; ' ti me" wc)ul d come "sooner or 
later" ignored the reality that the legit.imacy of t.he old 
workplace rules depended on their accept.ance or toleration by 
management @n~ their continuous exercise by the workers. There 
was nothing intrinsic to the old relief agreement that would 
allow it to be restored several months after management tore it 
62. Q~~ July 12 1958. 
6 :3. Q~~~ October 4 1958. 
64. ~~~~. 
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up and workers had ceased to experience it. Collectively-
imposed workplace rules restraining managerial autonomy were not 
barqaining items that could be added or subtracted from a 
contract negotiation like a demand for higher wages. "Working 
without a contract" was thus a particularly dangerous strategy to 
adopt in Chrysler plants since the implication of "working under 
management·s rules' meant so much more there than in GM and Ford~ 
65 
where management " s rules already held sway. Chrysler seized the 
opening offered by the UAW and the market situation to transform 
working conditions in its plants. By October 1958 all that 
remained was to ensure that the national contract supported the 
new managerial control system at plant level, and openly and 
publicly to defeat its key local, Local 3, and so prevent any 
chance of the 1959-60 market recovery being used to turn the 
labour relations clock back. 
Managerial authority 
The UAW's 1958 ' target' company, Ford, gave nothing away in 
its contract with the UAW, signed on September 17, so there was 
no prospect of Chrysler conceding anything additional. But the 
eighth Chrysler contract was not · n~utral · . Its "benefits' were 
only for those leaving the company pay-roll (severance payments 
from five days' wages for up to two years' service to 150 days 
t>5. Relief tile of just 24 linutes per eight hour shift had been i'posed by Ford lanagelent in 
1949; Brody, QP f!!~ 201. 
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wages for those with 30 years). Those still working~ however~ 
f i:\ced two significant contractual changes that rei nfo ... ·ced 
managerial authority in the workplace. 
management redrafted the 1958 contract to reflect its 
new policy on production standards. The 1955 agreement had 
allowed informal bargaining between the chief steward and the 
foreman~ and Chrysler had agreed to give the steward "all the data 
upon which the Corporation has based the standard" if the steward 
66 
Y@c~~liY requested it. FY"om 1958~ however, "all 
supporting the standard" would be made available only 
67 
its dati:\ 
"if a 
written ql~ievance :is filed". This deterred the worker and the 
steward from proceeding with border-line complaints and ensured 
that no compromises would be reached on the job between the 
steward and the foreman without the involvement of the labour 
relations and IE departments. 
The second significant change was to extend the the degree of 
involvement by the international in plant--level negot i at i. ons. 
if UAW rules had been adhered to and the IEB had 
sanctioned a strike, a local could stop work after five days of 
plant-level negotiations. From 1958 the negotiations had to 
continu~? "for at least 12 days", 
328 
notify Chrysler "in ,""witing" o·f the strikE? author-ization and 
bEl 
grievances involved. 
The 6~OOO Dodge workers called b~ck in September and October 
1958 to work on the 1959 models were more con~erned with the new 
working conditions than with the longer-term implications for the 
rule- making process inherent in the 1958 contract. The contract 
was ratified without marked opposition and the workforce proceeded 
to tc~k+? c\ stri ke vot€.~ on "rateE~ o·f production~ 
69 
relief time and 
war· ~d ng cond it ion!:;" • 
70 
The result was a 93% majority for a 
Yes 3.611 
No 262 
Void __ 12 
~!.~~~ 
But the small numbers voting reflected the increasingly divisive 
71 
impact of the mass lay- offs and the success of management ·s 
three year struggle to condition its workforce to a new definition 
---------------------------
6 ft_ Local 3 collection, WRL, Executive Board Meetings, Box 2; Minutes October 9 1958. 
7(1. lh~, October 15 1958. 
7 1. In late October and Hove.ber 1958 Chrysler insisted on certain sections working Saturday 
overtile. Despite a decision by the EB not to permit this while large nUlbers were laid off, EB 
Minutes! October 23 1958), it still persisted, leading to the local's Unelployed COllittee setting 
up an unelployed workers' picket line in front of the plant on Saturdays in Novelber. This created a 
an angry protest by the Dodge stewards asking the ED to take action to stop the picketing. The 
stewards argued "that sOlething be done to organize unelployed cOI.ittees in all plants of the Big 
Four, and then the picketing could be done a national-wide scale", EB Minutes, Nove.ber 20 1958. In 
the event the EB, that was attended by 72 ·visitors· lobbying for and against the issue of Saturday 
overtile, didn't vote on either position. It hoped instead that .anageaent's insistence on overtile 
while workers were laid off could be resolved in the continuing negotiations over what the 
International had by then agreed were strikeable grievances. 
of " legitimate' union activity. 
Chrysler h a d three important advantages over its weakened 
opponent in the strike that finally took place between December 2 
and December 19 1958. It had used the new maximum of 60 days delay 
between a strike vote and strike action to consolidate its new 
workinq practices at Dodge. It had also extracted an additional 
two months ' production from the plant. Crucially~ unlike the 
comparable moment in 1939 when the speed-up at Dodge Main had been 
u sed by the UAW as the spark to ignite a successful struggle 
7 2 
across all Chrysler's plants~ the Dodge local was on its own. 
Although there were eiqht other Chrysler locals queueing up for 
IEB authorization to strike on speed-up~ relief times and working 
7 ":" ~\ 
conditions;~ once the national contract was signed each was 
considered separately by the international. This was a recipe for 
a decisive manaqement victory in a strike that marked the close of 
a twenty-year period in which the labour process at Dodge had been 
gover"ned by workpl ace rules estab lished through i nforlnal 
departmental and sectional level bargaining. 
Although the Dodge Main two-week strike was the action of an 
individual plant~ Chrysler generalized Local 3'sdefeat throughout 
72. See page 105-106 above. 
7~3 . Local 3 Collection, IiIRL, EB Box 2; Minutes Deceaber 13 1958. 
the corporation. 'rhe "1"lemor andLlm of Understandi ng on Hates. of 
Production", signed on December 19 by Jack Conway and Doug Fraser 
for the UAW Chrysler Department, was given the status of a 
corporation-wide amendment to the national contract. The 1.939 
contr·act "rates of production" clause II'Jc3!5 iambiglJoLls: 
The Kanagelent agrees that in establishing rates of production it Mill lake studies on !b@ 
~~§!§ 9! !~![n@§§ ~ng !9Y!!Y consistent Nith quality of Norklanship, efficiency of operations 
and the reasonable Morking capacities of norlal operators.£IY eaphasis, SJl 74 
Instead of this commitment to studies "on the basis of fairness 
and equity", the December 19 1958 (agreement laid down "time study" 
itself as the impa~tial marker against which the studies should be 
judged. And it recognized total managerial autonomy over the 
technique chosen to make that study. The new agreement began: 
Clause 1: Tile study is a generally accepted lethod used by lanagelent as a basis for 
establishing rates of production and as a basis for deterlining the fairness of Nork loads. 
Clause 2: The .ethod or technique used by lanagelent for the establishing of rates of 
production is an exclusive right to lanage.ent, and the Union does not have the right to 
challenge the lethod that .anagelent selects.75 
Clauses 5 and 6 of the December 1958 agreement freed management·s 
hands in two further respects: new man assignments could be issued 
whenever "production schedules are increased or decreased on ma jor 
and management could insist on workers 
continuing to work at their "nol~ mal pace" .when unforeseen 
76 
circumstances arose that affected the original work standard. 
Fi naIl Y', Clause 7 imposed a standard 24 minutes a day personal 
74 . UAW-Chrysler Contract, Novelber 291939,14. 
75. UAIi-Chrysler l'leaorandul, Decetber 19 1959, 1. 
Tl 
relief on all Chrysler "s conveyor line workers. 
The spur-'red Chrysler t,o complete the 
standardization of work standards and relief arrangements. In the 
stampi ng pI ant, 
78 
it posted time standards on each individual 
machine. 1959~ when workers with ten years' 
79 
seniority retL\rned to ",mrk "'Jit:h "mi>:ed emotions" on the 1960 
models~ the new relief procedure was in force throughout the 
plant: the Conant stampings plant had been taken on in February 
80 
c~nd the Foundry and Core Room in August. They backed down 
before threats to transfer their work from Dodqe Main; 
81 
the Wire 
Room did not back down and was closed. The 1958 strike was as 
great a turning point as had been the 1939 strike. 8i ),: months 
1 ater (lui nn admi t t(~d that "the December agreement was a "col d' 
one" • Yet he jU!stified it !5ince "it paved the "'Jay for the 
82 
production elf the s:,mc~l.l Chrysler- (car) at our plant,." 
7 '7 • t~tq, 3. While this agree.ent applied nationally, a special relief agree.ent was drawn up for 
the Depart.ent 76 workers as the basis for the return to work. This additional agree.ent was to 
operate for the re.ainder of the 1959 lodels only, after which the 24 linutes a day agree.ent would 
apply. Until then, lanagelent agreed to stop the seventh and eighth floor conveyor lines for five 
linutes everv other hour (four hours a day, providing an extra 20 linutes relief) on condition that 
the line speeds were increased to lake up the production that would be lost. 
78. ~~~, February 19 1959. This was the first tile lanagelent had been able to do this. 
79. q~~~ October 10 1959! report frol the Final Asselbly Unit. 
80. ~~~, February 28, August 15 1959. 
81. Nalezty interview. 
8~" ..:... q~~, June 6 1949 • 
II'1utuality" had finally been dr-'iven off the shop floor . Even 
that face-saving form of words no longer appeared in the 1958 
The scope of bargaining had been deliberately 
restricted to the international r-epresentati ves~ the full-time 
local officers~ and to the plant committee. Chief stewards were 
still tol erc3ted ~ al though thei I'" number!:; were sCIon to be reduced ~ 
but their function was changed. From being organizers 01'" 
representatives of the areas which elected them~ they became 
merely processors of grievances. And with sectional problem-
Solving denied them~ Chrysler workers increasinqly turned to the 
propel'" :' consti tuti onal :' channels of the UAW and the company 
grievance procedure for answers to their problems. When these too 
appeared to fail, as they did to many black and younger workers in 
tht? l ate 1960s~ then uncondoned wildcats~ spontaneoLIS, violent 
explosions and drug taking became the locus of continuing dissent. 
The management victory meant workplace rules would in future 
be laid down by management and endorsed by the international and 
the Local 3 EB and plant committee in contract negotiations. 
Chrysler's shop floor rule-forming tradition had been ' normalized' 
---------------------------
8 :3 . The language of confrontation had given May to the luted conversation of pressure; 
unauthorized but condoned strikes Mere replaced by constitutional strike deadlines: "The Officers 
and President feel a 12-day notice [of strike action] is needed to love Hanagelent off dead center. " 
These Nere the Nords of PlYlouth Local 51's President Serafini reporting to his lelbership on the 
progress of negotiations over 52 strikeable grievances; Local 51 Collection, WRL, Box 17, File 5; 
General Helbership Meeting Minutes, October 13 1963. Agreelent Mas reached without a strike. 
in line with practice at GM and Ford. The result is shown in the 
dramatic six fold drop in Chrysler's strike frequency shown in 
B4 
from the 1950s to the 1960s~ and here in Table 15~ in 
the ten fold drop in the average annual number of hours lost in 
strikes per worker: 
TABlE 15 
CIIlYSLER AID fiElIERAl IIOTORS, IWHIOURS LOST AID LOSS RATES PER IDIH..Y-PAID DKER 
1M UNAUTHORIZED STRIKES, 1950-1969 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------.-------
Five 
yearly 
averages 
1950-54 
1955-59 
1960-64 
1965-69 
Annual 
average 
1940-59 
1960-79 
SOURCE: COlpany data. 
Cbn'~!~[ 
Unauthorized 
lan-hrs lost 
1,644,510 
2,471 ,528 
81,394 
359,975 
1,430,089 
241,340 
Hours lost 
per lIIorker 
18.6 
31.9 
1.28 
3.83 
18.21 
2.58 
a 
§~!!~L~! ~Q!Q[? 
Unauthorized 
lan-hrs lost 
150,264 
257,230 
207,670 
1,194,873 
406,525 
455,495 
Hours lost 
per lIIorker 
.42 
.67 
.65 
2.93 
1.40 
1.14 
NOTE: a.6" data not available for 1940, 1941 and 1975. The averages 1940-59 and 1960-79 are 
therefore calculated on the basis of 18 and 19 years respectively. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GM"s authorized strike loss ratio also rose significantly in 1958, 
as a result of the recession and the joint corporate bargaining 
strategy of making virtually no concessions in the national 
contract and then taking on fifteen 8M locals over their domestic 
aglr'eements. But by comparison with Chrysler between 1947 to 
84. See Chapter 2 above. 
1.965~ GM's unauthorized strike loss ratio remained at a very low 
85 
and 5;tabl e level indeed. 1958 did not mark a 
86 
organizational shift in the balance of f orces at GM. 
decisive 
Edie Fox only returned from an eighteen month lay-off in 
Cktober 1959. She remembered the dramatic difference workers 
e:-: per i enced: 
When I Hent back into the plant it Has a whole new world. Your boss told you: 'This is your 
production standard. You'd better get it. This is your job. You do it!' You had the tile 
study l en there. When they felt like it they would cOle and tile the job. After 195B it becale 
very dangerous to go on a Hildcat.B7 
In 1959 the num~er of strikes in Chrysler plants fell to 42; in 
1960, wh en Chrysler aga in produced a million cars~ there were just 
17 stoppages recorded by the Corporation. From 1960 to 1965 
Chrysler's yearly strike totals were less than t hose of GM . Labour 
r'eliations in Chry!:;ler Wf?re clear' ly in a "new world". Manager-i al 
a uthority had been strengthened qualitatively. E§~~ of managers~ 
super' i ntendents~ general foremen and even foremen a nd of their 
disciplinary powers had been largely missing from Chrysler 
wor kers' subordination to management over the previou s twenty 
yeiars. It now returned. However~ even this transformation was 
qualified: although 1958 saw t he removal by management of most of 
---------------------------
8:;. 6" strike data in possession of author. In non-contract-years G" workers lost on average less 
than thirty linutes each per year frol 19~7 to 1965. 
136. Anderson and Jefferys, Q~ £tt, Chapter 12. The conditions which were withdrawn at 6H during 
the period of 'working without a contract ' frol June to Septelber 195B were largely restored 
afterwards. 
87. Fox interview. 
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/ 
the restraints Chrysler workers had exercised during the previous 
20 years, and the structural basis of the Dodge union tradition 
was decisively weakened, the influence of that tradition lingered 
on, car ried by isolated individuals into the 1960s. 
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CHAPTER 12 
CONVERGING INTERESTS? 
THE 19605 AND 19705 
fh e s eve r e recession of 1979- 1982 triggered manaqerial energy on 
ind u s t r ial relations on a s cale not seen since the onset of mass 
1 
uni _ni s m in the 19 30s ~nd 19 40s . In 1983 a Harvard professor of 
bus i r"less .::\dmt ni str j:~t t on ~ D Du i nn l"li 11 s~ argued confidentlv that 
tl e e r a o f ad versarial labour - manaaement relations in which the 
II :' 1 a\o'J o "f the shop ' has become more and more burdensome to our 
,-, 
. .::' 
form of col l aborative u n ionism: 
pre--19 ::'~Os 
Fortunatelv! a concept of collective bargaining that goes bevond rule-making has deep roots in 
the US labour movement . Before the 1930s, unions ordinaril y envisioned themseleves becoming 
involved ill a broad range of problems associated not onlv with the difficulties of emplovees 
on the job! but also with the perforlance of the business enterprise ••• lt is tile to draw on 
this older tradition of the US labour movement. and leave behind the concept of collective 
bargaining as primarily a rulemaking process.3 
I I e s uo qes tion of a widespread revival S umn er Slichter 's 
1. Harris lists several late-1970s eYoaJlples of anil-Iabour ' business rOlllliunity' behaviour: "The 
business community ' s united efforts to defeat the 1978 Labour LaN Reform Bill! the NAM 's 
establishment ot the Council on a Union-Free Environment ! the proliferation of business-sponsored 
political ac t ion cOlmittees and ' new right' public policY foundations and overt propaganda agencies. 
should remind us that the leopard hasn't chanced his spots over tile, but has merely chosen and been 
free to pose as a biQ pussvcat ": QP fi!. 199 . 
::. D Quinn Hills~ DReforaing the United States svstem of Collective Bargaining", tlQutQl~ ~!~Q~ 
Bgy!g~ (March 19831 . 19. 
4 
"svstematic co-·opel·-ation" can be dismissed cIS; a s:l!Tlplf,? t-e'f lection 
of market behaviour in response to recession. But the rising trend 
(:l-t uni orl certi·f· ici:ytion deft?clts; that b eoar. in the mid - 1970s;. and the 
S l C:M dE;!clint:~ in unicm d('.:?n s it\/ through th E' ~.oJhol f.:? po!:;t.···· WC:\I'" pf2l l'- iod 
suoQest labour ' s criSIS deve loped earlier. Explanations cannot 
ionor e the cat~ lvtic effect of the two recess ion s of the 1970s~ 
but thev must qo beyond un emp l oyment t o deeper structural c hanges . 
One svmptom of t.he d eve lopino crisis was labour 's inabil i tv 
to ma kf? :i Il rOi:\cls :i rlto th ('2 j 5): of unoroani zed worker s . Un ion 
especiallv after 1962 when President 
k e nn edy a qreed to al l Lw federal a uthorit i es to bargain wit h 
5 
unions rep r esenting federal employees: according to the National 
the number of union member s in 1960 
was 15.5 million and by 1975 it had reached 2 1.1 million. But the 
tota l l a b or force crew faster : the ~6.3% union me mbers out of a 
59 mi l lion ciyilian l abou r force in 1960 had slipped to 25 .1% of 
84 million bv 1 97:'5 . BLS statIstics s uggest an e y e n greater 
6 
decline in un i on d e n sity : from 28.9% in 1960 to 23.1% in 
a nd a mClrE? t- ecent. est i mate : ;uqq f?S"tS that. LIn ion densi t y dropped 
sti ll more dramatically in the second half of the 1970s~ to .. i ust 
4 . 51 i chter ~ QQ. <;!.t, 5bl. 
:). Ja~es R 6reen~ £Q~ ~Q~tq Qf tQ~ ~QC~~Ct ~!~QC ~~ I!~~t~~tQ ~~~t~c~ B!~C~~~ (New York: Hill and 
Wang~ 1 9BO) ~ 234. Federal and muni cipal emplovees aade up lost of the increase in union metbers. 
6" ain and Price. @. <;!.t r 89. rhe percentages in both NBER and BLS series quoted are of 
' potential union ieabership ' . the ci vilian non-agricultural labour force . 
7 
20 .9% ot the t otal l abour forc e bv 1980. 
Wh y d i d Ameri can l a b o u r f~ il t o grow in the expandinq economy 
of the 19 6 05 and 1970 57 In 1960 Clark Kerr~ John T Dunlop a nd two 
ot h er l a b o ur econ o mi s t s pr e dict e d: 
We proiect a future. still long distant! of a world-wide society of pluralistic industrialism: 
a society where di 'Iersi tv and uni foraitv sti 11 struqqle for suprelacy and where managers and 
manaoed still carr 'l on their endless tug of war; but where the titanic battles which lark our 
period of transition have already passed Into the paqes of historv.S 
L. a bour conflict. ac c ordin9 to kerr and hi s equall Y experienced 
fe l l ow indus trial relat i ons arbitrators and analYsts, ItJOul d 
_ventuallv be reduc e d to shad ow boxing between the bureaucrat s of 
m~nao · men t a n d those of t t e "oc c upc\ t i onal associat.ions" into 
ItJI ieI-! latiol..w· l.\nion ~. ItJould eVf2nt u a l lv E"!vcllvf.:=.>= 
onflict NIII take place in a svste. of pluralist ic industrialism. but it will take less the 
form of the open stri fe or the revolt and more the for~ of the bureaucratic contest ••• 
PersuasIon. pressure and ·.anipulation will take the place of the face-to-face coabat of an 
earli er age . .. The great battles o'ler conflicting manifestos will be replaced by a Ivriad of ( 
minor contests over comp arative details.9 
10 
I 1e v l s ion was e a s ily di s missed at the time. But 'f f-om the 
I . George Ruben! ' Organized labor in 1981 : a shifting of priorities·, ~Q~t~ty ~!~Q~ ~~yt~~ 
(January 198 I! 2b. 
8 . Clark Kerr! John T Dunlop! Fredericl: H Harbison , and Charles A MYers, !'l~I!~ttt~n~~ ~'l~ 
jn9~?f[!~1 ~~Dl tD~ p[QQ1~! Qf l~QQ[ ~DQ ~!n!g~!~n! in ~fQng!!f g[Q~!n (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press! 19bOJ! 2. 
1 u. Ihe bOOk was subjected to penetrating wit ind criticisil for its blend of neutrality and 
adYocac'l of the rise of corporate/ industrial Ian by Hal Draper after Kerr, in his capacity as 
President 0 the Uni versity 0 Cali forni a. sparked off the Berkelev student rebellion in September 
and October 1964 by trvlng to obstruct on-campus collections for the ci vil rights loveaent; IThe 
Hind of Clark Kerr ". ~~! e~ttt~~~. III, no. 4 (Fal l 19641! 51-61. 
lli84~ 
11\1 nor" ccmte!::;ts o ver Comp c:\lr at 1 'Ie detai J:," cc::mdLlc:ted 
u s ual!; bv non -combatant s appears chilling l v accurate. In 1 98:2~ 
Elr' n:ie Savc)it?~ ~ord ' s Director of Labour Re l ation s . b e li eved their 
e mplovee Invo l vement schemes wer~ ev i dence of c\ q u a l itative 
" t.op 
people" • In 18 m ~nths they had been extended from nine to 
virt u a llv a ll For d 's 65 Ameri c an locations: 
Hare and lore labour and manaqement are cOlinq to accept the fact that their relationship ~ust 
also include a joint pursuit of their mutual converging interests. I see collective bargaining 
becomlna more open - addino neN structures under the collective bargaining umbrella - being 
more co-operative. lhese new lavers institutionalize the zone of converging interest so that 
we lav leqiti l ize and foster appropriate iutualisl in the vears ahead . ll 
Savoi _. ;. s assessment that "th i nos have c han~~ed p e r-man e n tl yo" c annot 
bL dismi ss~d as wishful thinkinq . In the c lose 1982 vote that 
fi l1 a l lv accepted concessIons in sti ll-prof itable GM~ plants:, with 
establi s hed Uu alit v of Work .Life circles 
+ avourc: b .l e to con cessi cms t l a n those wi t.hout . 
we r e ma r-k edlv mor e 
12 
I ll e t- e is c .l e,'::Ir- 1 v a cpr ':iii:\t. dei;;\.t of evi deneB to s u ppor-t. t.hOSf? 
who view t h e 19805 a6 a new lnd u s trial r-el a tions s r-a. But t.Ci j wnp 
mistake . Ih e I istorv of the last two d ecad es cont ai n ed both a 
9rowina accommodation bet.ween manager- ial and union bur-eaucr-acies 
~O~ a r-adicalizction ot million s of I peop l e demanding greater-
t .t. Interview liith Ernie Savoie! Director, Labour Relations, Ford Motor COlpany, June 30 1982. 
l :,~ . Interview with Fred 6 Haubold. Director! International Labour Relations, General Motors, June 
29 198 • 
":',4 1 
access t o f ull American equality and f reedom. tV!ea.nvJhi Ie the 
eV Ide nc e of continued deep manaoerial hostility to the necessity 
to con s ul t .01'- bar-t'led n wi th ev€;!n thE' most II r.:CI --opfzo r ·,::~t. i ve II of un ion 
leader s p OIn ts to a sioni f icant. residu a l d efensive role still 
p l a ved bv Amer ic an lab o ur. Section one of this chapt.er provides a 
backoround s ketch o f the 19605 and 1970s; section two c onsiders 
1. Background to the 19605 and 197 05 
th e lono war boom of the 1960s h ighlight.ed t h e inequalitv and 
iniustice o f American capital i s m while simultaneously n ear-full 
emp loyment and militarv and politi ca l defeat in Southeast. Asia 
bi-o\t: tles:," did f~I'- Up t. t o fzoal'T l million~.; of black (..)mer-icans thfa civil 
l i b ert i es p rev iouslv denied them. Opposition to the Vietnam War 
chanced the attitude of a g e neration of youn g Americans to th e 
McCarthvite a uthoritarian ism of the 19505 . t.<Jomeri ~ too~ 
f or more fre edom. a t work as well as in t he home. 
~nd li v ino e n vir onment s came to fiq u rs as other important 
li b ert i es fo r whIch many Americans were prepared to struggle. 
In the for mer For d Rouee worker and fi rst bl ack UAW 
Inter n ationa l representative. Horace Sheffield~ called some other 
bl~ck Uetroit union offIcers to a meeting in his basement and 
1 :::: 
Three years later. 
a tt er s imilar croups had for med in other cities~ A Philip 
F~: ando l ph . the veteran s oci a list and leader of the Brotherhood of 
Slee pinc Car Porters . + ounded thf2 I'Jf:? on::l ;~iller' i Ci:'In Labcll.w' COLlnci 1 • 
Ra nd olp h opposed separatism but believed black work ers should no 
l oncer wait for the existi nc whi te leader s to set them free: 
While the Neoro American Labour Council rejects black nationalism as a doctrine and the 
practice of racial separation, it recognizes the fact that historv has placed upon the Negro 
and the Neoro alone the basic responsibility to complete the uncoapleted civil war revolution 
throuoh keepino the fires of freedom burninq in the civil rights ftoveaent .14 
But Handol ph ,. s dE:·mancl t hat th(,? ?~FL-"C 10 act to "f2l :l mi nat e 
seQreqation . a nd di scrimi nation within international and 10c .,:\1 
OI''' Clanj.~! i~t ions" led to his being censured bv the AFL-CIO ' s 
1 ::j 
It Io'JOuld 
t.,,,kl': mon,,) t .han t ht,~ cw·clan:lzi:lt.iclI'1 (::l ·f e>(i£:;ting blc\ck unicln offic:er s 
to firil.s h IIJhF.,t Handolph c:wg Lled tl'1e Ci vil \.<Jc:u" h i:id bt~gun. 
c i vi l ri cht s move ment n ?--establ i shed collective 
militancv as a legitimat e form of action. The .Greensboro lun c h -
counter s it - ins of 1960 gently opened the door; 
riders of 1961 and 1962 pushed a little harder. 8v 1963 even the 
Ken n e dv administrction. 
118 ~OOO out of 68 million. 
1'::,. "Blacks in Detroit · ~ QI! ~tt~ 48 . 
14. Quoted in Foner, Q~ £,U! \ 34 . 
elected on a waf er-thin ma j o ri t y of 
was ready to acknowledge the need for 
legislation to guarantee sou t hern blacks civil And 
L v ndDn B.J (Jhn~50n ~ the souther n Democra t wh o took over from the 
~ssasi nated Kennedv in 1 963 ~ felt he had to move still faster to 
16 
ex orci se t he tai nt o f his political origins. But the 196LI· 
C:ivi .l f:::1ql1ts Act and 1 (jl6:'".5 Voting Fdght.s Act clidn :·t reduc!? ten s ion 
the fedf.:?r"al g overnment ·s recognition of certain 
blac k demands leoitimated the continuing protes ts and helped to 
stren~ t hen the movement for change. In 1964 Malcolm X broke with 
a nd cap i ted ism. in 1965 I~J a tts ~ a black s ubur b of Los Angeles. 
erupted il l a black r·ebe1 1ion that was echoed in dozens of ot.her 
uprisinqs across t h e Un ited States over the next few vears; i n 
19 66 3tok e1v ' La rmichael raised the demand for Black Power and the 
Ca.l i +orn :i "-,. in 1967 , the 
blqoest black u prising of all occurred in Detroit~ and in 1"i68 
l' l .:u"·t in Lut ll er· ~:, i no IfJ a <.:; ssassi nated in l"'lemphi s where '· ... e wa s 
s upportlno a strike of black sanitat ion worker s~ members of t h e 
17 
rapidly-growing municipal work e r s' uni on~ AF~CME. 
11'1 Memphi s and in part s o{ the aut.o industrv th e link between 
the stru~ole for black right s in societv at 
16 . Polennerg, Q~ £U, 168~ 181-190; he cites Johnson: "r had to produce a civil rights bill that 
was even stronaer than the one thev' d have gotten if Kennedv had lived. Without this! I' d be dead 
before 1 could ever begin. ' 
1 /. ~reen. QQ ~tt. L34. Sidney Lens, ~!~t£!tt~! t~ ~~~[t£~ (New York: Crotwell! 19691, 369-74. 
344 
,/ 
workers ' rights in the workplace is clear. A similar~ though less 
marked connection existEd between the Vietnam War and much rank 
i~ nd fi le discont -mt in the lc.-\tf.~ 1 c/60~s and ear-I,! 19705. Not only 
did hundreds of thousands of vounq Americans come under the 
direct influence of the anti-war movemen t~ but , many t)'f thf2 
hundreds of thousands of Vietnam War veterans ret urn ed to work 
disillusioned with the s tandard managerial~ nationalist and 
a ut.hcw-itar-i an :ideoloo'l. In 1('7' '72 th(: 901.. \1Jhite wor- k'forcf2 at the Glvl 
Ohio struck the country"s most modern 
c s!:'f2mbl v pI ant.. Gar'v Brvner ~ t h e youn Q Lordst.own UAW local 
presidLnt who ten vears later was on the International Executive 
rhere ' s a substantial number of people that are Vi etnal war vets. Thev don ' t cOle bacr. hOle 
wantino to take bullshit fro. foremen who haven't seen as Much of the world as he has, who 
hasn ' t seen the hardships.1S 
Th e role Vietnam played in generalizi ng the defiant aspects of 
bl ac k resistance to voung white workers who wer e also being 
dl~ a+ t:ed in 'tcl a war thf?v could not identlfv with. is not 
qua lltifiable . But when in 1973 news came over the car radios being 
titted on the lines in several Detroit car plants 
Vietcong hdd entered 8a1gon. 
19 
worker s began s pontaneous l y hooting 
hef.."!r:i no. Like the administration"s exposure in the 
Waterocte scandal that led in 1974 to Gerald Ford taking over 
Vietnam l egitimated cynicism about the motives and 
l B . Quoted in Studs Terkel, ~q[ti~g, (New York: Avon, 1975), 262. 
l C' t . Inter vi ew with several Detroit autollorkers. SUlilier 1975. 
,,~: 45 
In thE:: pi ants, man aq f:?Y" 5 ~ 
+oreme rl a nd ol d er whit e work e r s and union officers. brought up on 
Cr"E'\,oJ c ut s iand anti"--Comml.\nism~ experienced this disquiet as 
a d d i t i o na l ch a llenqes t o the legitimac y o f their work ethos. 
li-Jh i 1 e workplace racism and discipline were both being 
chal1enqe d from below~ the wider feminist movement also impacted 
o n workers' rloht s . Women organized more into unions than before p 
a nd both in s ide a nd outs ide unions fought for an extension of 
wome n ' s rights to includ~ paid pregnancy leave~ legalized abortion 
a nd f r eedom fr om sexual haras sme nt. It appear-oed that lithe womEm " s 
mo/ament stimulated more organizing among clerical 
2 0 
\o'jol'"" kf~I~ S than 
t hf? uni o n s had". In the miner s ' union. John Lf?\I'Jis ' succ~ eSSOF" , 
lon v Bovle fir st used the Janti ~gangster ' 1959 Landrum-Griffin Act 
19 of the UMW ' s 23 di s tricts under his direct control. 
lh en~ in 1 9 69. h e ordered hi s principal opponent to be murdered in 
a bid t o s tay in power . Th e mov eme nt that finally unseated him 
li'Jc:l!S bm"" n out o f a c:amp a i gl fOI"" mi nt"? 9" afE~ty spE?arhead€~cJ by thf~ r .'"lnk 
2 1 
and fil e Blac:k LunL Asso c iation. 
I t is di ff i c ult t o est imate the s i z e of these o pposition 
20 . Green [l9BOL QP' £U! 40 . 
~:~ 1. Guerin! Q.P' £U! 238-9; Green (1980J, 241-:i. 
(" , " . 
.L.t::. 
i1 l a'J~? fl l e ll t. s . In an ecr li e r period ~ t.hey mi g ht h~ve created 
I::-jt~ t- manent oroal l. Zat lons or a unitary political 
But the u nevenness of this r a dicalization 
between black s a nd white~ blue and whit e collar 
workers . metropoli tan a nd sma ll er urban and r ural areas~ presented 
:on si d erable difficulty i n cementing organization around any 
particul a r oenera li z ation. So d i d t he retention - o f ten, as in the 
the rlli nen:; ~ accompanying industrial militancY of a 
Behl l d these political obstacles were 
:.c cH1omi C and social ones . In the 19605 and earlv 1970:=. these 
mln Jr lti es faced a I economv whose qrowth allowed cer t ain limited 
refol" ms~ employers whose economic power was now truly global and 
a unlon traditi o n t h at. while it was patently better th a n 
24 
noth i nq. had b f:?fHl bc:~t ter'ed into a <:on=,e r· vc·~t i Vf:? pas si vi t y. 
Ih e longe r -term redistributive and demobilizing impact of the 
~:2 . Estimates of participants are difficult because these IOYelents operated within legal 
frameworks that appeared to tolerate liiited deionstrations of spontaneous anger and solidarity only 
before theIr unions were recognized. So it usuall y took considerable courage to stand up and be 
counted t work : StauQhton Lynd, ·Workers ' control in a Tile of Diainished Workers' Rights·, ~~qi£~~ 
.!g[if~ 10. no.5 (September-October 19761~ 6; Yet enough did for 
the 'labour revolt' to become a 
noted feature of recent hi storY: 6reen U980L ql! £.U, 218; Brecher ~ ql! ~.u, 329. 
~2 ~~.. Greer draws a parallel between the victory of the 19b7 black coalition in GarY, lndiana l and 
the victory of the lultiethnic New Deal coalition in 1934; 9P fil, 33. 
:':::4. In a critique of Brecher ' S ~tr.i~g, David Montgomery accepts that for lIany Allerican . workers! 
"nothing corrupts like powerlessness"; but he argues equally that others have a different experience 
and that "For the last century the union~ even in sOle of its worst forms, has provided a shield 
behind which workers of no lore that average aggressiveness have found both emancipation frol the 
bonds 0 subservience to the bourgeois order and a link between themselves and their lore forceful 
shopiates". 'Spontaneitv and Orqanization: SOie COllents · , R!qi£!~ ~~~r.i£! 7 no .6 lNoveaber-
Dece~ber 19731, 7 1~ 
5 4 7 
New Fron tier a n d Great Soc i e t v r eforms o f 19 6 3 to 1965- should not 
b €~ Ul icle lr-est. i ma t ed . Bv the mid - 19 70s t h e bl ac k middle c lass was 
wea l thier and mor e geo g rapi c all y disper s ed than £-? Vf2 1~ 
bef ore. i ts j ob o pport unities no l o nqer lay e xclus ive ly within th e 
:':~ b 
black Qhet t os . F o r t hose wh o had n " t made it , fed e ral a nd citv 
povert y pr o gr a ms p food s tamps and welfare pavment s allowe d 
wlt h out t h e hunqer o f t h e 19 3 0 5 : i n 19 8 2 a th i rd o f th e adult 
2 7 
popul c\t 1. on CJf Ue troit s urvive d on welfare. A safety n e t h a d 
b E.8n prov id _d. Ihose in wor k f aced anot her problem: 'f C) I'"' t , h e 
f i r s t ti me th e US f ully ent e red the world market a s a ma j or 
i rnp or-t:t:~ r of con SLlfIlel'" Dood s . Th e l o qi c o f wo rld- wi de competit i on 
fi n a ll v b eQan t o d a wn o n American workers who found the ir 1 abour-
r e la t ions exec uti v es. like For d "s Savoi e in 1977 a nd Ch rvs l e r "s 
Cl a nc: v in 1 980 ~ makin g pil g rimages to Japan. In many c:ases ~ th e 
corporat ion s pa id for- d e l e o at ion s 0+ internat i onal 
<,:l O w t o o . ind e pendence f rom ma nageme nt 
ma i n tai n e d b v pos t - war bus iness unionl s m was rapidl y erode d wh e n 
t he un i on s a gree d to r ed uc e wa g e costs. 
:25 . PolenberQ argues that "the years after 1963 witnessed the lost powerful surge of social 
reforre since the New Deal". detailino "l eoislation in the fields of ledical care, education, 
housing, ci vil rights, poverty and illig;ation ;, Q~ ~tt, J73, 181-207. 
2 6. !.h~" 276-B. 
:;'~'i' .. HichiQan Department of Social Services. Jl Honthly Trend Report of Kev DSS Statistics: May 
1982' , (Detroit: Data Reporting Section~ June 25 19821, Table lao 
the 1960s a nd 1970s as a resul t of t hree linked developments : the 
1955 reunion Jf the AFL and CIO strengthen e d the narrower~ 
conservat i ve Ie der s hip a nd tradition of the older craft-based 
(HCJveme nt at the e:-: pen s€o? o.f anv f"elilc:d n i n q c:ombatat :i ve indus tI,- i i:\l 
un:i.( ni S HI ' qovernments intervened more .frequ ent l y in 
i ndl.lst r- i ;:d conflicts and in wage settlements while labour's 
politica l c l out waned~ and ins t ead of har ness ing the groundswell 
of rad i ca lism to strengthen unioni sm~ international officer s made 
common cause wlth management to s uppress it. The. AFL-C IO had 
d ~c ided to launch a massive new organi zing drive at its founding 
ennventi 0 1 it never happene d. Meany " s view on devoting resources 
2B 
to union o rg a ni zing was: "!J.JE):· 'It'? done ql.\i t(::l "'Jell ~'Ji thout it . 1/ 
who headed the new federation~ told t h e National 
A ~sociation of Man ufacturer s in 1956: 
I never went on a strike in mv li fe, I never ordered anyone else to run a strike in my life, 
never had anything to do with the picket line ••• In the final analysis, there is not a great 
deal of difference between the things I stand for and the things that the National ' Association 
of Manufacturers st ands for.29 
A prac ti s ino conser v ative until his retirement in 1979, Mer.:\r,y 
steered the AFL-CIO into a close relationship with s uccessive 
qove r"nment s . In 1 972 ~ Pr' l-'~si d e nt. Fd chat""d Ni:< on 
..2i:3. Quoted j n 1972 bv Ki iii Moody and Ji 11 Wooditard, ~!.tU~ UU~t t~~ ~Q!!. §ttl~~ gt :Z~ (Detroit: 
Slln~ 1978) 110. 
:29 . Ci ted in Dan Georqakas and MaPii n 5urkin ~ ~gttQltt t qg !tUq qytlltl:. ~ ~t\!<iY til \!t~~1l 
[gYQ1Y!!Q~ (New York : St Martin ' s Press, 19751 ~ 39. 
appointed Ne w York const r uction union leader Peter Brennan as 
~:;. O 
Ldbour SecretarY. qr'o\l'ling -federal 
<::ID v E'I~ nment in wage bargaining and labClul" cClnflict. 
Ke nn e dv per s u ad e d Me anv to e ndorse pay controls in 1962, 
::;; 1 
d ecad e l a ter Nixon did the same. But the principal mechanism 
gD v ernment used tCl influsl ce the conduct of labour relation s~ 
b e sides neqotiatinq with its Clwn employees, was the invoki ng of 
T i:\·f t ····Ha r" t lev. ~1 ohnson , Nixon and~ in 1978~ Carter all 
u s ed Taft-Hartlev aaain s t workers whose demands and threats of 
industrial action could have trIggered more general labour unrest. 
And wh e t the f eder a l qovernmemt didn ' t finish! the courts did. In 
th e e e. t- l v 197 us thE? I Ji ~:(JI I i: ppCii nte(:-?E:',-domi nc~t~?d Suprem(':? CO Llrt and 
3 2 
var ious lower courts significant ly reduced workers' riqhts. 
the AFL-CIO ' s political clout had virtually 
di5app~ared . Despite the election Cif the Carter administration in 
1976 tooether witll the lar gest congressiona l Democratic majority 
s i n C f:? 1 9 64. the well-organized opposition of business interests 
ill vJ ", s !1j nqton f:.~ asi 1 y def€~ r.:\t(~d the AFL-CIO' s Labol.lt"" Law Hef (:ll~m Eli 11 
in 197 8. Lane ~:: irkland~ soon to succeed Meany~ wa~ outraged. He 
and 
industrv's resistance to the proposals to assist union 
.. , I 
"': :1 H 
~; ~. Lvnd l QR ~Lt, 7-9! li~ts ten areas in which court decisions limited the already narrOH 
definiti on of workers' ri Qhts created bv the Taft-Hartlev Act of 1947 . 
or'qi:ini zing 
then still outside the AFL-C IO , 
:':::4 
GI"j :' E', tOol 'e tn the ~.:;uccess+ ul +ilibL~5ot.er'. 
directed his attack on 
The AFL-C IO and the UAW 
were clear ly incapabl e of mobilising congressional ma:orities for 
demands affecting the independent interests of working people. If 
it was a question that affected mu t ual interest s of union and 
management~ thtnQs mtQht be dif f erent. The UAW appeared n e xt at 
Congress to camp ~ ion for fe dera l funds to bailout Chrysler, and 
in the e arly 198050 it headed a drive to limtt Japanese car 
imports that oat some quiet s uppor t from Ford and Chrysler. Th e 
AFL-C IO sti ll had the strenqth to mobilise hal+ a million union 
members to protest in the st.reets of Washington DC in November 
19B1 ~ but it could not - or did not wish to - lift a finger +or 
the PA 1'CO air traf+ ic controllers s acked by Reagan who also 
. marched on Solidarity Dav. 
In 1981. Fraser reaff ili ated the a ut o workers ' union to the 
AFl...·-C 10. Like the c los ure of ranks between the leaderships of the 
AFL and cro in 1955. this was svmbolic. For Reuther had withdrawn 
t h e UAW from the AFL-CIO in 1969 after clashes with Meanv over the 
absence of d e mocr acy withi n the federat ion and the ref usa l to 
,,~; :3. Quoted in Hoodv and Woodward! Q.I! !;tt, 123. 
:'::A . See Chapt er 16 below. 
.::::51 
countenance a ssrlOUS struGgle against the government or th e 
employers to s trengthe n un ion organ i 2a~ion. Labour 's ~ failure to 
grow in an economy that was expandinq rapidly was bad enough. But 
when the econ omv entered recession labour ' s l ack of dyn a mism 
bec~me c~tastrophic: b u s iness un ioni sm had no other path to take 
t h c:m s till c loser coll a boration with emplovers now mew e 
determined t han ever to c u rtai l labour "s 'rule-ma king" role 
whether those r ules were made in negotiations in corporate 
offices with international o fficers or on the s hop f loor. The 
UAW ' s return to the AFL-C IO c onfirmed that times had changed. 
First Reuther and t h e n Meanv had died. More sign if icantl y, 
UAW had also finallv ab andon ed any pret e nce that it could harness 
n ew growt h in union member s hip. 
I"he re-emergence o f nearlv tota l homogeneity of 
among uni on leaders and the defeat or stalemating of opposition 
mo~ement s amana the postal worker s, mi ners; , steelworkers and 
teamsters bv the l ate 1970s was a reversal for the radicalism of 
the previou s fif teen vears . It h e lped t o i s ol a te t hose who 
Wished t o r es i s t. The defeat dovetailed with growing job 
ir lsecuril v and a n e w resurgence o f American nationali sm with t h e 
Iranian hostage cr isi s o f 1. (=t79--BO. f~eag i:'\\l :. ~:; 1980 (~ I E~ctir.Jn 
victor v, t he pass i ve toleration of Ilass unemploy ment a nd the rash 
", 
"::;;5. 6ueri n, QQ £U, 214-223. 
of concession contracts in the 1979-82 recession all followed. By 
the first quarter of 1982 the 66 ma j or contracts covering 965.000 
workers sh owed a median wage gain of zero~ for the first time 
si n ce t h e BLS star ted keeping contract records in the late 19405. 
In the conce5sion -pacemaker~ auto~ st rikes virtuall y disappeared 
an d absenteeism rates, a measure of the con f idence of the 
36 
individual worker~ also collapsed: 
Absenteeisa Rite 
~~[y§!g[ fQ[g §gng[!! ~Q!Q[§ 
1979 7.3l 3.9% 9.2l 
1980 5.9t 3.0l 9. 4% 
1981 5.b! 2. 41- 9.6l 
1982* 5.1l .11. 8.0t 
fJanuary to June 
The ara ume nt h e r e is not tl at rank and file resistance halted. 
Soli dari ty with miners defying Taft-Hartley in 1978 was more 
wid espread than for anv other national str ike since the 19405. 
But res istance has been disorganized: the declining power of 
institutional unioni sm vis-a-vis the employers has not been. 
cOlnpSI sated for in growing power in the hands of ordinary workers. 
3; • Hoody and Woodward, Q~ £t!, 58-9, describe how in Detroit several auto union locals started 
to orQanize collections in mid-February 1978 - to be followed two weeks later by Fraser announcing a 
national donation frofi the U W to the UHW. 
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I I. Issues 
I hi s pc:ll~t o ·f tl e stud v addn2sses a par- ado>: 
e;·: c ~p t. i ana I i Sill. ·rhe auto maker wit.h the hig h est level of worker-
mane oement con+ 1 i c:t betvJeen 19 ~'::' 8 and 1979 bl;~came t.he f i t- st. to 
secu re UAW qr-eement to concession s tha t froze wo r kers' wages for 
tWJ vear-s end took awav promi s ed benefits . This tur n ar-oun d took 
pl ace a t:" • ::> rapidl v as had the earlier hiatus o f t.h e 1 ,~te 
Within a 'lear- o f the 1977 strike fr-equencv peak~ anel frJt- the 
first time since t he ear- Iv 1930s ~ as Table 16 shows, 
virtually di sappear- e d: 
fABlE 16 
ctltYSLER STRIKES, STRIkE FREIlUEtlCY AND HOORLY-PAID EJIPlOYlDT, 
1977-1980 
--------------------------------------~------------------------------------------------------------
- --------------- --------------- ------- ---------- ----- ------- ----- ---- -----~-------------------- ----
Year ~~~~gr 9! ?!rj~~? ~![i~~ ![~~~nfY tl9H[!Y:Q!i~ ~Q[~fQ[f~ 
Unauthor ized Authori zed All stri kes l change !OOOs) 4 change 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1977 76 18 .941 + 72.3 99.9 + 2.9 
1978 13 2 .156 - 83 .4 95. 9 - 4 
1979 9 5 . 186 + 19.2 75.4 - 21.4 
1980 3 0 .058 - 68.8 51. 6 - 31. 6 
SOURCE: Company data. 
~;.tri kes 
In 1979 and 19 80 worker- s" fears of comp an y b ankruptcy or plant 
c l osu r-es Dr- both c l ea I v created s u ch e deqree of insecurity that 
stri ke action (and other- forms of open r-esistan ce to managerial 
author-itv i:iS "'Je ll) becc:rne "ill e gitimate" in t h f-;! eYE!!:; not only of 
Iilc:naqement~ the UAW and the cour-ts~ but al s o in the commonsen se 
CCH'lSC 1 ousness of v;i.l~tLli:i ll v thE:: ent i re vKw~d Df"Ce. 
important quest Ions of in terpreta tion are raised bv the 
th e l ate- 1960s /earlv ;. 1 abour I'-ev ol t' 
skc~~ tc:h ed 0 r.d:<ove a nd of concession-barga ining. This 
sect ion first o utlines some objections to the application in this 
Reich labour-control-by-
seq me n tation t heorv~ and then discusses the workers ' contribution 
to the cri s is and the contribution of the crisis to the 
Reic h see the 'labour r evolt' as " a n 
un 1'- ave ll i nq of thE? pCI~~twc;\I'- tl .... u ce II a nd c~s 21 conf i l~ m<:'It ion of th('!;! 
h:l ~:. tOlo- ic:al ;. 1 onq ·_·ItJave ' economic c:vc:l€~s an d 
manaoerial control st r ategies. They al s o link the ' l abour revolt ' 
38 
wii.~ h an extension o f bargaining to ;. non-f:conomi c' issues. 
?-)nd of i naIl .I ~ they arrive a t t h e II ~=-tTonger cone 1 U!5i on II th<:'It "th c-2 
E~ I' '' os i on 0+ th~? postltJal'"' labour truce ••• con s titutes a 
p l~ inc:ip i:d t hf? 1f..1ell·····known 
~:;9 
s lc)wdown in prr.Jducti vi ty 
orowth in t he US ecclnomy". Their t hesis relies heavily on 
di scontinuity bet~een the 'l abour revolt" and 
vea r s . o n i ts wi d espread significance. and on its 
un a mbi g u o u s support for the view that management ·s chosen control 
t h ese dssumptions are high1v q u estionable. 
It has become a commonplace to assume that the "labour 
revo l t " was_both 'l ew and wides pread without testing the e v idence 
4(; 
pr" CJpE~I'"' J. v . Impr essions a nd asp i rations have often overtaken 
mOI" ' e sotJet- j ucig lnent abou t t h is pf':r i ad in much the S5ame way 1 evel s 
o f active ,participation in t l e mass un ioniz ing movement of the 
41 
1930s have been exaggerated . Paul Edwar d s and Peter Nolan 
recently presented BLB data showing that strikes over p lan t 
issues i n the transport equipment indus tr y (primarily a u to) 
declined as a proportion of a ll st rikes from the 19605 to the 
19)'05 . as did the proportion of str i kes tak ing place during the 
term of a _ontract: 
Year strikes during term 
of contract as t 
Transport EquipleRt Industry 
strikes over plant : Year 
issues as % 
Strikes during t er . 
of contract as 1. 
strikes over plant 
issues as t 
-------------------------------------_ ._---------- ---- ~ ----- ---------------------------- -----------
1%1 41. 4S.4 1970 40 .9 3S.2 
1%2 32.0 38.0 1971 27 . 1 28 .9 
1963 52 .0 51. 0 1972 26.3 26.7 
1964 47.5 44.2 1973 26.3 26.9 
1%S 44 .3 41.0 1974 IS. 7 20 .8 
19b6 48 . 1 39.8 1975 19.0 31. 4 
19b7 34.7 43.7 1976 17.7 24 .6 
1908 37 .1 42 .0 1977 10.6 13.8 
1969 43. 3 38.9 1978 9.4 11.4 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
40. See the discussion of ' labour revolt s' i n R Herdi ng! III!. i;.U, 255-3J9. 
41 . Paul Edwards recentlv e~plained this 1970s' 'over-eaphasis on the radi cal possibilities of 
rank and file action and a corresponding lack of concern with its l i.i t s and the resilience of the 
institut ionalized svstee' as a "reaction against the complacency· oj the 19S0s and early 1960s; 
Edwards! P ~: (1981), QP ~H! 217 . 
42 . Peter Nolan and P r. Edwards! "Hologenise, di vide and rule: an essay on ' Seglented worK, 
di vided workers'"! (Warwick: SSRC Industrial Relations Research Unit, unpublished paper , Decelber 
1982), Table 3. 26. 
10 the extent that anv firm conclusions can be dr~wn on the basis 
0+ BL_ S-"-counted s~tr-i k es~ the d a ta s uggests there was no s harp 
discDntinuit~ in the level 0+ mid-term strikes (generally accepted 
,,,5 1 Cily-q e _l .I unautllDr- i :~f:! d) 0 1--- o -f plant-issue strikes 
v iewed a s ' non-economic ' ) from 1961 to 1970 and th~t subsequently 
both rapidly declined. This contradicts the unsubstantiated 
general assertions mad e by Gordon . Edwards and Reich about rising 
un a uthof' i Zf?d ,:nd ' Ion --economic :' " m:i_lit.anct-: I • c:\ftf?r thc';') mid--- 1S)60!!:, in 
4 ~~, 
,:~ uto. But th e detail e d evidence of a two-fold rise in company-
counted strikes in Chr y sler and a five-fold ri se i n 8M in the 
fol lowing ch~pters balances t.he national s tatistics. Together, the 
two serles s uggest not a great national labour revolt sympt.omatic 
i so lated resistanc~ . It will be argued that a fragmented rank and 
fi l e moveme nt did e rupt in the first part of this period~ but it 
did nDt succeed in making permanent inroads in the e xisting 
c:ontr-ol svstem. And its defeat by management working 
wi t h the international union helped prepare the ground for 
concess I on b aroain i ng. 
I t i s worth reflectinq on ev idence of a s hift. to - nc_:m --
er.:cmomi c: :' even if strikes about such questions did 
not o cc u r more frequen t l y _ 
,, ":.-
-r .... ' .. Gordon ~t ~t~ t~tQ~ 220 . 
it does not follow t.hat an 
,or c.:.;- ..... 
-.~ ...... .I 
11 f?>: t. ~?n s i on 0+ barqai n i ng II t.o i SSU€~s;; s uch <:15 hee:\! th and s:.afe t v cw 
to t, !""! e number" o -f pav phone boo·ths:. acces;;si bl e to .vJclt- kers cn,'?ates 
res trai nt s o n manao e rial ~~tbgCit~ . To understand thi s it is 
i mpi.1F' tiH1t to di sentangle t he positive impact of collective 
orqani z ation on managerial authori t y over the l abour process~ the 
t e chnology, o rganizati on and pace of work~ from other areas of 
manaqement decision. I mpr o ving the work environment does create 
" e-fficiency ' costs for management. But although the local 
ma~ bargain about th~se, they cannot be directly attributed to 
l abour"s st ruggled-for restraints ~9§iD~t managerial authcwity. 
An d in meeti ng s uch c o s t s management may act similarly t o 
companies whi c h d o not collectiJelv bargain on them. Equally, the 
extra costs to management of providing federal safet y checks and 
W cW' k e I~' !:; :' an d i nsur'ance 01'" r.,f 
expectat ion s of racial a nd sex u al are essentially 
" soc:: i ,:\1 • {U tl 'loLlql , theil~' dfE 'tai lt~d implem€mt.-ation is 
often bargained over ~ the sour ce of what then become restraints 
41.~ 
on ma n agement decis ion-making is not direct union strength. A 
l"' l::.vo l t aqc:dnst ia sp(.;? c: i fic pr'cldw::tion stand':lrd~ by contr as;t, 
cost management little to concede~ but it ultimately challenges 
its al.\thot~ itv. 
rh e line between restraints on management decisions about 
the work environment and restraints on managerial authoritv over 
t h e work process can be blurred. but the eclipse of the latter by 
---------------------------
4A. 6oodr i ch~ <1.2. ~H ! 54. 
t h e f orme r explains observations about the " chcmqi n <;:J cii mensi o n s 
vJOI'" ker mi 1 i ti::\I""ICe" . The-? 1 "\C;~ vJ " dime n s ions" vJl:?r'E~ n ot. l1f 
Edwards and Reich imp ly~ but of less. Nor 
can t h e s hi f t in t he scop e of bargaini n g be seen a~ signs of a 
45 
hi qhf21''' -' 1 evel challenge to managerial power . 
e n v i 1''' Ol'''liilenti:\ .L e f ficien cv and s ocial bargaining should be seen 
i:'~ continuum. What began with management extending a negotiating 
ro l e on sma ll i ssue s to local offi cers who could no longer bargain 
o ver the labour proces s, d e veloped in the rec ession of t. h e l ate 
19 705 into the e s tabli s hme nt of q u ality circles and a major 
ejf:)cline in ce:>mbativit.v . 
rh is s uqqest ion of a fai r l y consistent management cont.rol 
str a t egv in the "c:on:~" auto i, ndus'tr-y (jpf.~f" ating fro m t h f2 19405 
t h r ouqh to the 1980 5 d oes not fit the Gor d on, Ed wards and Re i c h 
an a l /s i s: 
We have already noted that the world econo~y beqan sliding into sustained econo.ic crisis in 
the early 19705. Our analytical fra~eNork Nould therefore lead us to expect a corresponding 
decay in the prevailinq structure of labour Manageaent, gradually eroding the organization of 
the labour process and labour larkets that characterized the post-World War II US econoly.46 
F a r from t heir labour manag e ment strategies decaying in the late 
1 (? '70s, Ford and GM used the r ecession to e nhance 
ma n a qeria l a u thority over t h e labour process. They eQuId do so 
becau se the y had s u ccessf u lly disorganized the resistance spawned 
4 5 . Stephen Hill , ~Q~~t!'UQ!l ~!lq ~Q!lt[Ql!t ~Qt~!. I~~ ~~I! lQql!~ttt!l ~!!£!'Q1Qqy' (London: 
Heinemann, 1981l, 169-173. 
46. Gordon ~t ~l~ Q~ c;.U~ 215 
bv the tight labour market of the 1960s. Auto industry manag ement 
had not operated a l abour segmentation control strategy before the 
preferring to rely on unsophisticated , 01 d--f ':'\5h j. onf2iJ 
in the 196U5 it simply kept pressi ng the black and young white 
vJol'- kers unt:i 1 thev could b(;? "cl l"-:iven" tOCI. From the 19305 to the 
eat ' l y 197 Us~ racism was u sed frequently by manage ment to maintain 
di v isions between workers. But neither t his nor the qhettoization 
blacks and women in a large low-paid service sector in thf.'~ 
economy was crucial for a uto industry man"'\gE.'I'" i al 
authority .. 
I he ~.:;ub5tant:i. al post-war . n~mber5 of black auto worker s 
Edwards and Reich. They <H"e 
forc e d to concede: "Some blacks continl.led tel wctr'k in thr.~ con::' 
manufacturi n g i ndustries. For example, black employment in steel~ 
a utomobiles end mininq increased from 142~OOO in 1940 to 204~OOO 
1.f1 1960" , and "dUl'-' i nq t h e 19605 ~.rJmE~ of thes(·? Pi:'~t t~?r·ns bE-gan to 
cl"'sanqe 51 :i qht 1 y " 50 t.hat "black employmf.-!nt. in ' t.h(·? cCJn:~ qoclds 
4'7 
But sInce this u psets their general a neat 
privileged-underpri vileqed~ white-black divi sion of 
i nt(?r" est!::;~ giving rise to unimpeded manageri al aut.hOlr it y, t.he 
problem of how labour is controlled in auto assembly plants with a 
4 7 • Gor don f!t ~ll QP' ~!.t, 201>-210 . 
md,ioritv of b lack workers is simply ignor ed. So is much evid~nce 
to s uggest that American labour was certain lv not , mare divided on 
11 nes 0+ I'- ace. et hnicitv and sex by 1970 than between 1910 and 
(.:Jew'don. 
4B 
Reich and Edwards' labour 
"homoof'",nei tv" . "he lac k of applicability o f the i r theor y to the 
auto indu s try is unfort unate . Labour mark et seg~entation i s an 
important concept because ~ :i n l"Ii c hael vmrds~ it 
"b i: si ca ll v c~sser-ts:, thc~t, i n large territories of 
m ,'::'I F' k €~t, . job all ocation and pricing are governed by institut ional 
rules a nd c u stoms which are o nl y tenuous ly linked to rational ~ 
behavior or to competitive ma rket forces~ if thev 
are so linked at all .. . At the core of labour mar ket segmentation 
49 
':H" E? soc:i al group s <:nd institut.j.cms" . And - as a d escription of 
how t.he economic system works - this i s clear ly more sensi ble 
than mJst macro-economic models. But., as John Humphr ey's st ud y of 
t he B azilian auto industry h as s hown for an economy with 
considerablv g r eater extremes of wealt h and povert y than the 
Unit ed St.ates, ev idence o f dif f erentiation in the wo rking clas s 
does not prove t h at di fferentiation itse lf is the central or a 
48. Polenberg, Ql!. ~lt, 250! 291-2; Karwick, ~!Q ~lt, 362. 
4,<;.- .. Kichael J Piore! "Labor larket seglentati on theory: critics should let the paradigl evolve", 
tlgn!n!Y ~!~Q[ B~y!~~ (April 1983), 28 . 
major control mechanism ~ 
~50 
or t h at it inhib i t s worker rasistance . 
Ihe absence of proof for somewhat cavalier assertions is al s o 
( 
character i s tic o f the Gordon, Edwards and Re ich approach to t h e 
mid and late 19705 ' recessions. Their argument that the labour 
19}'Os is ot as str ide nt as the verdi ct of o ne historian t ha t 
I'st lr uct.u r al fe atur-es of British trad e unioni s m and coll ective 
bargaining have played an important ro le in the progress ive 
~)1 
b u t bot.h echo the analysis of 
52 
standard management thought. The i ssu e is especially important 
for Chrysl er worker s, since the arg ume nt here i s that they held on 
to greater restraints over ma n a gerial a ut. hority longer than 
wor ker s at Ford and GM; and Chrys l er went bust first. 
protr- acted labour revolt in Chrysler caused ma jor productivity 
problems then it appears logical t.hat the l a te 1960s/early 197 0 5 
national revolt c ould have had s u c h an effect nati o n a ll y. 
5() . John Humphrey, ~~~~t~l~~t ~Q~t~Ql ~Qq ~Q(~~t~~ ~tt~qql~ ~U t~~ ~[!t~l~!u ft~tQ t~q~~t[y 
(Prl nceton~ New jersey: Pr inceton Uni versity Press, 19821, 230- 1i he views the principal errors as 
"reduct ionism and mere description " which are • ••• often combined In analyses which pass from 
descr ipti on and voluntarist ic accounts of the development of events and organizations to the 
i echan istlc attribution of such delfelopllents to underlying structural characteristics of the class·; 
245. 
5 1. Jonathan lei tlin, "Workplace organization in the Bri tish Car Industry: a review", tli~tQI.y 
~9r~?h9P, 10 ,!Autuln 1980). This argulent is challenged by Dave lyddon, "Workshop organization In 
the British car industry: a critique of Jonathan Zeitlin, tll~tQIY ~~t~~~Q~, 15 (Spring 1983), 
5:::: . Slichter~ Healey and livernash made the salle observation in the recession of the late 19505: 
'I t is clear that certain plants and cOllpanies halfe becole non-colpetitive not through concessions 
granted in negotiations but t hrough the cumulative effect of concessions granted in contract 
administration"; QQ ~!!~ 663. 
Strugg l ed-for restraints in the mid-1950s did exert an 
i nfluence on Chrysler management, persuading it to rely more than 
8M or Ford on rec ruitment to raise outp u t . Yet even then ' most 
r esponsibi litv for its low output per worker was at management"s 
Chr ysl er was building larger, more complicated cars with 
l ess new investment than its rivals. Bu t after the labour 
relations watershed of 1957-59, car o ut p ut per h ead at Chrysler 
Illclved in line with Ford and SMs for ten years, rising with the 
expansion of new car plants a n d then fa l li n g as deman d exceeded 
the maximum output of existing facilities. vJhen 
production rose to over a mi llion cars in 1963 a n d to a plateau of 
j u st. under 1.5 million between 1965 and 1969, the new workers 
found n o remaini n g c u stom and practice agreements they coul d 
n2 l <::'b::~ to. Previouslv each s ustai ned boom period since the 1920s 
had seen a sign ificant adva~ce in shop f l oor restraints on 
m~naqeria l autonomy. But although in the a u to i n d ustry as a whole 
is some evidence t h at workers· je.,b motivc."It.ion, 
especially in t he boom years, stil l exerted a negative impact on 
Worker pe rfor mance (labour costs a n d prod uctivity), in thf.'! 
1960s s h op f loor working conditions did not improve. Then, in t.he 
1970s , Chrysler ' s o u tput per worker moved o u t of synchr·oni z ati on 
declining wit.h its growing financial crisis and lack of 
investmen t to 1978 and risi n g again wi t h 1 ay···offs, 
. .. . .... ,~ . , ..... " ._ "'M ..... ... _ ..... .. _ ... _ .. _. _'M "'M .. _. _ .. _ ..... . _ . ,_. ___ • _ .. . _ ._ •• _ • • _ , 
5 ::::. . J R t4orsllort hv and Craig A labal a ·Worker At t i tude , Worker Perforl ance l and Producti vity", 
(Washington DC: Bureau of the Census, September 1983i, si ~eographed ! 19-20. 
manaqet-· i a l 
plant 
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a uth o r· i ·t v . 
crisis~ invigorated 
Chrysler's pattern of 
labour relations first closed dramatically to the industry norm 
and t h en became a pattern-setter. The ' norm' it approached and 
dominant manaqerlal control svstem but~ :i of anythi ng ~ by a systlem 
CH authoritv more independent of collective worker 
in the l a te 19 70s than at any time since the 
Chrysler workers' independe~t impact on business policy c annot be 
h e ld responsible for the company's f alling productivity and 
Not surprisingly~ t h en~ contro l of th e labour process did not 
obsess Chrysl~r management in the 1960s as it had during the two 
both productivity and profit s broke rec ord 
0+ much greater signioficance to the 
Lvnn Townsend <1960-75) a nd Joh n Riccardo (1975-79) 
volume production figures and international expansion: accountants 
they wa nt ed a nd , in the 1960s~ got hea lthy looking 
b a l a nc e s heets. Lee Iacocca (1979 to date) had the tas k of piecing 
together the company which their years of mishandl e d international 
£·?>:pans i on, weak product judgment and busi nt;?ss 
strategies had finally bankrupted. In the recession o f 19!:i7--!58 ~ 
manaqi?ment haci tar' gt:-~t:ted ]. abour n::-si stance as its mai n !:"?n <:.? my . But 
in 1 lj> 7 8···· 7 9 Iac o cca ' s prioriti es were: manageme nt structure, 
---------------------------
54 . See abOVE, Figure 6 . 
CI rysler business strategy and labour costs. The evideDce suggests 
m~n~qement did not s ee l a bour resi s t a nce as a major component of 
declirling growth in the 197 0s. But while the workers' contribution 
it did not follow that t h e crisis 
had l ittle impact on the workers. 
A new balance of forces was shaped o n the Detroit labour 
larket as · Chrysler " s hou rly paid workfor ce declined slightly 
between 1977 and 1978 and then colla~sed in 197 9 and 1980. 
Unemployment in the City of Detroit rose fr om 8.3% in 197B to 
10. 3 % in 1979 and 16.5% in 1980, with unemplciyment among blacks 
who made up the majority of Chrvsler ' s Detroit workforce rising 
a:::' 5::" 
~l...s 
from 11 . 7 % to 26 . 8% over the same period. Th e old aphorism could 
be justificbl y reworked: when Chrysler gets a cold~ the City of 
DetrOit gets pneu monia. 
.:;:' , 
.JO 
Ihe "business cvcle " arg u ment alone doesn "t explain why the 
slight 9% fall in Chrysler ' s car production i n 1978 and 4% fall in 
emp ll'1y ment shClu.L d have bf?e l accompan i ed by SLICh ,3 dr-,3mat.1 c: 8 :':',% 
decline in strike frequency . This col l apse~ o n e year before the 
mia]CW" produ ction and empJ.ij \/ m(·,mt decli n e, was t h e resul t of the 
and Ct"wys l e l" management defeating 
---------------------------
~:;. Bureau of Research and Stati st ics, ~U~~~lqy~~U~ [!~~~ ~y [!£~~ ~~~~:~~~t , (Detroit: Michigan 
Eaployaent Security COlli 55ion ). 
:;6. The national rise in ' auto indust ry unellployaent rose a year later than at Chrysler . In 1978 
unemployment in the US automobile industry as a whole was still on ly 4.1%, up a sere 0. 2% on 1977; 
i t then rose to 7.44 in 1979 and onl y jUlped to chronic levels with the onset of the national 
econo&ic recession after August 1979, to reach an average of 20. 34 in 1980. US Depart. ent of Labour , 
Bureau of Labour Statist ics. Harch 1b 1981. 
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incor porating their black opposition over the previous _five years. 
On_ e t h e tradition of rank and file struggle was no longer 
available to legitimize new resistance, collective expressions of 
anger outs ide the procedure became significantly more difficult to 
organize. 10 assert that the economic crisis causes a decline in 
wor ker combativity does not exp lain why and how. ' The argument 
below will st r ess the significance of workers' collective 
Lorgani z ations in prOjecting either fatalism or independent 
alternatives. Structural factors s uch as the level of employment 
are clearlv verv important i II determining shop floor 
consciousness. But the consciou s activity of management and 
managed also playa part. 
III. Structure 
Chepter 13 considers the early 1960s when the l egacy from the 
1950s impacted on both management and shop floor organization. 
Chapter 14 traces the origins of growing instability in labour 
relations in the mid -196Qs a nd the impact of the politics of 
' civil rights · on the shop floor. Chapter 15 considers the 
emergence in 1968 of the Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement~ a 
black shopfloor militant organization p and its eventual defeat by 
the joint forces of manage ment and the international UAW. Chapter 
16 arg ues that wor kplace legitimacy was already being redefined 
in Chrysler p l ants well before the onset of the world-wide auto 
recession of 1979. Chapter 17 examines how managerial changes and 
Chrysler"s near-bankruptc y led to the closure of Dodge Main and 
conceSSion-bargaining. 
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CHAPTER 13 
WHITE- SHI RTED STRANGERS 
THE EARLY 19605 
Chapter 13 look s first at the chanqes that took place in Chr ys l e r 
management p e rsonn e l between 1960 and 1962, and at the 
consequences for its busi ness a n d operational strategies. Secti o n 
two considers t h e work e rs' r esponse : an initi a l t urn t o the left 
at Dodge Main followe d bv the fail u re of the l e ft a dmini stration 
to prevent the continued e rosion of the ol d s ystem of mutual 
rule-making. Section three cons ide r s t h e accelerated pr o cess of 
underlvinq c h ange in the role of the s t ewards in th e n e w har sher 
l a bour re l ations climat~ o f the 19605. Finall v, sec t ion four 
ex plain s how t h ese elements interacted to allow the re-emerqence 
of Reuth~rite control over Loc a l 3. 
I. Management changes 
Man ageme nt u nderwe nt a transformation as a result of the 
traumatic recession of 195 8 - 59. In Apri l 1960~ af ter Chrvsler"s 
mar ket share h ad fallen below 14% in both 1958 and 1959, Colbert 
steppe d down as presid en t and c h ose Wi l liam C Newb e rg. who h ad 
started with Chrysler in 1933 a nd was seen as a Colb e rt protege, 
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to take that post. So on afterwards Colbert, who retained the 
chai r-man ~;hi p, sacrif iced Newb erg when it became public knowledoe 
he h ad ma jor stock holdings in certain of Chrvsler's supp liers. 
Ne wberq then turned on Colbert, who resumed the presidencY, and 
tell cl tht'? I I W(.? can neVf:~ lr' -=\q f.:l i n hi:\ve a stronq ChY"Y£'oil f:r-
1 
undf::'r' the Cz ar i st ru l e of 1"11~ Col ber-t. " vJi th Chrvsl ek' s i n tl:'rnal 
management squabbles public, Colbert tried unsuccessf ull y to 
recruit an o u tsider to take t he presidency. In July 1961, t.he 
board appo i nted the 42-vear - old accountant, I Lynn A Town send , who 
, .... 
.. :. 
h~d worked fo r Ch rys l er on l y since 1957. 1 c1'61 , 
chairman of the Pittsburqh-base d Conso li dation 
Coal Companv and the giant Cleveland-based M A Hanra investment 
. ~:. 
·t. I'- u S t , took over Conso l i d ation Coal then 
commissioned the industrial cons~L\ l tants, 
Company, to con duct a new study of Chr"ysl er" . Thf-2 Y Opl"?rl 1 v 
Condemned the 1:)1 d Chrysl er "f ami 1 y" man aqement : II I n recent year's, 
inept ma n agement has hurt the company's competitive position and 
But they we n t o n to argue that 
with the right top management Chr ysler could get back on the 
and so Consolidation Coal , the ind u stry"s largest coa l 
---------------------------
1 " Mori tz and Seasan, II~ c;U, 62. 
::" Stuart, Q~ £It, 64-67. Townsend had been the Detroit outside accountant responsibl e for the 
Chr ysler account at Touche , Ross ~ Co. from 1947 until 1957 when Colbert appoi nted him Chrvsl er 
controller following the death after brain surgery of the former vice president fo r fin ance. 
~;. t~tq ~ b8. He ·had onl y served on Chrysler 's Board of Directors since 1958, but was an ilPor tan t 
bridQe to Rockefeller interests. 
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consortium, purchased a block of Chrvsler stock. 
While Keller and Colbert had acquired their managerial s k ills 
within the autocratic. conservative Chrvsler managerial tradition~ 
the take-over bv Town send and Love established a new breed of 
PI'"o+esro;;ional m c~ ni!:\qer . Th e t vJC.1 top men had onl y i.~ few year"~5 ' 
"'" .J 
e:.:perience of thl7~ auto i ndu:,tr"y. But as financial contrDl ler fr"om 
1.957 t.o 1960. Townsend brought Chrysler"s financial cc)ntrol 
systems int.o line with Ford a nd GM's. He had bought up financial 
experts from Ford a nd introd uced a cost-control 
made it possible to evaluate the impact of the n ew man assignment s 
operating on the shop floor an d a c urre nt - profit plan th a t allowe d 
the d ai ly control of costs and operations. He also introduced 
6 
capital- investme nt and forward~cost control progr a mmes. Tr.J mar" I:: 
<:lrqan i z .. at i oni:'~ I 
as president, 
"7 
Townsend dr ew up the company' s first 
and quicklv released the brake on 
---------------------------
4. L~Lq~ 68-9. 
5. Love, for exa~ple , Mas quoted as saying , "I don't know what a carburettor is, and I' m too ol d 
to learn. " But Townsend and Love did kn ow th at Chrysler was unmanageable as long as no-one knew 
exactly how much it cost the. to make a carburettorj Moritz and Seafan, QP' £tt, 63 . They go on to 
describe Townsend and his new teal as coming from Ha generation that had attended the business 
schools endowed with the riches of the foundinq fathers of Alerican enterprise. They were the bushy-
tailed "BAs who had long been dri l led that what was good for Aeerican business was certainl y good 
for them. " 
6. t~!g . 69. 
7. \ 
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8 
the earlier McKinsey report's advice to expand overseas. Bv' the 
I.tmt~ call ed Chr y ::.l (;?r lithe comebii:lck stol"'y of us 
and put Town send's face on its fron t cover with the 
9 
he i:\dline!. " ToII'Ja Y-{::l s a World Ivlc:\r"kE~t". 
This rapid and int e rnall v disruptive transition to outside 
manaoement was not ~ however~ a total c han ge in man a gement s tvle or 
st l~' u(:t ur-e • Chrvs l er"s old centralized 'riml ess wh ee l" model 
manaqement actuall y survived: a ll kev decision s were referred to 
the centc,?r. Chrvsler's nine-man Operations Committee~ wh :lc:h v-Jas 
dominated by Townsend~ 
prev ious top executives. 
business s trateqv. 
who was as autocratic and secretive as 
10 
Townsend r evolutionized Chrysler's 
a ma nuf a cturing comp any that 
produced wel l -eng ineered and often original cars and counted on 
customer l oya lt y to get them so l d, it now focused on salesmanship~ 
leaving the styling boundaries of Chrysler cars to b e l c id down b y 
---------------------------
13.. Chrysler's total non-US and Canada employment rose from 4,763 in 1962 to 24,046 in 1963 with 
the increase in its 1958 25l share of Simca , France to 64! and the acquisition of a 40X share of 
Barreiros Diesel, Spain. Between 1964 and 1967 Chr ysler took over Rootes Motors; in 1964 it 
established Chrysler Peru; in 1965 it bought up the Argentinian company, Fevre y Basset ~ and the 
Columbian company Fabrica Colo~biana; in 1966 it acquired the Brazilian Siaca subsidiary. By 1967 
its worldwide employaent outside the US and Canada was 75 ,bOO, a figure equivalent to 60! of i ts 
average US elployeent. Between 1962 and 19b7 its vehicle sales outside the US and Canada rose from 
75,77B to 5BB,163! and its ne t overseas assets from $73m to $482. Chrysler Corporation, E~£!?, 12-
15. 
9. lQlQ, 70. Il~~, never an introspective eaqazine returned to the theme of "Detroit ' s comeback 
kid" on Karch 21 19B3, when it featured the current Chrysler success story of a recovery spear-
headed by Lee lacocca. 
l(l. One illustration of this was Townsend's 1964 decision to hire a New Yor k publicity agency to 
come up with a fresh corporate image - the blue and white pentastar - which was taken, at a cost of 
$50 ~illion~ without consulting his top associates; Stuart, Q~ ~lt, 70-71. 
GM. Townsend introduced major warranty guarantees (5 vears or 
50~OOO mil~5) in 1962 - eventuallY forcinq Ford and GM to follow 
!5ui t if) 1966 - and in 1964 followed GM and Ford b v estab l ishing a 
cn?di t company!, Chfvsler Financial. He also 
diversification from exclusive dependence on car sales a nd 
encouraqed Chrysler Realty, o riqinallv established to assist 
Chrvsler dealers buy well-situated s ites, to enter big - time land 
SP€·?cul i:."\ti on. Oth er areas of diversification included a Ch e mical 
PI~Qduc:t~i G I~ OUp , Ai t-temp ~ the ai r' 
mianu-f: acturt'?v" , 
l:t 
Di vi si eln .. 
marin e e nqines and boats, 
cClncl it. ion i ng equipment 
and the Chr ysler Space 
Townsend's innovations wi th the biggest knock-on e ffect on 
d av-to-day operations were his decision to follow GM and Ford i nto 
everv sector of the increasinqly segmented car market of the 1960s 
and to build in advance of firm orders. The fir st decision meant 
that rather than concentratino on three or four sections of the 
Chrysler multiplied it s model range and the choice of 
options within each model range. In before Townsend' s 
influence beqan to make itself felt on Chrysler's product 
the company offered 93 different styles; 
12 
just five years l ater i t 
was producinq 160. Since its manufacturing base was much smaller 
1. :l .. ~~~~, 73-80. 
12. i..Htl, 102. 
than its rivals~ Chrysler's stamping plants had to produce shor t er 
run s and c h~nqe d ies mor e often than Ford a nd GM~ an d to h ave ma n y 
L ".!; 
more mix chanoes o n the assembly lines. The mod l~ l 
meant less economies of sca le t h a n for Chrvsler's competitors a n d 
III a n -:? t e nsi em elf') th e s h op f 1 (J~lI'"" . where s hor ter runs a nd constant 
ch a nq es in job descr iptions ag9ravated underl y in g tensions. 
Townsend' s second s i gnifi c ant operational dec isiDn ~ to build u p cOl 
sales b a nk rather than shut p roduction, was taken ostensiblv t o 
e n s u re a quicker d e liverv of cars to the dealers. In I~ea lity , it 
wa s to avoid additional ris ing overheads (for plant maintenance 
a nd SUB for laid - off work e r s ) a nd to boos t the top executives' 
bonuses that were direct ly related to factory produc tion r ather 
than f i n a l sa l es vo lumes . In 1966 the bank was al lowed to gro w to 
60 ~ 000 un i t ~~ ~ and then it beca~e institutionali zed, 
14 
swe lling to 
408, 3 0 2 in February 1969 - 29% of the year's total sa les . 
Thi s focus on volume rath e r than quality or lower labour c osts~ 
l€-?d to Chrvsler's 1960s emp loy me nt e >:plosion and to iii pi:lrt i c LIl ar" 
sharpeni ng of the intens ity of work as front - line management was 
told to keep th e line movi ng b v s h eer pressure on the wor kers. 
This f uel l ed a n ew s hop floor combativity even bef m- e th e 
earlier t r a dition could f i nall y be pronounced d ee d. 
------------------------_. 
1 ::~;. Interview with Dick Clancy, Jul y 28 1982. 
l.1L Stuart, ~ ~tt, 107-1"09. 
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II. Uni o n oppo s i tion / 
It took longer for Chrvsler 's n e w l a bour rel a tions s tr a tegy to be 
, fullv l e gitimated in the eves of the union activist~ th an it did 
to implement the top - down changes within management. In it.ii:1l1y~ 
the hostility of union activist s to the new procedures and 
pressures carried the day . But the gap between the ac ti v i s t s ' 
rhetoric and the realitv of life on the shop floor gradually 
erod ed the credibility o f most of the 19505 layer of activist s . 
Left turn 
When s izeable numbers of production worker s wer e ca ll e d b ac k 
to Dodoe Main late in 1959 , the~ were outraged bv the new working 
cClndi tiCHiS. In ~JanLli:\I'''y the UAW's Chrysler Departme nt 
D i I'" C,' c- ,to ()y-
- ... , - !f Nor man Matth e ws, sc h e duled a tour of the p lan t. wit.h 
L c,:ll 
file members c harqing ma nagement with impos ing i. nhuman work 
c hi s-ling on negotiated ag r eeme nt s and supervisors 
1 ~5 
cOnst iH1tl y pel'-"folr" minq hOl.lI'"l y I'"at.ed v-Jol""ker"s' jobs." This:, l ast 
Complaint became a constant feature in the 19605 as Chr ys l e r 
Vastly increased the strenqth of its first line s uper vision. On e 
estimate suggested that the ratio of foremen t o production 
1958 was one to every 75 or 80 workers~ 
--, -.. -' .. ,_. "- ..... _ ............ -.. -, .. " .-.. -- ..... -- .......... . -... _ .. -._. -- ... -_ ... _ ... _ .. _ .. 
j 1:;.-
",J . ~tl~ January 16 1900. 
16 
a f terwar d s it wa s one to ever v 20 o r 25 workers. CC-2rt. a i nl y, the 
propor t ion o f Chrysler's salaried comp a n y's wor kers to total 
e mp loy me n t r ose siqn i f i can tlv from a n ave rage of 28 . 2% in t he 
1 7 
fi ve vear period 19 55-59 to 32.7% over 1960-64. 
In May 1960 unit e l ec t i on s t h rou g h o u t Dodge Main resu lted in 
th e e l ec ti on as c h ief steward s of the fo rme r ~embers of t h e 19~)7 
' Ra nk a nd F ile' caucus , li ke Ed it h Fox f o r Di strict. 7 of t h e trim 
18 
d e p a rtment a nd Ed Li s ka in t h e body- in - whit e . An d o n e mont h 
S t E've Pasi c:a . t h e p l ant commi ttee c h a i r ma n an d a found e r 
the ~eft Blue Sl ate i n 19 50 wh o had s upp o r ted the 
ve t e r a n Pat ' Quinn for presi d e n t i n 1956 a nd 19 5 8 , 
1. 9 
d e+ F.?iated Qu i nn 
Thi s e lec ti o n ma rk e d th e e n d of 
th e ol d ri g ht ver s u s l e f t , g r e en s lat e a g ainst blue s l a t e 
e l ectora l con tests t h at h a d d omi n ated the 19505 • 
..... ..... ..... '. __ ........... __ .... ..... _00. ' H_ ••• • 'M • _... ..... .. ............ ~ ...... .. . ... -" ............ . 
16 . ~~~, tlay 14 19Ob. 
17 . Co~~any data. At Ford, by contrast, the ~roportion of salaried staff to total employment rose 
by just one per cent, froe 29.b! in 1955-59 to an average of 30.bY. during 19bO-64. The 4! rise at 
Chrysler is all the lore indicative of a sharp increase in su~ervision since one of the first acts 
of the new Administrative Vice 'President, Lynn Townsend , in December 19b0~ was to dismiss 7,000 
white collar workers , sase 1St of the total salaried wor k force; Stuart. ~R ~tt , 67. 
18. Liska interview; ~11~ May 21 19bO. Most of the 1957 'Rank and File' caucus activists had been 
laid off froil\ Januarv 1958 to October or Novellber 1959, and so had not been in a position to run in 
the 1958 local elections. Each unit at DodQe held its own elections for unit officers and committee 
chairpersons, chief stewards and their alt~rnates, one month before the Local elections. The Tri m 
Unit elected 7 officers, 11 standing committee chairpersons and 15 stewards and alternates on the 
two shi fts. 
11i . Q~~ June 4 1960. 7,b59 workers voted in this election, approxillatel y 60% of the workforce. 
Subsequentl y a trend to smaller turnouts for local officers' elections developed as the relationship 
between local officers and the leil\bershi~ grew increasinQlv distant. This 1960 election also saw the 
first woman. Edith van Horn, elected as a Local 3 officer , although only as Trustee. 
Quinn's principal lieutenant, but felt Quinn was too dependent 
Upon Reuthe~ and too compr omised by t h e 1958 agreement to be able 
to mount a n ew campaign again s t the speed-up. A-fter lClsing~ 
Quinn made hi s peace with Reuther rat her than r etur n to work. He 
told job in the 
Inter n atiClna l~ h e knew damn well that if I went back in t h e sh op~ 
I "d sti r t hinqs up . .. II'Je qot bought 0+ of. " 
It was a common Clccurr en c e in the UAW in the 1960s for a 
!'1anv 
21 
l ocal 
in c umbent who l ost Clf+ice because of hi s defence of 
Re uther's l ine to e nd u p on the internationa l staff - and it 
encoul'-a Cl e d local officer s to distance themselves from their 
mLmber s wh e never there was a conflict of interest between the 
member s a n d th e inter n ational. 
At finst~ Pasica attempted to ma in tain th e old tr ~ dition by 
pressi nq for a tough line aqainst the new attend ance procedure 
in the 196 1 nationa l c ontract negotiations on production 
During the shut-d own before the int r oduction of 
1961 mode ls~ t h e Labour Relations depart me nt unilat e r al l Y imposed 
a formal procedu re to standardi se sanctions agai nst workers who 
tOok unauthorized ti me off. -1'his "of fence " could no lL.,nqel~ 
----------------------------
20. Marquart, QIl ~tt, 132. 
2 1. Liska, Fox interviews. 
be left to the accident of shop floor relations between a foreman 
So a standard escalation of sanctions was imposed: 
writ ten warning, one-day l ay-off~ three-day lay-
five-day lay-off (twice); a nd on the seventh I(Jf"fenCf?" ~ 
Pasica urged workers to ignor e it and to support 
an vone uniustl v disciplined: 
so l et"s see if we can"t correct t h e situation fo r the 
,.., ,"'\ 
. .::''''::' 
bettc:0 r"fJient of But confidence in the 
l egit imacy of resistance h a d been sapped. Management· s unilateral 
r ule-ma kinc therefore succeeded in addi ng mandator y suspensions 
"" r",d event. ual discharqes to the mo netary loss incurred when a 
Worker stayed h ome. Thi s important reassert i on of 
over t h e work er"s o u t-of-wor k life was ec hoed i nside the 
plant in ma n agement·s continuou s pressure on pr"oduct: ion 
!:;tanclards-. . The Pasica administration"s response wa s to dr a w up 
recommendati on s for inclusion b y the national 
negot.iators in t.he 19 61 UAW-Chrysl er contract. Th ey amounted to a 
plea for man acement to surrender its recen tly acquired h ard-won 
right to chance standards after th e first three months of a model 
t o chanqe the method of operation of a .. i ob at c:'lnv 
:;;;!2 .. ~~~~ August 27 1960. 
:~3. Qtl~ , January 14 1961. Liska also reported: "Throughout 1960 work ing conditions have been very 
difficult on nearly all jobs. Workers were sub jected to Tille Study FiQures which meant that ever 1/ 
second of the minute was accounted for on all jobs. " Liska was elected the Bodv Unit's Alternate 
Plant Coe.ittee~an to Ed Domanski in June 1960, as part of a deal with the DOlanski slate whereby he 
lIould stand dOHn as Chief Steward. Subsequently , his reports increasingly lost SOGe of the radical 
edqe they had when he lias associated with t he 'Rank and File' caucus. 
"time. 
them: 
and to impose standards without havinq to barqain over 
1. All changes in the rates of production shall be made within 90 days of the date the model 
first goes into production. (The Company will still have the ri ght to ti me jobs for the balance 
of the model year but the new figures cannot be put into effect unti l the next model.) 
2. After a 'ob is once timed, during the first 90 days of the model year , ' the .ethod of 
operation cannot be chanQed unti l the next model . Too often we have agreed to higher 
production standards a~ainst the wishes of our mellbership, onlv to be confronted with the salle 
problem, on the sale job, sOle weeks later when the cOlpany takes a notion to change the 
lIethod of operation ••. 
4. No job should be tiled unless the regular employees are working on the job, and a full 
eiQht hours tilling must be made in order to deterlline fatigue , personal relief line 
breakdowns , etc •. • 
5. When a tile study is (olpleted the Coapany should give us the rating illmediatel y to prevent 
thea fra il alterinQ their figures to aake the study benefit them. 
b. A Job Tilling cOI.ittee shall be set up in each plant consisting of three mellbers frail the 
Union and three members frOB the Company. This cOllit tee will be given the authoritv to 
bargain on the rates of production on any operation during the first 90 days of the 1I0dei 
year. They will also have the final say-so on 'obs tiled during the year that must wait until 
the next model year to be changed. This Nould prevent the Company froll pressuring individual 
forellen to intimidate their ellployees for !~re work or be fired.24 
But the attempt to generali ze "t h e old front i e r of control that. 
had existed at Dodge Main throuqh demands on the UAW' s Chrysler 
Depa tment was a confession af weakness. If Local 3 cou ld not 
inSist t h a t it s own ma n agement respec ted th ese workplace rules, 
it had no c h ance of getting eith e r Chrysler or the international 
UAW to "take them seriously. 
Chrysler announced it was tearinq up its 
Side of the 1959 Dodqe stamping p l ant agreement und er which the 
Workers in the press s h op accepted t h e standard plant-wide relief 
2,+. Docu~ent dated Februarv 23 1961 in local 3 President's Collection, WRl, Box 12, Research 
file. 
times on condition their wo rk would not be moved elsewhere. Th e 
Conant Stampi ng Plant was to be run down from 3, 100 to just 300 
60% of the wo rk would b e transferred to the former 
Br iqqs Nine Mile Press Plant, a fifth would go to the Mack plant 
25 
l nd the r est wo uld go to Twinsburg, Ohio. Dodge Main had 
a lr eady seen i ts s hare of Chrysler 's tot a l workforc e fall 
25% in the fir st h a lf of the 195 05 to 19% in Januar v 1960~ vJhen 
it e mploy e d 13,000. This permanent loss of 3.000 s t a mpinq p lan t 
i ob s reduced Dodge Main's maximum employme nt potential t o 
b e tween 10.000 and 12 , 000 hourl y-paid wor kers . 
Recession 
'rh e onset of t h e 1961 -62 recession en s ured that the 
initiative remain e d i .n Dodge Main man agemen t·s h a nd s: :3,600 
Workers were laid off in October 1960 , a nd another 2 ,000 in 
26 
December. A t r im unit report in May 1961 point e d to the 
ccmt i nued i mpot£~nce fel t on the s hop f J. OCll'" ~ 
The bosses at this stage of the Model, plus the cosing of contract negotiations, are a defi ant 
lot and do work in full view of the Stewards.27 
Bv Jul v 1961 rouqh l I h a lf the pl a nt· s s limmed down workforce were 
laid 0++, and most didn't get called back until the start-up of 
---------------------------
"";'IC::-
. .. ~. ~tlt1 February 25 1961. 
26. qtl~ ~ October S, Decellber 3 1960. 
27 • ~tl~ Mav 6 1961. 
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the 1963 mo d e ls . A re p o r t fro m t h e body-in-wh i t e i nd icated h ow 
t hose wh o were wo rk i ng wer e d o i ng so at a r ate i n conceivab l e five 
Touch-up letal finishing Door liners 
!~~~ Hpl 1~~~ l~M 
Jobs per hour: 40 56 40 56 
Teams: 20 7 10 4 
Wor kers: 40 14 20 . 8 
Tt e 4 0 0% incr e a se i n l abour pr o d ucti v it y o n t h e se jobs was c l ear l y 
aff e cted b y improved qua li t y c o nt r o l a n d t h e arr i v a l o f p ower (a ir 
a n d c-d ec:t.Ir i ca l ) t ools o n t he lines . But pri ma ri l y it was t h e 
r esul t o f man a geria l c h a nges . Th e man ass ignme n t syst em cou p l ed 
wi t h s t a nd ar d i z e d s an c tion s e x ecut e d b y g r eat e r n umber s of 
f o r e me n aqa inst wo rker s whose l o cal uni on tradit i on o f r e s i s t a n ce 
ha d bee n d e feat e d ac hi eved a tot a l l y n e w work i n g e l vir o nme n t . 
Th e 196 1 UAW - Chr vs l er c ontract refl ec ted the f ac t th at~ li ke 
i t was n e g o t iat e d in a r e c ess ion a r y y ear. It 
Chrvs l e r workers' r e l ief t ime t o th e s t a ndar d 24 
minutes a d ay establ ished a ft e r t h e 1958 Dod g e Ma i n s tr i ke. a nd 
in on e i mportant area i t l a id th e bas i s fo r a f u r ther retr eat by 
---------------------------
:~ f3. The length of the lay-offs experi enced in 1958-59 and 1961-62 caused many of the workers who 
had been hired in to DodQe Hain in the 19405 to t ake transfers to other Chrysler plants or leave the 
indust rv altoqether. The result was that when Dodge cal led back its old workforce in October 1962 it 
needed to first hire in from the general Detroit Chrysler pool of labour and then start hiring off 
the street again to make up the nu~bers needed (8,000 in 1963, rising to 12,000 in 1965). 
29.. g~~ , Jul y 17 1961. 
::::'0. UAW-Chrysl er Agreement , November 2 19b1 ~ Producti on and Maintenance , 49. 
the uni o n from anv l ingering attachme nt"t o its role as a vehi c l e 
fo r shop-f l oor bar aa ining. 8M h a d op~rated a rati o of o n e ful l -
time committeeman to every 400 wor ke r s s inc e FOI'" cI h ad 
operated on the bas i s of o n e t o e ver y 550 since 1941. In 1961 ~. 
for t h e first t ime, t h e Chr ysler c ontract conceded that " an 
equi tab l c::? p r opoy-t i o n a l r" eprE~ S">en tc:"\t i em svs"l:em " of c h i ef 
n e (~d(::? d that is , fewer stewa rd s - and ag r eed to cut 
:::::1 
t.hc"? i I~ numbers in the 1964 aqref.? ment. In the mf=!antim£~~ 
provisi ons were ma d e t o r e duce the ratio of s teward s to me mb ers 
on second a nd third s hift s. Th e Loc a l 3 agreement reached the 
1\10 i mp l'"Ovf-:?mt?nt in reli ef t imes o r 
e xtension of t h e privil ege of f ive minutes was hing-up time to a n y 
new groups of wor kers was p e rmitted. Dodge ma n agement ag r eed to 
'I::" r',' t ' '"' L' I " • . a gl V8 ~ t ,ours" noti ce of overt ime working requireme nt s but 
Whil e it agreed 
that ove l~ t :i mc,.~ woul d b f2 "f?qual i Z f?c:I r:lmong producti on WOI'" k f:? r s as 
nearlv as poss ible"? it exc lud e d the car conditioning d epartment 
(departme nt 9190) wh ich u s u a ll y r eceived most of the c) VE~ I' " t i me 
---------------------------
:::;; 1. UAW-Chrvsler AQreemen t. Novellber 2 1961 , Production and Maintenance, 26. Robert Jensen, who sat 
on the UAW's 1961 Bargaining Comlittee, recalled that the union's 1961 negotiators agreed to bind 
the 1964 negotiators in this way so that no-one would have to go direct to the lembership (or the 
bOdv of active stewards) and sell a deal thev knew was very unpopular. As it was the 1961 
neQotiators could say 'We didn't do it'; while the 1964 negotiatofs could say ' OUf hands were tied 
by the 1961 negotiators'; Jensen interview. The two argupents used against reducing the steward 
ratio in the Q~qq~ ~!trr ~~~~, August 26 1961 , were, in order of priority: 'If a hundred stewards are 
eliminated it will mean 100 workers will be laid off. It wil l iIlean workers being less represented 
when troubles confront the •• It will weaken our Union." 
32. UAW-Chrvsler Agreement, Novellber 2 1961, Production and I'laintenance, 25. In return Chrysler 
offered the UAW a fairly ieaningless concession where it would guarantee workers on short-tifie a 
sinimul of between 50t and 6SY. of their regular 40 hours' pay - leaningless, since Chrysler , 61'1 and 
Ford all preferred to adjust their labour force by lay-offs and recalls rather than by the much more 
COlilion practice of short-time w~rking that was operated by British manufacturers. 
ari V vJ i:I V . Th e only concession it appeared to give freely was to 
"=!"":!' 
'_.' ••• 1 
provide ov~ral l s for fourteen groups of workers. vJhen :L ~ :500 
Dodqe workers (out o f the 6,500 e mployed at the ti me) tUt"'ned up 
to vote on ratification. there was considerable d ebate a bout. th e 
failure of both national and loca l dqreements t o dea l with " t.h f'.? 
'::'~4 
Work Stand ard prob l e m". But t.he old trad ition was fast becominq 
a d ream rather t h a n a rea l izable goa l~ an d l<'Jith l oca l 
the internat i ona l l~' ee: Clmnlen cI 
accept a n ce, t h e aq r eements were ratif i e d. 
In I"lay 1962, wit h the Dodge workinq membership as low as 
5~O()O, Pasiea an n ounced t h e mer ger of t h e Blue a nd Gray Slates to 
of i q h t on t h f.? 5 1 oq ii.'l n " End Gl (Jom c"Hici Doom !". Th e s l ate stood for n ?-
Open in g t h e 19 61 c o ntract a nd, for t h e first time, includ e d tl<'JO 
black s among i ts ten candidat es for loca l off ice. Th t? HI. ue--Gr c:\y 
d eman d s were pert of the legacy from t h e 1950s an d they were 
b aSic to a ll au t o work e rs: 
Re-open the contract for neqoti ati ons on these key issues: 
Shorter working week with no cut in pay, 
Eli mination of compulsory overtime, and 
Protection against speed-up. 
- - , ..... '-'" ..... .. _ .~ ....... .... M_ •••••• _ .. _ ••••••• ,M .. _ .... . __ .. • •• _ M ••• __ .M_ . ...... ~ " ___ .N. 
:~::5. ~llJ.~:~~i!Y ti~~§, April 16 1962. Joseph Sardon was the unsuccessful Blue-6ray Slate candidate 
for Record ing Secretary, beaten by Ed Liska; Curtis Davis, the veteran black Foundr y ch ief steward 
(23 years) also ran again. 
Th ev were to be repeated again and again over the following 15 
vears, but in 1962 it was 'old-timers' who rai sed them - a nd won. 
these demands would rema i n a constant theme of us 
auto workers' discont ent, but the grip of the UAW machine and the 
n ew definition~ imposed by t he company, o~ wha~ consti tuted 
or 'leqitimate' unionism meant those who articulated 
and orqanized around them p with few exceptions, would never aqain 
be close to power. Pasica's re-election, and the e lection on 
the same slate of Edith Fox as a UAW delegate to the 1962 
c:onventi on, ~·Jas the I c.~=;t def i c.~nt capture of the l_ocal :;;: machi ne 
bv the legacy of shop floor di s sent at Dodge Main. And it was not 
the revolt of any new found shop floor confidence. 
a technica l 'knock-out'. In the depths of the 1961-62 recession 
the seniol~ity system e n s lJl'-eci otl"'II?r 'clld--t.imers' from the 
and 19405 still had .iob s - and th~y were the ones most like l v to 
take the trouble to vote. With the arrival of the 'new' workforce 
t h e 'old-timers' would not again be in such a strong 
PDl5:i t ion. 
~--------------------------
.. , . ... '1 
'-~ I • One exception was Jordan SiIllS, who was elected president of Chrysler ' s Eldon Avenue gear and 
aXle plant in 1973, two years after being discharged; Jaees A Seschwender, ~!~§?~ B~f~~ ~~~ ~9r~~r 
h!?!!rJl~!}fYl I~~ !.~~g!!~ Q! B~Yfl!!!!ifl!}~rY ~!~f~ ~Q[~~[§ (Caebridge: Uni Ifersity Press, 19771, 200-201. 
::::.B2 
I II . Changing ste wards 
One of the most obvious changes from the 1950s to the 19605 on 
the shop floor in Chrysler plants was in the role of the steward. 
In the 1950s the Dodge stewards had been expected if thev 
wished to keep their privileged positions - to bargain seriously 
and to mobilize their member s in the event of a failure to agree. 
In t h e 1 960s ~ theirs was a demobilizing role. They were expected 
to adhere strictly to procedure and ensure their members did the 
S~me. Ine~itably, while thev sti ll retained their privileges, 
they were largely unabl e to deliver results for their members. 
Within a few year s~ and especial l y after new labou~ was hi red into 
the most exactinq low seniorit y jobs, the members' views about 
their c hief stewards became increasingly cynical. Sever a l 
differ e nt elements contributed to this. The centralization by 
mana~emen t of the l a bour relctions function; th e increasing v alue 
of the chief steward position to the incumbent; a nd the greater 
influence management ' s new 'friend l y ' labour strategy had on which 
. \ 
stewards s urvived. 
The new labour relations philosoph y of the 1960s had two 
element s in common with that held dear by GM s inc e at least 1947~ 
the centrali zation of labour relations policy-makinq, and the 
maskinq of the company's anti-unionism behind a veneer of 
friendship. Th e s tewards soon experienced the first e l ement: they 
found foremen and ~up erint end ent s would refuse to take dec i sions. 
Nothinq could be sett l Ld on the spot and everything went to 
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fil e: bOL\I~ r:;: e l ations" . At Dodge JVJa i n, five l a bour relations 
SUpervisors were appointed to cover different areas of the plant 
on the first s hift. a nd four for the second s h ift. 
mee tinqs enabled t h em to estab li sh continuity and consistency of 
:;El 
policy_ In Novemb er 1962 Edith Fox described t h e effect of t h e 
of the steward's functions from barqaining 
qrieva nce processinq: 
RemeBber the davs when. a wor ker or a Steward coul d take up and resol ve a gri evance wi th the 
immediate foreman? 
NON He are forced to deal with indi viduals who are total ly removed fro! the realiti es of the 
job... If a dispute of any significance ar i ses, a parade of white-shirted strangers appear on 
the scene. This has a Bost unfortunate eff ec t on the employees . They tend to become fri ghtened 
and nervous. 39 
to 
Th~? hoI d t;"ken b v the " whi te-shi rted s tlranger·s" OVf2r s hop f 1 OOt-
Conditions after th e industrial re l ations watershed of 1956···::59 
r e duced t h e status of the steward and the foreman and transformed 
the relationsh ip between them. In the 1950s, custom and practice 
agreements gave both a reason for co-operation. In the 1960s, 
when con d itions wer e standardized, t h e foreman"s discreti o n was 
Sharply curtailed. Shop floor reports of 'good" 
'qood" steward s n ow became increas i n q l v rare. 
As the stewards became l ess effective, many workers began to 
see their s u per-seniority as more of an ind i vid u al privil ege than 
a s a collect i ve asset . In 1939 stewards had won the right t o be 
" ' " .... .............. ...... , ....... . .... . ....... . .... ,,_ ..... " .......... ~ ., ...... .. . .. . .. .. _" . .. .. . _ •• ~ . .... m ....... , 
·'::;li . Interview with Di ck Clancy, Jul y 29 1982. 
~:;9 . ~~~, NoveMber 3 1962 . 
called in when even o n e worker in t h e i r dep a rtment was working. 
Th is t.o h e l p 
col lecti ve l y- imposed wor kp lace rules throuq h per" i ods when 
ma n ageme nt might have b een ab l e t.o break them. It me a n t steward s 
were the l ast laid off a nd the first bac k. In periods of boom~ 
overt ime was worked~ it meant they could always , \1'101'" k' 
overtime. Already in the 19405~ thei I~· ,a nnual 
Significantly above those o f the aver age worker 
di!5t.ricts . But, in the':! 1940s a nd 19505, - thi s pri vilege was 
accomp&nied b y a h i gh proporti o n of di smissa l s and an active 
barg ai n i ng role with long hour s at the local h a ll a·f ter wor· k, 
educat ing themselves~ e xchan g in g information and discussing with 
So most worker s b e lieved it j u s t i fi ed. In t.h~? 
19605 t.1l is " c:1li:lnqed . tr" i bun e in 
Con f r o nt a tion with man agement. disappeared a nd ma nageme nt b ecame 
mOI'"e i.~cc: ommodat i nq t o trlf? rE?qui r"E'm l::nts of "uni em busi n ef::">s " . In 
jus t. o n e month at the close of the 1963 model year~ ':lpiart from 
the seven full - time local union of·ficel'· s ~ s i >: 
c ommitt eemen took a tot a l of a week or more official 1 E!aVe o·f 
a b S e n Cf-2 on "LlniCH1 bus ine£:.s" ~ 13 were o ut for between One and 
t hree d a vs a nd another 12 took off for per i o d s of between on e a nd 
40 
Manv more spen t time i n local bar s durin g working 
leaving a phone numb e r ·inside t h e plan t wh e re they c ould 
.... ........... - ..... ....... _ ........ 'M" •• _. ,,_ ..... ..... _ " , •• M •• _ ... . ........... ..... ' u .. ..... . ...... _ ._ .. ... M ._. 
4 0 . l~~y.~ Q.! ~~~g~g' fori subilli tted by President Pasica to Dodge Main labour relations supervision 
for Jul y 1 to Jul y 31 1963. In Dodqe local 3 Collection, Box 4. WRL. 
be contacted in case of trouble. Th e y h ad only to ensure that a 
fri end had clocked 'them in . 
Ma nagement was well a ware of what was taking pl~ce , and liked 
it. As Li s ka recal l ed, 
Il'IW:: h i f 
41 
management could throw him being out o f the plant up a t 
h :i m. " Thi s abuse of their position from the early 196 05 was a 
r.:: C.if(jP on G~n t of ef f ec t i venes!:',; 
br.:w'gai ni nq ins; t :i t uti on, and further encouraged a growin g rift 
between many stewards and their member s. When it came to re-
election~ the incumbent would ei ther s how a b urst of s hort - t er m 
militancy, or make enough friends in the district (50 or 75 would 
Usuallv b e enough) through buy\ng beers and spending time with 
individuals while " \1'Jal kinq the b<=~at ". Manag ement might a lso 
influence the outcome by making key concessions (or withhold ing 
them) or by encouraging canvassing (or denyinq it) in the peri o d 
42 
just before an el ect ion. 
The s tewards' privileges were thus transformed froll'l be i ng a n 
aspect of a strugg l ed-for achievement of an effective shop floor 
union into a gift of management. In th(~ pn:Jr.::€.~ss, \l'Jhat it mecmt. 
. ....... ... -, . .. .. . _ . ...... . ~ .................... . ...... .. , .,," • ••• • _ . .. ..... .. ..... ,~ . . ............ , ... H . . ....... ... ~ 
41. Liska inbrview. 
4 :2. Fox, Liska interviews; for a similar pattern in a Detroit 61'1 plant, see Anderson and Jefferys, 
QQ fB, Chapter 9. 
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to be a steward chang e d . Commitment to a wider n6tion of ~l~g~, 
of weakened. The 
r~sult was seen in th e stewards' fa l ling attendances at local 
~embership mee t i n gs or any kind of non-emergenc y meeting out of 
Worki n q hours for whi c h t h ev wouldn"t b e paid expeHses and loss 
of earnings . 
While it h a d lost its original the l arge 
numbers of UAW act ivi s ts who d irect l y b e nefited from t h e survival 
of t h e s t e ward system created a s ub s t a n tia l vested i nterest in 
i t. Jus t h ow b ig can be seen in t h e numbers of stewards at Dodge 
Ma in in 196 0 . Then . when Dodge Mai n e mpl oyed an average of a r ound 
43 
13, 000 workers~ t h ere were 95 c hi ef stewards, about 30 
44 
a lternat~ c hi ef stewards a nd about 30 blue button s tewards. 
The rat io of chief stewards to workers was therefore around one 
to every 130 or 140 worker s . Du ring the 1961-62 r ecession whi l e 
---------------------------
4 :~. Dodge Local 3 Collection, WRL, Box 9; letter dated Septeeber 16 1960 enlisting support in the 
Upcoming State and National Elections for the Democrat Party frol 95 naled chief stewards. 
44. Local 3 collection , WRL, Minutes of Stewards 'Heetings. Recording Secretary's Files. The three 
Stewards ' Council meetings on November a 1961. were attended as follows: 2nd shift: 29 chief 
stewards, 1 alternate chief steward, 2 blue button stewards, 2 line stewards; 1st shift: 23 chief 
stewards! 2 alternate stewards, 1 blue button steward; 3rd shift: 4 stewards (unspecified). Of the 
five stewards' l eetinqs held in 1961 this was the l ~rgest attendance: 69; the st allest attendance 
was in April when 48 were reported present and 29 chief stewards were named absent. The guessti~ate 
of 30 to 40 blue button (or line) stewards in Dodge Main in 1960-61 is based on (1) Edith Fox' s 
recollection that she had six or seven while she was a chi ef steward; (2) The fact that despite the 
l ack of encourage_ent , five attended the November 9 meeting; (3) Nalezty' s recollection that the 
blue buttons still existed in certain areas in the 1960s but that they no longer wore their bl ue 
stewards' buttons. The guessti mate of the numbers of alternate stewards deri ves froa the fac t that 
Usuall y onl y, the day-sh ift chief st~ward would have an alternate; and in several ar!as the posit ion 
Has dispensed with. 
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the workforce was halved. s uper-seniority for the stewar d s meant 
theit numbeis onlv fell to between 70 a nd 80. a nd the r atio of 
stewar d s t o workers r ose to one chief steward for every 83 to 90. 
By the sprinq of 1964 , when Dodge Main e mployed some 12.000 
hourlv~p ai d wor kers , the total of chief steward s and a l ternates 
46 
elected betwe en Ma rch and May we nt b ac k up to 129, an d the 
chief stewa rd / wo rk e r ra t io fe ll back to a b o ut o n e to everv 120 or 
Takinq in to account a mo des t estimate of 
turnover of about 25% in each of the two elections, the number of 
wo rke r s who h a d full-time s teward experience at some point during 
the ·f C"JLlr veal"s f I~ om 1 <1160 tel 1964 coul d h ave be~~n as hi qh as 2 00" 
Thr ee or four times as ma n v were unsuccessf ul candidates. 
The To wn send labour r e lati ons p hilosoph y, however, didn't 
immediatelv tarqet t h is immense overhead as a thr eatr It 
reflected post - war pragmatism rath e r than Chrysler's tr a d itional 
ant i ···un i emi c:,m. This new ' li vinq with the UAW · 
c ompatible with s u c h high numb e rs of non - worker s bec a u se th e 
stewar d s were carryinq out a n ew r o l e. Befor e they wer e 
r epresentat ives of discontent: i n the 1960& they wer e a ll owed 
on l y to police the contract, a d Visi n g workers how and wh ether to 
r a ise objections when the comp a ny tran sg r essed what amounted to 
---------------------------
4·6. Q~tj, Var ious issues, March to Hay 1964. 
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its own workplace rules. Table 17 comp ares the number of chief 
and altern~te s tewa rds elected in 1964 with a list of production 
qrievances submitted at th e start o f t h e 196 4 model year: 
TABlE 17 
DODGE ItAIN STEWARDS BY DEPARTIlENT AND tIUIIBER, 1964 
AND PRODUCTION GRIEVAJICES SUBftITTED IN AU6UST 1963 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Deparhent No. of stewards No of gri evances : Department No. of stewards 
Foundrv 26 3 Maintenance 18 
Bodv shop IB B Tool and Die 12 
TriIU 16 44 
Fi nal Assembl v 12 17 
Pai nt 11 5 Transportation 10 
Inspection 6 1 
SOURCE: q~qq~ ~~t~ ~~~E' Reports of unit elections, March-May 1964 j production grievances , August 24 1963. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The s ubmi ss ion of production standard grievances bore no relation 
47 
to the numbers of stewards in a departmen t. Both their response 
pressur e and the amount of pressure exerted b y d epar-tme n ta l 
managements varied e n ormously across the plant. Man a oeme n t's 
Concern to reduce their numbers was no longer based primarily on a 
correlation of their numbers and the volume of problems it s fac e d. 
Th e steward s in tbgm§~lY~§ were no longer the proble~H 
Chrys ler objected to paving around 90 Dodge c hi ef stewards for not 
Wor k ing when in comparable plants, GM and Ford worker s made do 
4'7.. And the skilled Norkers who had proportionatel y the greatest numbers of stewards - including 
sever al in very small sections who did actually work - put the smallest number of grievances into 
the procedure. Liska inter vi ew. 
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with between 15 an d 25 ful l -t i me comm i tteemen. 
IV. Opposition overcome 
Th e 1963 mode l vear was an i mportant testing g r oun d for t h e new 
ma n a qem_ n t o perati n q i n Ch r y s l e r p lants : it was t h e fir st model 
year to refl ec t Townsend "s per sona l i nt e r ven t ion , i n Chr vs l er's 
st:ylinq Clf'f :ic es~ a nd a vear wh e n h is s u ccess ' me a nt that a sharp 
in producti on coi n ci d e d with t h e p t·· €~sen c:e of 
t r a d ition a li st Loca l 3 a dmini st r ation. Yet p l a n t- l evel management 
. h e ld f irm to it s unil atera l a u ton o my o ver t h e l a b our p rocess . As 
l ate as h a lf-way t hroug h the mod e l year, t rim d e p a r tment chief 
s t e war d Edith Fox r e por t e d th at t h e t ime s tudy d e~artment was 
sti ll h a rd a t work : 
The crew cuts are roaling the tria shop selecting operations that they think can be eliminated 
by breaking the. up and dividing them along other workers. 
This is the foulest type of speed-up we have eYo perienced. They've gotten all the leat and 
they are now loving in for the small pickings.49 
Stewards had b i q prob l e ms in d e al i n g with t h e new system, 
Camp) a in i n <.=l , OIEl. e mf?n ta l b r e a kdown s on di s p u t e d jobs are s l ow in 
r eac h i n q uni o n representat i ves . La b o ur Re l a t i o ns p e r sonn e l seem to 
b e t h e d e c i d i n q fa ctor o n a ll eli s pLltes, even supercedinq the 
50 
De p a r t me nt s up e r i n tend e nt. " Loca l presi d e nt Pasica pl eaded wit h 
•. ~ . .......... _ .. ..... _ •••• M' _ .......... N." ......... _ ........ _ .......... _M __ ... _ ... _ , ........... .. 
'+t!. qtl~. February 12 1966: At the Ford plant ten miles aNay in livonia, there were just 22 full-
tile plant comlitteelen covering the 7,000 hourl y-paid workers,less than a Quarter of the numbers 
paid bv Chrysler at Dodge Main. 
49. 
!:.)o . 
1903. 
Q~~~ January 12 1963. 
local 3 collection , WRl, RecordinQ Secretary Box 9; Stewards' Council mi nutes, February 26 
h is stewards to take up their workers' grievances throuqh the 
In order to ask tor Strike Action , gr ievances must be filed on work disputes. At th is time we 
do not have any on file •. • 
Comfort for the workers on di fficult jobs must be fought for and the union 
representat ives lust do their duty by writing up any jobs that are too difficult . We must 
build up the couraqe of the worker s in the plant and restore their faith in the Union.51 
But it was easier for Pasica, on leave of absence from Dodge, and 
sittinq in th e local hall to tal k about restoring the workers' 
" faith in the Uni on " thc~n it l<'J cH:; ,for' the stewar-d~~ to d~~live l~ it. 
(on paqe 252) and Table 18 s how that Chrvsler's car 
output per manual worker rose to its all-time high in 1964= 
TABlE 18 
CHRYSlER' S US HOURlY EltPlOYII£IT AND OUTPUT OF PAssasER CARS PER IWIJAl EttPlOYEE, 
1960-1969 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ye ar Hour I y-pai d, Car output Year Hourl y-pai d Car output 
ellployees per worker employees per worker 
(OOOs) (oOOs) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1960 72.1 14 . 13 1965 89.8 16 .35 
1961 47.5 13.67 1966 93.3 15.50 
1962 50 .0 14.33 1967 89. 0 15.32 
1%3 61.8 16.96 1968 101.4 15. 03 
1904 73.1 17.00 19b9 102.4 13.60 
SOURCE: Company data; Wards yg~[999! , Var ious years. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
then. that in June 1964 Edward Domanski 
def('-:)at Pasi cc:~ .::;;.s pl"esi den't "b y a substanti a1 mar-gi n il . 
~",oul d 
Pasic.::\ 
lost office because hi s promises of action agai n st the speed-up 
---------------------------
1:::-,..., 
o.J.::.. Q~~~ June 13 1964. 
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had proved empty. Ed Domanski had first been elected from the 
sl atE~ 
54 
in 1949. From that not ver v radi ca l begi nning he did not have to 
move far to become a supporter of the Reuther-Fraser UAW-Chrvsl e r 
administration. His election marked the end of a teH-ye~r spell of 
OPPosition ( to Reuther) control of Local 3 and the start of a n ew 
era . For the next 16 year5~ until Dodge Main was closed in January 
19f:lO ~ its president and EB would be firm s upporter s of thE.' 
international UAW leade r s hip. 
Soon af ter t hi s electiqn~ the UAW tarqetted Chrys l er in the 
1964 national contract negotiat ions. Chrysler had c limbed back up 
to a 16% s har e of US production from 10% in 1962~ and tl"'1e 1964 
contract reflected the realit y ' of the first contract in a dec ad e 
n(·?qot.i at!'2d in a non -recessi onary year. It added 12 minutes a d ay 
settlement so restoring a little 0+ what had been 10si: in thE? 
19::;(15. Thi s , concessi on:' , and the $400 a month early retiremen t 
scheme for workers aged 60 with 30 years of service, were b alanced 
bv the UAW fulfi llinq its 1961 und e rtaking on the steward r at io. 
Th e UAW aqreed to move towards a ratio of one stewa rd to every 
225 workers by not a utomatically replacing stewards as they 
-------------------------- -
53 .. Liska interview. 
See abov!!, Chapter 10. 
It also left the disarminq production standards claus e 
l.In chanqed. 
A core of Dodg e Ma i n workers objected s trongly to t h e 1964 
ccmt.r act. . Not only did several chief stewards understand that 
t heir privileges cou ld be jeopardized i f the proces s of cu·ttinq 
away at the numb e r of stewa rds cont.inued, but many workers 
remembered back six years wh e n they h ad between 50 and 120 minut e s 
a day a nd felt a l i ttle i n s ult e d that 12 of t hose mi n utes 
Were handed back as a great concession. There was also a s t r on g 
awar e ness t.hat th e improvement in relief time would have to be 
Paid fo r b y inc r eased productivit y, and the failure b y th e 
neqotiators to get a n y improvements in the aq r eeme nt on producti o n 
56 
s tand ar d s, created t h e most r esentme nt. The Do dg e rati~ication 
meetinq rejected both the national and the l ocal agreeme nts b y 41 9 
votes to 279 - a nd the local"s 9 . 500 votes we r e therefore cas t 
aga inst ratification a t the Chr y s l e r Conference . 
----------_ ._-------- -_._---
t:" t· .. 
• .J ;:). Q~~ September 19 1964 . 
I:::" • ~I (~ . Si!i l ar concerns were expressed at the Pl ymouth local ' s ratification leeting! "Bro Gulvezan 
(~ecretary of the l vnch Road Plant COllitteel spoke against the P & H Agreement, cl aiming the issues 
wl!l be paid for bv an increase in production standards and stated that the condit ions are bad. Bro 
Hanely, International representati ve, spoke in favor of P & " Agreement . He pointed out that a fight 
by all is the onl y way to resol ve production standards." loca! 51 Collection, WRl, Box 15, File 5, 
SpeCial Membership Ratification Meeting Minutes, October 4 1964. The loca! 51 meeting took a secret 
ba!lot on the agreement and voted in favor by 461 to 136. 
An insight into the tetchiness the UAW ma chine had developed 
durinq its ~irst decade and a half of one- faction-rule was gi v en 
by UAW Chrvs l e~ Director Doug Fras er's angry reaction to the 
Unfortunatel y, the thousands of Dodge Hain workers who Here Hell satisfied with the agreement 
did not show up to vote, thus leavinq the floor to those few who Here opposed. Thi s is one of 
the risks you take when vou run a democratic union. 57 
TOlerati n q opposit.icm had become i:\ "risk" fo t- " a democna tic union" 
tn take. Th e n ation al contract was r atified by 52~031 to 10.00::: 
wit h on l y o n e other tiny l ocal voting to reject. a l onq with Loc a l 
was even more bitter si n ce the l ocal 
Could not be voted i nto effect. bv t h e rest of t. h e Chrysler local s ~ 
a n d f or hundreds of other i nc umb ent local 
OPPosit i o n was not only anti-democratic, it was a conspiracy: 
This· (re jection) , I am sure, was due to the effective job done by the opposition to these 
aQreements bv distorting the facts , telling half truths and creating chaos and confusion among 
our members. Because they kneH darn well that the Local Committee could not negotiate work ing 
conditions and standards for this plant. These deaands Here on the National table and onl y 
t he National Negoti ating COlmittee could negotiate these matters . 58 
To win t l e vote on the rejected Locel Domanski 
fi n al l y divi d e d h is opponents by h avi n g it voted on at separ a te 
Th e loca l rank an d fi l e trad i t i o n of i n ciepEmdenc f'::) 
company and i n ternationa l had succ Llmb t~d to met h ods 
Characterist i c of the dominant Reut her faction: mani pul at i em 
replaced mobili zation as the major means o f e }: er- c:: i s i ng and 
mairtaininq t h e power o f l ocal union offic::er5~ In thi s atmosphere 
.... • • .. f ..... ....... w . ............. . . .. . '" .......... . . ................ ... _ •• _, .. ' . ........... " ...... . .. _ . .... . " .. " ........... . 
51 . ~~~ , October 24 1964. 
Chrys ler "s l a bour relations looked more peacef ul than at any time 
since the ~id - 1930s. It ap peared as if management had at lonq 
last di scovel'"!:,::d the forml.ll a that wo'd::~!c1 so "'Jell at. 811 and FOlrd. 
Buf beneath t.he surface important development.s were a lreadv 
underway that would soon undermine this short-lived stability: 
CHAPTER 14 
• LIKE CANS OF BEANS 
THE 19605 
By the mid - 1960s~ labour re l ations a t Chrysler were conduc t e d b y 
h~rd -h eaded realists - again s t the backc l oth of a new boom. In 
1965 Townsend open e d a new a sse mbl v pl a nt at Belvidere , 
mi les south west of Chic aqo~ and t h e n ew Sterling s tampin g pl a nt 
1 
in th e outskirts of Detroit. Production hit a four year p eak 
close to an a nnu a l output of 1 . 5 million cars whil e strike 
'-' 
. ..::' 
fr equ e nc y hit a n hi stor ic low for a boom year. To achieve this 
output, Chr ys l er had to recruit a new b}ack and young l a bour forc e 
t hat became a t hr eat to its institutional stabi l ity. Tab 1 C-? 19 
contrast s the un a uthori z ed s t rik e loss ratio indices of Chrys l er 
and 8M after 1955: 
.. ,------------------------
1. Moritz and Seaman, Q~ £It, 71. 
See Fi gure 1, Chapter 2 above. 
:::;;. These are less reliable indicators of the actual level of conflict than the strike frequency 
~atio since they leasure both the conduct of a strike (determination by the workers and/or 
intranSigence by the man agement) and the frequency with which strikes occur. A high loss ratio can 
therefore lean either a laroe number of stoppages of short duration or a few very lengthy strikes. 
TABlE 19 
CHRYSlER AND GENERAl ftOTORS. tIAH-HOURS LOST AND LOSS RATES PER HOURlY-PAID WORKER 
( IN uNAUTHORIZED STRIKES, 1955-1919 
Fi ve 
yearly 
averages 
1955-59 
1960-64 
1965-b9 
1970-74 
1975-79 
ChrY§!~r 
Unauthorized Hours lost 
man-hrs lost per worker 
2,471,528 31. 9 
8l,394 1.28 
359,975 3.83 
308~ 813 3.03 
215, 179 2.19 
SOURCE: Company data. 
NOT E: a. 6M data for 1975 not available . 
a 
§~!!~[~! tl9i9[§ 
Unauthor i zed 
man-hrs lost 
257 , 230 
207,670 
1, 194, 873 
269,929 
149,508 
Hours lost 
per worker 
.67 
.65 
2.93 
.67 
. 34 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
8M" s los s r a tio was f a ir ly s t a b l e fr o m the l a t e 195 0 5 i nto . t h e 
e arl y 19605 while Chr ysl er ' s p l ummeted in t he e arl y 19605 . But 
some t h ing ch ang e d quite dr a matic a ll y in th e mid - 1960s to u pset 
the p l a cid picture of 19 60- 64. And 8M wa s a l s o mar ke dl y affec t e d= 
Ch rys l e r ' s wil d cat loss ratio p ci r worker more th 2 n doubl e d, wh i l e 
4 
8M' s increcsed n earl y f i vefold. 
What c h a ng e d in the s econd hal f of the 19 605 was n o t the 
indus tr v 's tec hnolog y or it s pr o d uc t; nor was there a major new 
s hi f t in the front ier of j ob c Clntrol 
- it remaine d un der 
~nil ateral ma nagerial au t hority. much like t h e c ond it i o n s 
wh i c h saw the d e velopme nt of mass unionism i n th e 19305 , tWD key 
el e me n ts did ch a nge: the deq r ee of j ob secur i t y a nd the l abou r 
"., ... .. . ... _ .... . H ..... .......... . _, . . . ..... .. . .... H.H ..... . . . .. ..... . . . ................. _ ... " . .. . . ... . ........ , 
4 . This rise in the level of conflict is de~onstrated graphica lly in Fi gures 1 and 2, see above , 
pages 53 and 54. 
Section on e of Chapter 14 l ooks at the 19605' expansion and 
at t h e benefits it in troduced for older workers. 
conSiders t h e h istory of the black labour sucked in to the 
. industry to meet the n ew d emand~ and at the growth of a new 
di scontf::m t. Section three t races the qrowinq tension between n ew 
a nd o lder work e r s and the con t ribution to t hi s made bv the 
eXistinq b a rqaining system . 
• 
I. Product ion boom 
Th e industrv's tota l car production rose consi s t e n t l Y from 1961 
to 19 65 to remain at around 8 . 5 milli o n for the n ext f if teen 
dipping once i n 1970 and again in 197 4 -75 . Ta bl e 20 
contras t s t wo decades of growth ~ with t h e high 19 65-79 production 
TABlE 20 
FACTORY SHIPIDTS OF CARS FROII US PlAITS, 
1946-1980 
-~ ----------------------------------------------- -----,---------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another key diff e rence was t h a t before 1964 qrowth was associated 
with vio l ent c vclical move men ts, whil e from 1965 until 1979 total 
produc t ion on l v fel l below eigh t million car s in three vear s 
1974 and 1975 . Thi s expansion had a mass ive imp act on th e 
',3 
aver age hour l y paid e mplovment of the "B iq Three' : 
1960-64 
1%5-69 
Chrysler Ford 6ft 
60,892 
95,170 
114,000 
148,000 
336 ,827 
419 ,230 
Chrvs l e r's averaqe h o urlv l a bour f orce r ose b y 56%, Ford ' s b y 30%~ 
and 8M's by 24%. In Chrysler' s case the increase was nearl y twi ce 
its ear li er employment exp l osion from the late 19405 to t h e earlY 
19505 a nd re f l ected the increase in unit capacit y from 1.2 
million unit s in 19 63 to 2 .2 milli on b y 1 969 ~ ii.~ s we ll 
Town send' s obsGssion wit h volume - descri b e d b y o n e fo r mer top 
"L.v nn Tc.1Itm sf~nd ' s pol j.<.-y ItJi:\S i;\l\.-Je.,ys to s:.tack c .;w-s Ii kf2 
6 
cans c)+ bea n s o n a s h e l of. " 
Benefits 
The provision of a limited but fairly uni versal h o l iday paY 
---------------------------
0:;:-
..., .. COllpany data . 
6. Moritz and Seallan ) qp' t;.U, 96-99 . 
400 
7 
SYstem from 1950. suppleme nt al unemploymen t benefit from 1955. 
a nd t h e 1964 pen s i o n scheme gave siqn i f ican t b e nefits to workers 
Wi th t h e 19 6 05 boom allowing 
around-th e-Year workin g~ econ omic r eward s were mar ke dl y q r eater 
!3 
th a n fo r man u a l work e r s out si d e t h e a u t o i nd ustry . 
POwer to di sch arqe a wor ker fr o m ac c ess to these acc u mu latir lq 
be n e fit s b e came an a wesome th reat f o r th e l a r ge l y l o no-service 
whit e work e rs and for ma n y bl ac k work e r s who h a d previously 
Sur v ived o n the ma rgins of povert v. Ed Li s ka's yi ew was typi c a l 
of mos t o f Dodg e Ma in" s wh i t e, Poli s h a nd hi g h s e ni ority wor kers 
in th e 19605: 
._------------------------
7. The 1940 contract gave Chrysler Harkers with over three year's seniority a week's holiday pay 
entitlement. The 1947 contract gaye all Chrysler employees six statutory days' holiday a year! and 
the 1950 agreement [Norman Matthews, WSU. 133 laid down the following holiday pay entitlements that 
survived virtually intact for the next fifteen years: 
t~~[~ ~t ~~[~t~f tl[~ ~i ~~ltq~~ ~~y 
1 - 3 40 
3 - 5 
5 - 15 
15+ 
bCI 
80 
100 
In 19b1 the longer-seniority elplovees were rewarded bv the establishment of a new band: 10-15 
Years' of service secured 100 hours' entitlement, and 15 and over secured 120 hours; UAW-Chrvsler 
Contract, November 2 1961. 89. 
8. In the onl v two si gnifi cant production downturns between 1962 and· 1973, in 1967 and 1970, the 
average hourlv earninos of auto industry manufacturing production workers Here still IS! and 37. 
respectivel y above the ~veraqe for the manufacture of durable goods, and 3X above the second-placed 
durable goods industry, the primarv letal sector. Around ha lf of the Detroit area ' s labour force is 
emploved in auto-related industries but its wage and salary levels have a spin off effect throughout 
the area. Between March 1967 and February 1968 Detroit's average pay levels for office clerical 
Workers. ski lled maintenance and unskilled plant workers were 16t, 14k and 22k respecti velv above 
the US averaQe for letropolitan areas; in each case they were the hi ghest. BLS, tl~n~g9Q~ 9! k~gQr 
~!!!i~!if? lJll, Bulletin 1966, Tabl e 89 f la8, 162. The household inco~e distribution which resulted 
fro. these significantly higher pay levels in the Detroit Metropolitan Area (SMSA) was even more 
favourable to Detroit because more workers in each household had these higher-paying 'obs : in 1970 
the aedian househol d income in De troi t Mas 32.S! above the median household income for the whol e 
United States, and 447. of greater Detroit's household incomes were in the .10,000-.20 000 a year 
bracket compared to onl y 337. of households throughout the US; City of Detroit, Planning Department. 
Data Coordination Division , January 1982, Report No. 423. 
40 1 
When we ,started , He had nothing. But once YOU start touchi ng the money, you change. I 
changed. We all got fat. At one ti me you'd fight on the pr inciple and everything else. Now? 
You 'd just look at your paycheck .9 
Thi s. 
- l ayer of wor k e r s re mai n e d in th e l ead e r s hip o f Dod ge Loca l 3 
throuq hout the "good v e ars " . Al th t.HJ g h ~:·ome "'JEI'"e symp ath e t i c: to 
the line worker s ' grieva nces a b o ut t h e speed - up, mos t of t h e 
older workers were partl y cushion e d in seniorit y .i o b s away from 
con v e v or· s . 
>l b n ?C':\kthl"'oug h in 
t oo~ "'Jere :i n v ol v(;:d in 1 ljl65 
wh e n th e compan y a nd t hE'? 
i ntern .::~ti a n al jointlv s ponsor e d tr a ining s e ssion s fo r un ion an d 
mana~.~ e rnent pel" sonn G?l on the n e ~'J pen s ion plans i c\nd n[1 pl'-- e-" 
10 
retireme nt coun s ell i ng. They o bj ected in l\Io vf:? mb E!r 1965 to 
man a gement wantin g to cut the 6 7 chief ste war ds a t Dodg e Ma in to 
the 53 specifi e d bv t h e nation a l cont r a ct rati o - p r im a r i l y 
1.1 
because t h e privileges o f 14 indivi dual s we r e at s take. ('~bove 
all~ thi s layer of work e r s wa s cautious, unwi ll ing to ri sk t h e ir 
iob s and th e material ~spects they provi d ed in struqgles th ey n o 
----._ .. _-----------------
9. Li ska interview. 
10. Q~~! March 23 1965. 
1:t. q~I~ , Decelber 4 1965; the ex isti nq ratio lias I : 180, with sOlie as high as 1 :419 and others 
a~ low as 1: b [g~~, Januarv 29 1966] , and the company wished to reapportion the stewar ds ' 
districts to love rapidl y to the contract level of 1: 225. In practice, since it soon had the 
problels of the ' new' workforce to concern itself Hith, Chrysler managelent never found i t 
Worthwhile to pursue a direct assault on the steward ratio! leaving equalIzation at the 225 level to 
the slow process of natural wastage as districts were amended out of existence through engineering 
changes. Robert Jensen estieated that the ratio of 1: 225 was finall y attained as late as 1980-81 
as a direct result of the lay-ofts caused by the 1979-83 recession. It Has perhaps for this reason 
that Chrysl er introduced in the 1982 contract negotiations a proposal to bring Chrysler ' s workp lace 
representati ve ra tio in line with 6M and Ford; but symptomatic of the low significance this del and 
had for Chrysler after its s.uccess in removi ng their shop floor bargaining role, Chrysler soon 
dropped it. 
1 :.'2 
lonqer h a d any conf idence they could win. 
II. New labour, old wounds 
In 1963 growinq order books and the retirement of older workers 
forced the companies to hire fre s h labour. At Dodge Main t hese 
were th e fi rst new starts s ince 1957. The ' new' workers were 
predominantly in the ir 205 and, i n Detroit , overwhel~inqly bl ack. 
Th ey respond e d differently to the industry' s discipline s i nce the 
tight l a bour market gave them the c onfidence that even if "h ev 
Were discharged they could always qet another job elsewhere~ a nd 
because bl acks in America were in th e process of 
Poli t i cal tran s formation. 
Th e n:~<L a t i ansi i p betl-'Jeen the :' n e w' a nd :' 0 1 d ' 1 a bour f Olr"ce \l-Jas 
not h e lped by th e history of connivanc e by whit e workers in anti-
bl aC k discriminat i on b y ma naqement . In the 1930s Chr ysler had 
employed a bout 2,000 bl ac ks, predominantly in t h e Dodqe Mai n 
~., .. , .. ,.,- .... , ... ~ _ .. ............ _ .......... . _ .. . __ ..... _ ... ..... ..... _.M __ ._ ...... ... _ •.. ~ ..... _ ........ .... . 
1'-' 4 . This is a very generalized description of the motivations of several thousand workers whose 
~eniority in the 1960s dated from 1930-41 and who were, especially after the pension conditions NerE 
lmproved in 1964 alJowinq workers with 30 years' service early retiresent, becoting in increasing 
nuebers eliQible for retirement . It is based primarily upon the Liska interview, but is supported by 
the Fox and Naleztv interviews and by the issues covered in the ~~qq~ tl~l~ ~~~~ of the period. There 
were exceptions, of course. Edith Fox, for example, with seniority from 1948, although admitt ing "r 
was very ver'l cautious", \'las cOJi li itted by her socialist politics to risking her own job on several 
occasions by openly siding with workers' protests against intolerable conditions, as in the 19b7 
three day wildcat th at took pl ace in a 'no contract' period , when she wal ked out with the rest of 
~ h e Tri m Department despite bei~g warned by here foreman: "Don't go , Edie , you'll get fi red." Fox 
ln ter vi ew . 
foundr y or as janitors. When Chrysler recruited labour for its 
Tank Arsenal it ignored black production work e rs with seniorit y 
and b v late 1941 only 170 of th e 5,000 workers at t h e new plant 
11+ 
Were black , a ll of th e m wer e janitors. Serious labbur shortages 
and the federal qovernment"s Fa ~r Employment Practices Committee 
establi s h ed in response to the al l -b lack March on Wash ington 
Movement in July 194 1 eventually caused the auto ma nuf actur ers to 
15 
recruit blacks as produc t ion workers. At fir s t, there was quite 
widespread white opposition. In Februa ry and June 1942 wi ldcat 
s trikes occurred at Chrysler"s Highl and Park and Dodg e Truck 
plants against the transfer of b l acks to production work . 
ended onl y when the internation a l threatened the stri kers to 
·16 
return or lose their jobs. Und e r joint UAW-qover nmen t pressure~ 
the proportion of blacks in Chr ys ler ' s Detroit workf orce rose 
17 
from 2.5% in 1942 to 15% by the s pring of 1945. 
the UAW's senioritv agreements and Chrysler's concentration in 
the Detroit area meant, 
HI 
despite th e efforts of a minority o f 
"r-eel '--n ""c- I.·· t- II \";."";' .. .. .. ~ !f the proportion of black ~ in the Ch rysler plants 
---------------------------
13. See above, Chapter 7; Seschwender, QQ. £it, 20. 
1 iJ. • Seschwender, QQ. £U., 34. 
15. Foner, QQ. ~~t, 240-241. 
1. "1. Heier and Rudwick, QQ. £.U, 213. 
18. Liska interview. 
19 
remained higher than at Ford and GM. In 1949 the white Chrvsler 
~<en::heva l workers objected fo r several month s to t he up-grading 
20 
of four blacks to assembly l ine work , but t hi s was the last 
maj<Jr collective display, 0+ racis:;m by IfJhit e producti'c:m IfJ(Jrkel"'s. 
The absolute growt h of ava ilable semi-skilled jobs in the 
industry from 1946 to 1955 meant that both blacks and women ( lI~ho 
were first hired on final assembl y jobs from 1949 in Dodge Main) 
ware no lonqer seen as direct competitor s for work in the way 
they had been in the 19305 . In the boom year of black 
employment a t four Detroit Chrysler plants rose as hiqh as 
21 
But while the proportion of blacks among auto industry 
workers as a whole rose from 3.7% in 1940, to 7.8% in 1950 and 
9. l'/.. in 1960~ they were still restricted to semi- and un -
~~ki 11 ed IfJOI"' k. The stronger job-protection sentiment among the 
skilled workers and the disenchantment of man v of them with the 
UAW led to demands for an all-white skilled union. Th i ~::; IfJef t 
Unchallenged b y the auto man ufacturers, who hired no mor e than 
one per cent black e mployees out of the combined white-collar 
---------------------------
19. Gesc:hwender, ~ ~g, 40. 
20. Howe and Wid ick, Q~ £It, 22B. 
21 • Gesch wender, Q!!' I;,!,t, 40. 
22.. "b'd 41 LL, . 
...,-. 
.0::.":;'. Anderson and Jefferys, QR £H, Chapter 9. 
:.24 
occ upat ion s . To add insul t to thi s c l ear - a nd unchallenged 
in t h e 1950s man y bar s in t h e v i rtually a ll - white mini -
city of Hamtr amck~ i I vJhich t h e Do clC:J e ty'ii:d. n p lant (I'Jas; situat e::~d~ 
refused to serve th e blacks who came to work ther e ~ and in the 
26 
19605 cert ain bars s till r e fused to emp l oy bl ac ks. 
New discontent 
By 1970 blacks mad e up 13.4% of the s l ightl y more than 
million work e r s in the motor vehicl e a nd motor v e hicl e equipme n t 
:21 
industry. Four out of every fiv e bl ack males were in the f r on t -
l i ne o f the production p r ocess , the three lowest blue-coll ar 
28 
occupational categor ies . In Detroit, whi c h emp l oyed nine out of 
------------------_.-._- _. - -
:':'4 • Geschwender , Q~ I;.li, 41. 
25. Liska interview. 
26 . See below, Chapter 15. 
27 • Geschwender, Q~ I;.~t, 42. 
2f3 . t~tq , 43: This co~pared with half the white male workforce being employed in the same 
cateqories; national lY black males lade up 19.47. of all male operatives, 22.St of all male 
labourers, and 25.97. of all males service workers. 
... 
29 
everv 2 0 blacks in the industry. the new black politics had a 
dramatic effect on the shop floor. 
The impact of the new recruitment into Dodge Main was 
reflected in the election of a black production worker. Charli e 
30 
Brooks, as Local 3 vice president, in 1966. Th e patt e rn of 
grieva nces d ealt with b v the local also began to change. Table 21 
analyses the 753 grievance items discussed between the Local 3 
Officers and t h e Dodqe Main l abour relati o n s department in 1466: 
---------------------------
30. ~tt~ April 16 1966; Ed Domansk i was re-elerted president. 
TABLE 21 
DODGE "AIM, GRIEVANCES DISCUSSED AT lOCAl OFFICER LEVEl, 1966 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a.Number b.I NUr.lber 1. 
Rates of production lOb 14 . 1 Dislissals for: 
Overtille bb 8.8 Falsification of 
Classifications 50 b.b eaploYlent appl ication 53 7 
Violation of agree~ents 42 5.b Insubordination, walking 
Foreten Horking 36 4.10 off jobs, etc 37 4.9 
Safety hazards 35 4.6 Excessive absenteeism 33 4.4 
Under the influence of 
Working conditions 14 1.9 i ntox i cants 32 4.2 
Senior i ty, proBotions 8 1. 1 Fighting 22 2.9 
Shift preferences 7 .9 Theft of Co. propertv 11 1.5 
Parking lot co.plaints 4 .5 Misc . dismissals 34 
Total discharges: ~~l 32.1 
other discipline: 
Misc. grievances 44 Un just penal ti es 78 10.4 
Harassaent complaints 16 2. 1 
Reinstatement del ays 5 .7 
gt 
SOURCE: QQ~g~ ~!in ~g~? June 17 1967. The discharges exclude those of probat ionary elployees. 
NOTES: a. The to tal nUl\ber of grievances discussed was 753, but several of them were classified 
both in te'rlls of the issue, eg a production standard grievance, and in terlls of the outcome, eg 
unjust penalty or dislissaI for insubordinati on. 
b. The I is of the 753 grievances discussed, not the total number classif ied. Thus it is 
POSsible to say that 14. 11 of grievances that reached local officer level of the grievance procedure 
concerned production standards and that 32. 1 ~ of grievances at this level of procedure concerned 
di Scharges. 
"'-.. -
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Net surprisingly, production standard grievances were the hottest 
i ~':;(:;L\""'_ t I . t l tl . f'f ' <= .i:h~en up Wl " , '. e unlon 0" ·lcers. But the hieh number of 
during the year - one in fift y of the total 
labour force - s hows h o w young work ers we re l ess prepar .d to 
aCcept the h a r s h working cond ition s and di sci plinL of Dodge Mai n. 
UAW member told one ob server in 1970: "The y(Jun~~(::? I~' 
:.:;1 
Qener at i em is not g <::> i n~~ to take the cr c~p that I'Je had to tak~? " 
........... 
Th ~y lied ~bout th ei r job h istories an d were more readv to tell 
t he foreman wh ere to g~t off . Bu t the high num ber of 
i s a l so ev id e n ce t h a t ma n agemen t r ef used to l e t th e period of 
l abou r s h o r tage wea ke n i t s sho~ f l obr a u thor ity. 
19 65 a nd 1967 t h e recen t l y-hir ed bl ac k workers were 
l ess p r e par e d to tol e r ate ei th e r wor kp l ace rac i s m o r the severe 
we rki ng c ondit ion s i mposed b y man a g e me nt s desperat e t o raise 
Pl"'oduc t i o n. In August 1965 four work e r s wr ot e t o t h e pgctg§ ~~iQ 
Nelfw 
..... ........... = f rom th e p ower h o use c ompl a in i n g th a t b l acks 
di s crimin a ted a gain s t fo r p romot ion . Th e l oca l 's r ecording 
secretary , t h e fo r me r ' rank a nd f i le' cau c u s s upporter, Ed Liska, 
was ass i g n e d to repl y . Hi s a n swer r eeked of self -con g r a tul ation: 
The 12,000 workers in the Dodge Plant have various problems with lanagement, but the most 
stirring scene going unlentioned is that Whites and Coloreds work together , eat together, 
discuss family problems, discuss sports, Union problems, HUlan , Personal Problems, and 
Political Proble~s with no sign of animosity displayed by either party •• • 
The UAW Uni on has done lore for Equal Rights than any other organization in the Nation. 
The seniority and abilit y to do a job is the key in our Contract. This Agreement is all that 
the Ci vil RiQhts MoveI!ent is reall y seeking, the right for equal opportunity for a better wa y 
of life.33 
I t was n ot a n accep t able view fo r hundr e d s of thou s;,~~ li ds o ·f 
Americ&n bl a ck s mo v inq f r o m re questi n g ci v il r igh ts to looking 
Q~~, August 7 1965. 
33. Q~~, September 25 1965. 
for means to enforce them. Out of their movement was formed th~ 
DOdge Revolutionary Union Movement (DRUM) whose aspir a tions an d 
S ruggles helped to shape labour relations at Chrysler from 1967 
to 1973. 
III. Tension mounts, 1967-1973 
Und erneath the formal bargaining procedure of the mid-1960s an 
intense, powerful strain of c onfrontationism reappeared. Th e ' 
r enewed acceptance by a l arge minorit y of Dodge Main worker s of 
tl e leJitimacy of individual r es istance a nd collective s truggle 
reflected a complex of interactions: the new workers with the old 
rank and file tradition; the greater job security with 
management"s desperation to raise productivity and reduce l abour 
and the conf li ct between ~!@sh working class politics a n d 
unrepresentative institutions. 
New and old 
The new you n g and black work ·r s faced the same old prob l ems 
~5 had previous gener a tions of autoworkers . But b v the mid-1960s 
th _i r onlv protection from managerial excesses was an ineffective 
Plea-bargaining process run by a d istant group of older white 
Workers. Frustration with this system took many, mostly 
individual , forms; but o ne was essentially ~gl!§£ti~g, stemm in 9 
from the feeling that tgggtb§c something could be d o ne. It was the 
d l A 
response which helped create the conditions for the emergence of 
Dr::LJlYl. 
The shake-out at Chrysler durinq the two recessions of 1958-
59 and 1961 -62 had been mlre severe than at Ford a nd GM, and this 
Qave its labour force a younger profile when the upturn c a ms. Bv 
1969 half of Chrvs ler" s workers were new to the industrv and more 
34 
than one i n three were aqed under 20: 
Chrysler 
Ford 
GM 
:£ of workers 
under 30 
3b 
33 
30 
t of workers with 
less than 5 yrs seniority 
51 
41 
40 
Two months after the laun ch of the 1968 mode l s~ John Bruce~ the 
Dodoe Hub er Foundrv plant ma nager, apoloqized to the local 
o·ff i cer-!::' and i ntern i::"I t i anal I' · epn?s~?nt.ati ves fOI'· wl'·ongl y 
classifvin q certai n workers: 
Management has many ~e(hani(a J problems and it is his belief that workers deserve correct pay 
for work performed •.• The big problem now faced by managelent is that during the past bO days, 
the plant nearl y doubJed its work forre. It is very difficult for management to keep the new 
hirees in the Plant. They just keep quitting .35 
But at the same meetinq Local 3 " 5 financi a l secretary conf i rmed 
that whi l e manageme nt· s logistical control had weakened, 
_ . .... _ M • • ~. _ ...... _u .. .. . _ ...... _, N _._ • __ •••• • _ .', • •• _ _ ._. _ .. ..... _ .. __ ...... _ Oo •• _. 
:::"4. Esti Mate in UAW Resear~h Oepartlent Collertion, WRL. 
":\.1" .... 
< • .j. fHnu tes of Huber Foundry Special Meeting, October 23 19b7; in author's possession. 
\'-ep l if2d , "thev vJf.::c\~e DI~~CHPtl:~:GED. " 
Ma n agement's doqged pursuance of it s unil at=ral 'r igh t to 
man a~~e:' , even " at the height of the new boom, p rijvoked 
numbers of compl ai nts: 
I The ForeBan has only one goal, 'Set the production out - the hell with the workers' problems. ' 
f The production helper classification is being abused. Many tilles workers are taken off this 
classification to higher paid operations and then they are not paid for this work. 
f Ti ee Study lien interfering with workers. This should be done by Supervisors, NOT Ti me Study 
tlen. 
f. Standards are changed at fore~an's wh ims . 
f Supervisors t ake off seniority workers and allowing lesser seniority men to stay on 
operations, saying "I can take you off anytille I please as long as I pay you ," etc • 
• Doctor Skowron is not doing the job he was hired to do. A worker injured his back and had to 
wait dne and a half hours in the ledical department to be serviced and then told to go back to 
his job ••• The Union charges Dr Skowron of being too arrogant.37 
The ir qrievances we r e th e same as ten a nd twenty vears earli er . 
But there were n o longer a n y f ixed points of sel + -- (:?vi dent 1 y 
c onduct or work e r - influe n ced workplace rules by wh ich 
ma n aqement was const r a ined to operate. So Local 
c ould onl y ap p ea l to Bruce and the plant's Personnel 
Manaqer, Karl Bran stner? a nd La bour Relations Director ~ Tom La~q, 
to stop iqnoring t h e worker s' problems. Charlie Brooks , the blac k 
L c)c 0,\ 1 3 vice pres ident, protested at the bargaining table: 
--------------------------
:~~ 7" .. tUg: sale of the 1B abus~s listed by Local 3 president Ed Domanski. 
.. 
Plea bargaining 
Shop floo r b a rq a ini ng h a d ce a sed . Th e f o r ma l p r6ced ures too k 
ti me, we r e l iab le t o man ageri a l ob s truction , a nd wer e r are l y 
SU f.: c e ~~ s+u l . 1 oc: cd p l ant c:ommi ttf.~t~m f? r1 
i ncreas i n q l y turn e d t o i n f o rma l d ea l s with ma n a g e me nt. A Local 51 
me mb e r s h ip meet in g in Dec e mber 196 6 hea rd how i t s o ff ici al s 
j u s ti+ e d n ot wr iting up gri evan ces becau se they g ot b e tt e r 
r esu lts i + th e y di dn' t~ 
Duestions were asked why a grievance was not wri tten on the di scharge case and what procedures 
the uni on has at its disposal to follow in such ~atters. 
The President expl ained that letters of protest are seldom written by the Loc al as this 
hampers the chances of getting the discharged e. ployee back to work. The Committee~en and the 
barqai ning Officers have been gett ing good resul ts by bringing up the names lof discharged 
employees) at the weekl y meet ing with Plant Managelent.40 
wh o s erve d on Loc a l 3 " 5 EB f r o m 1962 un ti l 
b e l i e v e d th e d o min a t ion 0 + th e case-book q ri evan c e proced u r e 
e ff e ct i v e ly f o rc e d l oca l offi c e r s t o repl ace :' b,:\r q~-::I :i n :i. ri g b y 
t h r ecd .':' W ',l' 't l'~ ' 1 :l ' n q I • p . e a c 1 .' " I f th f~ s t e lfJar'd don ' t \IoJ i nit at 
" y o u :' r ' {:'? qoi n q to h ave a h a rd 
.. -. - .... -
- - _ •• ' WN , ._ .... _ .. _ . _ . ___ • _ _ .. ... _ _ _ • • _ .. .. . ... _. _ _ . .. _ , .... ............... .. 
3B. He felt t hey Here ignorinq t he cOllftlitteemen and chief stewards deliberately: "The previous 
Union Representation were beaten in an el ect ion because of the many unresol ved prob lems in t he 
Plant, and it appear s th at Managelent is again creating probl ems to pursue thi s harassment of Un ion 
Representation" ; i~ig . 
39 . ManaQ l!lfIent deliberatel y I! y. cluded the chief stewards froll the October 1967 Huber Found ry 
leeting, arguing that if they had been present nit would be too ~any Un ion Representati ves in the 
IB l!etinq. • 
'1(). local 51 Collection , ~Rl , Boy. 17, Fil e 5; General membership "eeting minutes , Decemb er 11 
1%6. 
.. 
41 
time." Th e onlv way f or the officers to s how any results~ t h en. 
W~s to p l ead for leni e nc y and to seek 'tr a d e-off s' with personn el 
42 
labour rel at ion s ma n agers . Ivli:\n a<,}f2 ITle n t , bv ql. vi nq o r" 
i.AJi tll h ,1 d i ng s m,a ll conc~?ssi cms on qr:i evances m -' pe'n a l ties, IIIIas; 
thus a bl e to in f luence the apparent effect i veness of parti cu l ar 
uni on rep r esent atives in t h e eyes of their me mb ers, part.icu l ar l \' 
in t t e run-up t o elec tion peri o d s . 
Bac k - door pleading, b ecame a highl y c ontroversial 
lTH?thl1d o'f c ondLH:ti n 9 i ndustt- i a1 relations wh en the 
C:001pos i t i ClII of thos e doing the pleadinq an d those dispensinq 
, j \..1st i ce:' came to diff er s u bstantially fr o m those r e cei vi ng t h e 
penaltib s . Th e r e i s no a gr eeme n t e n the exact date Dodge Main 
f.I. ~~' 
emp l oyed a majority of black worker s. But b y 1967, t h e year of 
th e Detroit 'Re b e lli o n', the lowest seniority job s in Dodge Mai n 
On th e mai n convey or line job s in the body s h o p p 
---------------------------
41. Liska interview. 
L~ ~:. Liska interview. Over one issue, Local 3's endorsement of the national agreement negotiated by 
Art Hughes on Ju ly 24 1969 to all ow part-tilers to be elployed so as to make up for heavy 
absenteeisl, Liska clailed to have used his opposi t ion to the plan to extract concessions from both 
the personnel and the labour relations lanagers as well as to have played the two off against each 
other. 
4,::::;. Liska lIai ntained the shift took place in 1970, but this is al lost certainl y wrong, since he 
hllself stated in the 9Qgg~ ~!!!} ~~~? in August 1968 that 56Z of the chief stewards in the asserlbl y 
Plant were black, and the Huber foundry part of the cOllplex had always had an even hi gher 
proportion of blacks employed there than in the assesbly plant proper. In the April 1968 local 
O~ficer elections blacks took four of the ten Executive Board positions , including Charlie Brooks as 
Vlce president 'for a second terl, and Joe Gordon elected as recording secretary. It was in this 
election that Ed Lisla defeated Domanski after a campaign in which he argued for more action on the 
Workers' complaints; Q~~, April 24, August 3 1968; Liska interview, 1982. Dating the transition 
later rather than earlier helps to justify his re-election as Local 3 president in 1970. 
LL'\ 11. 
. 
.. 
assembly wer e overwh elmingl y black. 
New problems 
In the n earb y Chr ys l er Pl y mout h plant an Lyn c h Road a 
Simil ar c h a nqe took plac e ~ accompanied b y v o cal ob .iection s from 
the older whit e worker s who saw drug-taking an d absenteeism from 
wor k in the same li ght: 
Alcoholis. and dope peddling was discussed and the Local 51 position is clear in that we do 
not condone and will not defend the pushers ••• 
Absenteeisa was talked about and the seriousness of being absent. The seven steps of the 
procedure Nere exp lained Nhere in ti~e cont inuous absenteeis~ can lead up to di scharge . It is 
also a Local policy that when a member goes through all the seven steps, this Local cannot 
make an effort to get this melber reinstated. This type of mesber is onl y causing undue 
problems for all our worki ng ileillbers and the autoS!obile industry will not put up ~jith 
absenteeis. on such a large scale. They intend to make it rough on the offenders .45 
"Too muc h money' was t h L s u perficia l explanation for high 
absent ~eism g i ven by one o bserver, writing i n 1970: 
Many of the workers who stay off the jobs are younger employees who feel they can make enough 
l aney in three or four days to meet their needs . A Chrysler worker says of the young workers, 
"They don ' t res ist authority, but they don't like to be driven. And this is wha t mos t auto 
plants are trying to do today, drive" 
Black workers also contribute to the absenteeism rate: one can see them on Friday afternoon, 
after payday~ sitting on car hoods in the parking lot ~ ehind a block-l ong stri ng of bars 
across froll Chrysler Corporation's Dodge Main plant, drinking beer, whisky, and Boone's Far SI 
Apple Wine. Often they do not return to work those Friday afternoons. 46 
'" "'~ .... . 
------------------------
~· 't. From 1967 to 1968, Chrysler began recruiting Arab workers into Dodge Main: 500 in 1968 rising to 
nearl y 2,000 by 1973. It was almost as if Chrysler's recruitment policy was deliberatel y designed to 
balance the falling proportion of white workers in the the plant by another large but ~Q~:~~![Q1! 
~l ~f~ racial group, particularl y one that light exhibit the customary self-discip lini ng 
character istics of a recent illligrant group. Georgakas and Surki nsuggest, "These Norkers were often 
totall y confused by Alerican conditions, and they were fearful of losi ng their jobs or being 
deported"; Q~ ~tt, 37 . 
'+5. Local 51 Collection, WRL, Box 17, Fil e 5; Genera l Membership Meeting , lIlinutes, December 11 
1%7 . 
46. Serrin , Q.~ £.It, 233. 
LL1 ':::;._. __ ~ ..,.,..... 
• 
In December 1969 Chrysler Lynch Road chief stewar d Hicks had made 
the c l assic comp l ai n t about 'new' workers: 
He feel s that no latter what is done for the youth of our Local , they still will not show 
interest in the l abour movement ••• They just don~t care to participate.47 
Th e divisions a mon g Detr o it auto workers were cons iderab l e. ThE~ ~./ 
Were o n lines of race~ ethnicity~ age~ seniority a nd skil l 
- a n d the ol d er UAW l ocal activists a nd t h e internationa l , which 
h ad onlv two blacks on it s 26-member IEB, showed few signs of 
being ab le to overcome th em. 
Drug dealing a n d druq use was an enormou s problem in Dodg e 
I"lain. It was a very large a nd potenti a ll y profitab l e market of 
Well - paid workers, a way from the prying eyes of the police. By 
1968 mos t of the younger black a nd white wor kers s mo ked marijuana 
OM the job to ease the monoton y - and mancgement didn " t worry too 
mU c h . Li s k a recalled: 
They took pills! they were shooting up their ve ins •• and no-one knew how to stop it. Manageeent 
condoned it. There were supervisors selling it, stewards selling it. But they didn't try to 
stop it. The fear was there . It was big busi ness, and the pushers inside the plant had an 
organization outside. 
Management didn ' t fire too much on these things. If you didn't do the job, that was one 
thing. But if you were shooting up they didn't care about you. Everybody cl osed their eyes on 
it.4B 
With l arge s ums of mon ey chanqing hands, a nd cert a i n workers 
taking drugs on cred it and then finding t h ey owed their pay check 
........... _. 
-----------------_._-----
'+"7 •. Local 51 Collection l WRL , Box 17, File 5; General Membership Meeting, minutes, December 1 1969. 
1.1·8. Li ska i ntervi e\ll. 
. 
... 
the at mosphere inside became more c h arged. 
workers began carrying weapons to work, some even took in 
Even so manaqeme nt didn"t bother t oo much as long as 
production wasn"t effected. 
Dn ,Jul y 15 :L9 )'(I~ a production worker at t he Ch rysler Eldon 
Avenue gear a nd axle p l ant, wh o had j ust been suspended for 
refus i nq to p ar ti cipate in a speed -up, went b ac k in to the p l ant 
t o find hi s chief s t eward. Claren ce Thornt o n, had 
himse l f j ust ret u rned from a s u spension resulting fr o m of c,,\ 
safety i ssu L wi ldc at after a man was killed in t h e p l a nt in Ma y. 
A wh ite l e fti st who was dismi ssed during t h e safetv wildcat 
They left the stewards in the street for a ti me, and when Clarence came back, he had to sign a 
state~ent that if there was further trouble he would get per.anentl y fired. When Johnson first 
approached Clarence about his grievances, Clarence told him, "I can't do luch for you because 
I just got back ~yself.· Clarence had been inti~idated and sold out to the point where it was 
no lonqer safe for hi m to fi gh t for his melbership . Johnson saM his union could not function 
for hi ' and decided to deal with it hilself. These connections are important. The who le 
precedinq set of events was to break down the stewards so they wouldn't defend thei r people. 
The cOlpany refused to deal with safety and other legitiaate grievances.49 
When Johnson saw t h e foreman wh o had discipli n e d him earlier that . ~ 
c.1t.~ y 
twCl 
h f-.:! pu ll ed O\-lt a n t"11. ca l~ bi.n e an d s h ot thr-ee "whi te shi r-ts " , 
J 
foremen a nd a job setter. Johnson was neither a black 
mili tant nor a uni on activ i st , and two years later a Detroit jury 
fOu nd him to h ave b een temporari l y insane as a result of injuries 
inflicted on him by Chr ys ler Cor porat ion which was subsequently 
4 9.. Quoted in Georgak as and Surki n, QIl £It, 117. 
50 
ordered to pay him compensatio~ at the rate of 575 a week. 
By thE"~ 1 ate the inabil it y of the existing uni on 
organizations to articu l ate workers' grievances a nd effect any 
significant change in working conditions, had ]. (:,:d mclny of the 
workers to s hun them. The c oncept o·f 'collectivity', 
ab ility to influence the work situation l y ing :i n thf.~ 
exercise of their collective strength, was i n tension with the 
practice of individualism. Th e o u tcome was b y no means fixed in 
advance. One important tendency among the black workers stood out 
against indivi dualism: those influenced by the bl ack nationalist 
and socialist politics of the Black Power move ment. AnottH?r wcO\.s 
th. group of blacks who h ad entered the UAW mac hin e and who took 
oVer the Dodge local union in 1972 and ran it until th plant was 
c:losed in 19130. Dodge Main's black workers were not uniformly 
black n ationali st, into drugs and v iolence or a ll Uncle Toms - as 
HI a<::k WOr kf?Y"!5" 
consciousness, wt ile reflecting the experience of the Civil Rights 
~nd Black Power mov~ment5, did so in a heterogeneous a nd often 
Contr ad ictory fash ion. 
--.-------------------------
CHAPTER 15 
DRUM BEATS .•. AND IS BEATEN 
Myth s have been built up about the Dod ge Revolutionarv Union 
(DI::;:UI~l ) 
1 
a nd the wildcat st rikes of the lat e 1960 5 and 
ear I v 1 970!:;, But from the eviden ce of Dodge Main i t is clear 
that the issues were si milar t o those which h a d roused protest s 
twentv a n d even thi rty-f ive vear s before. Wh at was new wa s 
th e orqani zat i ona l a n d id e oloqic a l basis . 
:. n f?II-J ,. ideas were collectivel y resistinq t h e "old· cli ct.a t es o ·f 
un ilatera l ma n a q e me nt ~ob cont ro l . The situat i on paralleled the 
1930s : an intimidator y work ing environment mea nt a l arge majorit y 
were ready pass ive l y to s upp o rt action to improve working 
C Clfl d i t i em !:; ~ but o nl y a small minorit y were read y to act openl y . 
The even s ma ll e r numb e r s of organi zed socialists a nd commun ists 
(in the 1930s) or black r evo lutionaries (in the 19605 ), were ab l e 
to exer t a n inf lue n ce di sproportionate to their s iz e. 
1.. In their otherwise infor.ative book on DRUM, Georgakas and Surkin , for example , suggest the 
Mav 2 19b8 strike at Dodge Main which led to the founding of DRUM was "the first wildcat strike to 
hit that factor y in 14 years", Seorqakas and Surkin, QR ~lt, 24. Four wildcat strikes had actuall Y 
oCcurred in the previous six lonths alone , see below pages 423-b, let alone the hundreds that took 
Place between 1954 and 1959, At a totally different level of qeneralization, Gordon , ~t ~t , Q~ t;.U, ., 
220, argue that in the late 19b05 "tbe charact er of workers' protests has changed substantiall y", 
419 
. ... 
Militants had to contend with the UAW as well as management. 
That also was new. The a uto plants were alreadv 100% union s hops 
and the UAW was legitimized by managemen t and the law. A 19305-
l evel of di scont e nt amonq autoworker5~ or of organi zi ng b y a n 
active minority ~ was no l onger enouoh to effect permanent change. 
Strike act i on was a much riskier bus i ness. And so th e 
genera l ized discontent of the late 1960s didn"t s how it s elf more 
as open conf li ct: the sliqh t rise in strik e freque~cy between 
1967 and 1973 a bove the l evels before and after. was the tip of 
an iceberg of conflict . 
Sect ion one of Chapter 15 look s at th e evidenc e of g r owing 
bl ack a nd industr i a l militancy in 1967. Section two tr aces the 
orioins of DRUM in a traditiona l . a u toworkers' protest ~ a nd s hows 
how management's inept reaction gave the protest enough 
l egiti ma cv to a llow a s mall group of rad icals to qeneralize from 
t h e ,. ~rlevance of 'unfair' penalties to t h e 'unfairness' of 
raCi a li s m an d capitalism. Section three considers the nature of 
DRUM 's demand s~ an d s uqgests how t h e movement temp orarily 
---------------------------
2. Herding q~ £tt , 282, argues "the worker today avoids carefull y (being) caught in what ~av be 
termed 'official wildcats', as manage. ent (frequentl y equ ipped with detection devices to prove 
participation) ~ the International, the arbitrator~ and even the local officers combi ne to remove any 
protection they ONe hi ~ otherwise. " 
:3 .. The rel ativel y low level of strike action by comparison with the 1940s and 1950s does not 
~ean ! as Peter Nolan and P ¥. Edwards verge on arguing,that those who speak of the 'labour revolt ' 
have it all wrong; Peter Nolan and PK Edwards, "Homogenise l di vide and rule: an essay on 'Seqment ed 
Work, Di vided Workers'" (Coventrv: IRRU , Dece~ber 1982) , 24-25. 
420 
'. 
4 
af f ec t ed th e fronti e r of contr ol . Sect i on fo u r cons iders how 
Chrysler r Espon ded bv rebuildinq joint bargaini n g institutions 
r.\ nd r l~ l at i p n s hi p s with th e UAW an d r est ori n g man agel'· i a 1 
Section five exp l ai n s DRUM" s defeat as a b l ac k 
admini s tr at i o n took over Loca l 3. 
I. 1967: rebellion and wildcat 
Th e s ix - day D~troit "Reb e llion ' of Julv 1967 took p l ace wh e n 
DOdos Ma i n was s h ut d o wn for th e a nnua l mod e l c h anqe-ovel~ ~ and 
the EB ag ree d t o o pen Lo cal 3~s h a ll for b e tween 5 0 a nd 100 
5 
nati o n a l guar d sme n to u se whil e g u a r d in g th e p l an t ~ 
mi l es f r o m the s c e l e o f q r eat est dest r u c t i on . The b i qgest of the 
S~? I~ i es o f u pri si ngs' th a t h a d beg un in vJ att s~ Los 
in t h e "Rebell ion ' l e d t o the deat h s of rd. ne 
whi tes a nd 3 4 blacks ~ 3!,800 a l'T est s , 2 ,700 looted build i ngs a n d 
more t h an 550 0 milli on in d a ma ges . A s u bse qu e n t stat i stical 
an a l ys is con c l uded: "Wh i l e a n i mpor i:ant SE!gmt~nt c)f t h e b l ack 
community e i t her part icipated in o r s upport e d t h e even ts of t h e 
i nSLlf-rect i o n ~ ac tua l p ad~. i c i p a t i on wa s d i s pro portion ate l y 
clus t e r e d a monq the mor e d e prived segme nt s of t h e bl ack work i n g 
--------------------------
4" The renewed restr ai nt s on shop fl oor manageri al authority were , however ! much too short- J j ved 
to be used as evidence for the Gordon g! ~! weakly-supported clai m that such labour unrest was Ba 
prinCipal source" of decl ining labour product ivity in t he 19705; QP' fl !, 219. 
~5 ., Liska interview. 
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the seqment of the black workinc c i ass that h dd l ess 
6 
st a b 1 €.~ emp 1 c),/men t ) . " The significance of the :' t::;:ebel l ion:' 
most of Dodq~ Main"s black workers was not t hat they participated 
- thou q l1 a bod Y s h op worker wh o was kil l ed a n d an in s pector who 
7 
i n the l e o undoubt e dly did '.. b u t 
B 
gYmR§thi~gd. Th e ' Rebellion' e n couraqed a po l itical re-th ink in 
Det roit" s b l ack communi t y wh ich , 
9 
wi th f~?nnen t". 
b V the Fall of 1967 , was " rife 
In t h is at mosp h ere UAW presid~nt Reuthe r c h ose Ford as the 
t a r qe t c o mpan y i n contract neqot i a t i o n s , a nd struck i t for two 
mont h s i n Sep tember and October 1967 to secur e l ay-off pay of 
---------------------------
6 . 6eschwender ~ Qg, t;ti, 72-3. 
7 • Qtl~ August 12 1967. 
8 . The group of black Markers who had used the growing black vote in Dodge Main to ,become runni ng 
Gates with the Local 3 governing faction l isread this lack of direct involve&ent for hostility. So 
while white EB ~e.bers like Ed Liska argued it was "the Communists" who had lost to gain, Charli e 
Brooks disassociated himself fro. "the sha~eful tragedy in our city during the week of July 
24 ••• [whichl could not be considered in any wav a part of any ci vil rights struggle". The undoub ted 
OPPosition of many 'responsible' blacks soon mellowed when the 'Rebellion' appeared to produce 
results [Chr y~ler announced it would open special hiring Dffice~ in the ghetto); tqtq. 
9. 6eschwender, QIl. t;U, 83. 
/I rl'~' ~1' . ':':' ...::' 
I II· 
earn ings for a period of up to 52 we~ks. In 
50lidaritv, Chrvsler a n d 8M refused to renew their contracts with 
10 
th e UAW an d stopped ded ucti n g the UAW's check-off pavments. But 
i n o n e maior respect it was totally un l ike the 'workinq without a 
c antY-act • per i o d o'f 1958. In 1967 8M an d Ch r~s l er were still 
h irinq workers an d se llinq cars as qu ic kl v as they could build 
Th e re l ease f r o m t h e no-strike provi si on s o f the contract i n 
1967, a nd what Trim De p a r t me nt c hi ef s t e ward Ed ie Fox cal l ed lI t h e 
11 
WhOl e s pi rit of t h f:' p e l''' i od"~, gav e t h e Do d ge Main 
depcrt me nt wor ke r s th e confi d ence to staqe a three-day wildcat 
protest against ti q h t work stand ar d s i n Novemb e r : 
rh~y told me, "Edie: one o'clock we're walking out." And they did. They stopped and the whole 
tria shop shut down. Everyone was waiting ,and then Stanley Flint shouted , "What the hell 
we're waiting for? Let's go!" And everyone walked out. 
Workers went to the Local hall made their own signs. For many of the young blacks it was 
their first strike. Thev lade fires and manned the picket for three days. The whole plant 
supported them. 
It needed to be done. It was the feeling.12 
EXcept i o n a ll y f or a c h ief steward ~ Ed i e Fo>: helped personally 
'l. e ai ti mi ze' th e wi ldca t b y wa l kin a o u t wi t h h e r me mbers . 
........... 
9. Serrio, QR ~lt, 176. 
l e). Local 3 Collection, WRL, Box 9; notice to all members, Septeaber 28 1967, signed by Ed Domanski 
and Frank Czarny: "The courageous fight beine waged bv our brothers and sisters who wor k far Ford 
Motor company, must not go unsupported. The members of this Local union must show our solidarity and 
unity by payinQ our dues a,nd assessllents pro!ptl y so that these brothers and sisters can be paid 
their strike checks in the current Ford stri ke. " 
1. :L • Fox i ntervi ew. 
The 
' ... 
P l ant honored th e p icket li ne a n d the st ri ke appeared . t o unite 
the Dod q e trad i tion of the 19 505 wit h t h at of th e 19605. 
three d ays a,group o f st rik e r s who belonged to a n ew b l a c k caucu s 
Cr.:\11 ed " Concer' n e d IvI E)mb er~:; 'fClI'" a Bt?tte l~ UI"'li c:) n l ' ~ in c l uding cer t a in 
Q-f t h e found e r s of DRUM , star ted to a r g u e to g o b ack ~ a n d t h c-=? 
s tr-i ke e nd e d. Bu t it di d ~50. s ign i f icant l y, wit h o u t the 
firin Qs th a t h ad b ec o me cust omary af t er s t rikes wi t h in the 
con trac t period. Th e soli dar i t y o f t h e November 1967 s trike fired 
t he imag in a ti o n a nd hopes o f many new worker s . Th e in teract i on of 
two tr a di t ions h a d b r ought st r i ke ac t i on b ack i nto th e vocabulary 
of the Dod g e Ma in shop fl oor . 
II. 1968: DRUM is forged 
Th e f a ilure of t h e l oca l a nd i n t e rn a tion a l UAW l eadershi ps to 
h ar n ess the growing milit a n cY of the y ounger workers created 
in 19 6 8 as t h e company kep t ra is i n g pr oduction 
t ar g e t s . In January a woma n wor ker p rotest e d: 
We haven' t qained eucn on the working conditi ons which we have been fighting for several 
vears. Our brothers and sisters are worki nq harder than ever. As a matter of fact, they are 
work ing harder now than before our Union was orqani zed .14 
On Ma r c h 2 a nd Ma rch 2 2, a ft e r bod y s h o p work e r s staged a ~econd . ~ 
---------------------------
1:, . This account is based on Edith Fox, a critical observer/participant of the DRUM era at Dodge. 
But it is supported in a reference by 6eschwender, QQ ~i t, 85, to t he first black caucus meetings at 
Dodge Mai n taki ng place in the Fall of 1967. 
14. Q~~, Januarv 27 1968. 
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protest stoppage on wor k s t a nd a rds , 
them. Wo~ried by a possible growing trend, the Per~onnel Manager, 
l eonard Nawroc ki , called in Domanski and the pl a n t committ e e to 
W<'M"n them -th,,~t i·F any mOI~ c-? II i 11 e ~lc:d \flal kouts II took plaCE:' t.hen 
1!5 
II Sf'~ve \"- e disc i p 1. i n €'~ vd.ll n?sul til. In retu~n for what management 
took was an assurance that the UAWwould put a stoP. to further 
wa l kout s . 
16 
Nawroc ki then s u spend e d the penalti es on the bod y shop 
17 
dS he l ater descr ibed it, hel pf?d 
to l egiti mi ze t he walkouts. On April 22 manageme nt raised its 
But~ 
during the n ex t four days as ma n ageme n t staggered the lin e speed 
increase up from 49 car s an hour to 56~ half of these n ew h ires 
18 
ei ther' l eft in di sgu st or were fired. Th e r esult was a n intense 
Speed-up in other sections of t h e pl .':Int ~ a s Domans ki 
pr otestt'.!d !I the manpower about 30 
---------------------------
15. ~~llY ~l~~~t~ ~l~ty (DDD1 , Special wal kout meeting, May 3 J968. This 'diary' was maintained by 
the Recording Secretarv, Ed liska, who only took over as local 3 president in Jul y. It consists of 
verbatil reports of meetings of the local EB , of the whole Plant Leadership, of the members , and 
with lanaQe~ent, and discussions with pickets and telephone calls fro. May 2 to Kay 26 1968; in 
possession of author at time of writing, but to be deposited in Liska Collection, WRL. 
16. qQ.Q, Speri al EB Mav 15; Heeti nq with management , May 16. 
17. QQQ, May 16 19bB. 
1.!:'3. gqn. 
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19 20 
4 0 " (sic). (~~ rash o-f q l'-ievi:lnce's ~'li:'! S immedic\t.e l y ·filed :. 
Tri ~ Department 18 
Final AsseBbl v 11 
Paint Shop 7 
Car conditioning f 
~~ 
Wo r kers were mo r e aware t h a n u sua l t h is was a major speed-u p 
they h a d alreadv been f ull y man n e d u p to wo~k at 56 an 
2 1 
h O LW in 1967. a n d o n Saturday 27 April wh en they finally hit 
t h e 56 car s a n hour~ t h e wome n wh o wor ke d in th e fin a l a s:sGmb l v 
b\_lInp f:~ I'" a5sembl y a l'- ' ~?a staqed a :1.4 mi nute pr o t es=,t 5i t--doYJf1. To 
cope wi t h t h e 14% increese i n li ne s p eed the -f i n a l i:ssemb lv h a d 
23 
received .iust 7% more l abour . 
The 1968 wildcat 
Th is mann i n q l evel dispute abou t the l eve l of e f fo r t in the 
f in <:'\ l assembl y soon bor e a ll t h e h a llma rks o f a c l ass i c l a bou r 
r e l at i ons c ri sis . It fEste r e d on ~ wit h workers sti ll u nder acute 
ph vsi c<:-l. l pr essure ~ u n t il t h e fo llowina Thur s d av wh en r umours 
Spread t h at those who h a d s t o pp ed th e pr e vi o u s Sat urdcY would 
f ace h eav v pen a lt ies. A second i ng r e d ient was n ow presen t: t h e 
' uni us t ' p e n a l t v. It didn "t mat t er t h at the f in a l ,"£I5semb l y 
,_ • • _. ,,, _ _ • , ......... . .. _ ...... _ .. _ .. _ . .. " ...... ,", . ..... _ .. ,, 'w " '" ........ .. , . ' M . .. . _ .... _ ... ' ..... .. 
2 0. Q~~, Hay b 19b8. 
2 1 • ~~D. , Hay 2b ! 9bB: PI ant Coltai tteel an Char! i e Walters tol d the Speci al i'le!lbershi p Meeti"9 , • We 
must have the same san assignments as wh en we had 56 jobs per hour before. " 
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superinten dent fin a ll y a dd ed two workers temporarily to t h e qroup 
wome n f ix in g f e nd e r s to th e cars . Th e women saw this as a 
tempor arv re l ief t h at would b e taken awav as soon as 
made u p lost production. An hour or so l ater t h e third recurrent 
in such wildcats appear e d: t h e workers' p ay c h ec ks were 
24 
h c,:~nded o ut. . (-1S u s u c" l !c large numbers of second shift workers 
Who h a d s t a ged t h e s i t-down t h e previous wee k left the plant at 
th €d r :l (I pm 1 un c h peJ~ i od. Wh e n they came back at about :l0.25 pm~ 
a q roup of s i x women and two men for me d a pi c ket at the main gate 
25 
a nd p e rsua d e d them nat to go in. 
,£I n wil dcat situ at i o n. 
Manaqement" s desper at ion for production at any price had led it 
to unde r man the line an d rely upon d isc iplinar y p rocedures to 
keep production rolling . The ph ys i ca l ef f ec t on thei r workforce 
was con s ider a b l e. Stri kers ex plained: 
I work on the steering column job and when I get ho~e I al too tired to do anything. The work 
is getting harder and harder and nothing is being done about it. 
I work on the serrv-qo-round and the work is just too hard and I al always tired. 
I work on the bumper job and I can't keep up . More work is asked and I have to use sleeping 
pills when J get home.2b 
---------------------------
:~4. I have gone into detail ey.plaining the factors that triggered the Hay 2 wildcat partl y because 
it is necessary to demystify DRUH's origins by placing it within a standard labour relations conflict 
Situation, partly because the evidence confirms just how 'normal' this particular conflict was, and 
partly because even Seschwender's excellent account of the strike begins, 9P fl! 88-9: "it is 
SomeNhat unclear exactlv hON the Nalkout developed" and goes on ' For so~e unexplained reason their 
discontent reached a peak on May 2 and they decided to walk off the job." 
~~5.. ~QQ .. Company evidence , Hay 3 1968. 
:::~6.. QQQ, Hay 51%8. 
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But the huge turnover Chrysler experienced was viewed as 
secondarv to output. at the suqq~stion of 
ffic.,,\l'ic."\oement, Ed Liska had qone to the Warehouse qate at j.30 pm 
and talked to the pickets, four women and one man. "They had told 
hi fT\ the samE~: 
The Qirls kept saving that they ar e tired of the speed-ups and nothinq is bein9 done to help 
them. They rei used to come to the Local Hall and kept on picketing.27 
And thev clearly believed their only remedy was direct action. 
Not black revo lutionaries, but largelv white women worker s in 
thf~i t'" l ate 205 and early 30s and with three or fuur years' 
senioritv~ they believed that taking grievances throuqh procedure 
was a wast~ of time. 
Liska's diary reported the course of the three d ay wildcat 
27. ODD IA "t 19 L8 ___ ~ nay y D. 
4213 
"~~ ~.~~: . 
The plant had to be shut dOHn because of lack of persons returning after the lunch period. 
Note: Management had Labour Relations and Supervisors observing the Hajn gate' and the 
picket line. They have names and evidence of thi s acti vitv. 
Friday "ay 3: 
When ~he day shift workers reported for work before 6 am, thev were faced by pickets at 
al l entrances to the plant .•. The pickets were 2nd shift workers, mostly females who stayed up 
al J niQh t near the pI an t. .. 
When the 2nd shift tille neared, the same pickets appeared at the Warehouse and Main 
gates . The Conant gate entrance did not have any pickets. It was evident that most of the 
pickets were females who had a lot of seniority and Harked in the final assemb ly department. 
The 2nd shift did not start, due to workers not crossing the picket l ines. ' 
Saturday "ay 4: 
••• At the Hain and Warehouse gate entrances, some pickets did appear and the workers 
refused to cross the lines. The pickets were small in number, most ly feeales and they staved 
onl y a few minute at the qates and soon departed. The damage was done and the plant did not 
operate although many Horlers did actuallY enter the plant. 
2nd shift. No pi ckets appeared and many workers reported to work. All qates were free of 
pickets, but due to high absenteeism, who just did not report to work, the plant did not 
operate. 
Note: Manaqement did go to Court and got an injunction against illegal picketing and were 
to subpgena 20 persons if picketing was evident.2B 
On Sund ay after noon nine pickets turned up to a meeti n g wi t h the 
laced. EB c.'\t Io\th i ch they /I i::\q r-eed ncr!: to picket and go bar.: k to 11')01"' k" 
a nd "the Offi cers promised to db ever ything pO$si b le to fight f or 
Wo r k resumed o n the Mond ay mornin g and two workers who 
Were discharged on th e spot were later recalled b y telegramme 
wh i 1 f? "lnia n .:\q€! nl f.? nt. •.. we r e wait in g for order s from t h e Chrys l er 
COI" por a t i on to metf.'2 out d i ~;c: i P 1. i n ar-y act ion£.:. " • 
Management reacts 
Chr ys l e r h e adquarters in Highland P a rk too k severa l days to 
make up It s mind about the level of p e n a l t ies it was going to 
28 • gQ~, May 2-4 1969. 
29 .. Q.~~~ EB meeti ng with pickets, Hay 5 1968 . 
QQQ, t1ay 6 1968. 
'\ 
i mpo=.e. But thE' th in ki nq that took p I aCt"':! SI'lOvJed no si Clfl o·f . an')" 
sophi t.;t i cat :i eln . Thev felt a few workers had to be ~ischarged to 
avo i d al l owing wildcat strikes to re-emerge as a n establ i shed 
pract i ce in the plan t . Yet t h ey were also concerned about the 
r is k s attac h e d to a cr u de approac h. ·f or e:-: amp 1 e" 
L:i ska 1'"\ (:Jt<!?d : 
This day Has routine , nothinq to report other than the Plant was full of rUlors ..• 
The threat of a walkout in event some are discharged persists in the plant •.• 
Others say they should fire them all. 
The rumors and opinions are in progress, but things seem to be cool as of this day.31 
But at t hi s s t a g e ma nag e men t st i l l h a d lit tle i d ea, 
s t i ll l ess a bout th e exten t of d iscontent in the pI i:\nt. 
Hi g hl a n d ~ark corporate h ead q u a rt e r s d eve lop e d a pure l y tac ti cal 
a pproach d es i g n e d to min imise t h e ri s k of mOI'''e 
indus tri a l ac ti on whil e max imi si n g penalti es . Th ey waited un ti l 
I"'I ,':'IY 11 . 
Do d ge Mai n 's La bour Re l a t ions Director Tom Kowlasky, and a 
Hi g hl a n d P a rk r e p resen tati ve, wor ke d fr o m 11 p m u nti l 2 iain 
c a llinq work e r s in to t h e o ffi ce a nd in forming them of t h ei r-
p e n a l ties . Fi ve were d ischar ged (inc ludin g two day-sh ift workers 
on t h e l'lond <.'\Y ) ~ n i n e we r e qiven 3 0 - d ay p e n a l ties, foUl~ 9i ven 
d ay p ena l ties , two 3-d ays a n d f our j ust one d ay each. 
To red u ce st i l l further the ris k of lI-Ji l dr.:: at act.ion~ th(~~ 
lab o u r relat i o n s d e p artment then t ol d t h e f r on t-line supervision 
---------------------------
:~; 1 • @q~ May 8 1908. 
~~:' 2 • @~~ May 13 1908. 
.' 
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to mou nt a major di sc iplinarY crackdown against the entire 
Workforce. By Tuesday Ma y 14, Liska noted: 
The most alarming facts reveal that the Dodge management is hell bent on penalizing everyone in 
the plant for any and all violations. Report s throughout the day are coming in that labour 
relations and supervisors are threatening evervone and are spying on workers who leaVE the 
plant for lunch , etc. Cameras are being used in aJ'1 parts of the plant. 
The workers are in a fighting mood and are demanding action against the managereent .33 
Even c hief steward s we r e not safe. A Labour Relations man told a 
wom an steward she had no riqht to qo t o the Emplovment Offic e 
wh F.~ n Clnf:? c)-f her members w~s being interviewed bec ause "th~? 
states Pl ant Committee an d or Local 
::::4 
Of f i c.<er- s. Thf? 
Manaqement "s response intimidated worker s from t a king any 
immediate action in d~fence of those di SCip lined. But it had two 
unintended consequences for Local 3's circle of activists. First~ 
crackdown a li enated the whole me mber s hip, but 
Particularl y the EB and chief steward s who then publicly excused 
the wildc at and condemned the pen a lties. Second, i t unde l~ I i n t'.? ci 
Lec .::\1 3'$ ineffectiveness. Neither plea ding nor following 
procedur e appeared to mea s ure up to the probl ems. Ma n agement thus 
the n eed for ef -h?c t i ve 
organi zat ion a nd action at precisely the mome nt when black 
Detroit wa s mournin q the assassination of Martin Luther King 
---------------------------
::::;:~; • QQQ May 14 1968 . 
:34 • ~QQ, Heet i ng with management , May 20 1968. 
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(shot o ne month ear l ier) and was searchinq for new ways of 
gf2ttinq n2su l ts. In t h is failure of institution s, t h €~ new b ] ac k 
n ation a list politics and a black network l inkinq a core of 
Workers at Dodge Mai n and some Trotskyist-influenced blacks 
wh o h ad bee n puttinq out the monthl y !QQ~C ~ity ygi~g newsp aper 
si n ce the'Rebelli on', took on the l eader s hi p of the protest. 
Thev we r e a bl e to generalize from t h e specif i c inj ustice against 
a few t o the growing resentment aqai n s t r a cial di scri minat ion 
f e l t b y most black workers. 
It i s r important to repeat that both black a nd white wor kers 
ioine d i n t h e wildcats b etween November 1967 and Mav 1968~ and to 
• 
not e that t h e numbers wh o p l ayed an actiye p~rt were small 
relative to the 12~OOO worker s in th e pl ant. But while sma ll 
r e l at ive to the tot al workforce~ t hey we r e perhaps larger than 
36 
th e immediate circ l e of local officers a nd stewards. Only 300 
Wer e ri l e d up e nough to go to t h e Locel Ha ll on Tuesday~ 
to protest the int e nsif i cati on of discipline in th e plant. Onl y 
.:\ttend e d the Sunday Mav 26 Local ~:; I specia l 
---------------------------
:::'\5 . Geschwender, QQ. ~tt , 88. 
~'6. See above, Chapter 14, whefa the circle of current and recent stewards in the earl y 1960s is 
estimated at about 200 . 
37 .. qqQ~ May 14 1968. 
\ 
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meet :i. no that voted to take a stl'- i h? ball ot ~ 2.nd onlv 49 l, 
bothered to vote (388 in favor, 103 agai nst) on Jun e 3. The 
a tmosphere amonq black Detroiters in the l a te 1960s. 
meant thi s tin v minority of a ctiv i sts had the space 
within whi ch to qener alize. 
Unfair penalties 
The spec ifi c i n gred ient s that lin ked the May 1968 wildcat 
a nd t h e est a blishme nt of DRUM were t h e d isc h arge of o ne final 
assembl y wor ke r, General Gordon Ba ke r, and the feelinq of most 
bl ac ks in the pl ant that Chrysler h a d si nql ed out 
(' 
P i:tr-t icipant s i n the wildcat for punishment. BakE·? l·- , h acl 
f o~med th e organi zati ona l l i nk with th e IDD~~ Gi~Y Y9i~~ an d was 
one of the t wo me n wh o joi n e d the women"s p icket line on May 2 
---------------------------
:31:=3. ~~~, Ma y 26 1968. The ballot, as laid down in the contract, was for strike action on 
outstanding gr ievances and not directl y on the pen~ l ties . Thi s signifi cant legali stic difference was 
not apprec iated by .any workers ot her than those steeped in UAW rules. The plant leadership were, of 
course , full y aware of the consti tutional restrictions , but clear ly hoped that tempers would heal 
and that an arranQeeent could eventuall V be wor ked out with management. The wider political context, 
however, ensured that tempers di dn 't heal , and management was not prepared to accolililodate the Local 
3 leadership to the point of reinstating General Baker. Many aembers therefore believed the EB was 
gui ltv of deliberate conni vance in his firi ng . In NoveBber , DRUM wro te: ·What ever happened to the 
seven wildcat strikers who were fired on Hay 11 19b8? The ridiculous and corrupt UAW attemp ted to 
tell the fired strikers that thei r hands were t ied until a strike vote was taken. Such was done. 
Next the Black workers were told that nothing could be done unti l the vote was sanctioned by the 
International staff of the UAW. We were never gi ven an answer on this question. Furthermore, we were 
given a whole lot of oo-bla-dee about whv the str ikers could not be reinstated •.. What has happened? 
Last week five of the fired strikers were re-hired; a sixth was approac hed to come back to work, but 
our other brother is still in the streets . Whv? Because he is Black, and these policies are made by 
linite racists. " 
:~:;(:r. Local 3 Collection , WRL, Bo): 9; letter fr om Do manski to Fraser, June 5 1968. 
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and was s u bsequentl y fired. Less than two weeks after he was 
esc orted f rom t h e plant, Char" J i e Brooks 1'"G'pol'"t e d to the EB "t.hat 
a l eafl e t titled DRUM is bei ng circulated aroun d the Plant a nd it 
4 1 
is a 51 a nd e r'ous an el mud-'s 1 i n ~~ i n 9 1 ea-f 1 et" . It was wr itten and 
di s tribut e d by Baker and a group o f about nin e Dodqe worker s, 
Thi s first DRUM bulletin f ocused on the discriminatory 
di scip linar y action: 
Referring to the above discharges and disciplinary action taken agai nst the pi c k ets~ ' the 
overall( adillinistration of punishment was overwhellingly applied to the Black wor ker s who Here 
held responsible for the walk-out which was directl y caused by company indifference towards 
working conditions. 
Three HI ack workers were fired outri ght. Thev were gi ven 30 days off, and numerous others 
were given fr ol one to fi ve days off. 
Why l ust the Black Horker continue to be utilized and exploited beyond hUlane reasoning 
and judged by double standards? It is time for Black workers to concern themselves with 
ma licious tactics used by the White PONer structure in its attempt to demoralize the integrity 
of the Black indi vidual ••• You have but one life, l ive it with dignity.42 
And since it was the qroup of Poli s h women around Hel en De ms ki 
a nd other s in t h e same Rosary Society who h ad initiat e d the 
---------------------------
4(1 . Q~Q~ various days. General Baker was a leader of the League of Revolutionary Bl aCK Workers 
frol its incepti on in 1969 until its demise in 1972-73. Around 1976-1977 he used an assumed name to 
Qet hired at the Ford River Rouge~ where he created a sufficientl y strong base to remain hired »hen 
the company discovered his real identity and in 1982 was a plant committeeman in the Rouge Foundry. 
41. local 3 collection, WRL, Box 3: EB Minutes, May 23 1968. 
4·2 .. Qr.Il! , vol 1~ no. 1. 
the sense of qrievance struck a deep chord with manv 
44· 
Th e bulletin also move d from the immediate 
in .j u s ti ce to generalize the problem: 
Black brothers and sisters co~pri5e bOt. of the product ion workers at Hamtra!ck Assemblv, yet 
the percentaQe of Black supervi sors and shop stewards are too low to mention •.. 
~hile Chr vsler is go ing into the ghetto for common labour , they go to the suburbs for 
supervisi on and skilled workers. The Black worker who tri es for supervision is tol d that his 
attitude isn't right , which means that he thinks BLACK. The bJack worker who tries out for 
sk il led trades is Qi ven a test [for] practising journeyaen to pass. Where the ~hite worker ~av 
not be gi yen a test at all. Th i s si tuati on must be stopped nml. We as hI ad lien and woeen 
looking for equa l opportuni ty to emploYlent cannot tolerate this. The ti me to put a stop to 
th is is nOI'l.45 
Th e argu ment that it was not an individu a l problem, but an issue 
for a ll bl a cks to be concerned with, pr ove d t h e necessar y link to 
t h e exper ience of v i rt u a ll y a ll black work e r s. 
bl ac k Loc:,a l 3 vice president ~ was forced b y the stren gth of 
support for the DRUM a rgument to ack n owledg e th e charge of racism 
agai nst Chrysler. I n his regular Qg~gg ~§iQ ~§~§ column the 
f o ll owing month h e agreed: 
We get a }ittle more than our share in Vietna • ••• l , therefore! ~ust once again cal l upon the 
Hamtratick Assembl y Management and the Huber Foundry Management to call a halt to t he 
underhanded di scrimination practised by some of your supervision.4b 
DRUM exp lain ed bl ac k workers' s pecific grievances in terms of a 
theory of rac i a l oppressi on a nd class conflict. and 
leg i ti mi zed indi vid u a l a nd coll ect i ve a ct ion agai nst management . 
... • - .. ,_. _~. ,M •• _"'M' ............. _ ._ ............ ~ ...................................... _ ...... ___ •• - ..... . 
4·3. QQQ, various days; Geschwender , Q~ ~it , 89; Liska interview. 
44 . As did the leafl et's charges of unfair , raciall y-influenced discharges of one bl ack wi th 17 
years ' seniority the previous September ~ and another on April 27. 
45. Qr:.!:!!!! Vol 1, No.1. 
46. Q~~~ June 15 19b8. 
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White wildcat 
[OE'st It-J i t h the 
q ene~ali z ation of l~esentmF.~nt: a mo nq b l ';H.: k vJ clf"k e t-s . Th e rOt";!ooo. 
l a nguage that justif ied the u se of !5 tlr °:lke 2,ction 
also affect e d whit e Workers. Th e pl a nt committeemen f o~ the 
s ld ll e d vJCwoker s in t he looolc:\mtramck Assemblv pl cl nt .:.~n.d the Hub G\f"" 
FOL I d~ y had been t~e most c ~ itica l of th e Domans ki administration 
for n ot s ticking s trictly to t h e pr ocedure inthei~ ef f orts t o 
'+7 
calm their production worke~ cr iti cs. This resentment a bout 
black workers b e inq given specie l treatment ~ a n d about th e sharp 
DRUM attacks on white racism, festered until Jul y. 
/' 
after DRUM h a d staged a mass i ve displ ay of s tr<.'?nq t h , vJi th i::l 
, 
community picket on the Dodge gates being respected by around 70% 
413 
of the black workforce. ther e was a small a nti -b l ack walkout by 
Whites. It. oc:cl.lrTl:'? ci when manaqE~ment wi s h6'c.1 t o p av 21 bl ack vJoroke r' 
the s kill e d pay rate fo r cleaning the Huber Foundry sewers. Th e 
HUb e r Foundrv skilled trades did n" t want t.o do the 
407. ~QQ, various o days. At every point they kept arguing to take the issues through the procedure 
and to invol ve the International representati ves. 
1~0 8.. 6eschwender, QIl c;.U, 93; ~~~, August 3 1968: the DRUM \IIi! dcat began with a par ki ng lot 
'eetinQ after the day shif t on Thursda July 11 t hat oobilized about 150 workers to !arch to the 
Loc al ha l l. There, they interrupted LiSka's first EB Geeting as president to present complaints of 
"RaCism, Discrimination and Intimidation; BiQotry and Abuse frol Supervision; Indiscriminate 
discharge of black workers," local 3 Collection, Box 3; EB minutes, Jul y 11 1968. The following 
olorn inq an all -b l ack DRUM support pi CKet was put on the Jos Campau Mai n gate , and picketing was kept 
up on Saturday as well. The wildcat ended on Monday Jul y 15 when Chrysler secured in junctions 
aga inst unn a~ed DRUM pickets. 
, 
4 00:,0, ._:10 
lillork 
and 
put up a picket in their Cdrs at s ome distance from the plant . 
None turned up that day_ Manag e ment sei z ed upon thi s s tr i ke to 
mete out ~ bit of "equality' and they fired the Huber Foundry 
49 
skilled trades chief ~t eward, Cv Van Fleteren. 
This disciplinar y a c t i on had the opposite effect to th a t 
i ntenci<ed. I t 1. e'f t thE""> L.ocal 3 officers with two sets of 
di s charqLs which appeared similar but in fact were very different 
i n cont<::!nt_ On the one hand there were the May 2 striker s , 
aqc.'1i nst whom the company h ad cast-i r on cases, inclwjinq 
PI"\otoqrap tVi c evi d e nc e .:mel sEve!"'al stctt ements from sup e !"'vi s ors. 
They could not be won through the qrievance procedure; to sc:?cur-f.? 
the reinstatement of all seven would requir~ a managemen t climb-
down o r show of still mOI~e "compl:\ssion" --, or the plc.~l"lt t.o s t a t;Je 
a successfu l strike. But, as ~ i ska a nd Brooks put on the rec ord 
at the special Local ~ membership meeting on May 26, II accor-d i nq 
,tt:> Contract.ur F.tl (sic) pr-ocedur-es, a r- e not 
5() 
On t f e other hand they had a white chi e f 
aqainst whom t h ere was no evidence except his failure , along with 
---------------------------
i~ 9. Local 3 collection, NRL, Box 3: EB Minutes, Ju ly 25 1968: Liska intervieN. 
5(). DOD . Hay 26 1968. Production standard grievances were the only ones on which a legal strike 
could take place during the course of a contract, and tha t would only be legal if all the stages of 
procedure had been fu ll y exhausted. 
4::::7 
the rest of his member s , 
:' 1 
t o ap ear at work on Jul y 18: tl (2 Van 
Fl eteren case could be fouq~t and won ~ilhiD the procedure. 
to b e two s imil ar c~ses were not: and the different 
t l~ f2i:1 t m(-~In t .I11 E~t(-2d (Jut Van 
while tw6 bl a cks. Genera l Baker an d Benni e Tate. 
remained discharqed confirmed for many bl acks that Chrvsler " s 
" just i ce ' wa s racially motivated. 
DRUM's influe n ce within Dodq e Mai n increased and its tone 
became mo r e st r ident. Th e Jul v wi ldcat was considered highlv 
SU(: ces~;+ul since no-one was fired. DRUM then organized a n 
effective ~oycot t of two l oca l bars which refused to hire blacks, 
and ran c candidate~ Ron March, in a specia l election for the EB 
Tr u stee position . He h eaded the first ballot~ with 521 votes but 
54 
l ost t h e run-off by 1 ,386 votes to Joe El liott's 2,09 1. The 
number s s u pportinq DRUM were evident l y growing and, 
---------------------------
:5 :1,. In September the skilled di vision at Huber Foundry continued their partly raCist , partl y 
skill conscious campaign by submitting 393 signatures on a petition to form a Separate Unit within 
local 3 from the rest of the Huber Foundry ; Local -3 Collection, WRL! EB Minutes Sep tember 12 1968. 
52. local 3 Collection, Box 3i EB minutes, October 24 1968 . 
~):3 . The r u le-~akinQ and rule-enforcing procedures disc riminated against anyone who took direct 
action, but under constant pressure to ship co~pleted cars out of the plants, Chr ys ler &anageaent 
was &ost concerned to prevent successful rule-break ing by those who constituted the majority of 
asseablv workers and who had the most interest in breaking the rules, and these were blacks. The 
fi ve who were given their jobs baci included the two white Hoeen fired and three blacks. 
54. Local 3 Collection. Boy. 9; Results of election of Septecber 26 1968 in iIIhictl 22 candi dat es 
stood for Trustee , and of r~n -off on October 3 1968 . 
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cl a imed t h at t he run-off election ,was stolen. Its reputation 
also spread beyond Ha mtr a mck and ' revol uti o nary un ion mov e ment' 
qroups wer e establish e d at Ford 's Rouqe pl a n t a nd at Chrysler's 
Eldon Aven u e qear and ax l e plant~ where 26 work _r s were fired in 
~J i::\nuar'v 1969 as a resuit of a wildcat protest aqai nst penalties 
!:i6 
imposed on work ers returninq l ate f rom a n ELRUM meet ino. 
III. DRUM demands 
The movement reflected th e dovetai ling of t h e wid er civil I~ iqht. s 
moveme nt with s hop floor wor kers' demands for restraint over the 
exercise of ma naqerial authorit v . Wh en DRUM li sted 14 demands. 
t h e fi rst eiqht wer e s traiqhtfor ward dema nd s few' 
treatment: 
1. 50 black foreeen. 
2. 10 black gener al foremen immediately. 
3. 3 black superi ntendents. 
4. A black plant man ager . 
S. That the major ity of the e~plovment of fice personnel be black. 
b. All black doctors and SOX black nurses in the ledical centers at this plant. 
7. That the medical poli cy at this plant ba changed entirel y. 
B. 50! of all plant protection guards be black and that every ti le a black worker is 
reloved fr om plant premi ses that he be led by a black brother.57 
---------------------------
5~:j. Geschllender, 'lI! £.U, 104-109. DRUM made th is ch arge each tilile it was beaten in elections. 
liska. of course, denied there was anv illegit imate ballot activity on his part in ei ther this 
election or in his even lore controversial re-election as president in 1970. But he recognized that 
there migh t have been larger numbers of Hamtramc k-based (ie Polishl retirees voting in these 
elections because of the greater interest they provoked than previousl y - and the i ssue of white 
ret irees outvoting the fiajority of blaCKS who Horked in the pJant was one of DRUM ' s charges; Liska 
interviel'l . ./ 
56 . 6eschMender, Q.~ £.U, 94-5. Other RUM groups were set up in 1969 as Mas the ullbrella group, the 
league of Revolutionary Black Workers. 
57 . q[~~, Vol.l ~ No.9. 
None of these demands 0ic§£t!~ c h allenged Chrysler"s capacity t6 
contro l th e lab our process and most, i f not al l ~ were impl emented 
duri nq t h e next fi ve ye a rs. In 1969. a new "inteqrationi st" 
poli cy wa~ consciously int r oduced into th e p!ant b v the new 
personnel ma n ager , Dick Cl a n cy. The recruitment of black foremen. 
general f oremen and superinte ndent s was accelerated~ a nd exist in g 
supervisors 
58 
r e moved . 
were eit her "educa ted" on th e race issue or 
Th e DRUM mov e ment, howe ver , rai sed t wo other sets o f d emands 
th at did d i r ec tl y threaten manageria l con t rol. III l anguage 
borrowed directly fro m the traditional Dodge l eft, it demanded a 
n e w g rievance system, 'ob J 
---------------------------
safet y. a fi qht aqai ns t the speed up. 
~8. Interview with Dick Clancy, Chrysler Labour Relations Executive, Hi gh land Park, Julv 19 1982. 
Clancy was a former FBI employee who had joined Chrysler's personnel department in the late 19505, 
serving as personnel l anager at the Chrysler Kercheval plant for many years before being tr ansferred 
to the 'hot seat' at Dodge Main in 1969, with a brief to 'clean up' the manage~ent 's act there. 
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the four-day week a nd a doubling o f production workers' 
DRUM a l so raised a wider, more ' political ' category of 
t h at clear l y reflected i ts editors' a tt empt to genera li ze f rbm 
grievances in Dodge Main to the s ituati o n of blacks in America 
a nd oppress i o n t hroughout the world . DRUM' s l ast six demand s in 
the bull et in quoted abov e were: 
9. DRUM demands that all black workers immediately stop paying union dues. 
10. DRUM de~ands that the two hours' pay that goes into union dues be levied to the black 
community to aid in self determination for black people. 
11. DRUM demands that the double standard be eliminated and that a commi ttee of the black rant 
and file be set up to investigate all grievances against the corporation, to find cut what 
type of discipline is to be taken against corporation , and also to find out what type of 
discipline is to be taken against Chrysler Corporation employees. 
12. DRUM demands that all black workers who have been fired on trumped up racist charges be , 
brought back with all lost pay. 
13. DRUM demands that our fellow black brothers in South Africa working for Chrysler Corp. and 
its subsidiaries, be paid at an equal scale as white racist co-workers . 
14. DRUM also demands that a black brother be appointed as head of the board of directors of 
Chrysler Corp .60 
---------------------------
59" league of Revolutionary Black workers , ~~~£h ~m ~Q.~Q. Ii~U, October-November 1969, leaflet for a 
special UAW Convention: 
"* We demand that the grievance procedure be comple~el y revised so that grievances are settled 
immediately on the job by the workers in the plant involved. The grievance procedure is used to 
prevent workers from using their strike power to fight abuses from management. Since the procedure 
completely ties the hands of workers and basically serves company interests it should be scrapped 
and replaced by a completel y new system. 
* Eliiination of all safety and health hazards in the auto industry. this leans cleaning the air in 
the foundry and redesigning dangerous machinery, and a cut back in production on hazardous jobs. 
* The union Bust fight vigorously against speed up and increases in produc tion standards. The 
companies should double the size of their work force to meet the present workload ••• With today's 
I . 
technology production standards can easily be cut to reasonable humane lines. 
f The union must fight for a five hour work day and a four day work wee~. The profit level of 
industry is high enough to allow for eore leisure time for workers. 
* The union must fight for an i~nediate doubling of the wages of all production workers •. • We know 
how wealthy the company is. We know hOH low their labour costs presently are. In fact , we know th at 
it costs less than $100 in labour to produce a $3,000 car. We say increase that labour cost to $200 
per car and double the wages immediatel y." 
This part of league's programle was virtual ly identical to that developed by the left-organ iz ed 
United National Caucus that operated within the UAW from 19b9-1974. See local 3 UNC 1970 election 
prograliDle, in local 3 Collection, WRl. 
60. Q~I!I!, Vall, No , 9. In the October 1969 league programme quoted above , they induded the 
deland for the withdrawal of American troops from Vi etnam. 
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Lik e the demands for major chanqes in shop floor condi t ions. 
these directly challenged managerial power 2 nd were unattainable 
short of the kind of r ~volutionar y change in society the League's 
Frontier of conflict 
m:;:UM's i mp act on the frontier of contTol i c: not 
quan ti·f i abl e. There was a marked fall in car output per manual 
(~11 
emplovee from 1968 to :1.970 , s h own in Figure 6, but this was 
primarilv the result of a fall in production targets. Yet. it. 
Would be surprising if the barrage of publicity given bv DRUM to 
i ndividual cases of for~men harassinq black and women workers~ 
and the regular resort of angry workers to phVsical protest ~ did 
not have some effect. The evideoce confirms a new wa Ve of 
primarily ~~f~Q§iY~ st ruqqles= col l ective protest.s against 
working in excessiv~ heat in the summer~ a nd aqainst :·unjust· 
disciplinary penalties. Liska's diary entry for Tu _sday February 
25 1969 with its report of recurrent ~ short stoppaqes and threats 
of picketinq is t ypical: 
---------------------------
61 . See above, Chapter 13. 
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Tri. Shop Probl~ 
Thursday Feb 20: 
Work stoppage due to a worker being penali zed three days . After work stoppage managelent 
reduced the penal tv and workers went back . 
Friday Feb 21: 
About 15 members from this same group (Fay. distri ct) did not report to work. They Cd l e to 
the pay office and demanded their pay checks . The cheCKS were in the depart ment office. The 
group went to the depart ~en t and after creating a scene, swearing, drinking, calli ng other 
workers names for HorKing, etc, they got thei r chec ks and left. 
"DIlday Feb 24: 
After an all day investigation by management , they, at the end of the "day meted out 
several penalties for the Friday incident . One fe llow was discharged , "four were given 
penalties up to fi ve days off. 
Tuesday: 
Three of the five workers penalized reported to work . One actuall y went on the line and 
started to work. Supervi sors notified them of their penal ties, etc . A work stoppage of about 
12 minut es occurred before others went to work and the three men left the pl an t. The three 
men told sanageient that Edith Fox told them to come in . She denied i t . 
After the first break, agai n a work stoppage occurred. About 12 ainutes were in volved and 
the lines started again . 
Durinq the rest of the day, Chuck Walters ( Co~mittee!an) and Edith Fox met with the 
~anaQement to discuss the penalties. The discharge case was reduced to fi ve days. 
After the meeting, about 3 pm, Edith Fox Nent along the lines in the group and told 
ever yone to go to the local hall for a meeti ng .62 
Th e i ssue that prov oked the first s h ort solid a rit y s t oppage was 
a n 'un"j ust:· pen ;.dt y . Fur-th e l'" penc:\ ltie~:. <:{gai n st the q l'-o up wh o Wf.:? yo"e 
ce l e bratinq their initi a l v i c tor y and who only entered the pl ant 
to col l ect their p cy checks caused t h e second. The full th r u st o f 
a n ger a q ai n s t th e comp a n y was , 
restrained . Th e lines wer e only s topped for brief period s a nd t he 
t~ree who defi e d ma n ag e me nt b y coming in t o wo rk in ~.:. pi t.e o f 
their pen a lties~ soon went h o me. I t was as if they kn e w t h e r e was 
a li l"1e bey ond ~..,hich "furth e r l :illf.=qi?l l" a ct s \.AJCluld bl"- in g a b c)ut a n 
escalation by man ageme nt. Ins"\:e,"::Id, the full forc e of t h E? i I'" 
fru s tration was di r ect e d aq a in s t a target th a t was not a 
---------------------------
62.. Liska' s diary, February 25 1969; in Liska ' s possessi on at til'Je of wri ting. To be placed in 
Liska Collecti on, WRL . 
the left-wing chief steward~ black committeemah an d 
local 3 presi d ent. Lisks" s diary continue d= 
About 50 persons were in the Executive Board room. Chuck Walters tried to explain what 
happened at the meet ing. They would not listen. Edith Fox tried to explain about the problems. 
They shouted her down. Ed "Liska tried to talk about procedures that ilust be followed. Deaf 
ears. Joe Gordon attempted to talk. He was shouted down and called na~es. 
The group was totally unreachable. Few did not know the rules. Some fro~ the ext reme 
militant group. Others just came along to hear and see. Swearing, dirty talk and just plain 
arrogance prevailed at the meetinq . They say, ' send telegrams to the five people who were 
penalized, get them back to work and get rid of the general foreman, etc' ..• Simple as that. 
They said that they will picket the plant on Wednesday. 
Liska cautioned them that they will be fired and that injunctions will clear them off the 
gates, etc. They ignored the plea. 
The meeting ended up with shouts, yells, confusions. No one knew exactl y tlhat will 
happen, except that there is a total breakdown in that triG group.b3 
Whi le car product ion remained a t high lev.l s, and before t h e 
lonqer- t e rm ch a nges Chr ys l e r wa s planning were fu ll y imp l emented~ 
l a b o ur relations a t Dodge Main remaine d litera ll y o n a knife ' s 
64 
In one of the mor e f a mou s incidents, a DRUM actiYist ~ 
s petwe lder Rue h ie Forge~ wa s s u spend e d b y a black l a bour relations 
S l..lr.) t~ I~" vi se))'" vJi the u t e}(pl i:: nati o n c: nd cleni ed the ri gh'l t D CD ll ec:t 
Whil e hi s steward~ Fc)wl er- ~ a nd th e s upervi sor 
Tom Yo un q were ar-guing, Fo)'"ge 1\ s udden 1 y 'lUI'"ned ar'oL.md a n d hit 
YC~l.lfi q with hi s -f ist., t hen he reached inside of hi s shirt a n d 
Pull e d out a d agqer-, lun ged at Yeung and str-uck him tw ice in th e 
---------------------------
64. Liska explained his problem lJI ith taking up lIlany discharge cases: 'A lot of guys didn't think 
hitting a foreman or stabbing him is doing anything wrong. so they say they' re innocent." 
J 1;:' 
C)..J 
bi::\ck. /I To protect themselves some foreme n started to carr y 
qun 5~ whi c h became so commo n 
post e d notices pr oh ibiti n g 
in t h e p l ant that 
61:.> 
t h em. Wo r-ket-s being 
dismissF_d ·f en- be!i n g 'in poss;ession (Jf glJn s or ·fOlr 'fit- inq thf2in 
67 
in s i de t h e f actor y in 1970 a n d 197 1. 
UAW resp o n se 
Unti l 1960 wor kplace unrest was of t e n viewed a e a n 
opp o r t unit y b y t he full-time l oca l of f i cer s. But in the late 
19 6 0s i t was a d est a b il i zi n q, h ost i lt? ele tTl (.:! n t!I 
l e fti s t s like Ed ie Fox. To the s h e ltered UAW officials of 
Solida rit v Ho u se wh o h ad nlarc h e d b e h i nd Wa l ter Re u ther and Ma r t i n 
Detro i t·s Wood war d Avenue in 1963 o n t h e twentiet h an n iversary of 
th e Detroit race r i o t s, th e moveme nt was doubl y s h ocking. It 
Chell I e nqed t heir o stensibl e l i b erali s m a nd disturbed their 
c omf o rt a bl e r e l a t i on s hi p wit h th e a ut o comp a ni es. 
---------------------------
6)5 . Forge escaped by running out of the plant; but after one steward had escorted Young to the 
hospital, ' Young made a telephone call to Personnel Manager leonard Nawrocki, demanding that steward 
Fowler be fired for not helping hi .. when Forge was attacbng him with the knife"; liska's diary, 
February 12 19b9. 
66 . ~~~~!~t~ q~t~Y~rr~~ ~~~~, grievance A70-b02-3bO, November 14 1970. 
l)'/ .. tHq, grievance A71-735-5B2, November lb 1971. 
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reali z ed DRUM h ad sur v ive d the fir s t hi gh l y-c h a r g e d wee ks a fter 
t h e May wildca t , ~'J eapon 
c .. ~q a i nst di ss£~nt, The J ul y 1968 issu e of t h e UAW' s 
offici a l magaz ine, ?§tiLgliD§ ~ c harged: 
Black Power advocates are clai ming that ·white racist foremen" are "harassing , insulti ng , 
driving and snapping the whip over the backs of thousands of black workers at the Dodge 
plant. n • 
Using these lies as their base for creating discontent they have formed the . ~~~~g 
8~Y9!~!19DE[Y ~Di9D ~9yg~gD!~· (DRUM) . The theory behind the movement is pure marxism (divide 
and conquer), and they even Quote from the works of a noted communist, WEB Dubois, in their 
newsletter (DRUM). 
It appears to us that the com~unist-inspired black power Slovesent has shifted from 
looting and burning to leadino campus revolts and attempting to bring the black wor~ers into 
the revolution. 
It was exactl y this cOlbinat ion of events which the Reds used - almost successfull y - to 
brinQ the iron curtain down on France recently. With only a handful they spearheaded the 
student strike while comlunist goons kept the French workers from returning to their jobs. 
We knoN the communists look upon Detroit ' s automobile plants as the economic bellwether 
of the countr y, And to bring their production to a screeching halt through internal revolution 
wou ld better ser ve the enemy's purpose than if they were bombed out by enemy aircraft .bB 
In Loc c:d :::. ~ Li s ka dropped h is ear li er sympat heti c a pproac h s nd 
h ead e d clf ·f: t r o u b l e by re l yi n g o n the o ld t ac t ic o f denyi n g th e 
mili tan t s a p l at f or m at gen era l member s h i p mee t i n gs : 
I learned that too being a local officer . Only the politicians who want to stick vou wi th 
something showed up to reqular membership meetings, so you told your guys to st ay away or go 
to the bar next door in case we need you .b9 
'T'hi s st r ategy e nabl e d the EB to settle t h e 19 613 wi l d c a t 
g ri evan ces wi t h o u t h vi n g to P It the set t l e me nt b efore t h e 
I t a l so boug h t time t o g e t mo r e bl ac k s i nvol ved i n 
t h e UAW mac hine l oca l l y a l d n a t ionall y . 
---------------------------
6 8. Cited in 6eschwender I QI! £It, J04-5. 
6 9" Li ska interview, 
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The UAW's deliberate manoeuvering to make life di+ficult for 
DRUM in turn fueled the DRUM activ ist s ' host il ity to the local 
Uj!:~ \I,J act ivi ~~ts . In t h e March 1970 Local 3 elections Edie Fox r an 
on t: h f? opposition Unit ed NatiClnal C;:\UCUS pl.:;, t f arm ,'and IrJ a!s 
70 
.:\ttac:ked by DF::Uf"1 a~~ c:.~ "lib el~al ". Liskc:\~ r'unni nq again 'for-
president, was acc u sed of having "almost d ead racist old po l locks 
standing in line for two a nd three hours tr y ing to vote for some 
7 1 
,-a 1 rf-:?ad y de c'\ d p(:>ll oc: ks II • DRUM" s frustration at it s l ack of 
effectiveness and the growing ten sion within the League of 
F:evo l uti or lar'y BI ac k War ker s b€'~tIrJeen those vJho we l~ e E!SSent i r_ 1 1 v 
bl ack nation a li sts a nd those who saw the n eed to work with white 
Workers and revolutionariLs, was marked by a heightene d 
rhc:?toric that bf2came E~\f£~r- ilion? vi tr-iolic:. It a l so testified to 
the fact that by 1970 DRUM had passed iis peak. 
Despite its ob v ious a nxi ety , L.i s ka "s "Unit e d Membership' 
s l at8 wo n all ten EB pos it ions , and Liska, a lthoug h opposed bv 
Ron Mat 'c h a nd a n ot h er bl~ck candidate, 
ma.:jm-ity and wa s r-e""'c::!lec:t:ed II'Ji t h o ut the m~ed fot- a l'''un-·''off. Th f:: 
ease with whi c tl this e l ect ion was won c learl y surprised Liska and 
---------------------------
70. The UNC Has established at the 19b8 UAW convention by a core of radical skilled workers 
around Pete Kelly (6M) and Art Fox (Edith Fox's husband who was a skilled worker at Ford' s Rouge 
plant) arising out of the discontent of skilled workers at the 1967 contract which, national ly, as 
at local 3, the skilled workers who were then allowed to vote separately, had rejected. The UNC 
atteepted to lobilize production Horkers, but, being predominantly white - even though Jordan Si ~s 
lias a co-chair~an after 1970 - it ~ade very little headway and was virtually a propaganda caucus by 
1973; Anderson and Jefferys, Q~ £ti, Chapter Ten . 
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DRlJ l' l. ThF-2 El.r s ne l~'vousn (~ss about the outcome had I io~d . it to ask 
Re uthe r' t o sE nd physical assistance - which h e did, in the +or-rn 
of a dozen armed i n ter-national staf f wor-k e r-s from the regional 
72 
CJf ·f ice. DRUM complained b itter- I y a fter- the e l ect ion that " Li s k a 
'?:::;~ 
'''''on at t.h(:'? poi nt. o·f a gun " , a nd didn't r u n any more candidates 
i n Dod qe-? tvla i n. Bu t DRUM's defeat waF rea l enough, and it 
ref l e c t ed mo r e t h a n t h e deve l opmen t of inter n a l dissensi on within 
th e League and t h e greater preparedn ess of the existing Loc a l 3 
7 4 
p ower str uctur e fo r t h e electoral c h al l e n ge. Th e 1970 downt ur n 
i n a uto prod uction h it Dod ge Mai n 's low seniority wo rkers h ard, 
whi l e Chr ys l er's n ew accommodation i st st r ategy s plit DRUM' s 
bl ack support by presen t inq a d i fferen t a p proac h to bl ac k 
i nequali t y . 
IV. New strategies 
In 1969 Chrysler int roduced a two-p r o n ged strat egy to d eal ",Jl. t.h 
t h e c h al l enge of its n ew black lab o u r force. It deci ded to reduce 
r e l ian ce up o n Det r o i t a n d Det r o i t's b lac k wor k i n g class 
---------------------------
72. ~~t~, May J6 1970, pr ints Reuther' s repl v to Liska's letter Ot thanks: "Dear Ed , We were pleased 
to be able to extend a helpinq hand of friendship and solidarity. The results proved there is no 
SUbstitute for teaework and solidarity when there is a problee to be settled." This characterist ic 
stateGent of Reuther practice was written just two days betore he was killed in an aeroplane crash 
flYing out to the aonuaent he had built to hi mself, the UAW's residential training resort at Bl ack 
Lake. Liska says of the effect of "one week in Black Lake" on a black .ilitant who was sent there 
fro~ the local in the earl y 19705: "It turned hi m round. Just one week up there"; Liska interview. 
"74 • 6eschwender , !}1! £H ~ 120-122. 
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f or its labour supp l y. This could not be done overniqht and it was 
ten year s befor e Dod ge Main it s elf WdS closed . Th L second aspect 
of th e new strategy was to d evelop a new image. 
Chr ys l er determin~d to respond t o the · gen uin e · gl~ i evancF.!s of 
Y" <.. i c:\ 1 in .just i ce whil e cont inuing to ac t vigorou~ly aga inst the 
r evoluti o nari es who wi shed to c h a ll enge its power . 
Di c: k C l anc:y~, th e Personn e l Manaqer who was moved t o Dodge 
l'1ai n in 1969 with the br ief of ·integrati n g · the pl a nt , claimed 
l ater: "vJi t h i n c\ year I 
7 :::i 
h ad DF:UM beaten ." Cer-ta:i.nly~ 
Significant number s of forme r bl ac k union acti vists, and even 
76 
5<:)'le ~·J h c h a d come c l ose t.o DFo:LJI"1 ~ \l'J(:::~ I"'e pr-omoted to fo r-eman . f~n d 
with t h e room f or r acja l confli ct reduced o n the j ob , r.mUl'"1:· "!::; 
abi lity to generali ze from a par ticul ar produc tion standard 
grievance or p a rti c ul ar piece of har assmen t on the basis of 
'white agai n s t bl ac k' became increasing l y limited . Chrysl e l'- also 
encour a g e d th e e mergence of a l ayer of 'responsible' black local 
un ion l ead e r s. But t hi s carried a price: ma n agemen t h a d to s how a 
' willinqness to ~ l low certain u p an d comi ng loca l i:h.:tivistfs to 
' win' a few v ictori es . 
7::i. Clancy interview. 
76. Lisk a, Fay. interviews; Ernie Allen, "Dyi ng frOID the Inside : The Decline of the League of . 
Revolutionary Bl acy. Workers" Ih~Y ?hQ~l~ D!yg ?grygg !h~! f~Q Q1 fQ11~gl ?~ygD r~~if~l? rg~g~Qgr 
!hg ~g?, ed. Dick Cluster (Boston: South End, 1979), 77. 
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accommodationist appr-oach was qenerally 
.. 
successful . By restoring some credibility to a new layer of u n ion 
activists it persuaded several articu l ate i ndividuals, who miqht 
otherwise have r ema ined in opposition, to wor- k within the loca l 
Management' s attitude to the , r-espclnf::.i b 1. e :' I oc c.~ 1 
l ead e rship had b een generall y contemptuous after- th e water-sh e d of 
1957--59. FI'-om 1969, as if suddenly aware that the stewa rds and 
1. ocal officers WLre helping to keep the lid on the kettle, 
management con sc iously built t h em up agai n as a force t h r-ough 
\.'Jh :i (: 1···, Ch i:inges ( a lbeit of a minor c h aracter ) could take place. 
Th is e>:plai n s \.'Jhy L.iska'~; r€.")collect.icm, "vJe I-Jo n almost evet-yt hinl.=l 
77 
\.'Je IlJent in ·for", ap pe ar-s to confl i ct with the evidence of h arsh 
d iscipline, a high turnover and, r-enewed s pontaneous 
revolt in several of Chr ys l er's Detroit plants. 
Clancy u nderstood h e had to wi n th e hearts a n d mind s of the 
l ocal's act i v i sts to 'ClOS8 ran ks ' wit h manage~en t, as well as to 
a nd integrate the Dodge Main supervision. 
calcu l ated that joint work b y management and Local 3 a :tivists 
f or the United Foundation charity cou l d bring manager s and Local 
3"s officers togeth er . First he held a fund-raising din n er in the 
77. Liska inter'l iew. 
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Dodqe Main canteen~ then he secured an invitation for a second 
d :i.nner in the local h a ll. FOI~ manv o·f Dodge ' s ma nager s and 
'-:t' 
''') 
h a ll . t-'Iumani t.ari a n 
78 
i SSu€~ ~ h e e n cour aged it over problems i n s id e the plant. 
the f i rst d inner h e wrote to Ed Li ska : 
I do not want to believe that our leadership at HamtraacK is any less sociall y aware, or has 
any less wi ll to ask our people to gi ve of themsel ves to help others; yet , the record says so . 
Last year (1968), your local and this plant had to suffer the ignominy and embarrassment 
of raising the fewest dollars per elp loyee of any plant in Chrysler Corporation for the care 
and cure of the blinded, the lame, the bedridden, the incurably sick, and the mentall Y and 
emotionall y retarded persons who cannot help themselves. 
Ed , I am addressing myself to the pride of your stewards and committeemen who are the 
leadership of Local 3. They have been selected as leaders. Leadership has its obligations. One 
of the most important is to raise the sights of those they serve. It is no less true in our 
plant cossunity than in our national community: people are hungry for good leadership. They 
will respond to good and sound leadership that wil l challenge them in ter r.s of their hUl an 
spirit to rise above pessimism, negativeness, fault finding . The leadership, Ed that this 
country lost to the assassin's bullet in the 1960's can only be repl aced by the people 
themselves. We can work together for peace and haraony at Hamtramck in the 1970' s for a better 
plant co.munity. Let thi s be a beginning - to show this cOlsunity that we can arise above our 
differences in service to the COllon good.79 
Within a year Cl a n cy's 'wor kino together' a pproach was r ewarded 
in the hi g hl y s u ccessful 1970 Unit e d Found a tion dri ve, 
80 
Support fro m 96% of Dodge Main's worker s . It was a l so tested i n 
mor e tal qibl e ways. 
78. Clancy interview; Liska intervi ew. Liska Baintained he never accepted the repeated 
inVitations to discuss problems infor~all y with Clancy, but believed that those who followed hi m 
didn't share the same scruples. 
79. Letter dated October 17 1969 from Dick Clanc y to Ed Liska in Local 3 Coll ection, WRL, Box 
20. 
80. Il~~, November 7 1970. 
In September 1970 and June 1971 as production recovered .from 
, 
raise output from Dodge Main . Th e first test of the new st r a tegy 
C2110e \.'Jhen a qn3up of sec() lei sh :i'ft ~'JDr-kel"'s stonned out o·f the 
P LoU'lt a t mi dni. qht" As ather wor kers continued to work, 
th e s trikers got drunk and attacked some cars in the Joseph Campau 
1 C)t • When exaq qerated accounts of th e damage were 
reported inside t h e pl ant, those st ill working storme d out and 
attacked th e group in t h e parking lot who had inten d e d to stay 
through the niqht and pi c ket the d ay shift. After quite a battle 
B1 
th e pickets wer e dispersed an d the strike t hr eat disappeared. 
Th e comp a n y had been able to mo bili ze anti-strike a nd anti-
milit a nt sentiment among the majority of worker s as a result of 
82 
the misdirected a noer of a few. 
The following June a n incident at the gate led to a walkout 
by t l1f? s~?cond s hi·ft. in tht~ (4sf:;embly plant <:\lid , subsequently. t CJ 
Was the biggest. potential explosion Dodge Main had experienced 
S:ince 1968, but the EB was able to prevent any further walkLuts 
and to secure tl e reinstatement of a ll four. Lisk a pointed the 
l eSson out to the workforce: 
-------------------_._------
81 • q~~, September 26 1970. 
82. Liska interview. 
The membership helped greatly by not having additional walkouts which would on ly result in 
more penal t ies and hamper the negotiations for the Stewards and others , whe were already 
discharged.B3 
'The test v-Ji:'!S, pc\ssed vJith ,flyinq colc)r'!:.. The new labour relations 
in e+ + e~C t :' qiven the old collecti ve bargaining 
:i n!:;ti tut.i ons i::\nd I'·'e l,,,t.i onshi ps b(:?tv-Jeen t.he 10Ci:'!1 officel" ~, and 
man agement a kiss of life ~ whil~ DRUM~ 
84 
in the recess of an 
political split, h a d lost its 
DRUM h ad taken the blame for attacking workers' car!.::; 
it s sup por ters could no longer point t.o the total 
ineffectivness of 'going by the rules'. 
Labour discipline 
, 
The extension of man agerial discretion to t.he handlinq of 
th e black question was not accomp anied by a l ess har s h regime or 
10s5 of control of the labour process. Discip l ine remained a major 
85 
felr management. Lateness and absenteej sm v-Jer e 
Considered serious offences by managers wh o were held personally 
84. Georgakas and Surkin, QI!. t;.lt, 161-3. 
85. Reuther effecti vel y justified the use of sanctions by the companies, argu ing [cited in 
Serrtn , QP fi!, 13] , ' There is a new breed of Korker in the plant who is less Killing to accept 
Corporate decisions that pre-empt his own decisions. There is a different kind of worker than we had 
25 or 30 years ago." This view of the previous generation of auto workers totally accepting 
lanaqerial authority is, of course, ludicrous - and eost observers who actuall y worked in the plants 
during the 1940s and 1950s contrast working conditions in the early days favourably with those of 
the 19605 and 1970s. 
responsib l e f or lost production. One man who h a d wor ked at Dodge 
Mai n for near l y five vears wa s s u spended for fiv e d ays in 1.971 
after comin g to work l ate b ecause he had been p i c ked up for 
86 
q~estionin g - and th e n r e l eased without charge - b y the police. 
He h ad telephoned t h e foreman ex pla i ning the s ituation, but it:. 
hadn' t help l"? d ~ Informine t h e foreman in advance wasn't good 
enouqh e i t her f or a tr im department worker who t old her foreman 
she would b e late b ecause s h e h ad to take her baby to the doc tor. 
87 
"di d not come at .:~ ll d u £:? to baby cryi rig all i.-\ f t f.? rnoon " ~ 
and was also gi ven a five day pen a l ty lav-of f . On e worker with 20 
years seniorit y wa s sent home b y the c omp any doctor bec a use a 
b(::Ji 1 on h is stomach h ad burst. But wh en h e r e turn e d to work two 
days latE~I~ h e II-JB!E; ~suspend ed bec ause he "di d not br- inq in a ny 
88 
~;ub stc.-\nt i 1:1'1:: ion" for his absence. In anot her g rievance. 
worker compla ined t hat when hi s wife telephon e d t h e plant to ask 
h im to take h er to hos pital at 6 pm~ h is foreman had refused to 
When h e final l y did agree to l et him qo~ at 1 1 pm. 
r e turn ed home to firid hi s wife h ad h ad 
B9 
tnt t::c "'''''·- l" ·'ge 
. .." (=~ I I • • e \ :: ... ... Leavinq without permi ssion for any reason was 
---------------------------
l16. Ed liska, ~~~!i!~ti qr.!..!iy.~Il~!i ~qq~!.. lEQ:lEf, [AGS] of monthly lIeetings with labour relations. 
In POssession of author, to be deposited in Liska Coll ec tion, WRL . Grievance A71-835-69S. December 
13 1971. 
!37. i..Ug, Grievance A71-445-363, November 16 1971 . 
H8 . l~i..g, A71-348-307, October 27 1971. 
89. !"U~, A71-315-248, September 2 1971. 
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bound to lead to t h e severest of penalties occasionally a 30-day 
suspens ion a nd usuall y a di sc harqe. 
Workers were also fo r ced to accep t work standar ds a nd , after 
the major quality compl a ints received in 1969~ to do thei I~ job 
I-J :l thout anv of t h e c u stomary shor t c uts . On e supf.".,)rvl. SOl'"· ~ ·Fol'"· 
~;uspE!ndf2d a worker with a crJmplcli nt about h is job f ew 
five days f or "insu bDrdination " \l'Jh en the wor·kef· sa i d ~ " I ~'Jon't go 
90 
t o wor k u n ti l I Sf.":!e my s t E!I-J i.U·· d " .. Di sc iplina r y actiDn for poor 
work was ver y common: typica l cases were ones wh e r e a man was 
S"> U:5pf-=!nd e d f or· a day of or " of ai 1 i n q tC.1 f 01 1 o w i n stn.\ct ion s " by 
pullinq t t e d ip st i c k on ever y car to check that the transmission 
9 1 
c)r wh e lr.c,::'! C:~ ma n wi t h f.\ "l o n g bad l'"·f?COI'"d " w a~.:; ·f :i n i::d 1 V 
disc h arged f o r not sprayi n g g lue on the roof of a car a b o u t to be 
92 
fi tted wi t h a vyn l t o p_ LSss common was th e case of t h e worker 
in d e p a r t me Mt 3200 given a five- d ay p ena l ty f o r fau l ty wor k on a 
car wee ks a f ter it l eft the plan t. Liska noted: 
90. 
9 lo 
92 . 
9::; • 
Car in California found without oil in axle. Hanagelent gave HcLaughlin, seniority 1964, fi ve 
day penalty for failing to check axle . 
How in the hell can they track the car several weeks later and 2,000 ~iles awa y as 
checked b I this san?93 
ih~, Grievance A71-693-779, February 3 1972. 
LHq, A70-1417-996 , June 1971. 
lUq, A70-1374-899, June 1971. 
l~i.~ , Grievance A71-263-2tO , November 14 1971. 
As wit h most oriev~nces discussed between t he l ocal UAW officers, 
this penc\ltv 
was passed on to the· "n e:-:-I: step". Even i f t h e p e n a l ized axle oi l 
worker ever won t he gri evance a nd got paid the five d ays' monf'::V 
lost~ the p ena l tv ref l ected t h e ex t e nt o f manag eria l 
aut h or-ity. In th e n e>:t boom q uality vJOuld aqai n t 'ake sec l:lnd place 
94 
to gett i ng the cars o ut. But job insecuri ty on th e job 
remai ned~ whet her ma n age me nt wa n ted qu a lit y or prod u ction. 
v. Broken DRUM 
Bv the l"lav 1972 Dodqe Mai n elect ions DRUM was 
Il,:\r q i na li zed . Al l it coul d do was to a dvise workers to vote for 
9~5 
t h e more mili tant o f the n o n - DRUM bl ac k cand i d~tes . DHU~1:' s 
c:\c.:t i Vf.:! s uppor·t, perhaps 200-300 at its peak in Oct ober 1968~ was 
down to 100 at most before th e 1970 el ec tion defeat a n d then 
94 .. Horitz and Seallan, Q.2. £jJ, 104, cite Dan Papa, a former head controller at Dodge Main: 'We 
shipped cars at the end of a quarter we never shoul d have. In the last hour of overtille work on an 
end-of-quarter shift, we'd ship out hundreds of dogs.' 
9:5. The explanation below of why DRUM stopped running its own slate, in terms of its isolation 
and decline , contrasts with 6eschwender 's, whose book implies a stronger or ganizational base for the 
League of Revolutionary Workers inside the plants than was actually achieved. 6eschwender admits: 
"there is also salle evidence that the revolutionary un ion movements in the plants were becomi ng 
weaker ' with reference to events in 1969, but nowhere does he seriousl y estilate its real influence 
in 1968-69, or what iapact the lanagerial and UAW counter-strategies had between 1969 and 1972. For 
Geschwender, DRUM's 1972 decision not to run lias a problem for which he has to suck sophisticated 
possible exp lanations out of thin air. He arg ues, "It is not entirely clear why this policy shift 
lias made", and then suggests two possible reasons: "It may be t he case that the League cadre did not 
wish to risk the possible negative consequences of further election defeats. It is also possible 
that they were concerned wi t h t he seducti ve nature of reforllist activity"; Q.2. £U, 122. 
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declined cons iderablv. Even 20-30 committed workers could have 
constituted a viable UAW local caucus~ 
97 
as the smaller UNC group 
But DRUM did not h ave a consistent strategy of 
using the organizational thE.' 1 Deal to advance 
policies or individuals. Primari l y a political organization, its 
strength depended on the extent to which its generalizations of 
grievances st ruck home. As Dodge worker s lost this strength in 
the ec\!'" l y 19"705, so the diminishing cadre"s 'activity was r educed 
to mere propaganda. 
Th e 1972 elections saw Andy Hardy defeat Liska by a few 
hund".·ed vott?s. Liska's vice-president from 1970 to 1972 thus 
became Dodge Ma i n' s fir s t black president a nd another bl ack 
'Big J ohn" Smith, b ecame vic e -president. Blacks took six 
98 
t h e ten Local 3 EB positions. wh om DI::i:UI"1 had 
c:ab·? qc:w-ized in it !;:; 196B "To m Cha l~ t" as an "out of siqht. " 
99 
If2ve l "UncI (~ Ti3m II , brought 'Black Power' to Dodge Main 
plant 
in a 
completelv different manner f r om that envisaged four vears 
earlier b y those who t.riggered t.he movement inside the plant. It 
was, of course, an ent i rely different kind of "Black Power". 
filS. Allen estimates the Lea gue' s 1970 Detroit-Hide mefibership as about 60; qR ~~t, BB. 
fi7. She Mas elected Trim Department Comlitteewoman in 1970, 1972 and 1974, and got through to the 
run-off elections for Recording Secretary in 1970 and Vice President in 1972, attracti ng over 1000 
voles on both occasi ons . 
99 . ~R~ll, Vol ume 1, Number 22 . 
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Black a dministration 
Th e new black Loca l 3 officers had been' qroome d b y the 
international under heavy f ir e from the bl ac k n a tion a lists. Their 
exper i e n ce d a t ed onlv f rom th e mid-1960s a nd s o th e traditi o n 
they acquired was a blend of the official Reutherite histor v o f 
cClIllpl i-:!rnE"mteci b y deta:i 1 ed kno\.'JI edge of ·the U{.\W-Cl"w vs l e l~ 
contract and an instinc t for the factiona l politics of the place-
seekers active in Local When the oppositi on c: 1 c:l i med 
conti nuit y with the ear l y militant struggles of 
L.ocal 3 ' 5 first black recording secretar y, 
iII u!O=.>tr at i ng the d i sltance t he n e\.'J o ·f·f i cers had t r c?ve l! ed f v-om th e 
tr a dition o f 15 years ' earli er ~ 
You may not know it, but this Union had a communist beginning. It was not intended to be a 
unifying focus for the work ing classes, but a disruptive force designed to bring about a class 
struggle between labour and management . The end results would enable them to make inroads into 
key industr ies , disrupt the economic stability of this nation and destroy capitalism. 
The scheee backfired. Its grip Has broken by men and women armed with the unity, strategy 
and cOlllllitment that spelled better thi'ngs for \'larking people. The Union has been il God-send 
to the Horkers and especiall y the Black Workers. 100 
With this view of their own hi stor y~ a nd embittered b y the years 
the n ew admin i stration showed fewer doubt s 
about break i ng pi c ket 11r1e5 or surrendering plant a utonomy to th e 
101 
than had L.iske, . Hard y and a group of L OCc:d 
officers and stewards were quit e ready to respond in Auq u s t 1973 
to UAW Chrvsler vice president Doug Fraser's call for assistan ce 
100. ~~~, December 7 1968. 
1. 0 1. Liska intervi ew. He had refused to condemn a llIajor wil dcat at the Chrysler Sterling Heights 
stamping plant in 1969. 
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to h e lp d efeat a wi ldcat at the Mac k Avenue p l a nt . 
!'''!at''' dv boasted: 
The days of earl y unionism Here remarked tly many of us IIho manned those gates on Thursday and 
Friday August 16 and 17 lq73 in a sholl of strength on tlehalf of the UAW •.• 
We urge that you also refuse to accept smart literature from those outside agitators who 
are trying to overthrow not only your WHON I but the US Gover nillent as l1ell.l02 
The Hardy-Smith admi n istration in Dodge Main was totallY l oval to 
Solidarity House a nd on ver y friendly terms w~th Clanc y~ t h e 
1 ()::; 
personnel manager. 
Und(~r]. in inC) c 1 ose l~' r-f?]. at i emsh i p~.; ItJi t h 
a nd the compan y , the majority black ED round e d o n 
the trim d epartment i n Apr' il 1973 when 11 wor kers 
di sch arged for tr y ing to mount a lunchtime pi c ke t after a worker 
got a five-d ay p e n a l ty: 
Some say the President made them lose their jobs. THIS IS UNTRUE. I lias at the Plant the day 
before the 11 people got discharged ..• and the President asked them to 'Go bac~ to work and 
nothing 1I0uid happen' . But the next day, after they refused to ll§t~~ and Here ql~~~~~q~q, 
t hev found out that they did have a fallril y at hOlle and !)fU.Q~§.104 
Despite the renewed production boom, shop floor b a rg ai nin g b y 
i n tlust r:i a l ac tion at Dodge Main received neithe r 
1 ~2q i t i m i:'H: y from sympathetic loc al of fic e rs , 
l egit imac y as a response to new acts of man ageri a l racism. 
1.02. ~tl~, August 25 1973. 
:l o ~.::; . Clancy interview. 
104. ~~~, Apri I 21, May 19 1973. The contrast with the local officers' first reactions to the May 
19b8 wildcat could not be more larked. Five yea'rs' earlier President-elect Liska's ~~qq~_tl2ltL~~'! 
colu~n had begun: 'Writing this article is very difficult and with great reluctance because as one 
of the Local Officers, it is my duty and oath of office to tell the eembers that illegal activities 
can and do end up with severe penalties ••• " i~id, May 25 1968. 
h ad been beaten . Th is was clearly d e monstrated in the con trast 
b etween the passivit y at Do dg e Mai n l ater that y§ar, ,'::Ind the 
wildcat s tr ikes at other Chrys l er Detroit p l a nts. 
Th e 1973 c ontr act negotiation period I saw three wildcat s in 
Chrysl~r plants. Th ey wer e stimulated b y the hi ghest-ever 
lO ::7i 
emp l oymen t total r each e d by Chrysler, the intensity of 
106 
t.he 
d rive for production a nd a summer heat wave. Yet Dodg t."? l"1 ai n 
n a ti o n al ~;,tr" j. ke call 
107 
iss u e d when the contr a ct exp i red 
1013 
While s hop floor grievances r emained 
in 
vJ h i te 
wor ke rs f a il e d to radicali ze po l itica l ly in the same measure as 
h ad b l acks, an d DRUM could neither establi s h an a lter n at ive 
ins titutiona l framework nor tak e over the UAW and 5 0 wi n the 
recognition from management it r e quired for direct bargaining . 
And management and the UAW h a d not been in C:lctivf? The y had 
the coloLW elf t h e existing collective bar ga in i ng 
a n d a ll o we d black s teward s and pl a nt committee 
me mb ers margin a ll y mor e influence in pleading for their members. 
l05. 153,421 hourly and sal aried staf f; company data. 
106. The three stri kes took pl ace at the Jefferson Assembl y pl ant where the sei zure of a cage used 
for t ransporting car engines by two black workers protesting against harassment by a foreman was 
successful, leading to the foreman' s removali at the Drop Forge, where a week' s stri ke led to 15 
strikers bei ng dismissed and at the Mack Avenue plant where the wildcat Has also defeated. 
107. Dic k Cl ancy interview. 
l.OB. For eXclll\pJ e, stri ke procedures were set in iIlo t ion over har assment of workers, speed-up·and 
foremen working in March 1973 Q~~, March 24 1973. 
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T·hi.,:) system had ta ken on a n ew credibility. In these 
circumstances the s hift in plant consciousn ess triggered by a 
sense of racial inj ustice was turned a round. Aware of t h e change, 
1ll.:;U aqemr.:! n t t. ook to gen tl y tapp :i. nq the steV'Ji:u"'ds; OVE':I~ the + i nger' !=-
if t h ei r c l oser reldtionship with management caused them t.o 
provo ke unnecessary friction with their members. Thus; thi:-? Dodqe 
Labour Relations Man ager comp l ained in June 1972 about "the recent 
wor k stoppages where emp loyees refuse d to work because of l ack of 
proper union representat i on (n amely~ 
1 10 
unannounced stewards and 
a l ternate stewcu-ds:' absences)" ~ an d warned the l oca l officers 
not to l et things qo too +ar. 
Thi s same balance of f orces s u rv i ved until 1980 when Dodqe 
Ma in wa s c l osed. Ne i ther an ' outs ide' politi cs nor the presence 
0+ an on-going interna l t r a d ition provided t h e ideological 
justificat ion for independent s h op f loor st ruggle against 
labour relations' in the plant were se ldom 
:1.11 
i n terrupt e d b y wildcats. Chr ys l e r' s c risi s in the mid- and 
19705 cannot be blamed o n the milit a nc y of it s worker s; 
tlIt.l !:::.t b r.:! CH1 of 
109 . The credibility of the UAW was also enhanced in the 1973 UAW-Chrysler contract which included 
a "voluntary overtime provision" by which Horker!: Here required to notify management on a Monday 
that they wished to forego all overti le t hat week - and if they did not, then they wou ld be obliged 
to Hork nine hours a day for si x days. 
11 (J. Local 3 Collection l WRL, Box 9; Letter from J Hagel, Labour Relations Manager to Local 3 
President, Ed Lisk a, June 1 1972 concerning "employees being absent for alleged union busi ness", 
11 :L . Clancy interview, 
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CHAPTER 16 
GOOD COMMON SENSE 
1974-1978 
Tile nE.'VJ laboLw t'·elation~.; cl ima t e o-f t.he mid -·-- and late 1970s "'las 
not s implv t h e result of a new managerial s trat e qy nor o f 
u nemployment. The emasculation~ defeat or disappear a nce of the 
three st ructural factors th a t had prev iously s u stai n e d worker 
c o mbativ i ty also played a key role. Sectional ctjll ect i \ft~ 
b elt-- qai ni nq ~ a s igni f ic a nt ideological movement for mar work ers' 
within society as a whol e~ and a union tradition of 
resi s t c nce had a ll contributed to leqitimate collect ive s hop 
f l oew stnJgql e. Th eir absence resulted in fewer restraints being 
imposed on t.he unil ateral exercise of managerial 
1 
Chrvsler than at anv time since the 19305. 
authDI'''ity in 
The o bvious 
"di!:;c iplin21t- y €~ffect. o f higher- unemployment I~at_ es 2md t.hE.' qrcll'Ji n g 
thl''' l~at of 1 a y of -f sand plant ~;h Lli:<::l oV'Jns" s houl d n ot be v i ewed a s 
the §QYC£g of declininq s trike activitv in the secDnd ha l f of the 
1970s. Rather, the economic c risis reinforced an alrea d y en h a n ced 
1. This should not be taken to mean that £q~q~t~q~~ returned to the level of the 19305. The 
argulent is that within the new technological and social constraints of the late 1970s auto plants, 
lanagement had relatively as luch unrestrained authority over the labour process in auto plants as it 
had possessed in the early 19305 under the different constrai nts that operated then . 
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managerial authority . 
Wh at h a ppened in the mid-1970s to t h e structural ·f actors 
that h ad previously sustained resistance? Sectional cnllective 
bargaining, it has a lready bee n argued, hi-ui been 
e masculated in the l ate 19505. This examinati on of res i stance in 
the mid-1970s look s at i ts two remaining supports , a nd at th~? 
imp ac t on these of 1974-1975 oil 
considers the changing political climate and its implications for 
workplac e legitimacy . Section two outlines th e impact of the 1973 
oil embargo on Chrysler management and i ts bus iness pol ic i es 
affect ing labour control an d the labour process. SE~C:t. i on thre~:? 
. examines the recasting of the local union tradition into a mould 
that sYf:::,'t e mat.i cia ll Y demobilized 5~Op f loor resistance to 
managerial authority. Section four traces t h e contribution ma de 
by the evolution of the international UAW's barg a ining s tr ategy 
to t h e isolation of resistance in the work p l ace. 
:::;;" See above, Chapter 12. 
I. Politics and resistance 
The momentum of the struggle for new rights in Ame ric a n s o c iet y 
had been at the core of the militancy of th e late 19605. But b \;I 
the earlv 1970s~ ,,;:\ comb i rfati on o -f r - epl~ ess:i on and cLincess i o n b v 
federal corporations and the UAW had provided 
sufficient i ntimidation or progress to iso l ate thos e who ar g ued 
it was not enough. In Detroit~ t he League of Revolutionarv Black 
4 
Workers h ad split and died in 1971 . The b e l ief t h at rights a re 
Won through struggle gave way to the be l ief in a chieving th e m 
through due proce5s~ whether through the election of a bl ac k ~ 
Coleman Young, as Mayor of Detroit in 1973~ or through g ri evan ce 
procedure in the workpface. As a result it b ecame more ri s ky fo r 
the minority who sti ll wished to resist unilater a l man c:l q e r-i a l 
.:':\uthority. Wit h out the backing of the wider movement ~ 
t.hat might h ave been ignored between 1967 and 
4. In 1972 attorney Ken Cockrel and r.ey acti vist John Watson had withdrawn fro. the successor 
organization they tried to build , the Black Workers ' Congress. Cockrel subsequently enter ed the 
Deeocratic Part y and becate a leadinQ Detroit City Councilman, rUloured to be a possible successor 
to Mayor Coleman Young in the aid-19BOs; Watson returned to Wayne State Un iversity to complete his 
stUd ies; 6eschwender, Q2 ~tt, 204 . 
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automaticall y led to repression . '"I"'hi s, 
belief there was l eft in workers' r ights to sectional 
action. 
:i ndus 'lTi a l 
In the l ate 19605 , thoug h the frontier of control was not 
c:~d v a nc E.~ d ~ wor kers openly r es isted management when they fel t it 
jl.lsti'fied. Short- l ived resi stanc e became l egitimate when a 
specific griev a n ce caused d eep bitterness a nd when worker s were 
c onfi d e nt their f e llow worker s would ac knowl edge the justice o f 
\.<Jcjrk€'~r's c':\l so 'fel t they c oul d ItJi n the ~F"i r2vance 01'" 
at 1 er.:\st {.;~nsur·e mian2\qement hesi t,:.~tE'!d be·f or-e I_ ·t:i n g i na s:i mi I ar 
ItJay in futul"'e. But after 1973 the ideological and mater i i.,d . 
elements t h at justified resistance were qualitativelv wea ken ed . 
As confli ct was reabsorbed by instituti onal procedures~ the sense 
of outr~qe that triggered wi ldcats became limited to sj tuat ion s 
where management was seen to break its own r ules - in 1977 i t did 
so when it insi s ted work continue in near-freez ing t e mper a tures 
prev ious l y accepted as in to l erable. When management broke rul e s 
involved a positive sense of work e rs' r'i ght s '- like 
seniorit v o r foremen being stopp ed from working 50 more workers 
could be cal l ed back from lay-off -then grievances went into 
procedure without the option of industrial action even b e in g 
Workplace legitimacy h ad been redefined to exclude 
immediate industria l act ion in respon s e to manageme nt 's rej£ction 
of strug qled-for res traints. The toning down 0+ bitterness about 
man v grievances occur red in part because it became more d i ffi c ult 
to generalize gri evances a e the reliance by Chrys ler s tewards an d 
10cal officers on contract procedures became unshak e able. 
wink of encouragement from a loca l officer anxious": t o maint ai n a 
" mi l itant" r eputation without beinq fir ed v irtua ll y disapp e ared. 
With t h e imposition of t h e "peace obligation' on th e l oca l un ion 
st ructure, s hop floor initi a ti ve p assed e ntir e l y int o 
manageme nt's h a nd s . 
Resistance isolated 
Duri ng the upturn in labour-management c onfli c t between 1967 
a nd 1973 , ~ lthough the p ossib il i t ies of s uccess h ad r e ma in e d 
small, th e consequences of def eat had b een mitigat e d by th e 
overall balance of forces. Dodg e Ma in management had only felt 
s ufficientlv confident t o st ick with two dismissal s among the May 
1968 wildcat strikers . Th e first clear evidence that t he 
possi biliti es o f s uccessful resistance were going to b ec ome st il l 
more limited came wi t h the s ummer wildcat s of 1973. These h ave 
frequently been int e r p r eted as indi cator s of a r ising momentum or 
~ ~ 
potential o f strug g l e . But, wh i le the fir s t 13 hour act of 
r es i s tanc e in J ul y 1973 at the Chrysler Jeff e r son Avenue 
assembl y plant - in it iat e d by j u st two workers wh o occupied a 
caq e containing th e power switc h - was s uccessful in fo r cing the 
fi r ing of a rac i st foreman ~ t hi s s hould rea ll y be seen as a 
catching-up pr o cess . Open racism was no l onger accep t ed b e h aviour 
:.5 w l~lq, Chp 11 entitled l~~~~~~£tl~Q~~~ ~~t~Qtl~t r~!!tu~, 190-3; iaplicit in Gordon ~t ~l, Q~ 
~lt, 219-20. 
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bv management. This rule-enforci ng measure was followed b y 
widespread di s mi ssa l s in the two Aug ust Chr ys l er wildcats. But 
t h e rea l measure of t h e new balance of fcrces was shown when ttle 
UAW mobili zed l~OOO plant committ eemen from locals a l lover th e 
Detro0t area to turn up at dawn , two morn i ngs in s uccession, 
6 
help br eak th e Mack Avenue Stamp i n g Plant strike. 
to 
Th e i mpli cations o f t h e 1973 UAW mobi li zati on were not lost 
on Chr ys l e r labour r e l at ion s man ager s. 
whi c h the UAW had been constrained by t h e need to r e -estab li sh 
some cre Jibili ty with its largely new a nd youn g black l abour 
it was aga in s u ffiCientl y confident to confront member s 
wh o brok e man agement·s rules. Chrysler saw this as the OK for 
esca l ation on it s s ide. Dur i ng the J un e 1974 Wa rren Tr u ck plant 
wi ldcat s trike agai nst the ·fir ing of a chief s t e wa r d a n d three 
oth er' body s hop wor- kE.~r,~ for If:?ad i n g a " ~; i ck-in " ten d ays c-?Cl I<lier, 
managemen t not onlv secured in j unc t ion s against illegal picketing 
but brought a j udg e to the p l ant to order th e 
'7 
30 
def i a nt picke t s . Th is new readiness to order th e jai ling of 
pickets h ad a major i mp act o n the form of worker s ' 
By Auqust 1979, the definition of manag ement ·s rights was so 
clearl y establ ished t hat Ch rysler sen t seven Tren ton p I"lichigan 
6 . See ahov!!, Chapter 15 . 
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engine plant strikers to p rison for a week wh en they refJsed to 
s t op picket in g a f ter a strike caused b y t he e xtr e me s umme r heat. 
Th i s confirmed a steady str e ngth e ning of man ageri a l 
for heat walkouts had usual l y received lesser p un ishme nts in 
unwritten managemen t recoqnit i o n th at workinq condition s could 
b ec ome intolerable. 
Th e limit s of wor ker resistance had again been r e dr a wn. In 
the 19405 and 1950s it was accepted practice that a section or 
department cou ld picket out th e rest of t h e pl ant; by th e I a t e 
19605 this h ad become exceptional. hoIt'Jevl":!I" , t.he 
weapon' was outlawed. wh e n it. did s how i tself in 
co ll ec ti ve action, increasi n g l y became l i mi ted to t h e sh ift, 
d e p art m'.nt or secti on a nd didn "t risk t he dange r s o f 
retaliation that occurred when work ers tried to gener a li ze t h e 
action. It took t h e form of in-plant indir ect. strik e action 
rather th a n open confronta t ion s : 
(3 
stoppages lasting on l y a f e w 
minut.es:! 1!5ick--in s " , refusals to work overtime, and the sl o~'\f 
C'Jf 'The coll ec ti ve c har ac t. er of 
resist a n ce di ssol ved into t.h e individua l form s of protest th a t 
had always existed: a bsent.eeism, p oor qu a li ty work, 
rest.riction of output a nd occasiona l moments of sabotage . 
8 .. Studs Terkel, ~Q.tUl!g (Nell York : Avon, 1975), 226-231, describes a typi cal henty Illinutes 
stoppage at a Ford body plant South of Chicago in the ear ly 19705 as seen iroa the man whose 
confrontation Kith a foreBan led his to be sent ho~e and fro. the man who reacted by stopping work. 
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In wider American societv the political co-option of 
of "resistancs"/"riqhts" movements reached a hi g h point 
i n stituti o nali zation with the elections of a former b l ack UAW 
19405 opponent of Reuther~ Coleman Young~ as Detroit City Mavor 
1973, and of a Carter administrat ion pledged to cut back 
expenditure in 1976. The price of this overseas military 
political shift was~ however~ a defeat for the world view that 
suggested progress c a me through continuing st ruggle . And t h is 
politi c a l defeat for the concept of strugg l e h ad con s iderable 
implications for wo rkplace consciousness . This was partly because 
the political shift was accompanied by a major recession that 
bot h pr e cipitated a new managerial crisis and effectivelv wiped 
out the layer o f "new' milit ~ nt s from the plants; a nd partl y 
because both the local and internation al UAW had ceased to 
operate as orqanizations whose d y namic was provided by the need 
to mobilize against management. 
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II. Management in c risis 
In the second hal f of the 19705, Chrysler"s profits were too low 
finance it s massive debt, maintain its 
pretension s and continue investment in new products. The coll a pse 
of profitability was partl y the result of poor management 
defi ned here as fai ling to mobi li ze productive capacitv in the 
right markets at t h e right time, a nd p ar tl y the result of three 
gian t shock waves: the 1973 oil e mbarg o that accelerated the 
down-sizing o f American cars; t h e intr o duction of federal fue l 
economy and safetv stand ards t hat imposed significant extra 
costs; a nd t h e massive penetration of t h e US market by Japanese 
For t h e wea kest major American producer , s u rviving larqely 
0 1"1 d e bt and al r ead v suffering the conseque nces of t hE-! vi I'"tual 
standst ill i n new investment in the 1970-71 t~ h e 
outcome wa s disast rous. Chrysler's s har e of US production h eld up 
9 
at 16% in 1973 a n d 1974 but p lummeted to 10% in 1980. 
9. See above, Fi gure 5, Chapter 10. 
470 
The four month embargo on Middle East oil sal es to th£'~ 
United State that began in October 1973 resulted in a dramatic 
consumer shift towards more fuel efficient car s . \l'Jhir:.h had 
the greatest share of the full-size car market, 
lc:mq·--ter-m s-,t: I'-at.t~gy for "do\l'JIl--s izinq" each (jf 
10 
its basic model 
1 i I es . Not to be deflected by the 1974 recession, i t increased 
lt s capital investmen t from 52.1 billion in 1973 to $2 .5 billion. 
At CI-wys l (;? I~, i n contr-ast, where t.here had been no forward 
planning on fuel efficiency, the recess i on and the company's non-
exist ent credit rating forced cuts in investment on plant~ t. oo l s; 
a nd equipment from 5629 mil li on in 1973 to 5466 mi llion in 
11 
1<:;'74. Thi s ~ of course~ mad e it even more diffi cult t o invest in 
the n ew products n eeded to meet the chall enge of fuel efficiency . 
o il e mbargo also stimulated th e federal aq<-?ncies 
responsible for the 1970 Clean Air requirements to pus h ahead 
And by encouraging further direc t 
federal intervention on some matters of car design, it i nc rE.\a sf:.~d 
the pressure on a range of federal saf ety requirements that had 
bequn to be legislated in 1966. Th e details are not s ignificant 
1 (>. l10ri tz and Seaaan, ~I! £!.t, 165. 
11 . tQt9, 124. 
":>. 
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12 
15 important is that the smaller manufacturers~ 
and American Motors, claimed they were ad v ersely 
affected bv t h e need to raise standards of fue l efficiency and 
~~a+et y . l 'he l arger manufacturers coul d defray the costs of 
research and design over, bas i c mod e l l i nes t hat i nc l uded usuall y 
four or f i ve car typ es, whi l e Chr ys l e r h a d at most o nl y two car 
types operati ng in a particul ar mar ke t segment . later' 
est ima t ed t hat b etween 1974 an d 197 9 it s p ent $360 mil l ion BE a 
f e d era l i ntervent ion on safe t y and e missions, and 
a not h e r $ 240 mi l l i on o n ot h e r non -vehi c l e Oc c upat ion a l Safety and 
Health Admini s t r ation a nd En v iron menta l Pr o t ec ti on Agenc y -imposed 
13 
costs . Th ese a dd it i o nal costs were a COl veni e n t explanation 0+ 
Ch r ys l e r ' s poor ~et ur n s i n 1974- 1975 a nd a g ai n i n 1978, 
Ri ccardo, p resi d e n t from 1975- 1979 , cer t a i n l y earned his nick-
n c\lne <::\ s t h!? b a c! -.. tf?mp e n ?c:1 " Fl r.:lmethn:)II'H:'? I~ " in opp os i I q t h em : 
We now have clean air standards that more than adequatel y protect health and virtuall y 
eli.tnate the auto.obile from America ' s pollution problem, all at reasonable cost. 
Did we ,stay with comlon sense or get nonsense? 
We got nonsense, with a new elissions bill that makes so small a difference in air 
quality that it cannot even be geasured - but which adds another $350 to the price (of a carl .t 4 
Yet 'f o r a ll Hi c: ca l~ d o :' s acc u sat ion !:; o'f II n o n sc.;! n Sf:1 " 
12 . For these: !.~!.~, Chp 7, 129-1b1. 
1 3 . This estleate is interesting in itself, because, unlike the situation at 6H, it could not 
have been eade until after new cost reporting lethods were introduced at Chrysler under the new 
Iacocca lanagelent in 1979, Moritz and Sealan, ~a ~!.~, 158. 
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Chr ys l er wou ld have otherwise s urvived. 
The Japanese 'invasion' 
Th e second tr a umat i c devel o pment wa s the ·mass i ve in roads 
made b y Japanese cars . Tabl e 22 s hows h ow imports overtook 
Chr ys l e r" s US car output i n t h e 19705: 
Fi ve year 
average 
1900-64 
1965-69 
1970-74 
1975-79 
TABlE 22 
US NEIl CAR REGISTRAJI[IIS, llIPORT PEJlETRATIOII 
AID CHRYSlER CAR PRODUCTION, 
1960-1979 
Total US neN 
car registrations 
(ei 11 ions) 
6.998 
9.106 
9.752 
10.024 
Illporteda 
car registrations 
lID! 1110nsl 
.41 7 
.811 
1. 467 
1.842 
Ilports 
Z 
6.02 
8.9 
15.04 
18.38 
SOURCE: Ward's ~l!t~~'ltly.~ Y~~r.~'l~~L t~~q, 152 . 
Chrysler 
US producti on 
(illi lJ ions) 
.935 
1. 451 
1. 337 
1.1 05 
HOTE: a. All VolksNagen registrations are still counted as ilports in 1979 although large numbers 
Nere then being produced at VW's New Stanton plant, purchased froe Chr ysler in 1977. 
1 ~ . Moritz and Sea man, l~lQ! 160, are cl early critical of the federal governlent ' s attempts to 
improve safety and fuel efficiency, but assess the responsibility of this "federal int rusion" for 
Chrysler ' s overa ll cri sis as follows: 'Safety and emissions standards did not , in and of thellsel ves, 
bring Chrysler to its knees. Evidence of poor ~an age.ent decision, lack of organizat ional di scipli ne 
and any nUllber of penalties inherent in t he cOllpany' s relati ve size argues against such claills. But 
a conspiracy of fac tors - unintentionall y devastating in effect - clearl y incl uded federal 
regulatory and energy policy, the i.pact of wh ich Nould not be fel t until Det roit was hit with the 
full cost of fuel-economy standards." 
particul a rly VWs, had increased ste~dily': in the 1960s, 
bLlt the cars that tipped the b alance again s t Chr ys l er in the 
19705 were Japan ese. In 1,96 8 and when th e Japanese 
c h a llenge had just beg un , Vol ks wag e ns st ill accounted for 55% of 
all cars and trucks import ~d into the US. Toyota and Datsun" s 
share was just 16%. Bu t between 1975 an d 1979 the share of all 
c: al'- and tf"'UC k impol"ts ta kE.'n by the 'fi ve J,apanese -firms Toyot a!. 
.16 
Datsun~ Honda, l'1i:\Z d a and SLlbi~ I~Ll , 1'-OSl? from 48% tD 66'/: .. ThE.' 
compet it i on was 'f i r~ f"' cest in t.he ql~c)wi nq compc\ct. and subcompc\ct 
market ' segments wh ere profit margins had always b een 
Perhaps t h e most d a ngerous s ign was massive import s ubstitution 
of Japanese for Ameri can cars in the 1974-75 rec ession and at the 
onset of the 1979 s lump . Between 1974 and 1975 wh e n Chrysler" s 
share of the d ec lining total of car registrations f e ll b y 2 %, the 
s hare held by imports rose by 2.5%; and when recession struck 
again in 1979 and Chrysler's market share fell 1%, 
1 7 
too k nearly an extra 5%. 
i mpor-t e d c:ar!", 
The particular prDblems were of cost and cr ed ibility. Th e 
17 • L11t~f 152 . 
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availabilit.y of Japanese cars meant there was no room for 
Chrysler t.o raise prices to establish profit l evels high enough 
to meet a ll its commitments and, unlike GM a nd Ford , it h ad 
neither massive resources nor a profitab l e internation a l 
to fall back eln. To stay in business,Chrysler had to accumulate 
st ill more debt. 
Management shakeout 
It s d eepening crisis in t.he 19705 l ed t.o changes in top 
mcU1alJement per~.;()nnel a nd later t.o both and 
In 1970 Chrysler president Virgil Boyd 
was sacri f i ced after the launch of a new line of full s ize cars 
18 
coi n c id e d with a recession and a market shift to sma l ler cars. 
In h is place Townsend appoi nt ed a for mer fe ll ow accountant from 
Touche, Ross - the same Detroit firm he h imself had worked for. 
The new president, was one of Townsend's 'young 
T l.1I'" k <.::~ !' who had followed Town send to Chrysler in 1959 and then, 
rising one rank every year over t h e n ext eight, had j 1:.1i ned the 
1':;67 --. a position that u s u a ll y took thirty yea l'-r...; tl.) 
19 
Th e losses of $52 million in 1974 and $259.5 mi ll ion in 1975 
that followed the next coincidence of Chrysler's launch of a 
.... ~ ..... ........ .. _ ....... ..... N." ................ ~ ............ _ ....... , .• _ .......... ..... _ ......... _._ ............ . . 
113. Stuar t , 1lQ. c;H, 76- 7. 
1. 'i. Moritz and Sea.an, Ill!. <;.~t, 127. 
4]~':j 
whole line of fu ll-s i ze passenger cars wit h recession marked 56-
year-ol d To wn send"s qwn card. I n 1975 , for the first time since a 
si !.: month pE!r-°iCJd n o di v i den d s were paid. 
retired i n October h aving named Riccardo as hi s successor a e 
cha i r ma n an d Gene Cafiero as Chrysler president. Caof i f?ro . 
i ndustrial engineer at Briggs Body wh e n Chrysler took it. 
ovel~ in was known as a very s h a rp operator and h ad also 
20 
b een catapulted up Chrysler" s top management b y Townsend. 
Riccar do f li lowed Town send in keepi ng in very close touch 
with the b anks on which Chr ys l er was now e nti re l y d ependent . By 
197 1, 1 rO) .L of Chr-ysl er" s 23 directors were also di rectcws 010- 0 
trustees of major bank s or fi n ancial institution s. In t h e mi d-o 
19705 Ric cardo made two world trips t o visit promine n t for eign 
b a nks and en li st thei r co-operation. The po l icy wo r ked. (~s l onq 
as Chrysler kept up its interest payments a nd r e p ayments of 
pY-°i n c ip a l. its very si ze as Ameri ca"s tenth largest corpor ation 
a ppea r e d to mak e it a good prospect. Banks ff~om all oVl'.?r t.he! 
world want e d to l e nd it mon ey . 
By 1979 t e n o f Chrysl e r:' s 1 -:' 
-' 
outside had 
1. ntoeY-°l oc: k i nq di Y-ectorshi ps in bank s a nd other-° financi a l 
20. Stuar t, QQ. £.It, 81-83. 
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compan i E:~S. This c lose connecti"on with the world of finance was 
also true of General Motors, first taken und~r the wing of J P 
Mor gan in the 19205, but was historica l lv much less true f or 
who had a lways pri zed self-financing. By 1979, 
itse lf was borrowing from 1 60 diff e rent banks and Chrysler 
Fin i:lrlc: i a l was borrowing from 282 . Banks and insurance compani es 
in 20 dif ferent countries held a total $4.75 billion of 
Chrysler or Chrysler Financial debt and were qu it e prep ared, as 
late as November 1978, 
assistant vice president of Barc l ays Bank 
"Non(~ of the bankers seriou s ly thought i:hat th is me:>.) o r 
CDI'·polrati on vJas qoi n 9 t o + 1 op em it !:; bell y. II FU gh t unt.i 1 th f? end, 
Riccardo did hi s d e bt -juggli ng job extremely well - partly, 
the subsequent Iacocca management team pointed out, 
because " "theJ'"'e~ vJ,,;\s:;n' t t.t-,e depth 0+ under-st':!\r\C\i nq in Chr-ys l er" o f 
21 
t h€'~ depth nf the prclbl e mil .. 
Where Riccardo di+fered from Townsend was in h is readiness 
to cut h is international losses . He had not personally buil t the 
Chrysler worldwide empire: it was easier for him to sig n a l thE!. 
tht'm it We S for' TovJnsend. By the mid"""-1970s 
2 1. Morit2 and Sea.an, Ill! ~H, 297-301. 
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Townsend ' s earlier i. ntel"Tle\t i orial e x pansion on the basis o f a 
series of minor loss-making sub sidi~ri es wa s a s ton e a round the 
parent ,compan y 's neck. Chr y sl e r had neither the ma nag e ri a l 
c a pacit y nor resou~ces capable of restoring them to p r ofitablity. 
I 'f .:myth :i.n g~ the diversion of man a gement attention over s eas was 
even mor damaging than the diversion of financial t"es;oul"'C es . A 
forme r Chrys l er treasurer commen ted later~ "Th f-.? par-ent vJa s:, hu t'··l: 
more by the attention requ ired of h igh- l evel manageme nt over seas 
1°'} I, 
.l:' .. ::. 
than by investme nt s;." But the estimated $200 milli o n los t by 
Chrys l e r US in attempts to keep Chrysler UK afloat~ undel~ 1 i. n e d 
Within days of becoming president, Riccard o fl e w to London 
to blackmail the British Government into agreein g to under write 
f u ture l osses incurred by Chr y s ler UK . ~>Ji thi n ,":\ yee,,'·, 
If'~as consi derin g the sale of t h e whole Chrysler EUI'"<:JpE?an 
CJperc: t ion. It Ilcld becomf'2 cl~)i:1r that Ch lry .:>ler lacked suf'f i r.: :li'2n t 
f und s to provide new products for the stil l profitable French a nd 
Spanish companies. Thi s sale - to Peugeot - eventuall y came in 
1978 after nearly two years of on-of·f d i sCl.ls~,i on s " 
Riccardo and Peuqeot president Jean-Paul Payrare signed th e d ea l 
2:2. Quoted in "ori tz and Seaman, Q~ £tt, 190, who also suggest "It was not unusua l for senior 
managers to spend two weeks out of very three .onths away froe De troi t. II 
2 3 . Stuart , Q.I! £U, 75, who points out this was "in addition to sOlie $330 million the British 
Gover n.ent pUlped in during the l id-1970s through its subsidies after Chrysler threatened to 
withdraw and let the cOlpany collapse, " 
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on Br itish soil <wh e r e tax advant ages for Peugeot wciuld be 
(':~n Cll" mCH .. ! s) • In exchanqe for 25% of its wOrld-wide capacity 
Chr ysler qot $230 million in cash to pump into its domesti c 
p l'-od uc:t p l'- ogr-' am i3r1d ii:\ 15X sl ·,,:,t' .. c~ of Pt.'7!l.lq f20t s t oc k WOjr-th a ·f ur .. ther" 
24 
~t; 200 !lIi 11 i em • 
Labour under Riccardo 
When Townsend appointed Ri ccardo and Cafiero as tu !:':; 
s uccessors in 1975, he defended their l a ck of experience, saying: 
" ("\t t h i s I f"~ve l of !lI ii:\ n aqf?lIlent i t doesn "t miake a diffet- ence \.'Jhi:lt 
Riccardo held to Townsend's business 
str ateqy o ·f "compet i n g in ii:\11 nell-J segments o ·f t h e ffi .iil l'-ket as t. h E.'Y 
:Z{j 
and maintaining instant product availability with a 
hiqh vo lullle of production fee d ing t h e sa l es bank. 
cont i n u ed to show siqnif i canfly looser con t ro l 
productivit y t h an Ford and GM~ r elyi n g o n the mass ive swings i n 
h our l y-paid employment shown in Tab l e 23 to alter production 
l. \':?vt:~l s: 
24. Riccardo and Payrare flew froll Pari s to Heathrow especiall y for the signi ng cereAlony;LUQ., 
185-192. ,-
2 :5 . Townsend , quoted , L~LQ., 126. 
26. Ri ccar do~ quoted, !.~Lc1. 
Year ~~[Y~l~r.: 
Houri y 
TABL£ 23 
HOURlY-PAID EftPlOYKENT AT CHRYSlER, fORD AND G", 
1974-1978 
EQ[q €fm~r.:~l tlQtQ[~ 
Change Hourl y Change Hourl y Change 
empl oyment over previous emp loyreen t . over previous elliployment over previous 
(oOOs) year !i.l (0005) year m (OOOs) year m 
--------------------------- -------------------- -------------------------------~-----------
1974 97.3 - 13.5 152 - 5.9 380 - 15 
1975 75 .3 - 22.6 132 - 13.2 351.8 - 7.4 
1976 97.1 + 2B .9 145.4 + 10.2 402. 6 + 14.4 
1977 99.9 + 2.9 160.2 + 10.2 440.2 + 9. 4 
191B 95.9 - 4 171. 9 + 7.3 466.4 + 5.9 
SOURCE: Company dat a. 
As Chr ys l er l aid off an average of one wo r ker in five in 1975 
accomplish ed b y mean s of plant shut -downs for t hree or four 
months at a t ime - t h e quality o f finished cars fe ll. Cut ~::> i n 
qua l itv control s taff , a n d the s hor t boom o f 1976-1977, I'··t?n ev,te d 
its pressure to c hurn out v olume irrespec t i ve of quali ty. In 19 7 8 
r esea r ch on ear ly customer complaint s showed Chrysler qu a l ity 
..... ) .... , 
. .:'..1 
some 3 0 % worse than Ford or 8M . 
Under i ncreasingly d esperate s hort-t e rm ma nag e rial Pl~ ~? !:..;su r e 
fO I'- product ion , the number s of u naut h orized str ikes c li mbed 
dr a maticallv f r o m the cont r act-year level of 48 in 1976 to 76 in 
the boom year 1977 when protest s trikes erupt e d over working i n 
~--------------------------
freezing conditions in a n extreme winter .a nd ·: in oven-like 
conditions in a su mmer heat-wave . But while the strike fr equenc y 
o f 1977 reached that of 1 968~ the 1968 stoppages represented the 
~m~cg§Q~~ of signi fic a nt rank and fil~ resistance to unilater a l 
management job regulation and to its endor sement by the UAW. In 
1977~ the unauthori zed stopp ages were largely a spontarl eous 
response to bein g forced to wor k in exceptional weather 
conditi o n s . They were strikes of anger~ of reacti o n aga inst 
management for not maintaining existi n g working conditions; they 
were not strikes to place n e w restraints on ma n agement. When the 
weather chanqed~ t h e str ikes witl,ered away. Despite a tight labour 
market workers no longer felt they were entitled to exercise 
increased job control . The narrower l i mit s of workplace 
legitimacy si nce the period from 1967 to 1973 were effectively 
policed by loca l of f icer s who had no allegiance to the earlier 
tradition of dissent~ resistance and mobili zat ion. 
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III. Evolut i on o f Local 3 
It is often convenient, but u s uall v wrong, to assume that unions 
I'" 2\1'"e 1 y change. But nei the l'· i s change a lwavs constant. F en-
.consi d erabl e p er iods, because of t he domina n c e ·of a particular 
i ndi v i du <.:\l ell'" c 1 i que, or because of certai n s truc t ural features 
the dynami c is barel y observable. Th is was tr u e of 
th e UAW under Re u ther from 1947 until his death in 1970 . It h a d a 
213 
lO ci v i 1 i ZEld r e l .:~ t i CH1S;hi p" with the auto companies that didn"t 
cha ll enge ma n ager ial authority in t h e workpl ace . But it was sti ll 
an organi z ation t hat sough t to l e ver th e ma x imum price fo r its 
members in exchan ge for that wor kpl ace subordi nati o n, 
based on t h e assumpti on of conf l ict between collective l a bour and 
c,-apital. By t h e E!ar 1. y 1980s this was no longer the case: 
b a l'- qai ni ng is nO\l'J pr i mar- i 1 y " consul tat i ve" a nd " non -<.:\dve l·-s':\1'" i c:ll " , 
a nd c oncerns the m~ty~! problems American l a b our and capital face 
in a c ontract ing world economy in which l arge parts of th e United 
States are threatened wit h de-industrialization. Among t h(o? 
professionals who run the UAW and corporate machines, the 
28 . 'We still have a civili zed relationship· lias the reply by Reuther' s successor, Leonard 
Woodcock, in 1970 when asked Nhether the bitterness of calling a str ike against GK might make new 
negotiations lore difficult. Quoted in Serri n, Q~ £It, 69. 
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"ci vilized" n:;)laticlnship of adven:;.at""it~s is b E.1i nq 1'"f:"?plac:f2c:J by a 
mutual l v-supportive The preseht phase of 
unionism emerged from cumulative changes among loca l officers, in 
and plant bargaining strategies and in LII0jW t.op 
personnel in t h e 19705. 
The new tradition 
In Sept e mb e r 1973 the Chrysler contract had only scr a ped 
through in the Loca l 3 ratification vote: the prod uction workers 
f2n dol'"" !5ed it by 6 13 to 528 and t h e ski ll e d tradesmen by 25 to 
in a t ur nout of just 13% of t h e plant·s 9, 0 00 workers. 
hundred di ssi d e n t workers were not convinced by t h e propaganda 
bal'"l~agf? in fav CJLw (3f t h e "hi S",tol'""ic: " cantY-act that mcw"e could not 
29 
have been won a nd l ess conced e d. In .Januar-y 197"'~" , " youne,:) 
militant wor kers " wer e sti ll being blamed for rejecting president 
Andy Hard y " s proposa l to hold the Local 3 and the plant committee 
an d stewards " election s on the same day instead of separately as 
in th<i? p a!Et . But as t h e oil e mb argo bit into car sa les a nd 
~~9 • Serrin~ Q.ll. ~tt, 332-3. 
~;() . Q~~, February 9 1974. Unit elections for plant comlittee letbers, unit officer and for stewards 
and alternate stewards had always been better attended that the elections for local officers as 
workers saw these in-plant UAW representatives as significantly less remote than the EB members 
based on the local hall. The proposal to get workers to vote for unit and local positions in the 
same ballot would save the local the costs of hiring the voti ng machines and manning up the local 
hall twice, but it would also lake the el ection of opposition candidates as stewards or unit 
offi cers lore diffi cult since they would have to beat the single slate put forward for both sets of 
elections by the local inculbents. 
nat i cmF-'ll auto industr y unemploy men t quadrupled from 2.4% in 1973 
31 
to 9 . 3% in 1974 and 16% in 1975~ these workers' we re laid o f f. 
between 1973 and 1975. Hamtr amck"s 8,000 workforce was virtually 
cut in half wit h the l ay-off of t h e whol e of the second shift. 
In May 1974 Andy Har d y stood down to ta ke a position with the 
i ,yter·n at i anal a nd Joe Davi s was elected Dodge Main's youngest-
ever president with "Big John' Smit h as Local 3 vice pr e sident. 
They i mm(;?di c:\tf:!l y 1 a un c: h ed .:\ campai qn to c h a n qe the per i (Jd fJ·f: 
t e l"' ms . 
Th e Locc:d 3 c:ampaign to implement th e rule chc:'\n (,;}es 
introduced at the 1973 UAW Los Angeles Convention reflected th e 
i nc: umbF~1'1 t s:· confidence that the l aid off " milit an t.s " wOLl1 cll'''I' t 
bother to return to Hamtramck to vote. 19 7 4 ~ t hO SE?' 
not l a i d off from Dodge Mein were st ill predominantl' black, but 
t h ey h ad a t l ecst five , years" senior· ity , h aving been hir e d 
between 1963 and 1968, a nd so were in the i r mid-30s rather than 
mi d .. ··20s. The fact t h at these hi g h senior it y workers had h e l d 
down t heir jobs in Dodqe Ma in des pite t h e t housands of di s mi ssa l s 
3 1. US Departlent of labour, BlS, Harch 16 1981. 
" ::~,~~. qtlt~, Hay 11 , 25 1974. 
3::;. ~tl~, Jul y 13 1974. 
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1965 and 1973 was e qua l l l 5 u qaest i ve o f the 
consciousness J o e Davis appea l ed to wh e n h e urg~d s uppor t f or the 
th r'ee vear t er m of offi ce: 
The membership of this loc al uni on should not be confused by the drive being put on i n the 
Ha~tramc k Assembl y Plant aga inst the three year ter m. The onl y reason this drive is bei ng put 
on is to all ow those indi vidual s who are passing the petitions to run for electi ve office in 
1976 rather than 1977 . •• 
It is onl y good cosmon sense to ha ve all elections at the sale time in order to save 
Ploney ••. 
It i s Iy honest feeling that acti vities such as a Chri stMas Party for the chil dren of our 
~e~bers and a f~mil y picnic each year are a ~ust . We cannot hold these things un less we fi nd 
ways and ~eans to collect t he loney to pay for sale. By holding three year elect ions, these 
programs can becole a reality. 
Do not be fooled by propaganda that the 2-year term will give you bette~ repr esentat ion. 
Remeeber, a di vided leadership never work together to the full extent that they can help the 
l1el bership .34 
TIIC-2 l a nqu a qe o f c o n 'f r ont a t i cm a nd UlobiJ. i z a ti cH'l h a d van ish e d f l'-om 
the li ps of Loca l 3 off i cers. In s tead of a n arg u me n t Da vis c a ll e d 
o n work~rs to vote fo r a k id s ' Chri s tma s par t y a n d a s ummer 
pi c n ic - a n d wo n t h e vot e b y a t h r ee to o n e maj o r ity . 
",or: 
_'...J 
L.cJca l :::.~ ; . s 
fi rst s ummer pic n ic s in c e the 19405 e ven tuall y took p l ace 
AUQ ust 1 19 7 6 - in t ime to b e remembered in the 1977 e l ect i o n s . 
In Au q u s t 1975 Ha mt r amck As semb l y call e d b ack 2 , 000 o f the 
lOIo-J e;~ r - sef1 ic::l l~ i t y vJ() I" ke;~r' s on t . h e s e c o nd s hift to Io-JO I" k iJ I1 t h e 1976 
3 4 . ~~~f Septesber 28 1974. 
3 5 . Q~~, October 12 1974. 
~)f.> . ~~~ f August a 1976. The attendance at the picnic , 24,000, nearl y half the popul at ion of 
Haltralck, at a tile when Haatramct Assembl y onl y employed around 6,000 workers - largely from 
outside Hastraack - gives an idea of the impact Dodge !'lain still had in the locality. 
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triodel !:; . After a year ' s lay-off ( up to 18 months for the 
mi:."i j air' it Y of Chrys l er's l aid-off workers), they found the 
workplace atmospher e significantly different from that o f 1973. 
I ndependen t bl ac k po l itic s in Detroit an d i n t he n ation had 
coll apsed - or b een pushed - i n to the Democratic P a r ty. And in 
t h e p l a n t s t h e re t u rn ing wor ke r s fpun d t hat wh ife th e workplace 
un i o n o r gan i zation was more remote than e ver , it was a l s o mu c h 
mor e dif f i c ult to c r ea t e a new op posi ti o n a l trad it ion. 
At Dodge Ma in t h e rema ining c h ief stewards wer e more fi r ml y 
entren c h e d th a n e v er f oll o wi n g a joi n t Loca l 3-Ch rys l er labour 
re l ati on s redi str i c ting exercise h e ld at t h e a ll -ti me e mployme nt 
low o f Fe brua r y 1975 . The n umb e r of c hi e f s t e war ds h ad remai ned 
a t a round 90 for as l o n g as th e p lant h a d 12, 000 workers. I t had 
fa l len natur a ll y to abou t 60 wh e n e mplo yme n t was c u t back to 
8,000 in 197 0 an d 197 1 a n d stayed t h e re wh e n e mploymen t rose to 
12,000 aga in in 1973. Bu t when 75% o f t h e pl a n t's workers wer e 
l a i d off during t h e 1975 mod e l year, the n umb e r s of c h ief 
3 (;> 
s tewar d s we r e fin a ll y redi s t r i cted to a b o u t 35 . This coi ncided 
::',8. ~tl~, February 15 1975. 
:':: 9. Clanc y interview. This lias the 1964 contract level of one chief stellard to ever y 225 
workers for a plant eeploying 8,000. Robert Jensen suggested that throughout the whole of Chrysler 
the 1964 ratio was onl y finall y achieved in the 1979 recession. Dodge !'lain was therefore' ahead' of 
other Chrysler plants in accepting the reduced numbers of chief stewards as earl y as 1975. 
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the extensi o n of the s ur viving c hi e f i:er-Ins of 
of·fiCE-? two to t hree years . So 
const i t u e nci es were c h anged a n d those a n gered by this were 
s imultaneous ly d e prive d of an addit i onal twelve month s in which 
to do anything about it. 
The mobil ization of s hop floor res i s tanc e fa red a sti ll more 
intrac t able obstacle. Th e 197 4 - 1975 rec ession marked a n end to 
the ex ceptional p e riod of auto indust ry boom that h ad ta ken off 
in the e ar l y 19605. It b roug ht economic insecurity back into the 
lives of Amer ic an a u towor ker s. Na ti o nal unemployme nt in the a uto 
industr y h a d averag e d 4% between 1967 a nd 1973 ; in 1974 it more 
than doubled to 9.3% and in 1975 i t waS 16%, four times the l eve l 
o ·f t h€i.' " (]c:Jod t i mE~ ~~' • I t reac h ed a mon t hly high of 2:::; . 1 % in 
Jar', ual" y 1 97~'5 . At Chrys l er the 33% f a ll in the hourl y-paid l abour 
force b e tween 1973 an d 1 975 wa s in the same league as its 83rlier 
40 
40% employment coll apse between 1957 ~nd 1958. vJhi le n ationa l 
auto un e mploymel t f e ll back t o 4% in 1977 and 1978 ~ the spectre 
o·f job insecurity had visited the 19605 g e nerati o n of Amer- i can 
a uto wor kers and l ef t a doubl e l egacy: f ear and di s or gani zat i on 
of oppmd t ion. Fc:)r wh€·m the 1967--· 197:') " youn g mi lit a nt s" 
ca lled b ack~ they were d ispersed th r ough o ut the pl a n ts. The work 
groups that h a d established sufficient trust and confidence to 
40. US Department of labour , BlS, ;~l!l~y.'!~llt ~Il~ ~~r:Il!..llq~ , January i ssuesj cOllpany data. 
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cr e ate c ollective sectional loyalti es against unfair man agement 
act ion s between 1967 a nd 1973 were s plit up ~ partlv b y jesign 
and par t l y through the a utomati c 'bumping' lay-of f 
41 
and recall 
procedures . Th e individual mil itants who re turne d were mor e 
iso l ated than e ver. 
After the mass lay-off s of 1958- 1961, the tradit ion o f 
resistance h ad returned with a layer of s tewar ds, local office r s 
and sections of workers whose trade uni onism h a d b een forme d i n 
the combative 19405. In the 1974-75 recession, however, the 
milit a n t tradition was evicted from t he plant s along wi th the 
young e r workers - and when they did return those who tried found 
it al mos t impossible , to r e create from scratch th e earli er 
widespread opposition. Pe rhap s the single biggest difference was 
that t h ey could no longer appea l to the generalizing issue of 
racial discrimination. Those who tried to mobili ze res istance 
found themselves f aced by a s ubstantial layer of bl ac k 
supervisors and an overwhelming ma jori t y of blac k steward s a nd 
loca l officers~ who were more re li ant on manag e ri a l go~d will 
than b efore, and wer e sti ll more d epend ent on t h e int e rnational . 
41. The plant-wi de and Detroit-wide seniority agreements that entitled laid off workers to 
' rlail' 'obs in departlents and plants other than their own if there were lower seniority workers on 
those jobs and they wished to l ake the ~ove. 
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Consultative bargaining 
In CI rvs l er the local agree ment s o f the 19605 wer e alr ead y 
periodi c and ritualized consult a tions about a limited range of 
conditions r a ther than contests •. 'Ibout. day··- t.o""·d a y 
managerial authority. But the occas ion al combativit.y of n ationa l 
bargaining e n s ur e d that th e loc al bargain i ng relationship was 
a l so institut. ion a li zed aroun d the recognition of con'flic::tinq 
interests . So the way arg ument.s about the numb e r of pay phon es in 
Dodge Mai n took p l ace, ·f OJ'" e>: amp 1 £~, reflected both t he O~ti9D~1 
b alan ce of forces and d egree of open c onflict, a~s Itle ll as~ th e 
politics, and personalities of t h e t wo l o cal tea ms of 
vJh~=n , in t h e l a te 19705, the internati o nal 
4 2 
retreated from t h e prospect of a n c? t i cm C'.\l the 
iadver" sar' i a I character of Lo ca l 3 " s ritu a li zed consul t a ti o n s 
b ecame st ill more mut.ed. 
This development i s i llustr ated in the prot r act e d natur e o f 
lacel 3'5 1976 negotiations a nd in the content of its demands and 
the fi n a l ag r eement. Loca l n egot i at ions began in Jul y 19 7 6 a nd 
qui c:kl v "brokl:? down ", l eadi n g to a stri ke vo t e in August . In 
rea l ity n othing much was t h en ex pec t e d to h appe n unt.il after th e 
4:;'~. In the 1979 and 19BO contract years, the UAW anilounced in advance it Houl d not stri ke the 
.ajor cOlpanies. In 19B3, the successor to Fraser, Dwen Bieber, spoke to the press of the dawn of 
sti ll "aore cooperation", saying: "I don't Hant to suggest that you wil l never see a strike again by 
this Union in the United States, but on the whole you are going to see a lot more cooperat ion than 
ten years ago," ~~~ YQ~t It~~~, June 26 1983. 
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n."tional c:ontr-act. ItJas s igned Dn I\ IDVE-~mbel'· ~:i 1.976 .. Df-.?spite this, 
reg ul ar meetings of Hamtramck Assembly lab bur r elation s and 
personne l staff with th e local' s t en per s on negotiating committ ee 
They C (:? I~ tii:\ :i nl y h e l ped C ~2mE.mt the c 1 oser r 1'21 at i o n <.=, h1 p s 
b etween the four l ocal officers , f i ve plant committee memb e r s, 
one interna tional r ep r esent a tive from the UAW' s Region On e an d 
individual man a gers. In 1973 the local ag reemen t had bee n signed 
within d ays of the national contract; but wi t.h ·Lhe neltJ e(npha s i s 
on ~etting results at plant l eve l in 1976 t he intern a t i onal 
didn " t put the s ame pressure on th L loca l s . Ne gotiati o n s began in 
ecrnest only in Nove mber and continued for two month s until the 
fi n a l .greement was r e achej on January 7 1977. 
barqc ining proc ess over just o n e agreement had 
43 
The who l e 
I as:.ted SE.~ven 
months. Even if the iss ues being negotiated h a d b een domin ated 
by ii.~u th or· i t y and 
r-estr-aints~ the negotiating p r- o ess alone would h ave deflJsed 0nd 
demobili z ed an y pot ential r-Bsistance. 
M2ln y asp €~c:ts clf th E~ WCJl'·· k e nvil'· onmen t. L-Jer-!? d:i.f~:;CL\~::;S6~d, but. 
I'i E'? i t. h (~r · the d e mand s r ~ised by Loca l 3 nor- the agreement 
eventua ll y r-eac h ed chcllenqe manaqeri 1 i;:"'I u thor i . y. Tr.itble 24 
breaks down the plant-w id e and tr-im dep artment dem~nds raisec! in 
Local 3 i r 1976 - dur-ing the h.ig h t of the last big boom in 
Chr vs l er sa l es and pr-oduction: 
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TABLE 24 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE PlANT-WIDE AND TRI" DEPARTftENT DEKAMDS RAISED " 
1M THE 1916-11 CHRYSlER-lOCAl 3 NEGOTIATIONS 
P~!I~J.lg 
Dg,99H~!gg 
f!~f.l!:~lg!u:~~![~!f.l!~ 1 Y~!~J.lg 
SOfia! Effifiency Str~9·fr : f.lg9g!i~!gg 
I[!~_~~P~[!~~!)Lrg?!ni!)!? 
SOfial Effifiency Str~g.fr 
Health and safetv: roof 
leaks, lighting, fans, 
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The demands reflect certain shop f l oor gr i evances but clearl y 
omit many others . Th ose t hat reach e d the l ist submit ted to 
management were fir st di s til led through unit and plant commit tees 
into a 'bargainab le' shape. But wh at they show of the bargai n ers' 
expectat ion s i s revealing . Impr ovements to t he work envir o n ment 
made up 88% of trim d epar tment d e ma nds a nd 59% o~ t h e plant - wid e 
demands. And of th ese e nvir o nm e ntal i ssues, an overwh e lm i ng 
proportion (59% and 73% r espective l y ) could be justif ied directly 
by th e bargaining committee in terms of increasing the efficien cy 
of the plant. Th e second l a rgest ca t egory of dema nd s con cerned 
changes a nd improveme n ts in existing proc edure: tog ether, 
"technical" and more over tl y job- linked 'manageri a l " procedures 
ma de up 35% of th e plant - wide demands. By 1977, stru ggled-f or 
r estraints on man agerial authority we r e only a ver y s mall 
44 
proportion of th e tota l d e mand s raise d, a nd t hey we r e unlik e l y 
to be made at th e departmel tal level where workers f e lt l esst 
l e gitimacy in exercisi n g contro l over supervision. In s t ead they 
would be raise d at pl a nt l evel, and even then overwh e lming l y in a 
procedur a l contex t : seven of the nine d emands for plant -w i de 
positive restraints on ma nageri a l prerogative s we r e procedural 
demands. Worker s were onl y confident e nough to make d e mand s that 
management exerci se its a uthorit y according to it s own r u l es; 
d e mand s for li mit s on that aut hority h ad become inf r e quent. 
I 
44·. 430 separate delands were lodged and answered fro. the six divisions within Hamtramck 
Asselbly, and 52 for the whole plant. sOle of the demands contained multiple clauses; others were 
repititions. An analysis of all 482 delands suggests less than 25 could be categorized as 
representing the assertion of positive, struggled-for restraints over lanagement. 
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The picture of fewer restraints bein g imposed on managerial 
authority becomes c learer still in t h e act u a l aqreement reac h ed 
f:?,:;w 1 y in 1977" President Joe Dav is wrote a n introduction to the 
Some of the highlights of the AgreeGent are a~ folloH5: 
A Vending Service for our food which would give us cOlpletel y enclosed air conditioned 
cafeteria with hot food and a lenu approved by the local Union. Breakfast will be served prior 
to the start of the shift each day that the plant operates. 
Many of the problels experienced by the members regarding pay shortages and chec~s not 
available for an employe when the week's work is finished have been settled. We have firm 
language that will take care of this problel in the future.45 
''!'"hf? 13 1 ant'-wi cle dE'mand that foremen who cant i nUF.!d t o "'Nor k CH, 
h ourly rated j ob s after being counselled by th e Uni o n be given 
ti me O'f'f a s a disc iplin a r y penalty, u p to a nd includinq 
di ~~c h a l'- ge II 'Nas df'"(::Jpped in e)·: chan C;Je ·f or cop i es of the 1 et te l~ abol..lt 
foremen working included in the n ation al contract . And the pl ant-
Wi de d emand fo r t.hf? e limination o·f 1I ·fc:'\i l ed t.o foll ovJ a dir ec t 
order" as a reason for disciplinar y act i o n was sett l e d b y 
ma n agement agreeing " that. the reason for- disc ip lin e vJi ll be 
s p ecificall y st.ated ". Th e few other s truggl ed-for r estraint s over 
management that got through the loc a l officers· fi l ter we re given 
Similar treatmen t. The only "advances· t h at could b e claimed wer e 
on iss u e s where ma n a geme nt could see ef fici enc y gains or was 
under l eg isl a tive pressur e . Chrys l er c("Jul d ei:\!; :i 1 y II assur-I:? the 
4·5 . ~~~, January 22 1977. 
Uni on tl at t- oo+ 1 ea ks ~"Ji 1 1 be n:,~pai ,· ·ed on a cant i nLli !"""I e;} basi s " i::H1d 
even qive a prioritv list of roof 
46 
leak s "f or· comp l et i on· as· 
The bargaining committee ended LI p with a 
1 <:)cal contract that closely reflected the c arefLll se l ection of 
i 1"1 i t. i ,,;\ 1 clf?ma nd !5. Under t h is s vs tem workers' expec t at ion s would 
not b e d ashed - si nc e th ey wer e . never ra ised in .th e first place. 
Ban:Ji::d ni n9 h a d become a proc 5S that bore no effective 
relationship to rank and file workers ' daily frustration s . 
Generations change 
The shift to greater d e pendence upon the internationa l was 
assi s ted by the retirement, isolation or defeat of those wh o h ad 
car r ied the ear lier tradition of shop floor resistance from t h e 
19505 into the 1960s. The Pasicas~ Liskas and Foxes~ a nd even the 
Domanskis of the 1960s generation of Local 3 office rs, had al l 
acql.li r·ed their L1n ion exper ience leading and participating in t h e 
wildcat st rikes 0+ th 19405 an d 1950s - and thei r generation 
Used the 30-and-out contract retirement provisions to quit auto 
in the late 19605 a nd aarly 197 05 . In contrast, t hE! 1. ast 
thr ee Dodge Main pres id e nts, (4ndy Hardy, Joe Davi s a n d John 
Smith , and virtually t heir entire e xecutive boards and plant 
were hir e d into Do dge Main in the , qui f?t :' 
The inter national .:I1so changed. Unde r 'Wa lter Reuther 
bet ween 1946 and 1970, \oIJ illi c~m SE-?rTin's suggestion that "t.h ,.;: U{.:\ \oIJ 
---------------------------
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b~came a right-of-center 
47 
Uri i cn) l.'Ji th 1: e f t - of '--c e n t ~r-' 
was close t o th e mar k. Reuther wielded 
power cloaked in a very limi ted formal democrac y . His s tr eng th 
black r epresentation. In 1970 the position wa s that 
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UAW me mbers were black o nl y 13% of s taffers were. 
-I' \J'Y' 
surprised Leonard Woodcoc k assumed the presidency of the UAW 
, r 
after Reuther's ai rcr ash d eat h in 1 970~ it opened up th e 
pOssi b il ity of smal l changes. 
WOC:ldcoc k ~ a n ex -Sociali st Pa rty s ur vivor from Re uther ' s 
was e levated to t~e pres idency b y t h e 
Closest possible vote on t he I nt e rnational Execut ive Board : 13 
votes to 12 against the man Reuther had b e en grooming as hi s 
49 
Sl.u:cessor, Chr ys l er depart me nt vi ce president, Do u g Fr aser. To 
stay at the top of t h e UAW ever si nce 1947, when he was first 
elec ted o n the Re uther s l ate to the IEB (after j ust si x month s ' 
Work in an a u to pl a nt), Woodcock h a d l on g since abandoned h is 
early radicalism an d had l ear ned a great deal about s urviva l . I n 
l ess than firm control of t h e UAW, 
, 
h e decided to court rank and 
fil e popul ar ity by taking on 8M for the first time since 
4 7 . Serrin Q.I!. t;H, 148. 
48. ~~~Q, 150- 151. 
4·9. Victor G Reuther , l~~ ~[Q.t~~[~ ~~~t~~[ ~~Q tQ~ ~tQ.[Y Q.f tQ~ ~~~ (Boston; Houghton Mifflin, 
1976), 188, 471. 
49~.:'i 
Reuther's e p ic 1945-46 struggle, a n d to st r ength e n hi s own power 
base by improving the ' r ac ial balance of l oca l and 
,..if f i cel'''s .. spe lt out th e ca lcul at ion s the international 
ma d e about de a l i ng wi th black milit anc y : 
• You've got to be prepared to t ake issues away fr om theft, not allow issues to arise upon wh ich 
they can e~ ploit the situat ion. Unless you do that they're going to grow and groN.50 
Dodge Main's n ew bl ac k leadership was a conve nien t sour ce of 
bl ac k recruits to Solidarity Hous e and the in ternationa l sta'ff: 
i n 1970~ Ch a rlie Brooks~ Loc al 3's fir st bl ac k vi ce pres ident; in 
Andy Har d y, Loca l 3's first black president; a nd in 197B 
his successor Joe Davis . 
Th e internat ional itself , once staffed by activists who h ad 
rise n to prominence through their c a pacities in organizing ran k 
and fil e struggle agai nst the corpor a tions - or thr o u gh their 
\.'d. th had -- under-wc-:? ni: the 
tr a n s form a tion in the ear l y 1970s that had occurred at local 
l eve l. A qeneration of f or mer full - time local offi cers r ep l aced a 
q (~n erc:\i:i ClI"\ of former activists and agitators . Th e e n d CJf t h e 
Reuther era and the rise to hi g h office of a s econd generati o n of 
un ion tiur eaucr a t s ex perienced in s uppress ing r a nk a nd f ile 
militancy rather than mobilizing it was wid e ly we lcomed by 
management. Dick CI c\nc: y, Dodge Main' s per sonn e l managt?r 
throughout the 19705, recalled: 
~so . Quoted in 1970; L~t~! 306. 
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The 
Relationships changed remarkabl y in the 1970s between us and the UAW. It required 
statesmanship of a high order by a lot of people. There had to be a philosop~ical thrust on 
the part of the International Union towards harmony and to provide the opportunity to effect 
harmony ••• 
I' m thinking of occasions when their people got out of line and went undisciplined and 
anarchistic, and the y would take disciplinary action and say - "Get the hell into the main 
stream of the labour movement or get the hell out.· 
The International Union kept d close eye on their o~n people.51 
"phi losophica l thn.lst" to greater co-operation, Clancy 
Sugqests, was provid e d b y Fraser durinq his period as the UAW 's 
Chrysler vice pr~s id ent: 
Fraser ran a pretty professional shop. Of course, he had to be assured we had someone there 
who would 50rt things out on our side. But when he was, if I had a problem I'd call Chrysler 
Corporate Headquarters and they'd contact Fraser or someone else in the international who 
would help our problem. 52 
FI~ase l'" , in this respect, was doing no more t h an bringing 
Chrysler's labour relation s into l ine with the patter n of problem-
so l v il 9 at 8M a nd Ford, 
the union department a nd corporate h eadquarters had been a way o f 
lif e s inc e the 19505 . But the impact of ~b§Qg~ is always more 
marked than the impact of consistency. Fraser b e c a me identified 
with p ressur e for indus t r y-wide cooperation to - comp l e ment the 
closer r elation s hip a chi eved at Chry s l er . 
Th e combin a tion of political co- option of sections of the 
bl acl-:: mc)vemen t ~ of a ma jor ~ecession a nd of significant ch a nges 
in per"sDnnel and trad iti on at both the local a nd 
the UAW~ had wOI~ ~::e d ~ b y 1977- 1978 to bring l abour 
---------------------------
~51 " Dick Clancy interview, Highland Park, Detroit, 29 July 1982. 
relations in Chrysler plants closer to the industry 'norm' than 
at any time in the preceding f or t y years. Resistance independent 
of the muted ch a nn e ls provided b y the contract had been virtually · 
outlawed. Events of the next two years were to pu s h these 
developments still furth e r and create a situation in which 
Chr ys l e r bec a me a trend-setter in extracting concessions from its 
work e rs. 
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CHAPTER 17 
NON-ADVERSARY PROCEDURE 
1979-1982 
By 1979 Chrylser"s labour relations had been deci sively reshap ed . 
Restraints o n the arbitrary exercise of manageri a l authority that 
had been initiated, exerc i sed and renewed t hrough coll ective shop 
floor organi zation and activity, had been removed . A period 
followed in which Chrysler management was overhaul ed, th e company 
underwe nt a severe contraction, and the UAW p e r s uaded its members 
to accept s i gnificant cuts in their real wages and reduction s i n 
b e n e fit s . 
Section one o f Chrys l er 
m~n agement and its implications for the l abour p r oc ess . Section 
two describes the closure of Dodge Main in 1980. Section three 
traces the emergence of concession-b a rga i n i n g. 
I. Fordization 
Chr ys l er's production and market s hare s lide bega n in 1977. By 
1978 i t was al rea dy build i n g up losses on the scale of 1975 and 
the bi l lion dollar losses of 1979 and 1980 were c l ear ly on t h e 
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1 
h o!'- i. Z 01'1: 
Chrysler's n!t profit 
or lossl!S (SIa) 
---------------------
1974 52 
1975 - 282 
1976 + 423 
1977 + 163 
1978 205 
1979 -1 ,097 
1980 -1 ,710 
1981 - 476 
1982 + 170 
-----------------
In August 1978, l ess than a month after Hen ry Ford II had fi.r e d 
FOt- d presi d ent, Lee I a C O!:!:':I , both Riccar do and the Chr ys l er 
director who was manager of t he Rockefeller family fortune 
offered h i m a move to Chrysl er. Three months later , the 54-year-
old I acDcc:c.~ got Cafiero's j o b as with t.h e 
u nderstandin g he would ta ke over Ricc:ardo 's job as chie+ 
(:>pel~ at i n g officer a year l a ter. Cafi ero was 
2 
unc e remoniously push e d a si d e . 
The appointment of Lee Iacocca was mor e than a nother change 
in top personnel . By introducing as top ex ecuti v e a man with 32 
years' experienc e at Ford , Chrys l er was buyi ng (for $1.5 million 
1.. U.U, March 21 1983. The figures are net income after taxation. For 1974 and 1975 they are 
taken iro. ~~~q~~~ tQq~~ttt!t ~!Q~!tL l~I~, 369. The profits recorded in 1982 Mere the result of 
the sale of the Tank plant originall y built Mith federal funds in 1941. See above, Chapter 9. 
2 . Moritz and Seasan, ~ ~tt, 21 3-219 . 
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down and a n annual sal a ry ' of $360,000 ) more than o n e individual: 
it was buying the For d syst em. Wh at occurr ed in '1978 was the 
start of a management restructuring exer c ise to test whe t her the 
'fi nancial, org a n i zational an~ sa l es and product 
st r ateg i es that had operated in the 1960s and 1970s at Ford could 
bring n ew l i fe to Chrysler. Th e catalyst was provided by events 
in the rea l world a nd lacocca happened to be available at the 
4, 
moment the b e ll beg a n to tol l on t h e old manageme nt system . 
Iacocca brought with him severa l other c u rrent or reti red Ford 
executives who collectively introduced fQr~i§§~i9n . 
hired the Ford advertising agency to run Chrysler "s account. 
Illustrat i ve of the k in d of relationship s Ric cardo had with his 
s ubordinates was t h e f ac t t hey weren"t al lowed to smoke in s t a ff 
meet i n<.=l s; a nd symptomatic of the new r egime wa s t h at althou gh 
Ri ccardo remained chai rman for near l y another year, I acocca could 
smoke ,fr ee l y . The Ford e xec utives were contemptuous of t h e old 
Chr-y ~:;l er man c~g c-?r- i .:.~ I t r-adi ii on. Iacocca was q u ot e d " C' .. , ,=> say i nq~ 
"'fh i 5 comp,:\I1y t(Jok 25 year'!:; t.el b ecome dec c:\d(~ nt. -- I mei:\!1 I~' ott(:-"?n to 
5 
th~? CO I'''£~ .'' 
3" Always ~een to personal i ze any issue, journalists t10ri tz and Sea.an conclude the ir highly 
inforaative book Nith the argulent that the Chr ysler story and especiall y the success of Lee 
Iacocca "desonstrates that , far l ore than institutions and strategies, it is l en and their ideas who 
Succeed or fail ". But, of course , this fails to look beyond the "great Ian" to the institutions and 
ideologies froa which "their ideas· derive . Koritz and Seaman, ~ ~tt, 147. 
4 . Stuart, ~ ~tt, 134, points out that Riccardo had tried to get a replacement 10r Cafiero from 
6H before he approached lacocca. 
5. Morih and Seaean, !~!!! , 224-5; lacocca explicitly allocated blame in H!!!~, March 21 1983: "I 
th ink the Townsends of this world ••• wrecked this industry." 
5 01 
Str'l'\c t. Llr" a 1 changes in man ageme nt began almos~ at once. By 
Iacoc ca had spent nearly four a nd a half 
Chl'- y'!.~l f:r' ~ wh en Iim§ magazi n e gave him the accolade of a fron t 
Cf.Jve l" and thf~ t itl e "DetnJit' f:5 c (JlnE!b .:tc: k kid " , pre-Iacocca top 
manag ement had v i rtually disappeared. Of the 28 highest - ranking 
Chrys l er executives only four pre-dat ed Iacocca, 
6 
and the foul" 
most senior officer s were all e>:-Ford . Onl y eme of the 
restructured nin e-member top Operations Committee survived the 
'7 
'fil" st t.wo y(~ars. Thi s manageri a l "revolution " went deeper than 
8 
had Townsend"s nearly twenty years earlier, imp acted on 
day- to-day operations in four main ways . 
the channels of managerial responsibility and i n f(JI'-mation and 
i ntrodLlced the standard Ford practice clf ma nagement -by--
fJb j ec t i ves. The quarterly li sting o f individual manag er's a nd 
e:':f?c ui:i ves:' obj f?ct i VE'!S for' checking agad nsi: performanc e 
dramat ically shook up managemen t and stimul ated an on-going 
review of managerial efficiency in e very p lant. It is not easy to 
distinguish the inherent benefits of t h e n ew process of 
accountability fo~ management from t h e sti mulus of the syst em " s 
, newness' • But ear 1 yi n 1979 it put Chrysler "s product i on 
6. HI!~, Harch 21 1983. 
'7. Mori tz and Seaaan , ~ ~tt, 224, 282. 
8. The details of lacocca's total rest ructuring of Chrysler ' s corporate organizat ion chart are 
discussed in jgj~ , 224-7. 
5(12 
p r o ceSSES u nder a ma n ager ia l mic r osc o pe - and led r api dly t o th e 
c l o s ure of a 32-year -old tr im p l a n t in Lyons , . Mi~h igan in Jun e 
and, la t e r t hat mont h , t o t he news th a t Do d g e Main i t se l f would 
9 
be c l osed a year la t er. 
Th e manag ement-by- objec t i ves sys tem quickl y t a r get ted 
building cars for t h e sales ban k rat her than for rea l s al e s. At 
the time~ t h e fall of the Sha h of Iran and the r esu lting f ear of 
new oi l cutoffs triggered a major shift i n the ma rk e t t o 
subcomp acts early in 1979. Chrysler"s l arge c a r s were again 
swelling t h e sales bank a nd working capita l was falling rap i dl y 
toward s the point o f no ret urn . So Iacocca determin e d to phase 
o ut the sales bank a s rapid l y as poss ible, a nd c u t c urrent 
p r oduction; he laid off 15,000 workers in January 1979 a nd th e n a 
10 
further 5,000 by early June. 
) 
A n ew qualit y contro l sys tem and new fin a nci a l c ont r ol s a l so 
directly af f ected day-t o-day operations . Quality contro l was re-
e s t a blished as a s eparate management function, encouragi ng 
f ront - line superv i sor s to report recurring manufac t u r i n g f a ult s 
ra t h e r than dea l with poor quality by t he ~t and ar d tact i c of 
---------------------------
9. lt~~, Harch 21 1983; these were the first announcelents of a long series of closures. By earl y 
1983, the tota l of plants closed since Iacocca took over was 16 out of the 52 separate North 
Ameri can plants that had exi sted in 197B. 
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i ncreasi n g t h e pressure o n the wo r ke r s doi ng t he job: poi n t of 
p roduction c onfl ict wa s filtered back to the engineeri n g a nd 
d es i g n d epart me nt s . Th i s did not work u nambig u o u s l y to e ase shop 
fl oor ten s ions si n ce t h e o rg a n i z ati o na l c h a n ge went along wi t h an 
0 1 d ·_·f c:iS',h i o ned qua l :i. t v ck j . v e "- th e + a mi 1 i cu- ma n .::.>, geni("2nt r"esp onse to 
I'"f:~cess i on cl·f s hifting pt'"et:;sLII"' e · +I'- om v olume tel ·quia l ity. 
Fonj +inanci a l controls had another s igni f i c a n t e ff ect o n 
the character of the labour proc ess. They enabl e d Ch rysler t o 
identify the cos t and profit a bility, or" absenc e of :i t ~ of 
ind i vidual component s or proc e sses. This dir e ctl y encou raged 
product standardisation. Since the early 1960s Chr y sler had b een 
providing a mass of opt i on s in it s attempt t o s p rea d its n a r row 
mOdel. !'"' ange acros~; all s egments o ·f the III c?,t .. · k e:~ t • ?\ t the WarT€H1 
t l.IC k plant., for e~·, ampl e , !5(~Ven s h ades of whi te ~'Je l"'e CJ ·f·f e r" -! d to 
11 
cust CJmers~ and t.hese v-Jet- E~ n ()~'J cut to two. Th e ifnpact o f 
st a ndardization on the l a bour proces s was considera bl e: c h anges in 
t.'.he of wor k are a t the centre of mast mass p roduction 
ass emblv line di s putes . If a j ob s equence was sudden ly c h anged 
e v en thoug h no a c tua l in c r ~ase in work was invol ved, 
appeared to it s worker s to b e ac ting 'illegitimately'. Change 
upset the anaestheti c eff e ct of a s teady work r out i n e . By c ut tin g 
---------------------------
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thf:? val"i ('2ty of options comin g down the I i ne~ an d by ensur-ing 
1 anger I~uns on the pn?s;ses a n d in the machine shop~ the new 
management was a bl e to reduce the potential number of points of 
s hop floor conf l ict. 
II. Dodge Main closes 
MClunt.inq 1 c)s !aes dur i ng 1979 s purre d the new ex-Ford top 
manag~ment team to axe facilities with above average unit costs. 
To no-one:'s great. surprise~ Dodge Main~ once known as " Ch Y"!sIer':'s 
came near the top of the list. What perhaps was a 
surprise was the ease with which this once militant p l ant was 
Closed. Thi s was a mark of the weakness of work place unionism in 
Chrysler by the late 1970s~ and an encouragement to Iacocca to 
pursue t h e rest of hi s rationalization programme sti ll mC)F"(-? 
12 
qLli c k I y. 
The deci sion to close what was known in the 
Hamtramck Asse mb1 1 was taken early on in manag ement"s revi ew 
programme. Dodge Main's e ight storey st ructure meant t hat plant 
overheads remained exceptionally high i n periods when production 
---------------------------
12. 14 further plant closures took place oyer the next two years, includi ng four !Bajor ones in 
the Detroit area: Eight Mile/Outer Dri ve Sta.ping, Kack Avenue Stalping , Huber Avenue Foundry and 
the Warren Recreat ional Vehicle Asselbl y plant . 
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was cut. stock mdvement around the plant was always more 
(and hence more costly) than in the sinqle-store~ 
plants built in the 19505 and 1960s~ and when one of its four 
production lines was taken off in January 1979, ,~'\I"ld the labour 
force of about 8,500 cut by 25%~ it became what the jargon ca lled 
" ove l~ faci 1. i tated" too much investment and too many overheads 
producing too little out p ut. 
Once c l osure was decided , Chrysler's labour relations 
department gave consider a b le thought t o implementing the s hut-
down without creating un necessary problems with the UAW or the 
remai ning work ers. Initially man agement determined to playa very 
l ong I,;)a me . On May 30 1979 it a nn o unced the p l ant would close in 
June 198 0. The aim was for the idea of closure gradua ll v to 
pecome l egiti mate - somet h i n g t h at was inevitable a nd a part of 
management's ri g h ts t h at c ould not b e c halleng e d. Under the plan, 
the UAW c ou ld go t h rough a l l the mot i o n s of heated opposition but 
by the time the act u a l closure wa s immin e nt the will to resist 
would be I;}on e . Th e long notice d o ub led neatly as a gesture 
towards long-term consultat ion with the international and an 
uncharacteristically astute pieee of for wa rd -p l anning by the 
13" Clancy interview. He beli eyed there were "no eH i cienci es lie could have got in the short tera 
to keep that plant open.· This view is challenged by Ed Liska, who argued that Dodge Main was stil l 
capab le of producing half a lillian cars in 1973 and could still have been retained as a major 
asselDbl y plant if the investlent put into the Jefferson and Belvidere plants in the late 19705 had 
been put instead into Dodge Main; Liska interview. 
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]. aboUt .. r-·e l ati ems (jepi:H~tment. It ensul'··ed t hat t.he " ~.:\Ve Dodge I"lai n II 
campaian was virtuallv doomed from the start . Wh ile 3~OOO people 
14 
turned out on the first Sat urday demon strations ~ 
immedi ate urgency to strike the plant or prevent the work bei n g 
transferred elsewhere. Mi l itant speec hes were translated in to 
lobb v ing congressmen~ a nd the campaign rapidly l ost momentum, 
despi t e widespread support from the people of Hamt ramck . 
The origin ':11 timescale was overtaken by the sharpening of 
the cy-isis. Chr ys ler's 1979 losses were risi ng to $ 1 bill ion , a 
record for an American company. In August 1979 worker s on two 
more of Dodge Main's lines were laid off and fr o m September 1979 
onl y one line was left producing the Aspen car on the first 
t~h i + t . The sen iority system now worked with a veng eanc e +or the 
2,300 remaining workers. NonS of these workers had worked at 
Dodg _ Main +or less than ten years, and ma n y h ad star ted t here, 
lik_ Edi e Fox~ in the 1940s when they were in the ir l ate teens or 
e arly twenties. They clung onto full-time emp l oyment by 'bumping' 
younger workers - and so wer e forced to move from their previous 
easier jobs in material h andling, the stores a nd s ub-assemblies 
back on direct product i on. "It was terrible," rec a ll ed Edie Fo:-:, 
" sef? i nq all those worker s in their fifties back workin g o n t h e 
---------------------------
14· • ~~~QI. ~'lt~~, June 22 1979. 
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jumping i n an d out o f cars li ke t hey had last don e twen t y 
. 15 
~," ear s; 0?ar- 1 t e l'- . II 
Finally ~ these workers joined managemen t in wa n ting the 
c l osure t o h ap p e n q u ic klv - to en d t he a gon y of e x h austion on the 
l ine a n d t o e n ab l e t h em to coll ec t s everance an d. ear l y retirement 
benef it !:',. Th e y h a d had en o u g h. Between 1 ~500 and 2 p OOO of these 
DOd g e Mai n veter a n s r et i red r a th e r th a n movs t o t h e jobs on the 
second shift a t t h e J e f fe r s on Av e n ue a sse mbl y p l a n t they were 
it> 
e ntit l e d to . When ma n agemen t a nnou nc e d on Dec ember 9 i t was 
b rin g i n g the c l osur e forwa r d to J a nuar y 1980 th ere was n o 
r es i s tan c e l e ft . Cl a ncy was st ill worri ed~ but o nl y ab o ut the 
qUe li t v o f t h e r e ma ining c ar s : 
The onl y real Norr y I had was that the last four weeks of production would be bad - but this 
was the best quality we had bui~t there for years , that last menth.17 
Eve n th i s h a d been taken car e of . Chrysler h a d g iven the 
Sup e rvi sor ~;, a c omm i tme nt that i f t hey wen t "out of h el" 's 
pr i cle f Llil y II t hey wou l d a ll be (,;,Il.la r' ,:mtee d jobs o n t h f? secon d s h i f t 
a t t he J eff e r s on Avenue a s sembly p l ant ~ 
18 
buil ding t h e n ew K-c ~r 
sc h e du l ed to b e launch e d i n Au g u s t . So t h e las t c ars p roduced 
a t Dodge Ma in wer e built wi th s urpl u s s u p e r Vi sors l iterally 
15 . Fox interview. 
:t '7 • Clancy interview. 
SOB 
allover the place . 
Und (~ r" t h (0!S;f:? c::i. ,r' cumf::it r.:trlC e~5, C 1 ant:: y .:~c: knqL·JI edqE~d 1 c\ t el'- , I I YCIU :' d 
h ...... ve to have had 1 eader's h i p to do C!l nytht n 9 rJi ff(H-ent II t h an accept 
Clos ure as inevitab l e . But a n a l t.\,,~r· nati ve l'IC;~i:\d f2r" ~:;hip ' l in Local 
3 cap able of mobili zi ng around a perspective o f r es i st.anc e had 
not existed for near l y t e n years. In 1979, when mass coll ect.ive 
resistance to plant clos ures and wage and benefi t red uct i on s was 
C:'1n Ltnlikel y ~ but al l the same, the only alternative t o passivity 
before the cr-isis, neither the organizational nOI'- t h e 
ide ological basi s for s uch resistance remained i nside the pl a nts. 
Thf~ cm l y "l~?git.imate" collec:tive for m of e!·:pressi cm had bE:~C:CJme 
t h e UAW l ocal and national apparatus. Elsewhere, Chrysler workers 
exercised their fru s tration b y t hrowing out half the incumben ts 
2 1 
i n 40 local officer elections in 1978 and 1979. But th e cH1qer' 
refficined unstructured and impotent a nd t h e new a dmini stration s 
operated within the s ame rules a s their immediat e predecess or s . 
At Dodge Mai n , " Big John" S mi t h, who had a utoma ti c a l ly taken 
over the Local 3 presidenc y in January 1978 when Joe Davis took a 
job with the internati o n a l , was cer tainly not going t o lead any 
fight. Even the remotest chance of s uch an eventua lity had been 
19. Fox inter view. 
~: 1. Dave I'kCull ough, "Chrysler: Capitaliz ing on the Cri sis', ~~!.'lq~~, October 1979, Vol I, No 9, 
12. 
ruled out bv the UAW camp~ign to win congressional backing f6r a 
federal government bail -out. Smith a nd the last Lcic al 3 EB spent 
their last weeks deep in paperwork ensuring that as many of Dodge 
Main' s 8.500 on-roll workers 'bumped' other workers 'in other 
pi C':\f1 t: s a possibilit y established in the spec i al De::·t Y- a i t .-.~.j ide 
agreement negotiated by the international as a 
Supplement: to t he 1979 contract. Two and a half years after the 
clc)sl.lre~ a n d a y€~ar after the pI C'mt ,was physi call y demol i shed, 
Dodge Main 's for mer personnel manager estimated that up to 5,000 
of these workers had received job offers e l sewh ere. 
The seven-month closure process. as Clancy proudly said, 
"didn't af·fect pl'"oduction" . On January 4 1980 the last car went 
t h roug h the final a ssembly department an d the conveyor stopped. 
The remai ni ng workers cleaned up a nd went home . The plant that 
had produced car s continuously since No vember 1914 was shut down. 
On e hundred a nd fifty yards away down Jos. Campau , the UAW Local 
3 hall closed a few weeks later. Its death, like its birth, was 
symbolic of t h e arrival o f a new period in manag e ment- labour 
r-t-?l at ion s . 
---------------------------
22. Cl ancv itltervi eli. 
II I . Conce ssion- b argain ing 
TI"H? c: 1 O!5une of Dodge Main was brought forward and t h e small 
resistance diminished sti ll -f Ulr ' t ~1 E? I'- (I n c e 
Fri:!iSer" c.q l~eed t o tn?at Cl"wysler a~:;; ,7:\ " specia l case" in the 197<'7 
contract negotiations. Fraser"s own publi c stance changed quite 
dramatically in the late 19705. In 197 7 Woodc oc k retir e d a nd 60-
year-o l d Dou g Fraser was -fin a ll y allowed the rei ns of power. I n 
one way he was like hi s predecessor, another stop-gap president 
chosen more because o-f his len gt h o-f service and the p r o xi mit y of 
his retirement than because of any e x cepti o nal qualiti es . 
the last of t h e o l d 1940s Reuther caucus~ Fraser was particularly 
able at dressing up management-union cooperation :in I'"adical 
I"' h €:>t or i c . So when, 1 i b? vJoodcclCk ~ h e fe l t he had to open h is 
presidency with a gesture of def iance~ he c h ose publicly to 
attack t h e Carter administration 's failu r e to impl ement its 
promised pro- labour measures and slam 8 M for failin g to support 
thf.·? " f r" ag i I!.'?, unIo'JI'" i t ten compact" b e t. ween 1 a b OLlr" and mana~.}emEmt. 
GJVI ~, he c h arqed, had not countered the bac kwDod smen-employer 
pr"opaganda t hc,t. " I abou r power" II wa~; a growi ng mf?n c~c e. ·rh!.'? UAvJ was 
b~:?ing forc ed~ to return t o the stl~ug =.11 e 
perspective of t h e 193 05: 
.. 
I believe leaders of the business co •• unity, Nith feN exceptions, have chosen to Mage a one-
sided class Nar today in this countr y - a Nar against Norking people the unemployed, the 
poor , the einorities , the very young and the very old, and even .any in the sidd le cl ass of 
our society. The leaders of industry, co •• erce and finance in the United States have broken 
and discarded the fragile, unwr i tten co. pact previousl y exist ing duri ng a past peri od of 
growth and progr ess ••. 
j cannot sit there seeking un ity with the leaders of Aaerican industry, whi le they try to 
dest roy us and ruin t he l ives of the peopl e I represent. 
1 would rather sit wi th the rur al poor , the desperate chi ldren of urban bli ght, the 
victims of racism, and the working people seeking a better l ife •.. 
~5 1 .t 
We in the UAW intend to reforge the links with those who believe in struggle: the, kind of 
people who sat down in the factories in the 1930s and who marched in Selma ,in the 1%05. 
I cannot assure vou that we will be successful in fiaking new ~l liances and f or~ing new 
coalitions to hel p our nat ion fi nd its way. But I can assure you that we will t ry .24 
he was 
a member of a corporate de l egation goi ng to Wash ington to plead 
for feder a l funds to bailout Chrysler and~ at the next Chrysl er 
AGM~ he was elected a member of Chrysler ' s Board of Directors. 
Fr aser" s 1978 resignation from the Carter a dmini stration's 
La bour Manag e men t Group was largely r hetorical~ designe d to warn 
of f the auto industry from pursui n g a n open shop (nc)n un:i on) 
policy in the move awav from i ts t radit ional sites in t he mid-
West that was t h en t aking place. Be hind hi s ta l k of "cla~:;;5 vJar " 
was a c l ear desi re for a return to class peace , and h is very rea l 
anger acainst 8M was largely because it sti ll seemed ignorant of 
th e coming c ris is . Two s i g nifican t devel o pme nt s p e r s u aded Fraser 
to aba nd on hi s 1978 r h etor" :i c of e:\ "on e:~-sic:led class war" i n 'fc\vour 
o 'f h i s 1979 ~ 1980 a nd 1981 a dvoc a cy of c oncessions at Chrysler 
a nd 1982 a d vocacy of concession s a t Ford an d 8M. One was t h e fal l 
o~ the n ational economy in to d eep recess i on at the ve ry moment 
:2'~, • ~C!lt~Klty! Jul Y 1978, 3-4. 
2~j.R Cohen, "The elploYlent consequences of structural change in the auto industry', Massachusetts 
InsH tute of Technology Research Paper, (Boston: I'l IT, June 1981l . The extra costs invo! ved in 
continuing this industria l relocation during the 1979-82 recession, and the adoption of the Japanese 
~~n g~V system of reducing costs by laintaining very low inventories - and ensuring steady suppli es 
by locating the cOlponents plants close to the asseably plants - effecti vely brought a halt to the 
relocation process in 1981 and 1982; S. Jefferys, 'Recession, Innovation and Industrial Relations: 
the US car industry in crisis ' , ~~lC!Y~~ ~~l~ttq~~, V, no . 3 (1983), 7. 
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the Japanese challenge was threatening · the .surviva l of the US 
a uto industrv as Fraser kn ew it. The second was Chrysler's 
response to the threat of bankruptcy in which it undertook a n 
unprecedented managerial and labour shake-out that removed any 
ml. dd 1 e gr-ound. fg~~i~4tigD of Chrysler, in the context of a real 
economi c cr i sis and the whole history of the post-war UAW, meant 
Fraser had no a l tern ative in answer to t h e question "Which side 
a t'- t:? you o n ?" t h c.~n t.o rr'(.;!pl y un {~ qLl i vocal I y -- " vJi th the ne~'II 
'~nd once he had openly entered a c I OSf.?r-
re l ation s hi p with laccocca, it was only a matter of time before 
Ford a n d 8 M d rew into line . Fraser ' s ex per i ences within Chrysl er 
prepared h im to l ead the whole UAW into accep tance of quality 
C::i l'"c l es, e mp l o y ee ' i n vo l veme n t, p l ant c l osures a n d, in 1982~ into 
concessions at Ford and 8M . 
I n 1979 , Fraser's earlier e n c ouragement of emvi I·- onment 
efficiency a n d social bargaining l e d him to see 'recessl.on · 
barqai ni ng as a natural deve l opment . C l ancy~ ~."ho moved to 
Chrys l er's corporate labour relati o ns head quarters after the 
closu re of Dodge Main ~ recalled how the basis for the cooperation 
of t h e ear l y 1980s was l aid in t h e previou s d ecad e: 
In the 1970s when Me had to get devi ations fro. the Union and required the~ to bend in the 
interests of productivit y! I found that if the issue was sufficientl y vital t hey' d (the Union 
officers) use a great deal of commonsense and go along with you.2b 
26. Clanc y interview. He rel ar ked a bi g change in UAW officers' at t itudes fr o~ t he 19605 to the 
1970s. 
It was no great step from this to a willingness .. to assist the 
company in Washington by settling for less than Ford and 8M. But 
however sma l l this last step, it was taken in a new direction, 
one from which it was soon clear ther e would be no return. Th e 
1979 con tract negotiations t u rned out to b e the first of three 
waves of concessions between September 1979 an d January 1981 that 
sliced $1 billion from Chrysler's labour costs compared with those 
of 8M and Ford. 
The impact o f concession-bargaining at Chrysler was felt far 
bevond the auto ind ustry_ Once t he employers' argument that 
domestic labour costs were a ma jor part of the crisis was accepted 
bv t h e UAW for Chrysler, then when Ford and 8M also moved into 
105s s ituations, the logical step was to extend the same argument 
to them . Late in 1981 the UAW agreed to early negotiati o n s with 
Ford and 8 M on the 1982 contracts, an d 'take away' contracts were 
signed at both companies in the spring of 1982. Wit hin three 
year s of the first Chrysler concessions, its concession-
bargaini n g patt ern had become the 'nor m" in bot h public and 
private sectors of American ind ustry. The UAW' s agreement to 
lower the price of th e subordination of Chrys l er workers to their 
management became a signa l to e mp loyers everywhere to demand 
simi lar sacrifices. 
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Concessions: round one 
The US auto industrv was hit i n 1979 by a new shift to fu e l 
e fficient cars after the overthrow o f the Shah of I I'" an ~ 
!:;ubst i tut ion, and the onset of world recess ion. Th e domestic car 
mar ket then fell for f our consecutive years f~om its 1978 pea k , 
and America"s third-biggest producer was squeezed close ' to 
banklr uptc y . Chrysler's top management had bee n changed in 1970, 
. in 1975 and again in 1978. All t.o ne) aVid 1 • In Augus t 1979 , t.he 
c: omp ,:\n y that h':''l.d inveighed most severel y against "fedE;?r-al 
i ntt"usi on II begged the federal government for a $1 
c oncession. But th e Carter administration was unwilling in a pr e-
election year to be seen to be handing over such sums on a plate. 
Riccardo's request for the tax relief to be offset against 
projected profits for 1981 and 1982 was rejected and g ovel'-'nme nt 
agencies beg a n to estimate the impact of 
27 
the 
corporate bankruptcy in US history . At this point , congress ional 
hearings began on the possibility of another option - a federal 
Thi s wa s far from Riccardo's liking, s i n e e it 
il1volved providing Congress with an un precedented a moun t of 
confidential company information on profits and product plans, and 
the establishment of a emergency loa n -gu arantee board with 
responsibility for administering the loan. So in Sep t ember 
27. A Chrysler bankruptcy would involve a decline of about O.Sl in the GNP, a rise in national 
unemployment of be tNeen 0.5 and 1.09%, an additional bill of $1.5 billion in welfare payments and an 
annual tax loss of $500 lillian; "oritz and Seaman, Qg ~Lt, 279. 
51 :'::; 
Riccardo announced he was stepp in g dow n immediately in ~avour of 
28 
1acocc a . 
UAW president Fraser a ccepted the ser i o usness of Chrysler's 
situation a nd u s ed wh at influence th e union had in Washington to 
push fo r the bail-out . As a demonst r a tion o f good faith t he 
£'2 :-: i st i ng 1976 contract was a llowed to expire in early September 
1C,'79 \.'J i thout the "\I>Jclt-' king \.'JithoLlt a cClntt--ac t" disput(:?s of 
pr-evi OLlS yeal'-s . Negotiations cont inued smoothl y unti l agreement 
was reache d six week s later on Oc t ober 25. In this contr act the 
UAW broke the Big Three bargaini ng tradition estab li s h ed si n ce 
1955 al d gave Chrysler concessions t hat ad d e d up to $203 million 
l ess than the costs i ncurred h a d they fol lowed For d and 8M . 
Fraser told the press : 
These actions lake it clear that the UAW has met its responsibilities in the broad effort to 
save Chrysler workers ' jobs and restore the company to stability. The burden nOM rests on the 
Congress to act promptl y to assist Chrysler as well as on the banKS, supplier cospanies and 
others with a stake in this latter.29 
Intent on demonstrating a c ommon f ront to Congress, Chrysler a l so 
2f3 . McCullough, Q~ ~tt, 8-1S, has argued that Chrysler Mas not nearly so close to bank ruptcy as 
it pretended, that it was going for government aid because it Mas cheaper than the alternat ives and 
would encourage UAW concessions and that it the plea for a government bail-out had failed, the banks 
Mould have lade lore credit available in order to protect their earlier investment . But while 
verification of such a "conspiracy" theory of lIanagement behaviour Mould require access to what are 
totally closed cOlpany records, it is unlikel y such a t actical approach can be squared with the open 
hostility to "federal intrusion' in big business so often manifested by Chrysler and the Detroit 
manageri al ethos in the past. It is also lore probable that Riccardo's hurried announcement of hi: 
early retirelent was the result of bitterness at the prospect of a federal-i eposed solution. 
29 . Quoted in Stuart l gQ ~lt, 140. 
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picked up on the inclusion almost as a joke in thf2 union's 
1976 demands of one seat for a union director in the boardroom 
and agr eed Fraser should serve o n the Chrysler board from the 
next AGM in May 19E1O. It was also agreed that i n future, 
in ternational reps could sit in on th~ last stage of plant-level 
di s cussion of grievances. Aware of its own ne~d to introduce new 
tech n ology a n d to make massive labou r savi n gs with the minimum 
union res i stance, management saw the advantages of 
invo l vemen t b y in ternation a l officers even more remote from the 
s h o p f l oor th a n th e loca l of f icers~ in resol ving plan t problems . 
The concessi ons meant a six mo nth d e l ay in inc r easing the basic 
waqe fo r a major assemb ly wo r ker f rom 57.75 a n hour to $9.07; the 
delay 0+ a ye':l l~ in th e int r od uction of 
pe l~sc)n al h o li days t hat was ta k ing p l ace a t Ford and 8M in 
i:l.r1 d i mprovements i n Chr ys l e r workers' pension s in Jan u ary 
pai.d 
19E1Or, 
19BO 
:;:; :I. 
wou ld only b e 70% o f th e i ncreases to be p a id at Ford and 8M. 
In October 1979, Fraser an d di rector of t he UAW's Chrysler 
vice president Mar k St e pp , stressed to their own 
members t h a t wh ile concessions were t h e o nl y alternative to total 
. 
c l osure, t h ey were only temporary : 
:30 . Interview with Robert Jensen, assistant to Kark Stepp, UAN Chrysler vice preSident , June 
1981. Jensen stated that this del and was only included by the UAW in 1976 as an after-thought when 
they noticed that Chrysler UK had accepted a union-noeinated director as the price for its bail out 
by the British governsent in 1975. 
:31 • UAW ~ ~~t'l.~t~t ~~Ii~qr:.i!I! , NOl/ember 1979. 
There is no way vour bargaining cOllmittee would allow any deviation froll the pattern if we 
were not convinced that Chrysler Has 'on the brink' and that concessions are necessary to save 
the jobs of Chrysler Harkers •.• 
Despite the concessions~ in the third year Chrysler Horkers will reach the pattern 
achieved at 6M and Ford.32 
The inter-I""l ':ltic)na l assUlr-€~ d its mf7~mbf:~ l'- S t h at. "'-full p cElr-it. y " would bE' 
restored b y May 1982. Th ei r ar guments carried th e day. Conf ident 
that the vote to recommend ratification would be carri e d 
overwhelmingly at the 256-member Chrysler Bargaini n g Council in 
I< ansas Ci ty on October- 31, Fraser and Stepp took a s p ecia l 
chartered flight to Washington to hear the news they had b een 
cempaigning for: Carter h a d agreed to ask Congress to a pprove a 
$1.5 billion loan guarantee programme conditional 
itself finding another $1.5 million to match the federal l oan. 
Concessions: round two 
Two developments blew Fraser's promises of a ret urn to the 
pattern off course : fist ~ Congress imposed take-bac ks as a 
condition for agreeing the federal loan guarant_e; ,:Ind second, 
the deepening world recession hit Chrysler with a fur t her $ 1 
b i llion loss in 1980~ a nd prompted Ford and 8M to join the que u e 
o-f managements seeking this particular method of union 
cooper _tion to cut labour costs. On December 19 1979~ wh e n th e 
Senate finally agreed a $1.5 billion federal loan guarantee , it 
:'_HE! 
added the qualification that the UAW would have t6 forfeit 
"un l'- t:~cCJv<:?r' ab 1 e " c: Cl r1C f.~ssi on~.:, lI-JCl I'-th a f ur- t hf?I'- '$2!59 rni 1. 1. ion. Th e 
following two weeks saw a new period of intensive activity 
bv the UAW's n egotiating committee culminating on the day after 
Dodge Mai n was c l osed in an agreement on modifications to the 
Two clays later- ~ on Jan u ary 7 1980, F'r-es; :i. d e nt 
Carter sign e d t h e Ch rys l er Corporat ion Lo a n Gu arantee Act. 
F r a ser, S t e pp and Joe Zapp a , t he c h air ma n of the negotiating 
commit tee, p resented the secon d round of con cessions with the 
( 
same a r g ume n t used three mon t hs earli er : 
The additional contract concessions occurred for one simple reason: tQ~ ~lt~tQ~tty~ ~~~ ~Q 
!~~g~!!!g ~DrYElgr p~ntrgp!fY !ng ~ ~!E§!yg lQE? 9i j9P? i9r ~DrYElgr ~9r!~rE'" 
Despite the necessity of ~akin9 those additional sacrifices to save our jobs, the UAW 
Negotiating Co •• ittee succeeded in getting Chrysler to agree to modified contracts that 
achieve three crucial goals: 
1) The new contract full y protects the complete cost-of-living allowance; 
2) The pact provides the full health and fringe benefit package and all 
of the pension ilprovelents negotiated in October; and, 
3) Chrysler workers still will receive GM and Ford pattern wages, 
benefits and pensions by the end of this' agreement. 34 
(.~ q U i.d if i c at i on lI-Jas b ,LlY" i e d in j u s t on e s hor t sentc~nce: "W£~ cc'.!\nnot 
assu re t h at Chrys l er wi l l ret urn to hea l t h in the future with 
a b solut e c er-t a i n t. y" " BLl t wh €~t c:ame o v e r- was t l-H? r-~'S'pE?ated thl"E?,:,d: 
o f b an krup t c y a n d the renewe d p l edge that t he cohcessions would 
:t9B2. 
With o u t a n a l tern ative, the dep l e t ed wor k force gave a second 
::::;:::;;. Stuart, Qil C;.tt, 141-147. 
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overwhelmin g ratific at ion to these changes. 
The new concessions froze wages fo r a year from March 17 
and ruled cut any paid personal holidays (PPH) during the whole 
term of the agreement. This contract modifica~ion was the first 
act u a l "take-·-bac k" conceS~5i on ~ although even here it was a 
retreat on promised holidays rather than existing conditions . A 
nove l element in the package encou raged worker s to identify s till 
more c lose l y with Chrysler by allocat i ng shares worth 5162.5 
m:il li on ~ or abou t one sixth of the then virtually worthless 
Chr'ysl er" stock ~ to a special trust under an Employee Stock 
Ownership Plan (ESOP). And another new clause was designed to 
appease t h e Canadian section of the Chr ysler workforce: Cc:madi an 
Chrysler workers would be a llowed to ratify the agreement 
separately and to negoti ate their awn contract in 1982 . 
Concessions: round three 
Dur"i ng 1980 cooperation between t h e UAW and Chrysler 
c.:C:Hiti I1u ed. · In ~Junc~ jc.')int.!! management - worker quality committees 
were established in Chrysler plants along the lines of 
::;;5. This lias the date they recei ved the ri se that had al ready been delayed six Bonths and 
brought an hourly major asselblers' rate up to $9.07. 
:36. Wages in Canada lIere already significantl y below their Afierican counterpar ts as a result of 
their being paid the sa~e no.inal hourl y-rate whi le the Canadian dollar was actually lIorth only 
about 90% of the Alerican . 
5~~'~() 
Quality Circles and Ford's Employee Involve ment programme . In 
August 1980 Fraser joined Iacocca and Detroit mayor Coleman Young 
at the new K-car model launch ceremony at the Jefferson Avenue 
pll:~nt . By then Ch rysler had a n ew management, a fuel-Lfficient 
198 1 model , a s trea mli n ed l abou r force, and a major cost ad vantage 
Over its Americ a n rivals. But as the wor l d recession deep e ned and 
t h e Carter administ ration attempted to control tnf l ation by 
r~ising interest r a t es, K-car sales s lumped. Th e result was a $1.7 
billion 1 os~~ t n 1 9BO . Iacoc c a p ublicly d emand e d an extra 5600 
mi llicln "take--b ac ks " ,:?Ind as ked the banks to con vet-··t 1i600 O1i 11 i o n 
of long-term debt i nto pref e rr e d stock with t he r e st being paid 
o·ff at 30 cent s on t h e dol l ar . To ma ke s ure t h e message , was 
in Carter's outgotng administration~ 
Willi a m Miller, warned that wi t hout t he concessions t here would be 
:':':;7 
n o more f un ds avai l ab l e from the Loa n Guarantee Board. 
Th e UAW l et out a howl of rage . Fraser immedi ately re l eased 
a l etter to I acocca objec ting to hi s tacti c of n ~gcrti ati n q 
publ:i c:: 
Given Chrysler ' s difficulties, our hope is you Nill devote full tile to handling the company' s 
problems and will stop attempting to be the self -appointed spokesperson for the auto industry 
and corporate A.erica on labour-management relations.38 
i n 
But in a statement i ssued by the UAW 's Chr ys l er Counci l two days 
37 • l10ri t2 and Senan, ~ I;,lt, 329-333. 
38. Dougl as Fraser ! Letter to Lee A lacocca, Decelber 20 1980; ci rcul ated to all UAW I Deal s. 
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later the UAW agreed to re-open negotiations on t he 1979 
contract sayin~ it had no cho i ce but "to respond to the 
Qovernmen t·s actions: 
rhus, while it may be necessary for extraordinary steps to be taken regarding the Chrysler-UAW 
col lective bargaini ng agreements, these are a response to the requirements of the government 
decis ion makers rather than the demands of management •. • 
UAW ~e.bers will do what is necessary to meet the requirements of the Loan Guarantee Act, 
but we must knOH what is true necessity rather than merely a eanageaent goal, and He lust be 
assured that others will do their fair share.39 
The UAW position, of cour se~ was pure semantics. Mill e r and t h e 
Loan Guarantee Board merely reflected management poli cy when they 
indic~ted the scale of new concessions requ ired and the areas in 
which they could be achieved . The protest was clearly for the 
record and was designed to help sell the third round of 
concessions rather than mobilize resistance against them. 
The new agreement of January 14 1981 gave the company a 
further $622 million cast advantage over the nati o nal contract 
pettern, everything Iacocca had originally demanded. It 
implemented a virtual wage freeze for the last 20 months of th e 
contract~ al lowing only one more topp ing up of t he cost-of - living 
allowance and ~toppi n g t h e two further scheduled i n creases in the 
base rate; it delayed the next scheduled pension increc se for 
five months and stopped the others; and it withdr ew the proposal 
to give three shift workers a rise in paid lun c h ti me from 15 
40 
minutes to 20 minutes a day. Two letter s attac h~d t o the n ew 
3 9.. Statetent by UAW International Chrysler Council, Decelber 22 1980. 
4(1. UAW-Chrysler, ~~qtttqQ!l ~[q~t~tqQ~ ~~[t!lQlQq tq q~ !Q~ ~!Q!qt!Q ~~~lq~~~~, January 14 
1981 . 
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contract provided 'sweeten e rs ' : Chr ysler agr e e d . to negotiate a 
profit-sharing agreement at l ~ast as favourable as the 1961 
Amer ican Motors Corporation contract, "n o lE!sS th.::\f'l 1~5 '1. (0+ th(e) 
41 
would be distributed to 
And it agreed to a non-advers~ry 
procedure in which committees will b e formed at the national and 
1 DC a 1 level" so U{'~W o'fficers could be "(Jiven the QPPol'"tunit y to 
construct ively input ideas into the decision-making process prior 
to implementation of decisions which might adversely affect t he ir 
job E;ecur it y" . Chrysler retained its managerial authorit y = " t he 
Corporation cannot agree to a n y limitation on the res pon s ibility 
fell'" th(~ ·finial d r:?c isicm" , c:\nd "the WC:lt- k of t:h~? commi tt.f?e :i s ':And 
42 
IllLISt remai n conf i d(·;!nt i al" :; but the UAW had extended its right 
to consultation on plant closures. 
The third wave of concessions dwarfed those which prec e ded 
:i.t. Against t he background of nearly 18 months of cl')nc~?ssi (In-''' 
barqaininq~ and of an apparently unstoppable stream of closures~ 
the tntal wage f reeze proposed by extreme right-wing senators 
during the 1979 loa n guarantee hearings was ove rwh e lmingly 
Prev iou s concessions had been baited with promises of 
"par ity" b y 19B2 bLlt ~ by the third round, Chrysl er workers' 
42 . t~i..~f 14. 
expectat i ons were al ready so low t h is was no . l onger necessary . 
Significant resistance to shop floor manageria l a uthClt"' i ty 
lon g since ceased. By 1981 it was c l ear the international 
wo uld no I Clnger place other th a n consu lt ati~e restra i nts o n 
c ompany-wide manag e ri al a uthoritv. Th e re s tri cted l egitimac y that 
had been superimposed on the weak workplace organ ization of the 
mi. d'-l '170s, had been reinf o rced and transformed by Ch rys l er ' s 
c risis to the po i nt where the collective articulation of d i st i nct 
workers' aims had stopped. Fraser was awar e of t h e chang e taking 
pl ace and defended it. He told c riti cs of hi s taking th e 
d i f " t~c:t cw s h i P em Chrys ler's board, " l'1 aybE:! the 
relationship i s precise l y what' s wrong wi th the American labour 
movement." Th e UAW was now in a j uni or p a rtner s hi p relationship 
with Chrys ler manageme nt. It shar ed the same g o al as I acocca -
t he economic s u rv i val of the company - and was committed to 
cooperation to attain it. CrUCially, it no longer h a d a distinct 
collective resistance t o 
mc:tnagement. " Thf~ un i on 'in Cht'"ys51et'''~'' c~ n inter·n at.ic.lna l 
sa id confidentially in the summer of 1982, "no l OI"\gE~ I" e)-:ist~:; :i.n 
LI·::;;. Quoted in l'Ioritz and Seaman, Illl fit, 340. 
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thE'? pl i:\ nt~:; in any l~ ecClqni z able +01"""11"1." 
The lowering of the price of UAW member s ' labour reflected a 
s hi ft in the balance of c l ass for ces in th= US in favour of 
managerial power . Th~ shift occurred as managements ex p loited 
opportunit ies created b y the r ecession and the longer-term 
df:?C 1 i nE~ in effectivity of American workers' Ltni ons. Thf2 
• sweeteners' provided to the UAW in exc h ange for the concessions 
- Fraser's seat on the Chrysler Board~ EEiOP ~ 
joint con s ult ation on c losures and joint l abour - man agement qua l ity 
circles - we re presented to UAW members as a step forward b y 
labour. Understan ding them in the context of the overall shift in 
balance of power puts a different interpretation on th e m. Had 
they been s truggled-for restraints on manageri a l authorit y, th~:-?y 
mig h t have had a different role. Bu t far from representing any 
greater restraining ability by l ab our as a distinct int e rest i n 
these essentially consult ative procedures obscur e 
labour·s i nd ependent interes ts. At best, they merely wea ken 
workers " c oll ective representation; at wor st. , they could help 
destroy it and pr ovide unrestrained man ageria l autl-lor'i t y \I'd t h 
stil l greater workplace l egi timacy. I n 1954 Cl ark Kerr wrote: 
;'~" L Interview by author in Solidarity House, SUlier 1982. 
t::'r'~i ' 
.J.~.J 
Conflict is essential to survival. The union wh ich is in constant and complete agre~ment with 
~anagement has ceased to be a union .45 
If the 19805 develop into a decade , in which union organization 
becomes synonymous with a II f1 on ""'cid \/er' S'::il'· y II relationship with 
1TI,:il"\ ,:\qE~men t , then the quiet closure of Dodge Main in the first 
wEmk of 1980 lTIay h ave heralded more than rationa l ization of 
large core company in face of a severe economic crisis. That 
closure might well signify the start of the end of unionism as it 
has been experienced over the l as t f ifty years. 
45.. Kerr , gPo c;.i.t, 231. 
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CHAPTER 18 
POWER AND EXCEPTIONALISM 
Part One established that shop floor conflict in Chrysler plants 
was much more v i si ble t han in 8M or Ford. In e x plaining this 
difference i n the narr a tive at l east five themes emerged. First~ 
shop f l oor r e l ations appeared as outcomes of prac t ices with 
specific hi s tories. Often the o u tcomes were unin tended a nd the 
actors were un aware of like l y resul ts. Second, th e context of 
t hese specific situation was determin ed b y an unremitting 
struggle between cap ita l and l abou r at the point of production. 
Third~ this struggl e took a d if ferent shape in different auto 
companies an d t he experience at Chrysler was significantly 
different from that at 8M and Ford. Thi s diff erence is exp l ained 
in terms o f the greater strength of s hop floor organization in 
Chr ys l er, a strengt h that developed primaril y as an unintended 
consequences o f management ac tion s . Fourth~ an underlying theme 
spe l t o u t mor e c learl y below, is that this Chrysler experience 
para ll e l e d in ma ny ways the ex perience of industri al relations in 
t h e UK car industry . Wh i l e Ch rys l er was an excep t ion in the US, 
its experience questions the view that the US working class was 
so totally diff erent from working classes elsewhere. Fin a l ly, the 
study h as s tressed t he complex interaction of factors shapin g 
management "s frontier of control ove r the labour process~ its role 
528 
in shaping th e form, politics and traditions of wor kplace 
emp lovee organization; the countervai ling impact of the presence 
0 1'" i ndep en d e n t working class pol itics in wider 
societ v; and the often-overlooked strength of managerial power. 
Chapter' 18 I~ev.i (·:! ws t.h ·? find i ngs a n d th en cc)nsi df2rs thei r-
imp li cat ions for the argument abou t the "sxceptionalism' of the 
American working cl ass . 
I. Review 
O .... ganization 
Early mass uni o ni s m and the subsequent estab l i shmen t of 
collec tive bargai ning in Chrysler was dec isive ly influenced by 
man agement b e haviour . Walter Chrysler's blend of p aternalism a nd 
vehement opposition to union organization l ed him to estab lish a 
works council 'company union" with mor e influence than at GM. His 
sys·tem repr e sentatives merged int o a n 
ind e p endent union whose s h op s tewar ds a lready r eceived d~ f§~tg 
I~e c: ognition. The steward s were recogniz ed a e s hop + 1. oor- ~ 
s;ectional bargai ners from the first UAW- Chrys l e r contract of 
:L9~P • The company's continued resistance to un ionism led it to 
oppose the imposition by the NWLB of a n outside arbitrator in the 
grievance procedure during World War 11~ h elping to foster t h e 
wOI~' kplc;c:e l eg itimacy of sect .i anal i ndw:;tri al action . 
a sect ion a l-bargaining tradition estab l ished a 
broad-based layer of union-involved workers (nat n e c essarily all 
r.:.. . ,· ... c·1 ...,..:~ 7 
'activists') who identified more closely . with their fellow 
workLrs than with the international officer; it legitimated 
sectional industrial action; end it extended this l egitimacy to 
thE labour p rocess issues that were most likely t o become 
grievances: production standards nd discipline. 
Onlv as a result of the 1950 strike d id a changi ng 
menagement became fully reconci l ed to the permanent presence of 
unioni s m as represented by a markedl y less combative 
international UAW. But it took the removal of the old divided 
areas-of-influence management structure in 1 956~ and tl e threat 
to its resources presented by the lete 1950s recession, before 
the companv finally mobilized it s ful l resources for 
conf ontation with local union organi z ation . The outcome 
decisively re-shaped Chrysler's s hop floor un ion ism along the 
lines then operating in 8M and Ford: secti onal stewards were 
deprived of all bargaining opportunities~ and the balance of 
inf luence between the local and the i nternational tilted 
decisively in favour of the latter. Confrontation was placed in an 
institutional framework where it could readily be accessed by 
management and union leaders, but not by rank-and-fil e workers. 
Finally, a further mcnagement restructuring brought on bv massive 
losses and the onset of world recession in the late 19705 
resulted in a major d emon strat ion of managerial power. In two 
years Chrysler c losed 16 of its operational sites and the UAW 
fil ally di sowned i nstitutionalized confrontation in favour of its 
top officers conduc "in g concession-bargaining and its local 
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officers endorsing qua l itv circles at p lant 1 f?ve 1 . Hesi <;5t.anc:e 
largely r eturned to where i t had been in pre-union days : 
1. 
U ll d et" 9 f " i3uncl • 
Politics 
non-work politics were also highly s i gni f i cant in 
shaping co l lective organizat i on. Bet ween 1932 a nd tht: 
election of a refor m President ~ Franklin D Hoosevelt , a nd the 
passage of t h e NRA and Wagner Act ~ g av e wor kers a new sense of 
" 1'" ig h ts " 'ins i de t:. h E~ workplace . In Detroit t h e po l itical presence 
of Father Coughl in justified worker s i n join i ng h is ' independent ' 
union i n t l ousands at a time when un ion member s e l sewhere in the 
a u to i n d LI s t rv CC.ll.l1 cl be counted on 1 yin the low hundr eds . ThE! 
r i ght versus left factiona l fight i n t h e UAW from 1937 to 
reinforced t he early independence of local union workplace 
organ izat i on from t h e internationa l p a n d t h e d efeat of the Martin 
faction boosted the f ort~nes of those most strongl y identified 
wi th local autonomy at the very moment t h a t America b e gan gearing 
up for Wor l d War II. 
1 • Davi d Montgomery l "The Past and Future of Workers' Control ·, ~'lr:.~~t~~ ~tr:.l!q9.l~h E~~t ~'l~ 
Prggn! l !- ~B~9!f~! ~~~r!f~~ rg!g~r! ed, James Breen (Phil adephi a: leap I e Uni versity Press, 1983)! 
400. 
~..'i::::; :l 
An upsurge of wartime nati ona lism coexisted with workers 
using the tight l abour market to strengthen their" restraints on 
managerial authority. But in the slacker labour market of the 
second h a lf of the 19405, management focused that nationalism 
into J a powerful a nti-Communism. Connecting with post-war 
immigration from Eastern Europe~ anti-Communism became 
principa l means by which 'socialist' politics - which could 
include the ~iews of liberal Democrats~ of sympathizers with the 
British Labour Government·s nationalization measures~ as well as 
of the few th ousand Communists a nd few hundred Trotskvi sts - was 
ev icted from the l a bour movement. An 'ind~pendent' ideol ogica l 
justification of shop floor resistance was effectively dismissed 
from workers' vocabulary. Shop floor so l idarity and resistance 
remained~ 
fra mework 
but t h e absence of a wider oppositional political 
made it much easier for management to reimpose its 
control over the labour process in the late 19405 and 1950s. 
The rise of the black civil rights movement from the late 
19505, however~ introduced another ideo logi cal basis for 
opposition: black nationalism. And~ accompanying the Black Power 
movement in the late 19605, a growing hostility to the Vietnam 
Wa r weakened t h e hold of anti-Communi st na tionalism among a 
minority of you ng white workers. On the shop floor, these 
'outsi de ' political developments triggered a labour revolt that 
for a brief period in the early 19705 looked to man v as if it 
might permanently reshape the contours of workplace control. Top 
manegement then exercis~d its power over lower levels of 
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management bv appo in ting black supervisors and even black l abour 
relations personnel. This was in response to an upsurge of 
res i stance which, reflecting the reaction of a largely new labour 
force to r i si rlg inflation in a tight l abour market, was initia l lv 
legitimated by the emergence of independent black politics. 
Thes e minority move ments f aced not mere l y the immensely 
powerf ul corporations; t hey al s o faced e n t r enched organizational 
opposition from th e existing labour unions, and they failed to 
create o n-going organi zational structures that had the necessary 
legitimacy to s urvive the major sl ump of 1974-1975. Chrysler also 
worked with the international to secure the transition to 
conservative l ocal un i on administrations that were more 
representative of the increasingly black l abour force. The 
physical defeat of the most militant black national i sts, the CQ-
opti on into two-party polit i cal li fe of many bl ac k reformers~ and 
the ability of t he Ame rican political system to .sustain t h e body-
blow of Watergate, all gradually eroded the wi der political 
just i fic~tion of resistance a nd prepared the way for the 
resurgence of America·s political ri ght in the late 19705. In 
t urn, t h e politica l d efen s iveness of American l i beralism in the 
early 1980s made it still more unl i kely th a t a new movement 
opposing concessions a nd closures could s ur v ive. 
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Power 
1'1an Cl Cj f:? I'- :i a l powe r wa s de f i ned in Ch a pter 1 a s the sup e rior 
t"('::~lat i ollship c a pital h a s over labou r; for wh il e both need each 
u l ti mat e l y cap i t a l has gr'eater mo b il i ty . 
nei t her capital n or l a b our eve r c omes fresh-f a ced to t he mark e t . 
So man a e r- i a l i s n o t si mply a pure e mbod imen t of the 
o wnership of a cer tain s um o f capital , it refl ec t s resou rce si z e 
a nd how e a s y it is to acces s . Man a gerial power r esources a r e 
s haped by thei r hist ories into new or old plant, moder"n or-
outdated equipment , liquid o r fixed asset s~ pr' o duct.i (:ll"'l i n 
expanding o r declining mark e t s , rising or fallin g mar ket sh ar es ~ 
ex pectations of profi t s o r losses a nd so on. An d t h e h i s tor i c a l 
pattern of ownership a nd manageme nt structure p lay a key rJl e in 
fac ilitating or inhibiting access to these resources . 
The scale of ma n ager ial power resources avail a b le to t he 
' Big auto ma ker s t ilted the probabilit y o f 
maintaining c ontrol over the labour process stro n gly i n t h e ir 
f a vour. But the comp a ni es access ed thes L res ources diff e r e ntl y 
b £~cal.\se of variations in th e ir ownership a nd 
s tl"' uctLlres. Thus i n t h e 1930s 8M oper c ted a host il e a nt i -un ion 
policy while s imultaneous ly considering how to contain t h e thre a t 
to its s hop floor cont r ol in th e event of out r i g h t res i st ~nce 
b ecoming too c o s tl y . Neither Ford nor Chr ysl e r h ad a comparabl e 
pol i c y-ma king fac ility a t the time . However, in major per i o d s o f 
t h reat t o it s profi t ab i l i t y d nd ex i s t e n ce, Ch rys l e r cou ld sti l l 
move qu ic kl y to copy l abour con tro l t e c hn i q u e s . It s p enNe l'-
resources were sufficient for it to move agal nst, a nd then b r eak 
shop floor restra int s on it s rig ht s to manage in the 1950s~ and 
aga in~ h e lp s d by the state~ to break t he mould of 
institu tionalized confrontation with the UAW in th ~ 1979-82 
recess ion. 
Authority 
What implications do these findings have for man a geria l 
control over the labour process? Front-l i ne superv i sion's shop 
floor authority was extensive~ a nd challenged only by shor t- l ived 
resistance by individuals and smal l work groups in the late 19205 
a nd early 19305. In an unpredictable market~ aribitrary measures 
were the rule . In the mid-1930s, as sales rose , management moved 
a little wav to answering workers' demands for greater pay a nd 
work stability before collective action won union r ecognition in 
1937. This gain represented a maj or encroachment on manageria l 
authority on the shop floor. Disciplinary deci si on s by front - line 
supervisors became 'actionable" and remained so until the l a te 
19505. In the late 1960s, supervisory authority came under a 
fresh threat from the new labour force which disappeared with the 
labour shake-out of the mid-1970s. 
Since the mid-1970s manag e ment has had the author i ty t 
implement unilaterally virtually any change in work proced ure and 
pace of work it required. The individual worker"s only p o s sible 
r~course would be to raise the iss ue subsequently in a grievance 
procedure - which would rarely alter the result of a time-studied 
~7~ 
~~~ 
production standard or work assignment. The threat of an ordered 
f.,?scc.'Ilaticlil of sanctions in the event cif worker resistance 
F'f?p l ac(:.?d the ar"tJi trar'V c:~cti ems of trlf.? fCiI'"eman of + i f t Y yeews:' 
eat'" 1 i e l'" . But althouqh sanctions cou ld be queried after the event 
on t he basis of procedural case-book law~ this is more a 
paperwork p roblem for t he foreman than a n effec ti ve restraint on 
his .::~ uthor"i t y . Th e sanctions might mean a worker c ould 
the rules more frequently than in the past before finally being 
fired and n ot reinstate d. But the vastly g reater number of 
foremen~ the wider range of intermediate sentences and the 
frequency with which they are ad ministered s uggests sanctions are 
as much the mechanism that secures compliance cs ever . 
Labour process 
It is nec:essarv ~ as David Montgomery suggests~ to do iIlOF"€~ 
t h a n expand the understanding of the specific ways in which 
change occul~r·e cl. There is an obligation to "distill ft-om all this 
variety 0+ experiences a basic explanation and periodization +01" 
th(o? .. volution" of ~?vents. The pi c·ture of effective collective 
s hop floor organization restraining f or nearly twenty years the 
fair- ly constant sanctions-bac ke d pressure by for-emerl is 
The evidence supports t hese critics of Braverman wh o 
have questioned his lack of attention to the impact of 
cn-gani Z i:lt i. on on 
.. " 
-' 
It sLlqqests 
~~. David Montgoaery, "To Study the People ' , ~~~~~ tli~t~~~, 21, no . 4 (Fall 1980), 492 . 
5::~;6 
that: 
tec hn o log i cal c hange i n th e l a t e 1940s ( t he deskil ling r OT tr i m 
wor kers ), t he mi d-1950 s (deskill i ng of mu ch machine wor k )~ a n d 
th e 196 0 s (d ec r easing amount of l ~ad ~ sol der a nd meta l f in ishing 
n eed ed~ des k i lling o f most s ki l l ed pai n t s h op wor kers) was not as 
imp or t ant as th e l eve l of work e r s' c oll e ct i ve o r g a n izat i on in 
de t e rminin g the mo vement of control. But th e ev idence a l so 
e ndorses Braver ma n ' s underl yi ng theme of the central i t y of the 
dive svstem and Taylori s t work organiz a tion. It poi nts t o the 
continuit y of the drive s ystem of labour control fr o m t he 19305 t o 
the 1980s in mas s production despite the e r ection of 
institutionalized collective bargaining syst e ms at t h e 
international and local leve l s . 
How s ignific a nt a r e conclusions drawn from a s tud y of one 
firm for our understanding of the relationship of man a g e ment a n d 
managed in America as a whole? Are these conclus ion s abou t t h e 
factors shaping the moving contours of manag e r ie l c on tro l 
e xceptional to Chrys ler or can they be generali z ed ? And i f so, 
what are th e impli c ation s for the debate about Am e ri can 
exceptional ism? Thes e iss ues are now considered i n t he second 
s ection of this concluding chapter. 
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II. Exceptionalism r evisi t ed 
Until recentlv t h e debat e abou t " Ameri can exceptiona l ism' focused 
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primarily on how the ~Q[biD9 S!~§~ was different. Pellinq " s 
list elf 
substit u te for an a l ysis: 
••• class solidarity is weak and ethnic or social differences have tended to heighten fee li ng 
between the skilled and unski lled •• . 
The final perlanent characteristic of Alerican labour ••• is its lack of cl ass consciousness ..• 
in part a product of ethnic and racial rivalries! and of the div isive effect of different 
social conditions in different parts of the country. It owes a great deal to the fact or of 
high wages •• • And we lay be sure that the ease with which workers could become foremen had a 
great effect in earlier years.S 
The fami l iar c at alogue of observations about ethnic and racial 
d i vi sli on s ~ qf.~O~.l l'" aph 1. c a1 d is;pe l"' ~~a l (th~? impact of t h e f r-r.m tj.~?r- ) ~ 
econ omi c prosperit y and social mobilit y are drawn toget h e r to 
"ItH?clk " class c: on~;;c i c)Llsnes~; a nd .. ~ "1 ac k" of 
solidarity. Thi s approac h is wrong on two counts. First , i t fails 
to make exp l icit the ideal form of consciousness and s o lidarity 
L~. Davis argues that while Western European labour was 'incorporated' through reformisl, US labour 
Mas si milarly 'incorporated', but through the "negativities of its internal stratif icat ion, its 
privatization in consumpt ion, and its disorganization viz-a-viz political and trade union 
bureaucracies·, 911 fB, 7-8i Seymour Martin Lipset reviews the debate frol its beginnings, ·Why no 
Socialism in the Uni ted States?", ~~~C~~~ ~t ~~~t~!£~~~~y ~~qt~!lt~!, ed. Seweryn Bialer (Boulder: 
West v iew ~ 1977). But P r. Edwards (1983aJ, "The Exceptionalisa of the American Labour Movement : the 
Neqlected Role of Workplace St ruggle", Industrial Relations Research Unit Research Paper (Coventr y: 
Universi ty of WarwiCK, February 1983), 1b-30 (mimeographed); and P K Edwards (1983bl, "The political 
economy of industrial conflict: Britain and the United States', Industrial Relations Research Unit 
Research Paper, (Coventry: University of Warwick , 1983) , 19 (mileographed ) rev italizes the debate on 
exceptionalism by shifting its teras of reference. He argues that management 's greater pONer 
resources over labour ' s dovetailed Nith a historic opposition to unionism to create the major 
divergences in industrial relations patterns between Britai n and the United States. 
5. Henry Pelling, ~~~~L~~~ ~~~~r (Chicago : Chi cago University Press, 19bO), lb6, 22 1. 
with which Amer ican workers ar e b ei ng compared. shop f 1 O(j l~ 
unionism in Dodge M~in , cont~ a5ts with Palling's 
asses s me n t by suggesting an enduring sen se of class identit y and 
of o ccasional d emonstrations of common purpose with other workers 
which was not si gnificant l y different from that found in a 
pal'" al l e l st ud y conducte d by the a uthor of 
6 
bh e s im i larl y - sized 
Austin Longbridge plant in Britain. To have val idit y~ assertions 
of " pf:cu l i ar' it,y " mU!5t be r"ooted in fi l" m c ompal" i sc)n!s. SE!cc1ncl, t.:~v~::n 
c: CLWSOt'·v e:-: ami niat i on of thE? evi denc€:? of "s;tr'ong" ?-'tm E:? t·' i can c 1. ass 
consciousness and solidarity presented 
§tc!t§l suggests that severa l of the elements mos t f requentl y 
li sted as causing "~-Jeak" class consciousness, s uch c.'\s t :h (-? 
(,;Jeogr-iiiph i cal disper sal a nd e thnicity of labour, h ave i n cer t ai n 
7 
c i rcumstances produced its opposite . If thes e factors work to 
defuse consciousness at some times and to consolidate it at 
ot h ers, t h ey a re not very h e lpful explanatory variables. 
vJhat i s needed i s a keener comparative edge t c the 
elucidation of differences and s imilarities bot h in patt e rn s of 
working class behaviour between different American fi r ms 
6. Comparati ve historical study currentl y being written up for publication by the author on 
development of shop floor industrial relat ions at the Austin/BMCJBritish Leyl and Lonqbr idge pl ant ~ 
1939-1982, and the Pressed Steel /Rootes/Chrysler Linwood plant, 1942-1981. 
'7 . Brecher ' s histor y begins: "This book is the story of repeated, ~ass ive and often violent 
revolts by ordi nary people in America": gp fl1 : 10. 
(and 
industries) and between the American and other specified working 
c lasses . Th(? di scus~~i 01'1 of Chrysler's exceptiona l ism by 
comparison with 8M and Ford is cl~ar l v ~ helpful starting point. 
industry in which technology can be treated as 
constant; wher·e each fi r m' s l a bour market~ a lthough not identiccl~ 
was situated largely in the same area of the United States~ where 
plant s i ze if GM's Flint Chevrolet di v i sion i s seen as an 
extended River Rouge or Dodge Main - was roughly comparable: and 
in which managements dealt with just one intern a tional union. Yet 
there were m~jor differences between these firms in the l eve l of 
open c:cmf 1 i ct. ~ especially in unauthorized strikes. Thi s pCls~~~; 
questions not only about Chrysler, but also about 8M and Ford. 
For as Scott an d Homans put it in their essay on t h e high 
inc idenc(·? 0+ wc:\rtime vJildcat ~;tl'- ikes: "The usual e:-:planat ibns ."'Jhy 
8 
men le+t their·· ItJOI~~:: fc~iled to e>:pli:\in why they st.lyed." 
The Chrysler evidence expl~ins why some men staved and 
others wildcatt ed in terms of the establishment of sect i anal --:' 
plant- and company-specific traditions of workpl ace l egitimacy. 
Tr-adi tl. ons that condoned secti ona l industrial action 
developed and sustained by the insertion of politic~::. and 
co llective or-gan i z at:i o n in the spaces l eft by con!:-;c i nus 
B. Scott and Ho!!ans, Q.R ~g, 280. 
J 
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commission or by short-sight ed managerial omission .. 
tr- e:irJ it i ems of active r-estr~int o n 
author-ity did not long sur vive the powerfu l boost given them b y 
the achievement ~f 
there were not these same lapses in 
Thi s is not a simple omniscient manageria l de ter-minism: the 
independent activit y of collectivities of workers was c rucia l in 
taking advantaqe~ 
10 
Clf" not , of the opportunities man a g ement made 
c\vailable. But these oppor- tunites ar-ose as a resu lt of 
management actions . The exceptional wildcat strike frequency, 
I~ ~?tent i on of a hi gher- s tewar-d densit y and existence of mcw(~ 
effective restraints over manager-ial author-ity in Chrys l er th~n in 
8M and Ford for most of these fi f ty year-s was at root a 
r-ef l ~?ct ion of differ- e nces in t h eir top managements . [31'1 had 
adopted a multi-divisional s tructure by the mid-192 0 s, e\r1c1 coul d 
app l y its management - by-polic y tradition to indust r ial 
by the mid-1930s. In its dealings with the UAW t hereafter it had 
the capacit y to consider the conse quences of par-ticular- methods 
of apposing union encroachment on its manager-ial right s befor-e 
9.. Nillialll Brown, Q.Q. t;.it, 98-9 . 
10. Hyman [1975] argues : "The ob jecti ve charatteri sti cs of capi tal, and the pol i ci es adopted by 
lIIanagers, create pressures and constraints which set lilits to the possibiliti es of trade union 
action . But their determining effect depends ~t~q on the ext ent to wh ich prevail ing patterns of 
relationships are treated as inevitable by trade unioists themselves"; 9P fit, liB. 
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tv"vinq t. h(~ il\ o ut. As Ha rri s h as argued ~ 8M (a nd other l ar g e fi r ms 
wh i ch emulated i ts labour rel a tion s s t r ateg y) was no t a ttemp tin g 
t. n m,::\n ,3 (;) E? merl t 
structure was s uffic i entl y fle x ible to tes t out a rang e of 
:l. 1 
different methods of combating the threat of unioni.sm. 
adopted the 8M management st r ucture in the late 19405 , 
£:\ S a family-controlled company it 
i diosyncratic flavour; while Chrysler effectively only a dopt ed the 
Ford management structure as l ate as 1979 and aspect. s o f i t s 
1920s' autocratic, intuitive, one-man-rule management st ruct ure 
sti ll survive today. Chrysler managers traditionally agreed wi t h 
the chief executive or got out. They were allowed littl e r oom f or 
experiment at ion and virtuall y none for systematic reflec tion. 
even if they had wished to d o so , t.he weakness (Jf 
centr a lly-operated accounting system mad e it very difficul t to 
establish much more than superficial "scientific manageme n t· 
pr"acti Cf:S . Faced with op portunities provided by contradictory 
management po li cies of extreme hosti lit.y followed by p r e ssur e for 
production at any costs, Chr ys l er workers seized them . 
This conclusion underlines the importance of p r o v i di n g 
reasonably similar subjects if the p urp ose of a compar ison i s t o 
develop a theory of differences. Comparing Chrysler with 
l. :l • Harri s, q!l. ~tt, 198. 
Sear s & Roebuck or IT&T, compani es whose 1978 n~t sales wer e all 
within a few million dol l ars of Ch r ysl er , would not have thrown 
as much light on essential dif fe r e nces as has this c ompar ison 
with 8M a nd Ford whose net sa l es were four times and three t i me s 
1. 2 
I~'espec:ti 'l (o! l y t h an Ch r y sler "s . i So. wh y t.he 
Angl o -American compar ison is part i c ul a r ly instr uctive for an 
i n t erTla t i o n a l t h e or y of d iffer e n ces. Fo r whil e t here are many 
o b v ious d i f f erences inc l udi n g t hose of sca l e between t he two 
i n d U!5tr i a l r e l at i o n s systems, a l so 
s i mi l ar it.i ~?s , whi c h th e Ch r ys l er ex perien c:e o f a high s hop 
s t e ward dens ity~ section a l b argai n i ng an d considerable unoff ic ia l 
<:: o n+ I i c:t, Edward s quest. i o n s the assu mption that 
Amer i ca d iff ers s i gn i fica n tly f r o m Br i tai n in l acking a labour 
mo vement t h a t d e ma n ds fu n d ament a l politi ca l c h a nge .· And he goes 
on to s uggest that the man y s h ared soc i a l an d l ega l t l~adition!5, 
t h e c:ommo n ~i st ory of "voluntar ism" i n indust ri a l re l ations and 
t h e e mp h as i s o n co l lec t ive b arga i ni n g as t h e key mean s of 
p Y"ob 1. t? ITl --sol vi rig, make Brita i n t h e most u s;e+ L.ll 
12. [Q[t~~~, August 12 1979: 1978 net sales of these coepanies were: GH, S63.2bn; Ford , 542. Bbn ; 
IBM, $21 . 1bn; Sears L Roebuck, SIB.Obn; Chrysler, S16 .3bn; IT&T, 15.3bn. 
t ::~; • The most obvi ous are the absence of lIul ti -uni on bargai ning units in the US~ the determi naU on 
of pay and conditions there primaril y through centralized cDlpany- or industry-wi de - long-term 
contract bargaining, and the comparati ve lack of involvement of shop floor union representat ives in 
bargaining; J David Edelstein and Halcola Warner , f9!p~r~!lY~ ~ni9n P~!9fr~fJl grg~Di!~!i9n ED9 
QpP9?!!i9D iD ~[i!i~h ~D9 B~~rif~D ~Di9DE (New BrunswiCK , New Jersey: Transaction, 1979) , 18-20; an 
earlier list of differences drawn up by Jack Steiber stressed (1) the involvement of the 
international union in US plant agreements, (2) the vertical organization of US unions, 131 the 
greater coverage of detail and the provision of arbitration in US contracts, (41 the fi xed duration 
of US contracts , and 15) a list of other lesser differences incl uding the existence of the Taf t-
Hartley Act; QQ ~lt, 235-7. 
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comp ar i son to ma ke in exp lai ni ng those aspects of 
1·4 
experience which are different. 
UK e}~peri ence 
t. h t:~ Amel'"icc: .. n 
Testing the hypot hesis that American management~ 
resources and it s flexibi l ity of access t o those resources, was 
t h e major structural factor s h api n g diff e rences i n 
c on f 1 i r.: t , wh at can we lear n from the l ast fifty years of 
i n d ustri al re l ation s in Britain's car i nd ustry? 
Un ion density in British car p lants fl uc t u ated at bet ween 10 
an d 20% of t he wor kforce ~ primarily amon g s k illed wor kers , in the 
1.5 
1 (:.t30s . With the con version to war prod uction and the p rotec t ion 
of th e Essen t i al Wor ks Order and a for mer union general secretary 
as Mi n ist er o f Labour, u n i on member sh i p ros~ to around 80%. But 
a l t h o u g h th e r e were n o t able exception s~ r enewed man a ger i al 
14. Edwards (j 983a], QR c;.tt, 3; Davi s, by contrast, expressl y states hi s assullpti on that t he key 
difference between Alerica and other advanced industrial societies is "the absence of the level of 
working class self-organization and consciousness represented in every other capitalist country by 
the prevalence of labourist, SOCial-democratic , or Communist parties ••• ·, gp fij, 4. But these 
political parties do not all represent a similar degree of "class self-organi zati on and 
consciousness· , as a comparison of working class British Labour Party activists with , for exa~p l e, 
Frenth Couunists shows. In many respects the forller ltIould have lore in cOllllon ltIith Aserican working 
class Dellocrats. This 1971 assessment of the Democratic Party was a little crude , but cl ose to the 
_ark: "The Democratic Party is dOliinated by labour in every respect but one - the actua l pol iti cians 
are not of the labour movellent, and they get its backing on the cheap"; Paul Booth, "Theses on 
Contemporary US Labor Unionism" , FE~!fEl B!gr!fE! 5, no. 1 (Jan-Feb 1971 ), 2. 
1!5. H A Turner , G Clack and G Roberts, ~~~~I!r:. R~t~U.QIl~ til t~~ tlQtQr:. tsl~\!~tt'{ (London: All en and 
Unwin, 19671! 193. 
, , 
h O~3 til i t :.i i nth (O~ f:; 1. ac k p i:lS t ····ItJ cH"· ]. 211::, c)LW' mi~;ur' b?t n7?~:; i.: Cil" t?d ' t h E: 9 i7:n o:~I'- ii:\l 
16 
picture of union density in the car industry' to about 40%. Only 
in th e l ate 1950s and early 1960s did membersh ip in mos t car 
17 
plants rise quite quickly to 90% or higher. Unlike the situation 
i n Am€~ I'- :i. C E:\, shop stew3rd numbers con ti n ued to rise with the 
18 
expansion of union membership from the mi d-1950s. s~:~ c::t i oncd 
s t ewar d s not o nly served as dues-coll ectors, but in piece work 
areas management bargained d i rectly wi t h th e m over pay , a nd :i.n 
d~y-r ate areas and p l a n ts management had to conten d with them 
ever man ni ng l eve l s , job tim i ngs and th e mobility of l abour. 
1 C" . , 
In 
t h e t i g hter l abour market of t h e 19605, a n d as the loss of 
former l y g u a r a nt eed overseas Emp i re an d Common wealth sales a nd 
t h f? lower ing of tari f f barriers against Euro~ean 
20 
s t i mul a t e d f i er c e domest ic competit ion, most managements 
reluctan t l y accepted sign if ican t rest r ai nts o ver their uni lateral 
exer c ise o f contro l of t he labour proc ess in ret u rn for short-term 
i:ooper"ati on i n a c:t1ieving p Y"I::lduct.icH1 tarqet!:; . 
16 . Steven Tolliday, "Governl1lent, El ployers .and Shopfloor Organization in the Brit ish Motor 
Industry, 1939-69", Research Paper (Cal bridge: King' s College Research Centre, September 1982), 3-5, 
18-23; Research by author in progress at longbridge and at Linwood. 
17. In the earl y 19705, a study of lIanagement and labour confl ict in British industry found "1 00 per 
cent unionisil continued to be one of the li veliest issues in Norkplace industri al re lati ons", 
Turner, Roberts and Roberts, ~ ~tt, 23. 
H3 . Turner, Clack and Roberts, QIl.l;.tt, 279; Beynon, QIl. £.tt, 147; Friedllan and tieredeen , !!R ~tt , 62. 
1 (7 . Turner, Clack and Roberts, QIl. ~tt, 207. 
:2Cl. Peter J S Dunnett IQ~ q~~ttQ~ ~t tQ~ ~~ttt~~ ~qtq~ tQq~~t~y (Landon: Croom Helm , 1980), 34, 
%-98. 
In the UK a major restructuring of the industry took place 
in the mid- to late 19605. The only remaining independent 
producer of car bodies, Pressed Steel, supplying bodies for about 
• 40% of all British-ffiade cars, was divided up between its main 
customers, Rootes and British Motor Corporation; Chr"ysl el~ US 
''')/'"1 
..t:'.'::' 
finally bought Rootes outright; and, qDver·nment .... 
encouraged merger, Leyland-Triumph merged with t he biggest car 
assembler, BMC that itse lf had resulted from an unh appy 1952 
fus ion of Austin a nd Morris. Thi~ major reshapin g of the 
industry was followed in British Leyland and Chrysl er UK by 
attempts to raise labour productivity and reduce labour costs by 
:24 
moving from piecework to measured day work, and in Ford by moving 
from its historic day work system to a mor e intensive MDW 
!system . By the mid-1970s, it was clear that the attempt to 
restore managerial aut hority in BL a nd Chrysler UK had largely 
21. Monopolies Couission, r~1! ~r.tU~h ~1l~Q.t ~1lt:Q1lt:~U.QI}. lt~ ~Ilt! t.1}~ Et:~~~~~ ~tl!~t ~1l~1l2.1l'i ~tt!:. a 
~~qtt qQ tQ~ !~tq~t (London: HMSO, 1966); ~~qQq@i~t, Jul y 31 1965, January 29 1966. 
2:2. D G Rhys, IIl~ ~qtq~ lll~~~tt:'it ~Q ~~QIlQ~i~ ~~~t~~ (London: ButterNorths, 1973J, 27. 
2:';; . Graham Turner, II}~ ~1l'£t~Qt! E~~~~ (London: Pan, 1973) , 109-40, 87. 
24. Central Policy Review Staff, lll~ tlJtl!tl! 11£ till! ~tiU~1} ~!t lll!l~~~~¥. (london: HMSO, 1975), 102. 
25 . Beynon, Q.I!. ~U, IbO. 
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+ <3i 1 ed. BL was nationalized and Chrysler UK h~d to be' bailed out 
Ly the British government in 1976 before being sold to the French 
compan y Peu~eot in 1978. What had effectively sea l ed the fate of 
the two firms was their inability to compete in product range , 
qual i ty a nd va lue with imports into the UK from Europe an d 
I" ~ ••• ., 
..:~ I 
,Japan . In the 1979-1983 . recession managements in Leyland, 
Pe u geo t--Ta l bot , Ford a nd Va u xhall (GM) impl e mented a wave of 
2 E! 
pl a nt c l osur es and job reduct i ons~ and in Leyland top management 
orchestrated a de l iber a t e confron t ation with it s shop stew~rd 
organ i zati on to remove accumulated res tr a ints over i t s shop floor 
,,:\1.\ t hcn-:i t y . Wi thi n the 1. ast t.W(j or three years managE".~merlt. :l n most 
Bri t ish car plants has thus re-est a b lished th e control aver the 
labou r process th~t i t effectively ced ed from t h E late 19505 to 
:::':;0 
t h e mid-- l cnOs . 
::~ 6. Central Poli cy Review Staff, QQ I;.H, 102. Measured day NarK lias brought in on the new Marina 
car at EL's Cowley cOlplex early in 1971, and by Septelber 1974 some 94X of BL's hour ly-rated 
elployees were on day Nork. But "BL accepts that in order to secure acceptance of the measured day 
Nark systel, they had to agree to tanning level s Nhich were often excessive"; H L Ryder, ~~LtL~Q 
~gY!~~~1 !h~ ~~~! ~~f~~~ (London: HI'ISO, 1975), 34-35. 
27. Central Policy Review Staff , QQ £H, 65-70. 
:2(3 . Overall numbers e.ployed in UK motor vehicle ~anufarture (includi ng commercial veh icles and 
cOlponents) fell from 457 ,200 in Septemb er 1979 to 290,0000 .in "arch 1983; Departl ent of Elp loy~ent! 
~~l!.lQ'lI!~llt ~!:t~tt~ (London: HHSO, vari ous issues); British Leyland's eilploysent fell fro!! 192,000 in 
1978 to 105,000 in 1982: and Talbot (formerl y Chrysler UK) , frol 25,240 in December 1978 to 13,257 
in Dece~ber 1981; ~9Y~D!rY ;f9D9!if ~9Di!pr , 1982. 
29. ~~~ ~t~t~~I!!Il! December 7 1979, January 2, 9, October 30 , Nove.ber b 1981; Robert Taylor, 
'Where Edwardes drove BL", ~~Il~q~~~llt IQ~!Y , June 1982. 
2KI. Tal Forester, "The Nell Hodel Halewood ", ~~~ ~1!~Lllt'i, February 14 1980; Patrid Wintour , "Ford 
and the l'Iysteries of the Orient", ~~~ ~t~tll~!~Il, Nove.ber 28 1980; Steve Jeffer ys, "The Wash ing-up 
War", ~~~ ~Q£L~t'l, April 21 1983j D Arnott, MHow Vauxhall shifted gear ", ~~Il!q~~~llt IQ~~YI July 
1983. 
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Thi s accoun t p l aces th e d e ve lopme nt o f s t ron g s h o p fl oor 
un i o n o rqanization much l ater than i s s u ggested b y Brodv a n d 
3 1. 
L.i c:ht. E.'n s tE:,i n . But it i s i mpor t an t not to d ismiss the v er y r e a l 
rest ra i nt s o n man a g e rial contro l over t h e l a bour pr o c ess t h a t 
e x i st e d in most Bri t ish car pl an t s b e twe en roughly 1968 a n d 1977 . 
In Chrysler UK"s Linwood plant., for- E!>:ample, hourl y-p a id p ress 
shop workers in thes e years completely cont r olled thei r o wn pace 
of organized extended relief periods of an a ver age o f 15 
mi l utes in the hour, held s h op meetings t h at cus tomaril y e xt en d e d 
into working time and were attended by all stamping pl .:mt 
workers, and controlled the al l ocation of overt i me such t h at 
management wa s frequ e ntly obliged to offer overtime to large 
numbers o f worker s it did not require to get p~rti c ul ar jobs 
c ompleted. No workers were successf u l l y disciplined b y ma nag eme l t 
for exercising any or all of these restraints u pon the lab o u r 
proces s. These res traints were a fer cry from th e l argely 
l.lnsubstan ti ated Toll i dc.\y and , Zei t l :i n hypot hesi s that " j LI s t cau s€-? " 
grievan ce procedures in American pI nts i n the 19 4 0s had 
p l'"of oundly ~.; ubversive f?ffec:t on shop 'f: l oor- di,sc ip lint?". 
~: 1 . Brody, QQ tlt, 206; Lichtenstein [19803, QQ tlt, 348. It accepts the view of "painfull y slow" 
growth argued by Lyddon, QQ tlt 136. 
:3~~. Several interviews with Linwood workers, vari ous dates , 1980-1982; Linwood trade uni on archive , 
Mitchel l Library, Glasgow. 
'3;:~;. Steven Tolliday and Jonathan Zeitlin, ·Shop floor bargaining, contract unionislII, and job 
control: an Anglo-American coap arison", ed . Nelson Lichtenstei n and Steve Heyer . Ih~ ~~~r!f~D 
e~!9~9~!1~ ln~~§!rYl ~ ~9f!~1 H!§!9rY (Chicago: University of Illinois for thcoming) . 
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,erroneous assumption that contract terminology meant "unions had 
a lso manag ed to r e tain or acquire influ~nce over important 
assertion that " i n auto, the UAW had won s ubstantia l rest periods 
::~;4 
for assembly workers at the maj o r companies ". As has been s hown 
abClV(;;!, not. clnly "JF.~lre c::ontl'·,::\ct I'-est "qC:lins" irl the 1960s m:i,nim,::\ l~ 
but in Chrys ler US they never amounted to the total rest per i ods 
workers had achieved through their own organi zation in the 19405. 
The Tolliday and Zeitlin thesis that "for most of the pos t-war 
period unions were stronger and cut more deeply into manageria l 
prerogative~ in Americ.n than in British auto plants " 1S c l e arly 
contradicted by this study of American auto union strength ct its 
strongest - in Chrysler"s American plants. 
in an industry with similar technology and products to the 
American car industry help explain the differences between t he 
two? At this point it is necessary to return to the conc ep t of 
m':ll"l,'agel" i al power and power resources. The major differ~nce 
between the two industries in the period after 1933 is that the 
American was significantly larger, more concentrated and more 
verticall y integrated than the British, which had an ind ependent 
body-building sector until the late 19605. Another diff erence wa s 
that in Britain too many firms producing too many models limited 
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their ability to gain fu ll benefits from economies of ica l e. Th i s 
weakness meant that when the industry ratiohalized down to four 
firms by 1968, three of them were multinationals based i n t h e US. 
This (mul tin a tion a l i sm in turn meant that two (Vauxhall-8M and 
CI-w vs l e r W<) sustained a share of the domest ic market that was 
too small for long-term profitability, whi l e the th i rd 
moved rapidly to integrate its British pl ants into it s Eur opean 
manufacturing strategy. 
One result of these differences can be seen in th ~ gross 
profits accumulated in the 19605 and 19705. Between 196 0 and 
1978, 8M earned 537.6 billion profit, Ford earned 513.8 billion 
and Chrysler US 5524 million. In contr.:u;t, from 1960 to 1977 , 
British Leyland earned £324.2 million, Rootes/Ch rysler UK 
accumulated losses of £11·3.5 million, Vauxhall/8M earned £88.6 
million and only Ford UK returned American-l evel 
36 
:£':79 1 .4 m:i 11 ion. £<I'"'i ti sh -"' ba ~:;e d accumulated 
Signi fi cantl y s maller power resources and had less room i n wh ich 
to manoeuvre a gains t un ion organization than was the case in the 
US. 
In Briti sh industry as a whole, a s imilar l i ne of a r gument is 
:::')5. Stuart , Ill!. ~!.t, 106. 
:~;6 " Dunnett, Ill!. ~!.t, 39 . 
possi bl e . Th us an important concl usion from a ten t ative comparison 
of US an d UK strike trends is not that strikes occurred more 
frequent l y in Britain than in America~ b u t t hat it is probable 
thev were settled more quickly because of t h e s maller power 
resources in genera l ava i lable t o Br itish ma n agemen t: 
Trends in Strite Indites, United States and United KingdOl, ' 1931-1919 
Period Frequenty 1 Strikes lasting 
under OIl! wet 
US UK US UK 
----------------------------------------------------------------
1931-36 60.1 37.B 
1931-39 37.B 6S.S 
1937-41 106 38.0 
1940-45 81.5 88.4 
1942-45 99.6 70.5 
1946-49 90.1 87.5 38.6 
1950-59 84.6 98.5 44.S 91.7 
1960-69 67.5 106 45.3 B5.5 
1970-79 75.1 115 38.6a 67.4 
Note: a. 1970-78 
Frequency = Number of strikes per million employees 
Not onl y we re th e p o wer r e sources of American capitalists 
and suppor t e d b y s ignifi c ant p i eces of f e deral l eg i sla t ion 
in 1947 and 1959~ b u t i t s mul t i - divi s ion a l , management-by-po l icy · 
s tructure and highly i nf l u e ntial finan c ial back e r s g ave i t greater 
eas e of a ccess t o t h ese r esources. I n Br i t i:d n ~ by contrast, pre-
wa r ma nagement s tructure , s t y l e a nd p a tter n of own ership remained 
~; 7 • Edwards [1983a], ~~ ~ttJ Tables 1 and 3. The figures can only be tentati vel y coepared si nce 
both US and UK statistics understate the nueber of very short and small strikes, and it cannot be 
assumed that they do so either equally or consistently. 
::::'!3 
virtually intact u ntil the lat e 19605. It wa s only during World 
War II, as a result of government action, th~t personnel officers 
:38 
were appointed in most large UK factories~ while 34% of American 
plan ts employing over 250 workers already had 
40 
functioning 
personnel depart ments by 1929. After World War 11 it continued 
to be dominated by the old pre-war top manage ment personnel, 
41 
wit.h 
th~? i r neo-paterna li sm and individual idiosy ncracies, Ci.ll.lsi ng 
deep aggravation when the merger proc~ss that h ad been completed 
nearly thirty yf:1ar"S ear"lir.?"r in Ame l~ica resumed in th(;1 1950s and 
19605. The autocratic-impulsive managerial tradition was welded so 
tightly to extensive plant-level managerial di scretion in thf? 
year"s from 1930 to 1970 that as late as the mid-1970s plant 
managers within British Leyland would occasi ona l l y veto the flow 
o f information to the corporate h eadquarters. 
British car industry management's n?lationship II'Ji th 
gover nmen t was also sign ifi cantly more ambivalent than was the 
case in the Unit ed Stctes where all three auto makers were also 
major producer s in the defence industry. Certain l y, the pes t -war 
UK govern ment reculation of the economy t hrough export quotas on 
38. Littler, ~ c;.!.t, 115, 163; Turner, 6, ~ ~lt, 204-5; J 6 Norian, ' The Crippli ng of Chrys ler ", 
~~Q!q~~~Qt I~~~~, February 1981; Rex Win sburg, 'The Labours of British Leyland", ~!Q!q~~~Qt l~q!~, 
October 1969. 
4-0. Bernstein [19601, 166-7. 
41 . Turner, Clack and Roberts , Q~ ~H, 10. 
\.. 
, 
through car hire-purchase rates and regional policy a ll 
42 
added to t he UK industry's costs . 
British workers seized the opportunities made available t o 
them by managements anxious to secure short-term peace to 
establish widespread restraint s on managerial .aut.hor" it y. But. 
unlike Chrysler US managemen t in the late 19505, l.'\Jl~i i c h l..l Sf::Cj its 
resources to exec u te drama tic changes in top personnel, manag e ment 
str ucture and sty l e and to resh ape its labour control 
British-owned car firms lacked the foresight and consisten c y to b e 
able to conduct similar restructuring except when their distinct 
power resources were in jeopardy, or they were totally reliant on 
state f i nance and inter vention. The re-establishmen t of manager ia l 
corr trol over the labour process in British car plants during the 
last five years has thus owed as muc h to the pressure of 
intervention and the di sc iplinary i mpact of recession as it has to 
any deep l y-rooted conver sion to new managerial method. 
Th is interpretation of the British experience c 1 E)i::\I'"" I y 
s upports the thesis that the beh aviour of emp l oyers, 
continuity of worker resistance to man agerial control, goes a long 
,~"~:; 
way to explaining the distinctive features of that resistance. 
42 . Dunnett, Ill!. <;J.t, 31-41 , 61-5 , 87- 95. 
4::::; . Edwards, P K (l983al, ~a f.U , 35. 
In t h is light both the mor e ope~ conflict in Chrysler than in th e 
two o ther major AmLrican auto makers~ ' and the g reater 
institutionalization of conflict 
Britain, ap pear less exceptional. 
in post-war America than in 
Differences there certain ly 
were and are. But they are not t he resul t o f some peculiar 
weakness exh ibi ted by American wor kers . Th e case of Dodge Main 
s uggest s American workers, l ike those elsewher e, have s truggled 
and continue to struggle to i mpose restraints over their 
managements. But they have done so within a bal a nc e of fo rces 
determined b y the ir own hi stor y an d strength and, 
the h istory and st rengt h of management. 
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